Military Strategy & History | Decoding Global Strategies & Past Campaigns| Data-driven Insights 🌍 | #MilitaryStrategy #MilitaryHistory #Geopolitics
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I am starting a series to demystify some of the recent events in the Russo-Ukrainian war that have become shrouded by intense communication battles. The goal is to examine the bigger picture with a data-driven strategic perspective.
It is important to take a step back and gain a rational view on possible outcomes instead of relying on wishful thinking or overstatements.
The war has entered the last chapter of its current phase. Level-headed analysis is crucial to follow the unfolding events.
Thread of threads 👇
#RussiaUkraineWar #Strategy #Analysis
The “Russian losses increased” narrative is a fabrication, since all evidence available point to the opposite. Vehicle losses have decreased significantly compared to 2025, with armor down by a factor of 5 in average. (source: Oryx)
Mediazona’s in-year 2026 personnel-loss count remains 50% below 2025, without a valid explanation. The claim that bodies are harder to retrieve is insufficient: the battlefield and grey zone remain as dangerous as in 2025. Russian courts process MIA-to-KIA cases at high rates, and a body is not required to file for procedure. There has also been no specific additional documented enforcement of obituaries concealment which could explain such a sharp decrease.
Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher...
The 2026 attrition ratio is more favorable for Russia than in 2025. Progress has slowed but stays within 2024 ranges once the AFU Kursk advances are factored in.
2025 was peculiar: the Kursk pocket collapse and rout destabilized Ukrainian forces and enabled rapid Russian advances front wide for 6 months.
All signs indicate that 2026 reflects a more balanced attrition approach after the extremely costly 2024 and the front-wide pressure of 2025 that leveraged the post-Kursk situation, but at high cost.
Another myth is: “if attrition worked Russian advances should accelerate”. In attrition warfare theories, the principle is to cause collapse of the adversary to enable decisive gains; not that advances will gradually increase in a linear way, which is subject to both side’s respective effort at a given time. For instance, the weaker side could expend massive resources in a surge attempt, stabilising in apparence the front but collapsing 6 months later.
In 2025, Ukrainian forces suffered a sector collapse in the Sudja pocket, which rendered an entire part of the army combat ineffective. Hence, advances ensued.
Nevertheless, Ukraine has accelerated mobilization (aggressively) and alternative means to recover, and is nowhere near a collapse of its ground military forces for the time being. Though, with a mobilization ratio currently standing at around 18-20% of the remaining military aged male population, it may be nearing sensitive levels.
The point is to separate military objectives: conquest of the 4 oblasts against which Moscow can measure military success, and political objectives: demilitarisation and neutrality of Ukraine, central to the strategic settlement Moscow continues to seek. (Ideally enforced by a favorable regime change)
This matters because to achieve its strategic political goal, Russia needs to continue investing in its expensive ballistic and drone programs to collapse the economy at the rear, and make rational choices for expenditures. Losing 4,000 armor a year is not an option anymore.
The ground offensive’s primary goal is therefore not military conquest but applying pressure on the entire Ukrainian economic and social apparatus, to support the achievement of the political ambition. Seizing Donbas is a secondary and corollary territorial objective, because the political goal naturally secures the territorial one.
Understanding this principle is the basis of analysing this war correctly.
Moscow’s objectives in this conflict have not changed, but the strategy adopted has been evolving regularly based on various factors, including setbacks. Kyiv has also been adapting continuously to prevent its success. In 2026, the military situation has somehow improved for Ukraine, but the social and economic ones deteriorated at an accelerated pace.
There is however no way to tell whether the Kremlin’s plan will ultimately succeed, even partially.
See an earlier analysis in reply to understand attrition warfare performance measurement methods.
#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Attrition
3 years ago, Russia 🇷🇺 launched the Avdiivka offensive that slowly turned into the 3rd Donbas 🇺🇦 battle of the full-scale war
3 years later, the Russian offensive is still ongoing, at a much slower pace than before. 2026 was a very difficult year, and Russia failed to keep up the advance pace it had in 2024 and 2025, even suffering from 2 counterattacks in Komar and Lyman.
