MantisClone (@MantisClone) header
MantisClone (@MantisClone) profile picture

Engineering Lead / Scrum Master | Blockchain and Payments

Cleveland, OH
Joined July 2011
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How @Opolis works for me: * Employer of Record for proving income and taking loans * Payroll Processor to simplify tax and compliance * Benefits Bundler for lower costs via collective bargaining * Limit Liability by separating business and personal * Diversify Income streams
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MantisClone retweeted
Several websites were compromised yesterday, and some of them remain compromised still. We recommend to not use too many crypto related websites for the time being. If you already interacted with one of the compromised websites, make sure to check for any unexpected approvals. And check out the Revoke Sidekick extension in partnership with Fairside that simulates transactions before signing them, which can really make a difference for these kind of hacks.
⚠️How can you tell a DNS is Hijacked when you visit an official website?..⚠️ At least 12+ domains got hijacked last night, serving wallet drainer code on their official website.. All but 5 have now moved their DNS to Vercel/Cloudflare to mitigate and those 5 are still compromised, DO NOT VISIT! The URL can be 100% correct, but the website you're visiting can still be malicious. This compromise did not break anything from the teams flow, setup, compromise anything they did, it appears someone inside name(.)com (The registrar) change the nameservers to the domains. If you use them as a registrar I would consider moving away and at minimum setup cloudflare for hosting/filtering. If you are a user, there really isn't a way to detect this unless you are checking WhoIs, DNS updates, ASN numbers, and many more which most don't. The only way to tell is that when you go to the website it will ask for your seed phrase/private key, or prompt you to sign an odd transaction. The transaction part is tough to spot which is why I recommend always using @RevokeCash extension to help spot this for you with the transaction simulator... If you are a business and not using cloudflare, let's talk, this is basic proper security on domains outside of domain lock, etc. You have to be prepared ahead of time to prevent/mitigate this in an instance moment! Stay Safe & Stay Vigilant
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‼️ New TeamViewer vulnerability (CVE-2026-111585) flips the script... the machine you connect to can attack YOUR computer. No click needed beyond accepting the session. Researcher got code running on a stock Windows viewer — default settings, defenses on. Here's how the attack works ↓ thehackernews.com/2026/10/te…
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MantisClone retweeted
Update following the Binance incident: All markets are now unfrozen across Aave V3 and V4. They were frozen as a precaution after initial reports, which paused new deposits and borrows while withdrawals and repayments continued as normal. Aave contracts were unaffected by the incident and positions remained fully collateralized.
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MantisClone retweeted
Aave protocol will be fine. The hacker supplied 60M USDT and borrowed 19,762 wETH (~44.9M$) in 3 minutes, before Tether froze their address and before the Aave Guardian froze the Aave V3 Core reserves (46 min later). But USDT is real money backed by dollars, and the position is criminal but overcollateralized in the eyes of the protocol: health factor 1.04, 59.9M$ of collateral against 44.9M$ of debt. Sure, we now have a large borrower with little incentive to repay their loan, but liquidations work as usual: if ETH goes above ~2,365$ (+4%), the position gets liquidated like any other. The Aave V3 Core wETH reserve is 2.16M wETH, so the hacker's debt is "only" 0.9% of it as I'm writing this. I don't think Aave needs to take specific action against the hacker. 345k wETH is available right now (81.6% utilization), so wETH liquidity is sufficient if wETH depositors want to withdraw There's no reason or need for a bank run. The situation is much less dire than during the Kelp hack (zero-value collateral), and we should not expect a re-run of "DeFi United". On paper, a governance proposal could force-liquidate the hacker by upgrading the Pool to target this single position (lowering the USDT liquidation threshold would hit every USDT supplier), but I see no real upside in doing that as normal liquidation can eat this up without sweat. The reserves are frozen now, but no need to panic; you can repay and withdraw. This isn't the first time this has happened, and it won't be the last, and Aave is still there. Just another day in crypto.
