UPDATE: Additional Findings and Analysis Events over the past several months provide grounds for the following hypothesis. In May 2026, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) officer Artur Sushkov was expelled from Hungary. His activities had been monitored by Hungarian counterintelligence in cooperation with an intelligence service from a #NATO member state. According to VSquare, Hungarian counterintelligence officers had been seeking his expulsion since February, but the political decision was made only after the change of government. On September 8, #Budapest announced the expulsion of another ten Russian diplomats for activities incompatible with their diplomatic status. Then, on September 16, internal correspondence between individuals linked to the SVR revealed that an “active measure” in Budapest had been postponed. Could #Hungarian counterintelligence have known about the preparations for this operation before it was due to take place? Two scenarios are entirely plausible: Hungarian intelligence services may have independently monitored Russian intelligence networks, or they may have received relevant information through intelligence-sharing channels with partner services. The Sushkov case confirms that such international counterintelligence cooperation had already taken place in Hungary. We also do not know whether the cancellation of the rally was connected to counterintelligence activities. Nevertheless, the sequence of events suggests that, following the change of government in Hungary, Russia's SVR may have lost some of the operational freedom it had previously enjoyed. If so, the canceled “active measure” in support of Rosatom may be just one visible episode of a broader series of developments that remain unknown to the public.