If the Russian offensive on the Donbas was initially centered on the southern and western direction, it moved north, with the main battle ongoing near Dobropilla. You can easily follow the chain of towns from Kurakhove, Pokrovsk and all the way to Barvinkove, behind the Donbas fortress that Russia is attacking.
At the same time, Russian advance on the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia highway was stopped, while the one further south was slowed down.
🟥Russian control before 2024
🔴Territory taken in 2024
🟠Territory taken in 2025
🟡Territory taken in 2026
Big ⬜️ line : Donbas administrative border
Small ◽️line : main roads
What the map tells us :
-> Setbacks in 2024 and 2025 were due to multiple factors, including bad unit coordination, absence of fortifications, and a high number of Russian human resources. Since then, most of the issues have been resolved.
-> The "attritional war" narrative that should witness a slow increase of Russian gains until Ukrainian collapse didn't happen. On the contrary, Russia is advancing slower and slower, and Russian losses are increasing.
Every time someone is saying Russia is definitely winning the war, show them this map and ask why the "2nd most powerful army in the world" is struggling that much in Donbas while losing more and more men.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Oryx data does not show Russian vehicle or armor losses significantly decreased in 2026 (armor additions were ~2,432 in 2025 per Oryx summary); the post misrepresents figures, per the Oryx administrator.
oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…
x.com/rebel44cz/stat…
x.com/Rebel44CZ/stat…
About Oryx numbers, here is the raw data for total losses in categories MBT, IFV, AFV, APC, IFV and MRAP on the Russian side:
- 2025: 2508 vehicles or 209/month
- 2026: 372 (until August) or 46.5/month
The ratio is 4.5, rounds up to 5. (If September included: 4.9)
Even after April 2025, when Russian forces started reducing their use of armor, average losses were 147/month or ~3x the 2026 ones.
If instead of insulting, Oryx administrators would kindly comment and explain the data, it would be a more interesting discussion.
Caveats:
- 2025 data was scraped earlier this year and some cleanups have been done by Oryx. Latest number for both years could differ by a few units.
- 2026 September data is available but cleanup occurred and shows negative in some categories. Excluded for now but does not change the result.
- Armored SPG not included as their application is very different. Should be counted in an artillery analysis.
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
Koniec projektu pocisku manewrującego FP-5 "Flaming" firmy Fire Point?
Dzisiaj na ukr kanale tg Snajper pojawiło się o info o zamknięciu projektu pocisku manewrującego FP-5 Flaming firmy Fire Point.
"Projekt FP-5 „Flamingo” został zamknięty z powodu braku efektywności." napisał prowadzący go Stanisław Bunjatow.
Jednak powyższe info stoi częściowo w sprzeczności z oświadczeniem przedstawicieli Fire Point dla portalu Gordon z wczoraj. Poinformowali oni że produkcja FP-5 "nie została wstrzymana i nie ma planów jej zakończenia".
Dosłownie dwa dni temu sporą popularność w ukr sieciach społecznościowych zdobył film z wypowiedzią Ireny Terek z lipca 2026 r. z konferencji platformy Brave1. Powiedziała ona w jej trakcie, że FP-5 "był znacznie ważniejszy jako deklaracja polityczna niż jako jakaś "super-duper wunderwaffe". Nigdy nie zakładaliśmy, że stanie się "super-duper wunderwaffe".
