泊远的硅谷投研手记 (@Kunka020) header
泊远的硅谷投研手记 (@Kunka020) profile picture

资深科技行业从业者 | 用行业视角看美股 | 科技赛道深度研究 | 有判断,敢验证

Hong Kong
Joined February 2012
泊远的硅谷投研手记 retweeted
I believe the @nvidia board is not acting in the best interest of shareholders nor in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties. What we know is that the board fired Jensen or forced his resignation for violating company policy and/or in response to the accusation of an affair with a spy. They did so without careful consideration of the impact on the company, its customers, its shareholders or other stakeholders. They rushed to judgment without the benefit of careful due diligence or even with a basic understanding of the facts. How do we know this? We know this by how quickly Jensen was fired and how little was known at the time of his firing. It takes time to convene a board meeting. There was time, maybe, for one Zoom. And this is a decision that should have been made by a board sitting in person and carefully deliberating the facts once they are known. And they should have slept on the decision and met again the day after to discuss the facts, the risks and the other implications of their decision. The timing and lack of information did not allow for careful board deliberation. While boards can fire a CEO for an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate, it should not be an automatic decision. That is why we have boards comprised of humans and not agents. A board should consider whether or not such a relationship was consensual or whether it was an abuse of power dynamics. And a board has to consider what the impact of the firing is on all stakeholders. If I were in this board, I would not have rushed to judgment based on articles in the media. I would have made sure the board had all of the facts so it could make a careful and informed decision. Boards of Delaware companies have a duty of care which means they must make informed, prudent and good faith decisions. This clearly did not happen here. What law firm is advising this board? Or is the board even taken good legal advice? It doesn’t look like it. And now the board is compounding its failures by insisting that there is no possibility for Jensen’s return as CEO. Why is it in the best interest of the company to foreclose the possibility of Jensen’s return and to do so before all of the facts are known? This is yet another breach of their duty of care. Furthermore, the board has launched an investigation whose scope is unknown. Investigations can be extremely damaging to a company and should be carefully targeted to address whatever facts need to be known rather than be overly broad in scope. In short, this looks like a series of major governance failures by directors that panicked due to headlines in the media. They likely felt compelled to do something because they were afraid of looking bad in the media, not because it was the right thing for them company. They couldn’t stand the heat. The board’s conduct here is shocking for a company of this scale and importance to our country and the world at large, particularly at this moment in history.
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泊远的硅谷投研手记 retweeted
