CTO @TrustedSec | Former Optiv/SecureWorks/Accuvant Labs/Redspin | Race cars
/tmp/.a
Joined April 2008
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Hey
"The previous update (October 22 16:18 UTC) reported that Sophos observed successful exploitation of PHP2Shell in customer environments. Upon further analysis, we are correcting that assessment as Sophos customer telemetry shows scanning and a small number of failed exploitation attempts. As of this update, there is no evidence of a successful compromise due to these vulnerabilities." sophos.com/en-us/blog/proof-…
One of the variants that works however per build offsets is annoying
Heap leak → recover heap and libphp base addresses → use known per-build offsets to resolve zval_ptr_dtor and zif_system, bypassing ASLR → place a forged HashTable at a predictable heap-relative address → trigger cleanup of the stale session reference → PHP follows the legitimate destructor path, invoking the forged pDestructor pointer → execution reaches zif_system, resulting in command execution.
We’re going to look back at this era when LLMs have supposedly solved software security, only for people to realize how much money is still being lost every year to BEC and other attacks that require little technical sophistication.
All while LLMs have arguably become the best BEC tooling on the planet.
Justin Elze retweeted
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The agent gets the task done, but it doesn’t get your passwords..
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The hype leading up to this model, combined with all the “please stop us” rhetoric, is exactly how we got here.
Justin Elze retweeted
When I read Anthropic’s “self-replicating AI” article, I knew I had to respond.
The research is technically interesting. But the headline combines three different models, two separate experiments, a seeded foothold and a network of unauthenticated computers into one story about “self-replicating AI.”
Honestly, that conclusion would never survive peer review. Here is what they actually demonstrated.
Justin Elze retweeted
It seems that MS update prevents coercion and relaying via WebDAV.
Defeating SMB signing as described in QT will most likely be patched as well.
There is a PR for a module in NetExec
I wrote up a way to defeat enforced SMB signing for relay.
It abuses a documented SMB re-authentication behavior.
I'm surely missing nuance and prior art. Corrections welcome.
Writeup:
blackfield.ch/blog/defeating…
PoC:
github.com/aas-n/reauthx
AI labs have developed a culture of publicly speculating about the future. How does that culture change after they go public, when those same statements could move their own stock prices?
Will the models stop writing code with bugs by mid 2027?
xitter.cf/BVeiseh/status/2113389…
InfoSec we know drama
xitter.cf/PHPNewsnet/status/2113…
Chainguard Broke the php2shell Embargo
phpnews.net/chainguard-php2s…
Justin Elze retweeted
Project Swarm from @GreyNoiseIO let's you get ground truth on exploitation in the wild. You can deploy your own honeypots to collect reconnaissance, exploitation, and post-exploitation artifacts. It's a dollar.
greynoise.io/project-swarm
Zapped
"The exploit was already landing correctly; the earlier failures were because Docker’s VM disk was full"
I'm really interested to see the postmortems in a few weeks on successful php2shell exploitation in the wild during October 21–22 and how that aligns with vendor tweets here.
I did post this somewhat ironically, knowing the harness and the people writing it matter, but the comments are all solid...
xitter.cf/HackingLZ/status/21130…
Whoever is running around doing community notes
xitter.cf/rafalohaki/status/2113…
Working RCE against PHP 8.5.12 (the 2026-10-21 security release that fixed CVE-2026-109618/109619).
Pure logic bug — no memory corruption,
ASAN-clean, orthogonal to the CVE-2026-109618/19 class.
Receipt: uid=33(www-data) over HTTP, one-shot
#infosec #php2shell #php
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The claimed RCE on fully-patched PHP 8.5.12 requires a custom lab app with a destructor gadget plus deliberate session.serialize_handler mismatch (php_serialize writes, legacy php reads) and non-default settings like cleanup=Off; this is an app flaw, not core PHP RCE.
github.com/rafalohaki/php…
php.net/manual/en/sess…
Justin Elze retweeted
Just an incredible indictment of this guy and BBC news, for two reasons:
1) How can you claim to be a "cyber correspondent" and not know what PHP is?
2) Why would you admit this in public? You didn't have to say all that
👀 "We have not confirmed any successful exploitation."
xitter.cf/Huntio/status/21132838…
🚨 #PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619): everyone is staging the leaked PHP RCE, no one has landed it 🫠
We mapped the exposed PHP footprint and went into the attacker open directories after the Oct 21 leak.
What we found:
→ 683,922 IPs leaking a PHP version in one day of scans, mostly end-of-life builds
→ ~a dozen open-dir workspaces staging php2shell tooling, zero victims or shells in any of them
→ one mass operator sprayed up to 123 servers via a ~97-proxy farm, zero shells
→ scanning started ~20 min after the patch, driven by an existing Mirai-style botnet
→ no public PoC lands code exec on x86-64 yet (OOM corruption vs ASLR)
Patch now: 8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35.
Full research + network observables: hunt.io/blog/php2shell-cve-2…