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MantisClone retweeted
Binance has begun recovering affected assets for users and continues to work with law enforcement, issuers, blockchain intelligence firms and industry partners to trace, freeze and recover additional funds. The company has already publicly committed to cover losses through company funds in the prior announcement. Binance has already reserved over $6.34B of company funds to cover this incident. $5B of these funds are already held in the exact token assets that were impacted. We are completing the purchase of the remaining amount by buying token assets through market channels and OTC channels. We are doing this to match the format of the remaining token assets and address any asset shortfalls. This step can take longer because some tokens may have low liquidity and OTC settlement also takes time. We will share more progress as soon as we can. These figures do not include frozen or protected assets, which remain subject to ongoing recovery and verification. Currently, $3bn has been frozen, with thanks to our industry partners. We are working with partners and law enforcement to recover the frozen assets.We will continue to use company resources to cover confirmed shortfall and will provide further verified updates as recovery efforts progress. Ultimately, all user funds will be verified publicly through our Proof of Reserves. We will weather this storm. Thank you for the support.
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MantisClone retweeted
Reading the reconstructed bytecode of the Binance EIP-7702 sweeper (`0x63e8...6fae`) is wild. This wasn't a generic drainer. It was custom-engineered for Binance 14's architecture: - Leaves exactly 1 ether behind (`bal - 1 ether`) when sweeping ETH so Binance's automated hot wallet queue wouldn't error on gas and trip alarms. - Uses raw `staticcall` + `continue` loops with custom error codes (`SweepItemFailed`) so one bricked or blacklisted ERC-20 wouldn't revert the $6B batch. - Includes a custom `callExecute` function to impersonate Binance 14 as controller of an external vault holding $823M in USDC. They leave a comment: "robberies could be prevented if getaway cars were slower." You can't fully blame EIP-7702, but it sped up the attack. Without 7702, draining 64 tokens plus an external $823M vault from a live exchange hot wallet meant fighting moving nonces across 70+ transactions. Defense systems would've killed it after tx #3. With 7702, Lazarus sprayed 50 consecutive nonces in one type-4 payload, turned an EOA into a custom proxy, and atomically swept billions in a single block. Ethereum core devs built the ultimate getaway car. Surgical state-sponsored engineering. This could be etched onchain: `if (bal > 1 ether) { to.call{value: bal - 1 ether}(""); }`
The Binance $5.6B drain is a masterclass in modern EVM exploitation. It wasn't a complex logic bug. It was an EIP-7702 delegation hijack: 1. Setup: Attacker funds 0x7c86 via Tornado Cash, deploys a sweep contract (0x63e8), and runs three live dry-runs on external wallets. 2. Execution: Attacker submits an EIP-7702 batch with 50 pre-signed authorizations (nonce n to n+49) to hit Binance 14's moving nonce window. 3. One authorization hits. Instantly, Binance 14 (an EOA) is reprogrammed to run the attacker's contract bytecode. 4. Execution looks totally organic: Binance 14 sweeps itself clean. Internal threshold alerts don't trigger because, from the nodes' perspective, the hot wallet is just executing its own transaction. 5. Binance 16 immediately auto-refills 28,000 ETH due to automated treasury rebalance scripts, feeding the exploit loop. The cold truth: you cannot forge an EIP-7702 delegation list. For this to execute, the attacker already held the raw private key or unconstrained signing access to Binance 14's HSM/KMS. But hey, 5.64 billion drained across ETH, BTC, and Tron. 2.54 billion frozen by Tether, Circle, Ripple, and World Liberty within hours. Code is law until the stablecoin admin keys log in. Binance got bailed out by the very centralized choke points the cypherpunks warned you about. Hardware wallets leak your home address. Centralized exchanges leak the keys to the kingdom. Self-custody on native, non-delegated chains remains the only honest baseline. At least you know what to avoid.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The quoted comment appears only in an AI-reconstructed source (explicitly labeled not original) uploaded to explorers; no source comments exist in deployed bytecode, and core features match independent decompilations/on-chain data. etherscan.io/address/0x63e8… gist.wavey.info/Ta3FgAxastgj42… x.com/thearsondragon…
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MantisClone retweeted
I want to speak to you directly about what happened. Bottom line - your money is safe, and we're covering every loss. Our initial investigation suggests this security incident may have started with a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop. That gave an attacker access to a service container, where they submitted unauthorized withdrawal transactions. To be clear: the attacker did not simply use one engineer's permissions, and this was not a single "one-click" action. It involved a more complex attack process. Our investigation has not attributed responsibility to any individual. So far, we have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak. We'll share a detailed technical post-mortem once the investigation is complete and every fact is verified - and publish an updated Proof of Reserves once remediation is complete. What you need to know: • Your funds are safe • Binance will cover all losses from the SAFU fund and company funds • Estimated total impact: ~$6.3B, with ~$3B frozen on-chain so far, in coordination with our blockchain partners • No evidence of any wallet private key leak • Deposits are unaffected and operating as normal What we've done: • Temporarily suspended withdrawals while we complete a security revamp of the withdrawal service and its related addresses • Revoked the affected address authorizations • Engaged law enforcement and blockchain intelligence partners to trace and recover funds Our team hasn't stopped. We're working closely with law enforcement to ensure the matter is handled appropriately - and I'll share what I can, as soon as I can.