Część ukr opinii publicznej zwróciła słusznie uwagę że wypowiedź Terek jest kłamstwem ponieważ przez wiele miesięcy w drugiej połowie 2025 r. i na początku 2026 r. Flaming był przedstawiany ukr opinii publicznej właśnie jako coś w rodzaju wunderwaffe. Widać to choćby po zdjęciu prezydenta Zełenskiego, jakie sobie zrobił na jego tle w kwietniu 2026 r. (poniżej), a także po wypowiedziach przedstawicieli Fire Point z 2025 i 2026 r. Poniżej przypominam kilka z nich:
"Flaming jest dziesięć razy lepszy od Tomahawka", Tomahawk jest całkowicie przestarzały. Nasz pocisk radzi sobie lepiej" Irena Terek dla portalu Liga początek września 2025 r.
Denis Sztilerman - wywiad dla kanału tube ukr dziennikarki Natali Mosejczuk z 20.11.2025 - "Akcja oczerniania Fire Point jest inspirowana przez amerykańskie firmy zbrojeniowe, które boją się konkurencji w postaci najlepszego pocisku manewrującego na świecie".
Warto także zwrócić uwagę na wielką rozbieżność pomiędzy deklarowaną przez Fire Point i prezydenta Zelenskiego produkcją FP-5 a faktycznymi użyciami bojowymi.
Wrzesień 2025 r Prezydent Zełenski podczas konferencji prasowej na szczycie ONZ w Nowym Jorku. "Rozpoczęliśmy masową produkcję pocisku FP-5 Flaming".
Denis Sztilerman - wywiad dla portalu Znua z 11.10.2025 - "Obecnie produkujemy 2-3 pociski FP-5 dziennie"
Denis Sztilerman - wywiad dla kanału tube ukr dziennikarki Natali Mosejczuk z 20.11.2025 "Obecnie produkujemy 3 pociski FP-5 dziennie."
Sztilerman wywiad dla portalu tube Presing z końca czerwca 2026 r. po pytaniu o wielkość produkcji FP-5
"Produkujemy tyle, ile od nas zamówią.(...) jeśli będą silniki, to produkcja rzędu kilkuset sztuk miesięcznie jest możliwa. To bardzo prosta, niezwykle prosta rakieta. Bardzo prosta."
Kol @DelwinStrategy w swoim bardzo dobrym artykule o skuteczności pocisków FP-5, wyliczył niedawno, że ukr wykorzystali do ataków na rus łącznie do tej pory około 200 tych pocisków:
"Od lipca wystrzelono – według doniesień – około 120 pocisków (łącznie 190–220), co przy średnim koszcie 600 000 dolarów za jeden start daje kwotę 72 milionów dolarów.
W rezultacie doszło do trafień w zakłady w Wołgogradzie, a także w Rakietowo-Kosmiczne Centrum „Progress” w Samarze oraz zakłady obronne „Awitek” w Kirowie."
Moje szacunki są trochę niższe. Uważam ze ukr łącznie wykorzystali bojowo od maja 2025 r. około 150 tych pocisków w tym około 100 sztuk od lata 2026. Obniżam szacunki bo sami przedstawiciele firmy w wywiadach wielokrotnie podkreślali, że dane rus o przechwyceniach FP-5 są regularnie zawyżane, w rzeczywistości wystrzeliwują ich mniej przy każdym ataku.
Jak widać jednak bez względu czy przyjmiemy dolny czy górny zakres użyć bojowych FP-5 (150-200) obie te liczby nijak nie pasują do deklarowanej "masowej" produkcji 3 sztuk dziennie osiągniętej w październiku 2025 . Według niej do 1 pażdziernika 2026 r. ukr powinno wystrzelić około 1000 sztuk FP-5.
Co dalej? Być może informacja kanału tg Osman o zakończeniu projektu FP-5 nie potwierdzi się i jakieś użycia bojowe FP-5 jeszcze będą. Jednak widać wyraźnie po wypowiedziach samej Terek, że firma zmienia narracje odnośnie FP-5. Zmianę klimatu wokół FP-5 widać także po aktywności ukr kont wpływu na X odnośnie tego tematu. W ostatnich dwóch miesiącach FP-5 Flaming zniknął z komunikatów, oświadczeń, postów w mediach społecznościowych, tak jakby ukr pocisk manewrujący stał się nagle nieważny.
