OSINT Analysis on Russo-Ukrainian war. FDF Reserve Officer with passion for operational art. Following the war in the @Black_BirdGroup
Kuopio - Finland
Joined December 2015
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Over the month of September, the Russian net gains were negative 190 km2. This marks the greatest monthly net territorial loss for Russia in our dataset since the June of 2023.
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Russian armed forces expansions are continuing:
4th Motorized Rifle Brigade has highly likely expanded to the 84th Motorized Rifle Division. This is an unsurprising move as its combat elements already surpassed the numbers of some existing divisions
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
According to our data, in May the net gains of the Russian armed forces were approximately 82km².
Despite their advance in Kostyantinivka, the Russian forces are struggling to regain offensive momentum amidst instensifying Ukrainian mid-range strikes and local counterattacks.
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
"Right now the general situation for the Ukrainians seems to be better than it has been in several years, though several significant dangers remain." @Inkvisiit @Black_BirdGroup
rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-w…
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Western Zaporizhia ORBAT
Despite Russian successes earlier this year in deeply infiltrating toward Veselyanka and Novoyakovlivka, Ukrainian counterattacks continue to roll back previous advances.
Ukraine reinforced the line with the 🇺🇦153rd Mechanized Brigade, redeployed from Kherson to support the 🇺🇦128th Mountain Assault Brigade along the Stepove - Mali Shcherbaky axis, while the main counterattacks toward Stepnohirs'k are being conducted by an assortment of HUR special forces units (Tymur & the International Legion).
Russia, meanwhile, seeking to consolidate its gains, deployed the two reserve regiments of the 🇷🇺7th Air Assault Division (387th and 1445th Regiments) alongside the 108th and 247th Air Assault Regiments. Furthermore, around the March–April timeframe, additional elements of the 🇷🇺299th Airborne Regiment (98th Airborne Division) arrived from Kherson.
Despite this, elements of the 7th, 104th, and 98th VDV Divisions, as well as the 11th VDV Brigade, now operating in the area alongside various regiments of the 19th and 42nd Motor Rifle Divisions (58th Combined Arms Army), remain unable to regain significant initiative, as the battle for Stepnohirs'k enters its seventh month.
nitter.gq/WarUnitObserver/status…
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
According to our data, in April the net gains of the Russian armed forces were approximately 94km².
Russian offensive attempts continue to struggle, while the frontline on the southern front has largely consolidated after the Hulijaipole offensive of February and March.
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
According to our data in March the net gains of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine were approximately 25km²
This is slightly more from than it was in February, a net negative, but the Russian offensive momentum has clearly dimimished compared to late 2025.
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Brief look into Ukraines latest strike campaing: targets close to Finnish and Baltic borders, +900km from Ukraine.
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Since the start of the year, Ukraine 🇺🇦 dug more than 1 250 km of defenses in the rear areas of the frontline
The "kill zone grid" around the New Donbas Line is quickly expanding. Here is what you need to know and a detailed geographic analysis :
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
🇷🇺 ORBAT – Hulyaipole
Following Ukrainian reinforcements in the area, Russian forces redeployed units from Pokrovsk to Hulyaipole, likely in an attempt to maintain offensive tempo in southern Zaporizhzhia.
nitter.gq/WarUnitObserver/status…
🇺🇦Ukrainian counterattacks on the southern front - the wider perspective
Between the end of January and the beginning of February, Ukrainian forces began a series of counterattacks aimed at the south-eastern corner of the frontline - split between the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro oblasts.
This area recorded the deepest 🇷🇺Russian advances in late 2025, but the low force density generated by the infiltration tactics used seems to be an exploitable weakness.
The Russian 🇷🇺“Vostok” Grouping faces several 🇺🇦Ukrainian assault regiments along with the 🇺🇦82nd and 95th Air Assault brigades, redeployed from Pokrovsk in late January for the occasion.
Given most of this information has been published by various other sources, we set out to provide a longer perspective on the often neglected and forgotten south-eastern corner of the frontline.
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
In February, the Russian monthly net gains in Ukraine turned negative. Over the whole month, the Russians lost 37 km² of territory in Ukraine.
This is the first net loss since November of 2023, and the worst month for Russia in terms of territory since August of 2023.
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
The latest Ukrainian counterattack has drawn significant attention. The Ukrainians have claimed to liberate over 400 km².
There’s some sensationalism in the information space, as there seems to be some misunderstanding of what a liberated square kilometer here actually means. 1/
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
🇺🇦Ukrainian counterattacks on the southern front - the wider perspective
Between the end of January and the beginning of February, Ukrainian forces began a series of counterattacks aimed at the south-eastern corner of the frontline - split between the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro oblasts.
This area recorded the deepest 🇷🇺Russian advances in late 2025, but the low force density generated by the infiltration tactics used seems to be an exploitable weakness.
The Russian 🇷🇺“Vostok” Grouping faces several 🇺🇦Ukrainian assault regiments along with the 🇺🇦82nd and 95th Air Assault brigades, redeployed from Pokrovsk in late January for the occasion.
Given most of this information has been published by various other sources, we set out to provide a longer perspective on the often neglected and forgotten south-eastern corner of the frontline.
[1/9]
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Happy to share the latest. My views on the current battlefield dynamics and where the war stands in 2026. foreignaffairs.com/russia/uk…
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
✍️ Depleted brigades, unnecessary casualties, and political loyalty over military competence. As the enemy continue to advance, it's time to say what many think—Syrskyi needs to go. #UkrainianArmy #RussiaUkraineWar
Read all details ⬇️
militaryland.net/article/opi…
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Over the month of December the Russian Armed Forces occupied a total of 347km² of Ukrainian territory.
This brings the Russian total gains within Ukraine to 4580km² for the whole year of 2025. This is 31% more territory compared to 2024.
With Kursk included, around 20%
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Pasi Paroinen retweeted
2025 can reasonably be seen as an operational and strategic failure for Russia, but all scenarios remain on the table. Any optimism is premature, as Ukraine also faces serious challenges.
In this thread: An assessment of the past year and its broader implications. 1/
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
📊85 people per sq. km. We tried to calculate the price paid by 🇷🇺 for advance in 🇺🇦 and how these figures differ from last year's. Spoiler: the correlation between 🇷🇺's growth in advance and its losses has become less noticeable, but the scale of the losses remains the same.
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Key Summary 2025
In December 2024 we said two things that upset people:
- There's plenty of war left
- We hope Russia advances 4000 square kilometers (Hold your outrage)
We'll be covering in this thread 🧵on what that meant in 2025, and beyond
ALT Map showing Ukraine front line changes from end of 2024 to end of 2025
Pasi Paroinen retweeted
Given Rochan's close monitoring of military developments in Belarus, this is our assessment.
There are no indications that such a large-scale redeployment has taken place. We continue to assess that the current Russian troop presence in Belarus numbers in the low thousands and is primarily associated with long-standing Russian military facilities, including the Vileyka Naval Communications Centre (43rd Communications Centre) and the 474th Independent Radio-Technical Unit near Baranovichi. Additional personnel may have been deployed to support Belarusian efforts to establish logistics and storage facilities for Oreshnik IRBMs.
Given the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Russian Federation does not have the capacity to deploy a force of this magnitude to Belarus.
