Defence policy, space, cyberspace, metaverse, Lunapolitics and geopolitics wonk. Co-founder of @AstroAnalytica Слава Україні! 🇺🇦

United Kingdom
Joined August 2009
#Germany is moving from being a major user of space services to becoming a military space power. It's planned space force reflects a major shift: Berlin now sees space as an operational domain to be defended, and one in which adversaries’ use may need to be restricted.🧵1/6
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The building blocks already exist: the Kensington Treaty, new UK-German space cooperation, @rfa_space at SaxaVord, and the deep-precision-strike programme. Together, London and Berlin could develop shared SDA, responsive launch, & interoperable space control capabilities. 5/6.
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The goal should be an Anglo-German contribution to a credible, #NATO European space control enterprise; one able to protect critical space infrastructure, deter coercion, & operate through disruption. Read my latest for @AstroAnalytica END🧵6/6 orbitalforesight.substack.co…
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John B. Sheldon retweeted
Read about the future LUFTWAFFE space force and why Britain should work with Germany on Space Control, in our latest @AstroAnalytica edition of ORBITAL FORESIGHT 👇
🇩🇪 Luftwaffe Space Force incoming, set up under Germany's Space Command -- the Weltraumkommando. Read about it in @AstroAnalytica new ORBITAL FORESIGHT edition, just out. Focus: "Germany's military space rise", and the case for UK-German Space Control orbitalforesight.substack.co…
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What happens when an ally can switch off your military capabilities? Ukraine's reported Starshield restrictions expose a dangerous paradox: a technically resilient satellite constellation can sustain a strategically fragile military force. A warning for Britain. 1/5🧵
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What was once politically unthinkable is becoming thinkable: Washington restricting access to essential military capabilities to influence allied decisions. The UK must question its dependence on systems whose availability is determined by political decisions made elsewhere. 4/5
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The answer isn't technological autarky, but assured access, selective sovereign investment, diversified suppliers, & freedom of military action. Military dependencies can become strategically intolerable in a crisis. My latest for @AstroAnalytica 5/5 END🧵orbitalforesight.substack.co…
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#Poland is rapidly becoming a serious @NATO military #space power. Its completed MikroGLOB optical constellation, POLSARIS radar capability, French imagery partnership, mobile #ISR cell, and ARGUS agency are the foundations of a national spacepower enterprise. 1/5🧵
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But success creates new interests. Once national warning, long-range fires, and military operations depend on space systems, their availability and freedom of action become strategic concerns. Resilience and passive protection are necessary, but insufficient. 4/5
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Poland must now contemplate space control: assuring access and freedom of action for Polish & allies while denying adversaries the use of space. See my latest for @AstroAnalytica 5/5 END🧵orbitalforesight.substack.co…
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Replying to @BBCNewsnight
@BBCNewsnight you missed a real opportunity to have a serious debate on the UK missile defence system proposed by the Tories; pretty much everyone involved in your piece had no idea about the issue, and it showed. The £10B price tag cited by Tories is likely unrealistic…1/2
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…but so is the £75-£100B you cited from Gen. Barrons, which you uncritically accepted. No one came out of that discussion looking informed or persuasive, whether pro or anti missile defence. You shouldn’t have even bothered with it. 2/2
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Strategic analogies are always limited in utility and are often misleading, whether used to think about AI, space, cyberspace, or other issues, and often lead to bad policy, CONOPS, & doctrine. 1/2 foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
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Strategic literacy needs to improve considerably. To use analogies is human, but is the 1st step in thinking an issue through, not the end state. Relatedly, failure to distinguish between the nature and character of war is a sure sign of strategic error. 2/2
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