Analysis of the #Flamingo missile performance: with a documented hit rate of approximately 6-8% it is no understatement to emphasise that this weapon system has underperformed.
I thank the @mediazona_en team for their composed and rational reply confirming my earlier point: there is no evidence that 2026 personnel losses are increasing.
“7. For this reason, we can’t say whether 2026 will prove deadlier than 2025. But there is no reason to believe the situation has improved in any way for the Russian army: broadly, the same tactics and strategy are being used as in 2025. That said, any claim of rising losses requires evidence, and we don’t have that evidence yet.”
As I wrote: ultimately 2026 could be inferior, equal or slightly higher than 2025, but any claim of either is irrelevant for the time being.
Quote: “Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher... “
The only information known for sure is that 2026 records are being added 50% slower than previous years. We can debate the reasons for this, not the above.
Hi there. Dima Treschanin of Mediazona here.
1. We don’t consider our 2022–2023 data to be “broadly complete.” We do have non-public data that would add several thousand more people, including about a thousand from Wagner PMC alone. But our methodology is fairly conservative, and we don’t want to change it midstream.
2. According to our data so far, 2025 has been the deadliest year of the war. Although we have identified more than 100,000 people killed with dates of death in 2024, we know for certain that losses in 2025 were significantly higher. Collecting that data will take considerable time, though; it’s simply an enormous amount of work.
3. Thanks to non-public sources, we can see how long it takes the state to register deaths. For example, we’re currently working through a list in which most of the people were likely killed in the summer or early fall of 2025. Today we learned the dates of death for nine of them, and roughly the same number last week. To be clear: these people died last summer. Their obituaries, if they appear at all, will be published some time from now.
4. As for 2026, the situation is even worse: even government agencies (outside the MoD) don’t know how many people have been killed this year. And let’s be real, the MoD itself may not have the full picture either.
5. The more “static” the front line, the harder it is to recover bodies. The harder it is to recover bodies, the larger the share of soldiers listed as missing in action, and the longer and more difficult the identification process becomes. This also leads to more errors in which living people are declared dead; such cases are very rare, but they do happen.
6. Barring any major changes at the front, we expect that for the rest of this year and most of next, the new data we add will mainly concern 2025.
7. For this reason, we can’t say whether 2026 will prove deadlier than 2025. But there is no reason to believe the situation has improved in any way for the Russian army: broadly, the same tactics and strategy are being used as in 2025. That said, any claim of rising losses requires evidence, and we don’t have that evidence yet.
Assessment of Attrition Warfare efficiency, concluding that 2026 is more favourable to Russian forces than any other year prior, despite yielding slower territorial gains.
xitter.cf/DelwinStrategy/status/…
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
Interesting categorization.
The point is that RIA’s map has a dual purpose. It shows how far Russian units can reach, usually repeatedly, and will also be their negotiation baseline in case of a ceasefire on the current frontline.
Based on historical precedents like the Korean War, the “presence line” is likely to be where consensus is reached.
Basically, “the current frontline” or “control area” is a vague concept on which neither side usually agrees. This leads to harsh discussions, and the defender often has to concede part of the territory where the attacking side has regular presence and positions.
Greyzone and infiltration zones disproportionately provide an advantage to Russia.
#UkraineRussiaWar
A simple territorial framework I use to explain the differences between war maps.
I divide maps into three categories - RIA, Suriyak, and DS - representing four different levels of Russian advance.
RIA - Reach
How far Russian forces claim to have advanced, regardless of whether they have established a presence or control.
RIA and Rybar fall into this category, while the Russian MoD usually places its claims slightly further ahead.
Suriyak - Presence
Where Russian forces have established some presence, but not necessarily control. This is the most sensitive category, reacting quickly to changes on the ground. Easy come, easy go.
Suriyak, AMK, Radov, Creamy, and others pro-Ru belong here.