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Quick notes on 7702 to dispel fud and keep your funds safe. First thing first -- 7702 itself isn't broken. Don't panic if you are using a wallet that supports 7702 (MetaMask, Uniswap, Ambire, etc.). To recap, 7702 is an account abstraction EIP that allows an EOA to sign a special message, called a "7702 authorization," that would insert a smart contract into the account, which enables the account to do powerful things like transaction batching, e.g. doing "approve" and "transfer" in one transaction so you can swap on Uniswap with one click. But unfortunately the same feature also allows a hacker to efficiently move all your tokens in one single transaction. In the Binance hack, the hacker moved ETH, USDT, and 62 other tokens in one transaction, whereas without 7702 they'd have had to send one transaction per token. In this particular case, many of those transactions would've failed because Binance was still using the hacked wallet for withdrawals, so all transactions sent by the hacker would've had to compete with the legit transactions for nonces. So using 7702 did help the hacker steal as much funds as possible, as quickly as possible. Ouch! However, in order for the hacker to use 7702, they must have either 1) had access to the private key, or 2) tricked Binance into signing a 7702 authorization. The latter is very unlikely, as it's hard to imagine Binance being so incompetent as to expose an endpoint for signing 7702 authorizations or (even worse) for signing raw messages which the hacker could've repurposed for 7702 authorizations. But I can't rule that out until the official postmortem. What does all this mean for you? - If you are a wallet developer, do NOT, under any circumstances, expose a way for third parties to request 7702 authorizations. This is just handing your users a giant footgun to shoot themselves with. No wallets I know of do this, so don't worry if you are a user. - If you are a user, use a well-known wallet. 7702 does let wallet developers screw up in more ways than before, so use only well-known wallets whose developers' competence you can trust. - If you are a company (e.g. an exchange) operating hot wallets, do NOT, under any circumstances, expose an endpoint (even if it's an internal endpoint) for signing 7702 authorizations or raw messages. As a contributor to AA, I feel partially responsible for hacks like this, since by increasing the power of accounts, we've indeed also empowered hackers (not unlike how any new technology empowers both the good guys and the bad guys). That said, it's important to note that 7702 was only a transitional EIP, and "endgame AA" such as Frame Transactions (EIP-8141) would allow wallet owners to set up their wallets much more securely. For example, if Frame Transactions were available today, Binance could've: - Set up their wallets as multisig contracts only (not EOAs). - Set up "post conditions" for their `transfer()` functions, so that even if the multisig got hacked, the contract itself would perform sanity checks such as "no transfers of more than 1000 ETH without additional signers." In short, the endgame of Ethereum UX is one with both optimal security and optimal UX, and users never have to trade off between the two. But we still have a long way to go until we get there. Back to work!
