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‘When you're accustomed to privilege, equality feels like oppression,’ | Views mine, interpretations yours. RTs ≠ endorsement. | ❤️ أبو بنيامين , و باراك |

London ❤️
Joined June 2011
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Very proud day at #Buckingham Palace with @adammatan representing the Somali culture at Buckingham Palace as he picks up #OBE. It was great seeing and taking pictures with @HKane who also received his MBE from the Duke of Cambridge today.
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1/18 Abdalla Abdalla’s resignation lands in the middle of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s increasingly open confrontation with the United Arab Emirates. The timing raises serious questions about foreign influence, competing security structures, and the struggle for control over Somalia’s armed forces. But to understand why this resignation matters, we need to examine Abdalla’s political history, the allegations surrounding his activities in Lower Shabelle, and the wider confrontation between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi. A thread. 🧵
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18/18 Ultimately, the question is no longer simply why Abdalla Abdalla resigned. It is whether Somalia can exercise meaningful authority over its own security institutions when competing political and foreign interests are alleged to operate beyond the formal chain of command. A country cannot build a credible national security system while leaving unanswered questions about who authorises armed mobilisation, who finances armed groups and to whom their commanders are accountable. But there is an even deeper problem within Somalia’s political class. The same politicians who speak passionately about sovereignty, national unity and the authority of the state when in government sometimes adopt entirely different positions once they enter opposition. Principles that were supposedly non-negotiable while in office suddenly become negotiable when political power is lost. This inconsistency creates opportunities for external actors to cultivate influence across Somalia’s competing political factions. The UAE’s involvement warrants particular scrutiny because of the allegations surrounding its political, commercial and security relationships. The extent to which those relationships have influenced domestic political competition or security arrangements must be established through credible evidence. Yet foreign governments cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses of Somalia’s political institutions. Somalia’s own political class must answer for the relationships it cultivates, the compromises it makes and the willingness of some political actors to accommodate external influence when it serves their interests. Sovereignty cannot be something politicians defend when they control Villa Somalia and disregard when they find themselves outside it. Nor should national unity become a convenient slogan used against political opponents while contradictory relationships are maintained behind closed doors. The fundamental question remains: who ultimately commands Somalia’s armed forces, the Somali state or competing centres of power? And perhaps the more uncomfortable question is this: How can Somalia credibly defend its sovereignty against foreign interference when elements of its own political establishment may be facilitating the very influence they publicly condemn? These questions demand transparent investigation, institutional reform and accountability for anyone found responsible for unlawful activities, whether in government or opposition. Somalia’s sovereignty cannot depend on which political faction controls the presidency, which regional administration holds influence or which foreign capital enjoys privileged relationships with political leaders. The real test of Somalia’s political class is not how loudly it defends sovereignty when in power, but whether it upholds the same principles when in opposition. Until national sovereignty becomes a consistent constitutional obligation rather than a political position that changes with personal ambition, Somalia will continue to struggle with the same cycle of fragmented authority, external influence and competing loyalties. A sovereign state cannot be built by a political class that treats sovereignty as negotiable.
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17/18 The public record, as described in the accounts discussed here, contains serious allegations against Abdalla, his denial of those accusations, and a resignation coinciding with a major diplomatic confrontation between Somalia and the UAE. What remains unestablished is whether Abu Dhabi financed or directed the alleged militia project, whether armed groups in Lower Shabelle operated under foreign command, or whether Abdalla’s resignation was connected to external interests. But the timing warrants scrutiny. These developments raise questions that cannot be answered through political accusations alone. Investigate must be done independently, establish the facts and make the findings public. That investigation must extend to anyone who may have authorised, facilitated, financed or supported unlawful activities, including individuals who currently serve or previously served in the federal government, regardless of their political affiliations, official positions or institutional influence. Accountability cannot begin and end with those who have fallen out of favour politically. It must apply equally to those in power and those in opposition. Otherwise, how can the Somali public distinguish between genuine national security concerns and accusations driven by political rivalry?
