I am working on a map of the secure program synthesis space, in collaboration with @sergeybratus for our NDIST keynote on Tuesday. Here's a sneak-peak. The words "RISC-V" and "Lean" are used here WLOG, and some simplifications are made to fit everything on one page. Did I miss anything? 1. Develop semantics for each language in an interactive theorem prover, and then use these semantics to prove that every program is correct. (@oath_tech has done some work along these lines. See in particular Sam Xifaras' project on Ruby samx.io/blog/topics/devlog/2…) 2. Develop semantics for an architecture, say RISC-V, or perhaps for all possible architectures, and then use this to prove that every compiled program is correct. (@AnthropicAI made headlines recently with their announcement of a very large-scale project along these lines in collaboration with @theoremlabs anthropic.com/research/forma…) 3. Develop semantics for an architecture, say RISC-V, or perhaps for all possible architectures, and then use this to capture a formal model of each existing compiler or interpreter, and then iteratively (provably) refine each such model to an interpretable and easy-to-use formal semantics; then continue as in approach 1. (See foundational work by @kirancodes at BASIS AI basis.ai/blog/ship-your-inte…) 4. Make Lean, or some other such ITP + programming language, fast to run (comparable to Rust or C), and then completely rewrite all software in it, and prove the rewrites are correct. (This is I think, loosely speaking, the idea behind @VictorTaelin 's Bend.) 5. Make implementation-level verification tools, such as Verus, more capable and ergonomic, and then use them to prove all software correct. (This is what @fhuszar and @Craig_Hughes_ are doing at Reasonable, & I'm aware that BASIS and AWS are also working on this.) 6. Design a language in which unsafe states are illegal, and then rewrite everything in that language. Here, what kinds of safety you can express will be much more limited but the problem is, conversely, way more tractable. (This is what @danwallach and @DARPA did with TRACTOR, where the safety property is memory safety.)

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