Demographics Now & Then

Culture is the most substantive battlefield for any nation. The cultural battlefield is the one on which identity is maintained or lost.

Along with fertility falling faster than other parts of Iraq the Kurdish Region sees the highest volume of migrants attempting irregular crossings into Western Europe of any area of the country. At the same time Kurdistan hosts over 800K refugees (including 256K Syrian Kurds).

America is not Italy or South Korea or Germany. American demographics do not allow either party to marginalize their under 40 voters at all. Both DEM & GOP will need to court under 40s aggressively. You will start to see this much more in primaries in 2028 than you saw in 2026.

Xer/Boomer/Silent coalition that leans heavily conservative just got buried. They showed up but clearly did not have decisive numbers for their slate. By 2028 another 5M+ of them will be gone,replaced by smallest modern generation(50s Xers). Without under-40s, this math is dead.

South Korean births up only ~1.5% in October. The rebound seems to have had the wind largely knocked out of it of late. TFR could end up below 0.90 for 2026 against early hopes of close to 1.0. If the RoK cannot notch a few years above 1.0 now with comeback cohort it’s cooked.

The three Chinese Northeastern Rust Belt provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, & Heilongjiang (which have a far higher population than the two Koreas combined) witness some of the most extreme aging on earth. Liaoning is 32.6% aged 60 & older, Jilin 29.7%, & Heilongjiang ~28%.

Lots of talk on aging China in the media constantly. Well many of its largest cities are already aged. As you can see in the graphic below gigantic Chongqing is already⬆️25% age 60+(8M+ elderly!), Shanghai’s registered residents are 37.6% 60⬆️, & Beijing’s rate is almost 1/3rd!

However, this is likely not to be as it must be done within the last 5-7 years when there is still a significant cohort in their 30s. Polish TFR is dangerously close to 1.0 so the last real time to act is right at this moment. By 2035 the remnants of this cohort will be 45+.

As the die is largely demographically cast in most large European countries like Italy,Germany,& Spain fertility rate wise(all 3 being far below replacement since early 1980s) Poland is one medium to large European country which still has a(vanishingly tiny)window to turn around.

Unfortunately the South Korean birth rebound is may be losing steam. Now births up 13% in August preliminary figures compared to births the year to July being up 14.7%. The trend for TFR year to July was 0.92 & in August 0.87. Maybe just a bad blip but worth keeping an eye on.

The number of people who have left Ukraine & numbers still leaving are unsustainable & will lead to near certain demographic ruin if not reversed. Remember 3.5M+ who left in 2022 & never returned are statistically very unlikely to (& make up a large part of UA comeback cohort).

The only thing that can avoid this plunge is if many South Korean women start having 2 kids instead of 1 which is a very very tall ask. If this were to happen births could be above or near 300,000 for decades but this would still be below pre COVID birth levels.

Worth keeping South Korean fertility rebound in context. If trajectory maintains & births increase~15% year on year births will be~293,000. As you can see, comeback cohort of 1991-1995 are all now in their early 30s. Once most have had ~1 kid birth numbers are likely to plunge.