DS - Contest and Control
DS grey represents contested territory where Ukrainian forces maintain a presence and continue operating.
DS red represents actual Russian control and closely matches the GSUA maps.
OWL, Blackbird, Andrew, Playfra, Poulet, and others pro-Ua generally fall into this category, regardless of how they describe their own mapping methods.
2024–2025 were the golden era of the Russian offensive train. The advance was steady enough that you could simply copy RIA's territorial gains with a week's delay and appear reliable.
But 2026 changed that. RIA moved too far ahead of actual Russian control, while Ukrainian counteractions made delayed copying increasingly unreliable. What once required little more than waiting a week now demands constant corrections, revisions, and sometimes outright reversals.
Interesting categorization.
The point is that RIA’s map has a dual purpose. It shows how far Russian units can reach, usually repeatedly, and will also be their negotiation baseline in case of a ceasefire on the current frontline.
Based on historical precedents like the Korean War, the “presence line” is likely to be where consensus is reached.
Basically, “the current frontline” or “control area” is a vague concept on which neither side usually agrees. This leads to harsh discussions, and the defender often has to concede part of the territory where the attacking side has regular presence and positions.
Greyzone and infiltration zones disproportionately provide an advantage to Russia.
#UkraineRussiaWar
A simple territorial framework I use to explain the differences between war maps.
I divide maps into three categories - RIA, Suriyak, and DS - representing four different levels of Russian advance.
RIA - Reach
How far Russian forces claim to have advanced, regardless of whether they have established a presence or control.
RIA and Rybar fall into this category, while the Russian MoD usually places its claims slightly further ahead.
Suriyak - Presence
Where Russian forces have established some presence, but not necessarily control. This is the most sensitive category, reacting quickly to changes on the ground. Easy come, easy go.
Suriyak, AMK, Radov, Creamy, and others pro-Ru belong here.
DS - Contest and Control
DS grey represents contested territory where Ukrainian forces maintain a presence and continue operating.
DS red represents actual Russian control and closely matches the GSUA maps.
OWL, Blackbird, Andrew, Playfra, Poulet, and others pro-Ua generally fall into this category, regardless of how they describe their own mapping methods.
2024–2025 were the golden era of the Russian offensive train. The advance was steady enough that you could simply copy RIA's territorial gains with a week's delay and appear reliable.
But 2026 changed that. RIA moved too far ahead of actual Russian control, while Ukrainian counteractions made delayed copying increasingly unreliable. What once required little more than waiting a week now demands constant corrections, revisions, and sometimes outright reversals.
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
Refinery output steadily back to normal levels.
A brief update on the status of Russian oil refineries. As expected, production is up and now above Russian domestic historical demand.
I used the past 2-3 weeks to review and update my methodology. I found a few new reliable sources. I also included NASA FIRMS data directly into the model. For long time watchers, the net result was about a 0.3 mpd daily increase. Otherwise, little was changed.
The NASA FIRMS data has helped better pinpoint when refineries restart. Usually I can catch the flare, even during the day.
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
Sortie inacceptable, inexcusable. Une honte, tout simplement, car impossible qu'il s'agisse d'une simple maladresse.
« Ce qui s’est passé aujourd’hui c’est un tournant. C’est la première fois qu’il y a un acte terroriste planifié pour tuer nos compatriotes, nos enfants, a raison de leur couleur de peau ou de la religion qu’on leur donne » « Ne baissez pas la tête »
Emmanuel Macron à Trappes.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
La déclaration citée d'Emmanuel Macron n'est pas exacte. Des attentats terroristes planifiés ont déjà tué des enfants en France en raison de leur religion, comme celui de Mohammed Merah en 2012 à l'école juive Ozar Hatorah de Toulouse.
lefigaro.fr/faits-divers/t…
lefigaro.fr/actualite-fran…
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
Critical information on Rassvet proceeding according to plan for the first 2 launches. If the 3rd one also proves successful, Russian forces could benefit from some coverage in 2027 relevant to operations. To be monitored closely.
