
kimchi shitposter in @hyperithm posting to spread the word about what we’re building
Califonia
Joined September 2022
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0xShitAlt retweeted
The Royal Government of #Bhutan just transferred out another 400 bitcoin:native($30.62M).
arkm.com/explorer/entity/dru…
0xShitAlt retweeted
BREAKING: The median apartment in Manhattan, NY, is now renting for a record $5,000/month, up +6.4% year-over-year.
The median rent price for a luxury Manhattan apartment surged +31% year-over-year, to a record $13,750/month.
Meanwhile, Brooklyn also hit a record $4,500/month in July, with inventory down -27% compared to last year.
Living in New York City has never been more expensive.
0xShitAlt retweeted
Machi(@machibigbrother) bought Bored Ape #5670 for 85 $ETH 5 years ago and sold it for only 9 $ETH today, taking a loss of 76 $ETH($142K) (-89.4%).
He then used the funds to continue supporting his $ETH long position.
Current position: 3,450 $ETH($6.44M)
Liquidation price: $1,839.37
opensea.io/item/ethereum/0xb…
hypurrscan.io/address/0x020c…
0xShitAlt retweeted
After holding $ETH for 5 months, this guy finally gave up and sold 1,862.3 $ETH ($3.58M) at $1,923, taking a loss of $1.42M(-28%).
He bought 1,862.3 $ETH at $2,685 in January when the price of $ETH dropped.
arkm.com/explorer/address/0x…
0xShitAlt retweeted
We run an OTC options book, so take this as plumbing, not piling on.
Even taking at face value that you are not Madoff 2.0, the boxes were never the problem.
Funding a demand liability with a one-year asset that you market as ‘12% fixed yield’. You cannot back a redeemable stable with paper that matures in 340 days and no gate. That mismatch surfaces the first time redemptions cluster.
If you are truly above 100% with liquidity, buy msUSD at 0.30 and burn it before anything else. That retires a dollar of liability for thirty cents. Routing 8M through the minter at par is the most expensive way to restore coverage. A backed book does the buyback on day one.
That it has not happened is the tell.
100.04% to expiry is four bps sitting on a year of OTC counterparty risk. That is not coverage; it is a rounding error with credit risk attached. An insurance fund denominated in the token it insures is worth the least exactly when you need it.
Assuming you are trustworthy, none of this is fatal if handled like adults.
An orderly box unwind costs about a point. Offer holders 0.99 and keep the accretion. Most take it and move on rather than carry a year of performance risk for a few bps. Holding distressed marks and telling everyone to wait is not protecting NAV. It is protecting whoever is still got out at par.
There is a clean way through. It starts with buying your own liability back below par.
msY Portfolio & Redemption Update
We want to provide a clear update on the current msY portfolio, the remaining box-spread maturity profile, and the path forward for restoring liquidity to the minter.
As previously communicated, the msY box-spread strategy began approaching capacity in its original short-duration Deribit execution environment. In response, Main Street expanded execution across additional centralized venues and OTC box-spread counterparties in order to continue optimizing risk-adjusted yield for holders and avoid forcing new capital into increasingly compressed shorter-dated opportunities.
As part of that expansion, certain OTC box-spread opportunities were executed at longer maturities than the initial short-duration target range. Following the unwind of the shortest-dated and most liquid positions during the initial phase of the Morpho market squeeze, the remaining portfolio now consists of boxes with approximately 60 to 340 days remaining to expiry. The remaining book is therefore naturally more concentrated in the medium-to-longer dated part of the maturity ladder, because the shortest-dated liquidity was used first to support the minter and reduce near-term pressure.
Importantly, this does not change the core economics of the strategy. These are fixed-payoff box-spread positions. If held to expiry, and assuming the relevant venue or counterparty performs, the positions accrete toward their known maturity value. The current situation is therefore primarily one of timing, secondary-market liquidity, and redemption pacing; not a change in the expected terminal payoff of the portfolio.