Over the past week, I’ve been overwhelmed by the love and support of friends, industry colleagues, and people I've never met. Thank you to everyone who has shown kindness to my family and me. It means the world to me. I came to the United States 53 years ago, and becoming an American citizen is one of the greatest gifts and proudest moments of my life. NVIDIA has been my life’s work. Building it into the company it is today alongside my colleagues has been a privilege and an honor. Nowhere but in America could a company like NVIDIA be possible. I love our country, and I love NVIDIA. I did not live up to the standards expected of everyone at NVIDIA, and I have made serious mistakes in my personal life. I created problems for the Board that I deeply regret. I own my mistakes completely, and I am committed to cooperating with the Board’s independent investigation. Since my departure, I’ve seen an outpouring of calls from NVIDIA’s employees, investors, business partners, and customers for me to return as CEO. Many continue to reach out to me directly as the company navigates complex technology, market, competitive, and geopolitical dynamics. NVIDIA is a once-in-a-generation company. If the Board of Directors decides that my return is in the best interest of our shareholders, our employees, the company, and America, I would be honored to answer these calls and return as CEO. Thank you again to everyone who has shared their good wishes. I am profoundly humbled by your support. To my family: I love you, and I will spend the rest of my life being worthy of yours. Jensen
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泊远的硅谷投研手记 retweeted
黃仁勳對 Nvidia 的重要性,在於他能把工程團隊認為可能實現的技術,轉化成全公司願意投入資源、承擔風險,而且必須交付的產品。正因如此,供應鏈才能有極高的訂單能見度,並配合激進的規格升級。而這也帶動了競爭對手的跟進,進一步推動整體 AI 產業的技術升級與供應鏈投資。 如果硬要比較,做出並落實激進規格升級的決策,比提供供應鏈訂單能見度更困難。黃仁勳不必是 Nvidia 內部最懂 HVDC、CPO/NPO 與 CCL/PTFE 等新技術的人,但他的價值,在於同時考慮到策略、組織、技術與供應鏈,並迅速拍板定案與投入資源執行。 就目前公開資訊,黃仁勳似乎很難全身而退。在這前提下,比較務實的做法,可能是階段性降低 Nvidia 對黃仁勳個人的決策依賴,同時布局接班計畫。而在這過程中,Nvidia 能否延續高效的新產品與新技術研發,以及競爭對手如何因應,將是觀察整體 AI 產業技術發展與投資趨勢的重點,而供應鏈研究則能提供重要的判斷依據。
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$COHR 听完了电话会,虽然现在半导体人人喊打,还是讲讲现在产业链发生了什么。 过去一年,Coherent 内部磷化铟产能翻倍,内外部采购比例却几乎没有变化:新增产能基本被光模块出货增长消耗了。 这解释了为什么公司一边持续扩产,一边仍然无法明显提高自供率。对利润模型而言,这里存在两层变量:第一层是内部产能能否继续支撑收入增长;第二层是当产能增速超过下游消耗、开始替代外采时,垂直整合能释放多少毛利。后者目前还没有充分体现在 40.6% 的本季调整后毛利率中,但能释放多少,仍取决于外购成本、自制良率和产品价格。 再看资本开支。本季 CapEx 为 7.76 亿美元,占收入约 33%;经营现金流为负,自由现金流约 −8.68 亿。管理层预计下季 CapEx 继续增加,同时表示几乎所有长期协议都有预付款、研发资金或产能共投支持。客户正在承担一部分扩产资金,但预付款金额、退款条件和最低采购义务尚未充分披露,暂时无法精确计算风险转移了多少。 约 200 亿美元的五年期 PhotonLink 协议预计 2028 年初开始贡献收入。简单平均相当于每年 40 亿美元,约为本季收入年化的 42%;如此体量的远期需求,为产能投资提供了更长的规划窗口,也让 2028 年以后的交付、定价和回款成为估值的重要变量。 内部激光器自供比例、每一美元新增 CapEx 对应的有效产出,以及客户预付款对扩产资金的覆盖程度,后面是关键变量。 还有一条技术边界:管理层明确提到,磷化铟与砷化镓产线无法轻易互换。
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$AMD 这个指引直接超了我的乐观测算!amd 是我的核心重仓,对它也比大多数人了解,看来需要后面给大家做个详细解读
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具身会是下一波大幅提升 token 的变量,而且很可能比用想象中还要快。
10 Spicy Takes After Talking to 50 Friends at the Frontier of Robotics 🤖🔥 1/ Astra IS robotics' GPT-3 moment. Ironically, now that it's finally here, some in robotics seem reluctant to acknowledge it. Perhaps because it (sadly) didn't come from a robotics company? 2/ Robotics is becoming just another vertical for frontier labs. Not so different from coding in some respects. Why reinvent general intelligence for every industry? 3/ Robotics was too hard to underwrite until now. No convincing pretraining scaling law, no convergence on models, data, or hardware. No wonder some critics dismissed it as a fragmented industry playing an expensive "demo game". Astra may finally offer a credible path to scale. 4/ Robotics foundation-model startups have a case. But how strong is it? The argument: Astra handles System 2 (reasoning), while specialized models retain System 1 (skills) and System 0 (motor control). Fair. But isn't that already a narrower value proposition? And who says the boundary stops there? 