𝗪𝗛𝗘𝗥𝗘 𝗜𝗦 “𝗥𝗔𝗦𝗦𝗩𝗘𝗧”?
From time to time, our ill-wishers spread claims that the deployment of the “Rassvet” low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation has supposedly failed, or is at least facing major problems. The constellation is intended to provide reliable, high-speed internet access to subscribers in remote areas of Russia and around the world.
Meanwhile, judging by data from satellite-tracking channels, its deployment is proceeding more or less according to plan. Not without losses, of course — but everyone experiences losses, including Elon Musk.
As we can see from the chart, practically all the satellites from both launches have reached their operational altitude, currently set at around 508 km.
The exceptions are one satellite from the first batch that burned up (each batch consists of 16 spacecraft), along with two other satellites from that same batch that have not yet reached their designated altitude.
There are also three satellites from the second batch. One of them, “Rassvet-3.17,” will most likely burn up in the upper atmosphere soon. The other two, including “Rassvet-3.23,” which was falling toward Earth just days ago but began raising its flight trajectory at the last moment, are also climbing toward their operational orbit.
Thus, as of today, 26 satellites have successfully reached their designated orbits, while another four or five may still reach them later.
The next launch of another batch, assuming the launch rate remains unchanged, should take place in mid-November this year.
That is the current situation with “Rassvet.”
t.me/yurasumy/29790
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
The volume of strikes is staggering.
The payload impact ratio remains around 15:1, an important factor explaining the €70bn funding gap for Ukraine in 2027.
Projected tax revenues are bound to be much lower than budgeted amounts.
#UkraineRussiaWar
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
Mentionnons une explication non donnée par Clément : le front s'est déplacé vers l'ouest et les Russes contrôlent la zone en rouge...
Ce qui explique que les KAB jaunes sont plus à l'ouest encore, en avant du front
New airstrike map update in the Hulialpole/Orikhiv direction suggests Russia abandonned its plans to capture Ternuvate and fully switched west
🔴KAB impacts from February to August 2026
⚪️KAB impacts in September 2026
🟡KAB impacts in October 2026
Every month this year, Russia launched hundreds of KABs (FAB bombs guided by the UMPK kit) on the Hulialpole frontline. They were targeting Ukrainian positions on treelines and villages.
I've noticed how every month, impacts moved further west, as if Russia was trying to destroy methodically every fixed/known position from east to west. Indeed, there is barely any new strike on places which were already bombed, probably to let infiltrations work.
However, the strikes have now moved 10 to 15km east of the frontline, which in itself has barely moved and is still stuck near the first bunch of villages west of Hulialpole. The focus of the strikes and the montly concentration helps understand what was and is Russian plan in this direction :
-> It seems they abandonned Ternuvate, which is a very big victory for Ukraine, since this town protects all the northern flank of this offensive and has multiple high rise buildings were Ukrainian soldiers can hide.
-> Any offensive northwards no seems very difficult, thanks to Ukrainian Oleksandrivka counter-offensive. This forces Russia to fight on the lower ground without controling the heights.
-> The main push is ongoing from Hulialpole in the direction of Zaporizhzhia, aiming at avoiding Orikhiv. Russia is currently dropping bombs in the area of the unfinished second defensive line despite the fact it still has not crossed the first one.
Thank you for following, I will later try to analyse more deeply this direction and what happened this year, especially how Ukraine managed to nearly stop the offensive on Zaporizhzhia. Remember as well how the infiltrations inside of Orikhiv failed and how Ukraine cleaned the city from infiltrators.
The volume of strikes is staggering.
The payload impact ratio remains around 15:1, an important factor explaining the €70bn funding gap for Ukraine in 2027.
Projected tax revenues are bound to be much lower than budgeted amounts.