Current portfolio position:
Current CR, assuming boxes are held to expiry: 100.04%
Insurance fund: $525,527 in msUSD
Insurance fund treatment: if required, the msUSD held in the insurance fund can be burned, increasing protocol coverage
Coverage including the insurance fund: above 100%
Our priority is to preserve full backing and avoid crystallizing unnecessary losses. We are actively exploring opportunities to unwind or sell selected boxes where executable pricing is available and where, after taking into account the insurance fund and any applicable protection mechanisms, the system remains above 100% coverage. Where that threshold can be met, we intend to take those opportunities and use the proceeds to continue refilling the minter.
We do not expect that every remaining box necessarily needs to be held all the way to expiry. As boxes move closer to maturity, the discount between secondary-market pricing and maturity value should naturally compress, which can create further opportunities to exit closer to NAV without impairing coverage. This means liquidity can be restored progressively through a combination of scheduled expiries and selective secondary-market unwinds where pricing is acceptable.
Where secondary liquidity is not available on acceptable terms, we will continue following the approach outlined in our risk framework: allow box positions to mature, release liquidity as expiries occur, and refill the minter as capital becomes available.
Selling fixed-payoff positions at distressed marks simply to accelerate liquidity would be value-destructive for holders. Waiting for better execution, selectively unwinding where coverage remains above 100%, and using the insurance fund as intended gives the protocol the strongest path to preserve backing and restore liquidity in an orderly way.
This is a timing and execution-management issue, and the portfolio remains structured around fixed-payoff positions that accrete toward maturity value. We are confident in the path forward and will continue to provide updates as liquidity is released, boxes are unwound, and the minter is refilled.
Our focus remains unchanged: preserve NAV, protect holders, avoid uneconomic liquidations, maintain coverage, and work through the maturity ladder in the most responsible way possible.
0xShitAlt retweeted
Not a good take.
DeFi infra today is materially more resilient than in prior cycles (partially also thanks to AI).
Also DeFi has improved across the board over the years:
- better risk engines + lending market structures
- formal verification, audits, bug bounties
- better cap management, oracle improvements
- automated monitoring and security operations inc. circuit breakers
- far better tooling for smart contract security (including AI-assisted analysis)
Ironically, a lot of the remaining attack surface now comes from web2-type opsec, which is why many DeFi teams are investing heavily into better processes (inc. SOC2-based), infra hardening, and internal controls.
DeFi is constantly evolving, but pretending the industry hasn’t matured significantly or that AI is only a net negative for DeFi security is simply not true. The same AI capabilities attackers use are also increasingly used by security researchers, auditors, and whitehats to strengthen protocols.
DeFi Will Win.
0xShitAlt retweeted
There is another way to look at this.
The LayerZero/KelpDAO hack was caught in about an hour. Teams saved another $72M+ by reacting instantly. It took JPMorgan 20+ years of ignoring screaming red flags before Madoff’s $65B Ponzi finally collapsed.
Market manipulations like the RAVE token pump-and-dump got uncovered and crushed in under 24 hours by on-chain sleuths and exchanges. JPM’s own LIBOR, FX, and precious-metals rigging cartels ran for 5+ years before anyone outside the chat rooms noticed.
A $60B Enron-style rug pull would be damn near impossible to hide on-chain. JPM managed to keep that one going for years through offshore shells, fake trades, and straight-up hiding the debt from analysts and investors.
Maybe they’re concerned they wouldn’t be able to peddle opaque financial instruments on-chain without anyone noticing? You know, like the mortgage-backed securities they sold in the 2000s that triggered the $15+ trillion market meltdown.
Are they really “concerned about our industry”? Or are they just using the latest hack as perfect cover to push their “institutional” DeFi vision and JPM Coin while CLARITY Act negotiations are still live?
DeFi is not "scaring institutions away", it is scaring JPM that they will have to work honestly and transparently.