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16/18 There is another dimension to this controversy that Somalia’s political class must confront. When in government, politicians frequently speak about sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity and the authority of the state. Yet once they enter opposition, some adopt markedly different positions towards the same foreign governments, security arrangements and competing political structures they previously criticised. This inconsistency creates opportunities for external actors to cultivate relationships across Somalia’s political divisions. Foreign influence does not operate in isolation from domestic politics. It often becomes more consequential when political actors seek external relationships to strengthen their own positions. The United Arab Emirates deserves particular scrutiny because of the allegations concerning its relationships with regional administrations, political figures and security actors. But the responsibility cannot be placed entirely on Abu Dhabi or any other foreign capital. Somalia’s political class must also account for the relationships it establishes, the compromises it makes and the political advantages it seeks through external patronage.
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15/18 Abdalla’s resignation illustrates why these institutional weaknesses deserve sustained attention. A senior officer with a history in national intelligence, restored to his position by presidential intervention, now exits the security establishment amid allegations of involvement in a foreign-backed armed project. He does so at the very moment Somalia’s president is publicly confronting the foreign government alleged to be behind that project. The convergence is politically significant. It does not establish coordination or wrongdoing, but it creates a legitimate public interest in understanding what happened and whether these developments are connected. The issue is not simply Abdalla’s personal political position. It is the broader relationship between Somalia’s security institutions, domestic political competition and foreign influence.
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14/18 The larger issue extends far beyond Abdalla Abdalla or President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. It concerns whether Somalia’s security institutions answer to the constitutional authorities of the Somali state or remain vulnerable to competing political interests, external patrons and parallel chains of command. For decades, Somalia’s political and security landscape has been shaped by a complicated marketplace of foreign influence, clan alliances, personal loyalties and competing centres of authority. Senior security officials have frequently moved between government institutions, opposition politics and informal networks of power. This has made the distinction between institutional loyalty and political allegiance increasingly difficult to maintain. A state cannot establish durable security institutions if their authority changes according to the political relationships of the individuals occupying senior positions.
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13/18 There are also serious unanswered questions about the events in Lower Shabelle. Who authorised the mobilisation of armed groups reportedly associated with Abdalla? Who financed, equipped and trained them, and who provided their operational direction? Under whose command were these forces operating, and to whom were they ultimately accountable? What became of the proposed Southeastern State project and the armed formations allegedly mobilised to support its establishment? Were any of these activities connected to foreign security relationships operating beyond the authority of Somalia’s recognised institutions? And fundamentally, who was exercising authority over these armed groups: the Somali state, domestic political actors or foreign interests operating outside the constitutional chain of command?
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12/18 Against this background, Abdalla’s resignation deserves much closer scrutiny. Why has a senior police commander, whose ranks were restored by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud himself in 2022, chosen this particular moment to resign and join the opposition? What is the relationship, if any, between his departure and the deteriorating relationship between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi? Does his resignation reflect the institutional grievances he publicly identified, a broader political realignment, or some combination of factors? And what implications, if any, does his departure have for the armed groups previously alleged to be associated with him? The timing alone cannot answer these questions. But neither should the circumstances be dismissed without examination.
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11/18 Somalia has already experienced the consequences of fragmented security authority, competing political administrations, clan-based mobilisation and foreign patronage. The emergence of additional armed formations operating outside established command structures would risk further weakening an already fragile national security architecture. The concern is not simply whether one individual commands a particular group or whether one foreign government provides assistance. It is whether the Somali state can exercise meaningful authority over all armed actors operating within its territory. A credible national security system requires a clearly defined chain of command, lawful authorisation, transparent financing and accountability to recognised constitutional institutions. Without these safeguards, security institutions risk becoming extensions of political competition rather than instruments of national protection.
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10/18 Multiple accounts have alleged UAE involvement through the authorisation, financing, training or political support of armed groups in Lower Shabelle. These claims remain unproven publicly, and there is an important distinction between allegations of foreign support and independently established evidence of operational control. Nevertheless, their implications are considerable. If foreign-backed armed formations are being established outside Somalia’s recognised security command structures, this is not merely a dispute between political personalities. It raises fundamental questions about sovereignty, accountability and the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force. A national security system cannot function effectively when the authority to organise, finance or command armed groups is fragmented among competing centres of power.
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9/18 In August 2026, local reports described armed forces associated with Abdalla entering Marka, the administrative capital of Lower Shabelle. Some accounts characterised these forces as a Somali version of Sudan’s RSF and connected their mobilisation to the proposed Southeastern State project. If accurately described, these developments would raise substantial questions about the identity, command structure, political objectives and sources of support for the armed groups involved. Who authorised their mobilisation? Under whose authority were they operating? And how did their activities relate to Somalia’s existing federal and regional security arrangements? These questions have implications extending beyond the individuals allegedly involved.