5/ Follow the talent. Word is OpenAI reorganized its 30–40-person robotics team around the core Astra model. Hearing similar moves toward general models at @Tesla_Optimus. Org charts may tell us more than any demo. 6/ The robotics data gold rush is real. Million-hour procurement programs, some potentially reaching tens of millions of hours. Talk of budgets approaching $1B per frontier lab. 7/ Bullish on robotics hardware volumes. As intelligence becomes more accessible, the barriers to building useful robots could fall dramatically. The moat shifts toward reliability, dexterity, integration, and deployment. 8/ Robotics could fuel the next semiconductor and memory supercycle. A 100B-parameter model running on the edge requires ~50GB just for 4-bit weights. Now multiply that by millions of robots. Why do you think @JensenHuang is so obsessed with robotics? @elonmusk saw it coming: nitter.gq/elonmusk/status/211477… 9/ Is self-driving immune to the general-model threat? After coding and robotics, why assume self-driving remains the exclusive domain of proprietary, vertical models? Robotaxi increasingly feels like a solved problem to me. But if and when frontier labs move into self-driving, we could see an Apple vs. Android dynamic. Think about the implications for $TSLA, Waymo, and other OEMs. 10/ The next bottleneck may not be intelligence. It's deployment. Models are improving faster than our ability to deploy robots in the messy real world. Integration, hardware variance, failure recovery, and economics remain brutally hard. The real moat may be turning intelligence into reliable, profitable physical work. -- I realize some of these takes may rub people the wrong way, especially those who have spent years doing the hard work of advancing robotics. That's not my intention. I'm sharing them to spark debate, not to declare winners and losers. Astra has only been out for a month or so, and it's far too early to draw definitive conclusions. More importantly, when the TAM is this enormous - potentially the largest in tech - there should be plenty of room for different approaches and many winners. ++ Full diligence report: robonomics.substack.com/p/ro…
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现在的问题还是未来的资金成本以及确定性的问题,所有的估值都来自于信心和可见度。但是可见度越高,一致性越强,这时候进入也晚了
为什么我坚定看好AI,并且无视大科技自由现金流变负: 菲利普·费雪在《非常股票和非常利润》中描述的经典张力:卓越公司将在大力投资扩展长期盈利能力的产能时,暂时压低自由现金流和报告收益。市场往往将近期现金消耗视为问题,而非构建下一阶段增长的必要成本。费雪认为,那些关注长期利润前景并愿意忽略暂时支出的投资者,将在成果到来时受益。 今天纳斯达克综合指数的 trailing PE 在 20 倍,而 2000 年 3 月峰值约为 190 倍。这一轮的AI并非单纯靠叙事驱动的倍数扩张故事。
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现金比例40%,依然经历了巨大的回撤。正如我前面所说,市场开始剧烈波动,这往往是牛市后期的特征。市场正在极端定价风险以及未来的不确定性。AI现在最大的问题不是需求,而是钱从哪里来。然而,最终决定一切是需求
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和我的测算完全一致 $ORCL
昨天 $CRWV 再一次融资,通过可转债,同时宣布的3,500万股股票融资,但是这个融资其实离cover现金流还很远,那Neocloud 们什么时候能脱离不停稀释融资? 我做了一个现金流转正的推演,包含预付款的情况下,$ORCL $NBIS 基本会在2028年下半年到2029年转正,时间还很长,中间的稀释,利息支出依然不可避免
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Anthropic招股书回答了几个AI trade一直困扰的核心问题,就是巨额的资本支出换来了什么: 1.xn--vhquv是否愿意大额支付 AI 费用:大客户数量、老客户扩张都很强 2.模型公司能否覆盖当期经营费用:Q2 GAAP 营业盈利 非常bulllish
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token消耗会在知识工作者持续渗透,最终大幅超过coding,但是这个过程可能不是像年初Opus4.6+openclaw 这个agent vs chatbot这种爆发式的,爆发式的我觉得来自personal Agent(相比只是办公会是更大的场景)和机器人(广义)的chatgpt时刻。对应的其实就是每个人都需要一个贾维斯,先是虚拟的,再是具身的。 其实两者都已经开始量变,我觉得不会太慢。 回头想,去年这个时候,还没有opus4.6.