It's exactly what we've been saying, and now JPMorgan agrees.
Security is the key blocker to institutions coming onchain.
And whoever solves this problem is going to unlock tremendous growth.
theblock.co/post/398611/jpmo…
The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications.
After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users.
As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.
0xShitAlt retweeted
The latest fund movement from the @KelpDAO exploiter: arbiscan.io/tx/0x5618044241d…
0xShitAlt retweeted
Merkl is more than an incentive platform. With GENIUS live and CLARITY incoming, it's the distribution layer stablecoin issuers need to distribute activity-based rewards to their users.
Catch @GuillaumeNervo at @stable_summit to hear more!
Stablecoins need more than issuance to scale.
Guillaume Nervo (@GuillaumeNervo), Co-Founder of @merkl_xyz, will explain why institutional stablecoins require a revenue distribution layer.
JW Marriott · Cannes · 27-28 March
0xShitAlt retweeted
DeFi Exploits over the past year...
1/ Moby Trade/Arbitrum (Jan 2025) $2.5M
Leaked private key. $1.5M recovered by whitehat.
2/ Hyperliquid bridge (Mar 2025) $17M
Smart contract exploit.
3/ UPCX (Apr 2025) $70M
Compromised private key. Token crashed 70%.
4/ GMX V1 (May 2025) $42M
Smart contract flaw.
5/ Cetus Protocol/Sui (May 2025) $223M
Spoof token overflow bug. ~$162M recovered.
6/ ALEX Protocol/Stacks (Jun 2025) $8.3M
Vault permissions exploit.
7/ Resupply (Jun 2025) $9.5M
Oracle/collateral manipulation.
8/ Venus Protocol (Sep 2025) $3.7M
Flash loan attack. Attacker lost money, protocol responded in time.
9/ HyperVault (Sep 2025) $3.6M
Rug pull.
10/ Abracadabra/MIM (Oct 2025) $1.8M
Flash loan rounding bug.
11/ Balancer (Nov 2025) $128M
Composable stable pools exploit.
12/ Address poisoning (Dec 2025) $50M
Single victim tricked by lookalike address.
13/ Flow blockchain (Dec 2025) $3.9M
Execution layer exploit. Network rolled back.
14/ Step Finance (Jan 2026) $28.9M
Smart contract exploit.
15/ Truebit (Jan 2026) $26.4M
Minting flaw in 5-year-old smart contract.
16/ Saga (Jan 2026) $7M
Protocol exploit.
17/ SwapNet (Jan 2026) $13.3M
Bridge exploit.
18/ Makina Finance (Jan 2026) $4.13M
Protocol exploit. $2.7M recovered.
19/ YieldBlox (Feb 2026) $10M
Smart contract exploit. $7.2M frozen.
20/ IoTeX bridge (Feb 2026) $8.8M
Private key compromise. 86% of tokens frozen.
21/ CrossCurve (Feb 2026) $4.95M
Cross-chain bridge exploit.
22/ FOOM Cash (Feb 2026) $2.26M
Smart contract exploit.
23/ Moonwell (Feb 2026) $1.8M
Protocol exploit.
24/ Resolv (March 2026) $23M
USR depeg
Net losses: ~$505M
Despite the drop in the underlying asset, the lending market was completely unaffected. Some people are criticizing the curators simply because mF-one incurred losses. But I believe this is exactly what good curators are supposed to do, and that @SteakhouseFi handled the situation perfectly
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😅
Your product is so good that competitors feel the need to block it at the program level.
@kamino is openly ignoring open-finance principles by stopping users from leaving their platform via @jup_lend refinancing, all while preaching ‘transparency.’
Peak 5/10 multisig power, able to upgrade the program whenever they want. What’s next, blocking users individually?
At least their code includes a hall-of-fame mention to Jupiter lend, finally something superior in their codebase.
‘If you can’t win fairly, just change the rules, it’s easier.”
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