A normie tackling macro economics, technical analysis and geopolitics. Follow me on Substack
Joined December 2017
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I've been spot on with every plot of the SPY chart since early may. But now the RSI is flat. I need momentum to plot. First target was the red zone, then plotted the blue zone and it's held as resistance since early August. It makes sense that we are stuck at resistance right before midterms I guess. Charts are in order from May through today.
I've been spot on with every plot of the SPY chart since early may. But now the RSI is flat. I need momentum to plot. First target was the red zone, then plotted the blue zone and it's held as resistance since early August. It makes sense that we are stuck at resistance right before midterms I guess. Charts are in order from May through today.
I've been spot on with every plot of the SPY chart since early may. But now the RSI is flat. I need momentum to plot. First target was the red zone, then plotted the blue zone and it's held as resistance since early August. It makes sense that we are stuck at resistance right before midterms I guess. Charts are in order from May through today.
Kung Fu retweeted
First-order thinkers counting widgets or aircraft carriers don’t see that barring a quick one-and-done war, which isn’t how things work out as we now see, it’s all going to be about sustained production and supply-chain replacement power.
That’s also why when you build a global “rules-based order” based on post-WW2 U.S. military power and the U.S. dollar, and the latter means ever-less U.S. industry, which then means a less powerful U.S. military production system,… the “order” destroys itself and we get disorder.
So, the U.S. is going back to an economic statecraft playbook it used before to develop that echoes parts of China’s current model.
Everyone else globally has to deal with that - but with China and America’s sheer scale, they’d better be a side, pick a side, or be picked and left on their backside.
The real threat to the United States in a looming war is not China’s ships or missiles. It is the fact that China can replace them faster than America can.
China already produces ships, electronics, machinery, batteries, and components at a scale the U.S. cannot yet match. In a prolonged Indo-Pacific war, that industrial gap decides whether the U.S. can replace damaged equipment, replenish munitions, and repair ships or whether the fight ends when the first stocks run out.
Washington is trying to reverse decades of industrial contraction. One new facility for Virginia-class submarine components will not operate until 2030. China did not wait. It built the manufacturing base first.
A military that cannot sustain itself does not deter. In the Indo-Pacific, production capacity is the threat the United States has not yet closed.