#UkraineRussiaWar
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
While Russian advances across the frontline have slowed this year, their mid-to-long-range strikes have significantly increased.
I estimate Russia averages around 140 individual strikes per day using missiles and drones. Ukraine averages around one-tenth of this, giving us a strike ratio of around 10:1 in favour of Russia.
This figure excludes strikes on logistics, which are usually carried out using cheaper, smaller, and more numerous drones.
Mid and long-range strikes have always been one of Russia's biggest advantages in this war, and has remained a very important component of attrition.
Critical information on Rassvet proceeding according to plan for the first 2 launches. If the 3rd one also proves successful, Russian forces could benefit from some coverage in 2027 relevant to operations. To be monitored closely.
𝗪𝗛𝗘𝗥𝗘 𝗜𝗦 “𝗥𝗔𝗦𝗦𝗩𝗘𝗧”?
From time to time, our ill-wishers spread claims that the deployment of the “Rassvet” low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation has supposedly failed, or is at least facing major problems. The constellation is intended to provide reliable, high-speed internet access to subscribers in remote areas of Russia and around the world.
Meanwhile, judging by data from satellite-tracking channels, its deployment is proceeding more or less according to plan. Not without losses, of course — but everyone experiences losses, including Elon Musk.
As we can see from the chart, practically all the satellites from both launches have reached their operational altitude, currently set at around 508 km.
The exceptions are one satellite from the first batch that burned up (each batch consists of 16 spacecraft), along with two other satellites from that same batch that have not yet reached their designated altitude.
There are also three satellites from the second batch. One of them, “Rassvet-3.17,” will most likely burn up in the upper atmosphere soon. The other two, including “Rassvet-3.23,” which was falling toward Earth just days ago but began raising its flight trajectory at the last moment, are also climbing toward their operational orbit.
Thus, as of today, 26 satellites have successfully reached their designated orbits, while another four or five may still reach them later.
The next launch of another batch, assuming the launch rate remains unchanged, should take place in mid-November this year.
That is the current situation with “Rassvet.”
t.me/yurasumy/29790
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
(1/3) [INTEL BRIEF] Developing Russian gains in October across three primary directions: Orikhiv, Rai Oleksandrivka, and Dobropillia.
A total of 114 km² controlled and 39 km² grey zone so far this month (excluding Vivaldi reveals) have been added on DeepState.
In Orikhiv, Russian DRG reached Omelnyk, a key village on the fortress’s main supply line. Latest gains are around Hirke after an earlier armored assault this month. Verkhnia Tersa and Huliailpilske have not been under Ukrainian control since summer and should be marked in the greyzone. (Could be under russian control though.)
Hirke lies near the main defensive line (already breached further north). Satellite images from 9 October show combat and fires across the ditch and dragon teeth in this direction and Russian artillery strikes, indicating the assault possibly advanced further than reported and that renewed attempts will target this point. This armored assault likely intended at securing the breach point. (geolocated footage in reply)
Toward Sloviansk, mapped gains are older and under Russian control since summer, but only recently acknowledged. The area between Mykolaivka and Rai Oleksandrivka remains a grey zone with ongoing skirmishes for routes and villages along the Donetsk River, as well as the remainder of the ridge overlooking the strategic cities.
It is now confirmed that #Vivaldi did not significantly slow the Russian tempo in primary directions. Though slower than last year, operations are proceeding; in fact, Dobropillia taken in a pincer shows renewed intensity.
Ukrainian Vivaldi losses were apparently high as demonstrated by a 25% increase in MIA records this summer (details upcoming in an article). The situation must be monitored closely in the coming months to assess if this will be detrimental to the defense of the key Donbas bastions and the road to Zaporijia.
#UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy
Sortie inacceptable, inexcusable. Une honte, tout simplement, car impossible qu'il s'agisse d'une simple maladresse.