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8/18 Abshirow called for action against those allegedly involved and warned about foreign financing intended to destabilise Lower Shabelle. The significance of these allegations should not be underestimated. They concerned the possible establishment of a parallel armed structure in a strategically important region, with potential implications for the authority of the federal government and the existing regional administration. However, the allegations were not accompanied by publicly verifiable documentary, financial or logistical evidence establishing the claimed foreign involvement. Abdalla denied the accusations. That distinction matters. Serious allegations require serious investigation, particularly when they concern national security, foreign involvement and the possible mobilisation of armed groups.
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7/18 The most serious controversy surrounding Abdalla emerged in July 2026. Somalia’s Second Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Abdullahi Omar Abshirow, publicly accused him of acting on behalf of a foreign government to establish an armed force in Lower Shabelle modelled on Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The alleged project was linked to efforts to establish a proposed Southeastern State administration. These were serious accusations involving a senior security official, an alleged foreign sponsor and the possible creation of an armed formation outside Somalia’s recognised security structures. The allegations raised questions not only about Abdalla’s activities, but also about the broader political and security objectives behind the proposed administration.
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6/18 In August 2022, shortly after returning to power, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud restored Abdalla’s military ranks and rights through a presidential decree. This represented a significant political rehabilitation for a security figure who had been removed during the previous administration. Four years later, Abdalla has resigned from a senior police position and announced his intention to join the opposition. That development raises an important question about the relationship between political leadership and security appointments. Are Somalia’s senior security officials serving permanent national institutions, or are their careers still too closely tied to the political fortunes of individual administrations?
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5/18 Abdalla Abdalla is no newcomer to Somalia’s intelligence and security establishment. He previously served as a deputy director within the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) before being removed during the Farmajo administration following disputes involving former intelligence chief Fahad Yasin. His career has placed him at the intersection of intelligence operations, police special operations and the shifting alliances that have long characterised Somalia’s political and security landscape. Understanding this background is important because Somalia’s security institutions have repeatedly been affected by political transitions, personal rivalries and changes in presidential leadership. The question of institutional loyalty cannot be separated from that history.
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4/18 The confrontation between Somalia and the UAE did not begin with Abdalla’s resignation. In January 2026, the Federal Government of Somalia announced the cancellation of agreements involving the UAE, including arrangements concerning the ports of Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo, alongside security and defence cooperation. Mogadishu accused Abu Dhabi of undermining Somalia’s sovereignty and interfering in its internal political and security affairs. The dispute has since intensified, bringing longstanding disagreements over foreign security cooperation, regional administrations and competing political interests into sharper focus. At its centre is a fundamental question: where does legitimate international cooperation end, and where does interference in Somalia’s sovereign affairs begin?
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3/18 His departure comes in the same week that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud publicly accused the UAE of years of interference in Somalia’s internal affairs, supporting parallel security structures and pursuing activities that threaten the country’s sovereignty and territorial unity. The timing is particularly noteworthy given the allegations surrounding Abdalla’s connections to Abu Dhabi and his reported involvement in armed mobilisation in Lower Shabelle. The coincidence does not establish a direct connection between his resignation and the diplomatic confrontation. Nevertheless, the convergence of these developments raises legitimate questions about political loyalties, foreign relationships and the authority exercised over armed groups operating within Somalia.
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2/18 On 19 November 2026, Brigadier General Abdalla Abdalla Mohamed, Somalia’s Second Deputy Police Commissioner and head of special operations, resigned from his position. He cited injustice, abuse of power, corruption, nepotism in promotions and the mismanagement of national security. He also claimed that his professional advice had repeatedly been ignored and announced his intention to join the political opposition. His resignation is unlikely, by itself, to bring any meaningful change to Somalia’s security establishment. What makes it significant is not simply his departure, but the political circumstances surrounding it, the allegations previously made against him, and the wider confrontation between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi.
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Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs was asked if he was offended by Trump calling Somalis “garbage.” He replied: “I’m also a US citizen. Trump was elected by Americans. So I won’t respond.” This man is paid to represent Somalia & he can’t even say a bad word about someone insulting the people he claims to serve. Pathetic.
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Why does public service in Somalia increasingly feel like a business with citizens treated as customers? If NIRA registration is free, why impose a $10 penalty for travelling without the card? Who collects this money, where does it go and who is accountable?
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