Evidence and document release No. 7 hidrive.ionos.com/share/ahy1…

How many were directly affected? And how many indirectly? Read the paper using this link: ethicalapproach.co.uk/the_un… #OperationTalla and #NG163 @pjhlaw @XPCBirmingham @JacquiDeevoy1 @oakycoaky @CareQualityComm @gmcuk @PoliceChiefs @metpoliceuk @MetCC

For those who have asked - No, I won't be writing any book.

A lot of evidence has been obtained and carefully examined in great detail since March 2025. It has spoken. Shouted, in fact. The institutions identified through the Talla investigation know what we have. They know we have analysed in thoroughly and I believe they know we know what it points to. That, in my view, is why we have reached a position where those same institutions are closing down correspondence. It is what remains to be disclosed, as requested of them already, which they realise will cast the conclusive die.

The absence of an investigation can eventually produce an absence of evidence and that absence may then be offered as a reason why investigation would achieve little. That is a very dangerous institutional circle. Frameworks predating the pandemic recognised the importance of preserving evidence and coordinating police, healthcare and regulatory responses where suspected criminality arose. By July 2020, an official cross-government paper was also examining whether disrupted care, premature discharge and reduced access to hospital treatment could contribute to deaths. That analysis did not establish crimes. It did, however, establish that potentially fatal consequences beyond infection were recognised subjects of official concern. So what safeguards ensured that national non-recording guidance could never displace the proper assessment of an identifiable death or serious injury? • Who defined its scope? • Who authorised it? • What assessment preceded its application? • Who checked for cases wrongly excluded? Logging information as intelligence does not answer whether any alleged offence was adequately assessed. The question is whether a national approach made serious allegations less visible before their merits had been properly examined. Calling non-recording “a success” makes disclosure more necessary. Show the guidance. Show the safeguards. Show the decisions. Show how the claimed success was tested. Fewer recorded allegations are no evidence of fewer victims.

SUSPICIOUS DEATHS IN HEALTHCARE: THE RESPONSE THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT A death in a hospital or care home does not become exempt from scrutiny because it occurred during treatment, followed an end-of-life decision or arose during a pandemic. The documents I have examined in substantial detail describe a framework for establishing what happened: competent assessment, early cooperation, preservation of evidence and clear responsibility. That framework has developed through the 2006 NHS–ACPO–HSE protocol, the 2018 Williams Review, the 2019 CQC–NPCC agreement and the December 2024 healthcare investigation framework. Their provisions differ, but a consistent principle runs through them: where suspected criminality may have contributed to death, the relevant authorities must engage with the evidence and their respective responsibilities. The distinction between police and CQC matters. Police investigate suspected homicide, wilful neglect and ill-treatment. CQC examines provider compliance within its regulatory remit and can take civil or criminal enforcement action. Their responsibilities can require parallel investigations. Referring a concern elsewhere should establish who will address it, rather than leave it between institutions. Clinical records, medication charts, prescribing decisions, electronic audit histories and witness accounts can be crucial. Where appropriate, forensic examination and toxicology must be considered whilst evidential opportunities remain. The police’s own 2025 practice advice warns that an erroneous initial decision that a death is non-suspicious can lead to a potential homicide being missed. The first assessment can determine whether the evidence needed to discover the truth survives. Bereaved families should therefore receive more than reassurance. Their specific concerns should be examined, relevant information considered and the resulting decisions explained. To see the relevant documentation examined for yourself, visit: hidrive.ionos.com/share/grpg… For Covid-era concerns, a further question requires an answer: Did national rejection or non-recording arrangements such as have been exposed in Operation Talla policing guidance, affect the assessment of any identifiable death which otherwise warranted scrutiny?

NG163 - Evidence and Document Release - No. 6 This link provides access to documentation and reports which relate to deaths in care settings. hidrive.ionos.com/share/grpg… The short video link below provides an illustration of evidence given to the Scottish COVID Inquiry.

The Speirs Directive is an interesting document, as is the letter issued by Police Scotland, which accompanied the disclosure of the directive. The disclosure letter indicated that the decision to issue the directive came from Gold Command. Now, we must appreciate that Alan Speirs was a silver commander, not gold. The gold commander at Police Scotland was, at the relevant time, Malcolm Graham. Malcolm retired from his police position and is now the Chief Executive of the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service. The self-proclaimed national UK-wide gold commander was at the relevant time, Martin Hewitt. Martin subsequently left policing and was appointed as the Border Force boss, but resigned from that position several months ago. So, the Speirs Directive was signed by Alan, but on the evidence which accompanied it's disclosure, it was not his decision to issue it. Was the issuing decision made by Malcolm, or was it down to Martin? Such points as this require clarity.

Evidence and Document Release No. 5 hidrive.ionos.com/share/wr8b…

Evidence and document release No. 4 hidrive.ionos.com/share/j95y…