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最近对AI半导体投资最大的困惑,不是盈利增长的斜率,而是盈利久期(Earnings Duration)与估值久期(Valuation Duration)的背离。 NVDA、MU这两个公司是典型,盈利持续兑现,Forward P/E却不断压缩,甚至回到ChatGPT出现前的水平。市场究竟低估了未来盈利的规模,还是低估了超额利润的持续期(模型公司,云巨头资本支出还能持续多久、收入端增速怎么样、大科技都在借债了,市场上债务问题怎么样)? 两者对应截然不同的投资逻辑。 如果低估的是盈利规模,持续的EPS上修足以驱动股价;但如果低估的是盈利久期,且市场始终拒绝延长现金流的资本化期限,那么即使产业判断与盈利预测持续正确,投资者仍可能陷入Earnings Growth被Multiple Compression完全抵消的价值陷阱。 再进一步看,同一条AI Capex链条上,市场对NVDA、MU等已兑现的存量利润持续施加终值折价,却愿意为AMD、光互联等尚未完全兑现的增量利润支付显著的增长期权溢价。 市场似乎更愿意为利润池的再分配付费,而非为既有利润池的可持续性付费。 这意味着未来AI投资的核心Alpha,可能不再来自预测Capex增长,而来自识别超额ROIC的衰减速度、竞争优势持续期,以及市场隐含的终值假设之间的错配。 最终的问题是:如果市场永远不愿意修正对盈利久期的判断,我们究竟是在投资被低估的长期现金流,还是在承担一场没有明确催化剂的估值均值回归交易?
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今年几次美股调整给我的感受,是风险释放得很快、很集中。或许以后更需要适应的,是平静一段时间之后,突然出现一轮剧烈的仓位出清。 背后的逻辑并不只是情绪。不同组合可能押注同一套增长预期,波动上升又会触发类似的风控和去杠杆;某些情况下,期权对冲会进一步放大卖压,而真正愿意承接的买盘恰恰在这时减少。消息触发第一轮下跌,价格变化本身又触发下一轮卖出。 如果这些结构性因素持续存在,快速、剧烈的调整就可能反复出现。 虽然我是基本只看基本面,但是这种波动显然可以有更多思考,我觉得很难去做高抛低吸(我从来不认为能预判市场),但是可以考虑稳定的交波动税,上涨的时候少赚,下跌的时候少跌,税的含义是一定要交,而不是指望不交。但是综合长期看收益上有优化。
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40% 的国债,依然跌的很惨,又到了重新回来的时候,准备加仓 $intc $NBIS
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$SKHY $MU 我一直说内存股最大的问题就是Could not be better,英伟达就经历了长时间的盘整,每一次证明自己后又回到下次还能更好吗,毛利率的见顶会让营收增速看起来可能相对线性。而在一个上涨但是又分化的市场里,更容易受到挤压,但这是一个会偏长期的alpha机会。 BTW,$AMD 继续新高,成为账户的第一大持仓
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下次突破不考虑AI整体的发展抬升(例如personal Agent的大规模渗透提升)可能要等到大规模现金回购落地
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市场的波动越来越大了,但是基本都是坏消息,真一些问题解决的时候,会有剧烈的轧空。 重要的还是回到估值,并清楚了解 ai 现在的进展以及将来的进展所会影响的上下游。目前整个市场对 ai 还是太低估了 $mu
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互联网时代,c 端最好的商业模式只有广告
谷歌真的让我很不解,发自内心的提问: Gmail 是免费的 Chrome 是免费的 Android 是免费的 Search 是免费的 Maps 是免费的 而谷歌去年一整年赚了 4000 亿美元!! 谁告诉我这到底是为什么?
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市场上泡沫声音一直有,很多其实已经被证伪但是确实,我只要坚持说,未来一定会来。巨大的新需求新的技术范式带来的巨大变革,其实有泡沫才是健康,泡沫代表了资本投入,才有可能把这个需求做起来。 对比历史来看,ai 和互联网的那波区别巨大,ai 更像制造业,相比工业革命,但是前端需求增长快,后端产能却还是有物理限制,错配时间我认为还很久
这家伙把我屏蔽了,我觉得未来某一个时间点,算力的供给一定会超过需求,市场不可能控制好这个节奏,就像美联储加息周期很难软着陆一样,总会加过头,未来肯定会有泡沫。 但是不是代表一年前就开始唱空?我也可以说AI有泡沫,一直说一直说,直到泡沫破裂了,有句话叫“如果你时间线错了,即使方向看对了还是错” 这家伙过去10年62%回报,标普2.7倍;现在做LONG SHORT, LONG INDEX SHORT 个股。反正AI泡沫破裂,他赢嘛了,反正一直在唱空,AI泡沫没破裂前,他LONG INDEX。还不如骗订阅费的MICHAEL BURRY透明。
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看一些博主周末看到点坏消息说周五早就止盈,标榜自己判断有多对,周一一看已经早就 all in,为什么永赚博主这么多粉丝还有付费会员?
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