« Ce qui s’est passé aujourd’hui c’est un tournant. C’est la première fois qu’il y a un acte terroriste planifié pour tuer nos compatriotes, nos enfants, a raison de leur couleur de peau ou de la religion qu’on leur donne » « Ne baissez pas la tête »
Emmanuel Macron à Trappes.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
La déclaration citée d'Emmanuel Macron n'est pas exacte. Des attentats terroristes planifiés ont déjà tué des enfants en France en raison de leur religion, comme celui de Mohammed Merah en 2012 à l'école juive Ozar Hatorah de Toulouse.
lefigaro.fr/faits-divers/t…
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Refinery output steadily back to normal levels.
A brief update on the status of Russian oil refineries. As expected, production is up and now above Russian domestic historical demand.
I used the past 2-3 weeks to review and update my methodology. I found a few new reliable sources. I also included NASA FIRMS data directly into the model. For long time watchers, the net result was about a 0.3 mpd daily increase. Otherwise, little was changed.
The NASA FIRMS data has helped better pinpoint when refineries restart. Usually I can catch the flare, even during the day.
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
One glaring issue with Ukraine's current strategy is it is unable to hurt Russia's economy anywhere as much as Moscow can hurt Ukraine's:
Russian strikes are weakening the economy sustaining Ukraine’s war effort. Closing the growing funding gap will require more European support and politically contentious reforms in Kyiv, writes @BalazsJarabik: carnegieendowment.org/russia…
Delwin | Military Theorist retweeted
First, I wrote "appear to be", which expresses uncertainty in English, the equivalent of the French conditionnel. It is therefore an inference, not a categorical assertion, and is not subject to the same burden of proof. Grammar matters.
Second, you have no proof that those forest patches east of the railway were ever captured in the first place. Where is your evidence? Because DeepState certainly marked them as captured on September 3rd.
Now, let me explain how this works.
In the forests west of Dvorichna (Area 1), there was an initial approach before June 8 (blue circle), during which roughly a dozen FAB and 203 mm artillery strikes hit the area. Ukrainian forces advanced closer to the village throughout June, and by July 1, multiple FAB craters and evidence of combat were visible in satellite imagery (red circles).
As per the forested area south of Zapadne (area 3), the main fighting occurred around august 10th, when massive ordinance was dropped on it and the connecting treeline.
This is how we can infer that Russian forces lost control of those sectors at some point in June and august.
But for the forest patches across the railway (Area 2), it is different.
On September 17, the impact of strikes on the Khartia squad that entered the area is visible (at the very edge), but nothing else. On October 12, the situation is identical: absolutely no evidence of airstrikes or combat is visible in satellite imagery.
This does not follow any pattern observed in other sectors of the front.
There are a couple of videos showing South American soldiers entering the area, probably in July (but released in September), and early August, where signs of fighting are visible on images at the very edge.
On Telegram channels associated with Russia's 27th Motor Rifle Brigade, there are also videos showing these soldiers being targeted, followed by Russian infantry clearing the woods.
Since then, nothing… As of October 12, no further evidence of significant fighting ongoing is visible in satellite imagery across this entire area. No bombardment ever took place, no sign of fighting since early august.
So much for the claim that "operations are continuing", because, as a matter of fact, the available evidence points towards no significant activity having taken place there since those initial engagements. Hence my point that what remains are skirmish clashes between light infantry units, in the greyzone.
Therefore, yes, in all likelihood, the forest patches (area 2) were never firmly captured. The squads that entered were immediately engaged by drones and subsequently cleared out by small Russian infantry elements operating from the opposite edge of the woods which reoccupied the area. (All this being documented in geolocated footage)
It is always interesting to see how propagandists, entrenched in their own narratives, demand proof from others while having absolutely none to substantiate their own claims.
Proof is not always a straightforward concept in military analysis. Patterns are identified, hypotheses are formulated, and plausible conclusions are inferred from a variety of sources that are analysed and cross-referenced. The relevant question is not does absolute proof exists, but which scenario is best supported by the observable facts.