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The orchestrator dashboard is live today. It gives payment platforms one place to run stablecoin payments across their whole merchant base without relying on their tech team. From the dashboard, your team can: • Onboard merchants through a white-label flow that carries your brand • Customize every payment page with your branding or the merchant's • Monetize every transaction, and set custom fee per merchant • Enforce their standard or custom KYT rules to screen wallets, or let each merchant choose its own screening provider and rules. • Give the team access to the day-to-day, while only the super admin controls sensitive settings. • See every connected merchant in one list, with its status. Compliance managers see the KYT rules applied to each merchant. Payment managers see their entire merchant base. Everything sits in one place. The orchestrator dashboard is live today, try it out. Read the announcement: request.network/request-netw…
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MantisClone retweeted
Many of you don't understand how serious this is, so let me break it down. In computer science there is a famous kind of puzzle called 3-SAT. You are given a long list of yes-or-no switches and a set of rules about how they must be arranged, and you have to find a combination that satisfies every rule. The obvious way to solve it is to try every combination, but each new switch doubles the number of possibilities, so a puzzle with a few hundred switches would take longer than the age of the universe to brute force. For decades, the smartest people in the field found clever tricks that made this a little faster, but every trick still hit the same wall: the time required kept exploding as the puzzle grew. About 25 years ago, two computer scientists, Russell Impagliazzo and Ramamohan Paturi, working with Francis Zane, turned that wall into a formal idea. They proposed the Exponential Time Hypothesis, which says this explosion is not a failure of human cleverness but a law of nature. No algorithm, however brilliant, will ever solve 3-SAT without the time blowing up exponentially. Nobody could prove it, but almost everyone believed it, and it became one of the foundations of modern computer science. Researchers used it as a measuring stick. If you could show that solving some other problem quickly would also crack 3-SAT quickly, you had shown that problem was hopelessly hard too. Hundreds of papers, across scheduling, graphs, logic and much more, rest on this one assumption. Now an internal AI model at OpenAI claims to have broken it. It says it found an algorithm that solves these puzzles meaningfully faster than the hypothesis allows, and it has checked the proof in a computer verification system called Lean. And here is the remarkable part: the very people who proposed the hypothesis, Impagliazzo and Paturi, along with MIT's Ryan Williams, are now leading the public review of whether a machine has disproved their own idea. So what happens next? If the disproof holds, a large part of theoretical computer science has to be revisited. Every result that said "this problem cannot be solved faster, assuming ETH" loses its foundation, and researchers will have to work out which of those walls were real and which were simply where we stopped looking. It does not mean everything becomes easy. The new algorithm is still slow in absolute terms and this is not the famous P versus NP problem being solved. But it means our map of what is possible was wrong in a place we were very confident about, and it was an AI that redrew it. If the disproof fails, the hypothesis survives and the field breathes out, but we will still have watched an AI produce serious, checkable work on one of the deepest questions in the discipline, closely enough that the founders of the idea had to take it seriously. Either way, something has shifted.
An internal model at OpenAI has produced a claimed refutation of ETH! Russell Impagliazzo, Mohan Paturi, and I have been asked to help organize an open and independent examination of this claim. 1/4
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MantisClone retweeted
OK SO I LEARNED WHAT THIS MEANS > imagine you’re planning a dinner with 30 friends. > One friend refuses to come if their ex is there. > Two friends say they will only come if their crushes are also invited. > Someone else wants to bring their dog sitter and clavicular > everyone has some stupid condition. > as the organizer, your job is now to find a guest list that makes everyone happy. Sounds simple enough right? … No. > There are over A BILLION possible guest lists, and every extra person DOUBLES the possibilities. > For 25 years, scientists basically believed that certain problems like this had no real shortcut. > As these problems get bigger, they become INSANELY harder to solve. They called this the Exponential Time Hypothesis, or ETH. Anyways: > OpenAI is now claiming that it’s AI found a mathematical shortcut that proves this belief is WRONG. “Alright Binji, but why should I care?” Because If we discover better shortcuts, we could eventually solve problems that were previously too expensive or difficult to tackle. But while we wait for it to be proven fully, this affects us in another major way: AI may just have figured out something that the smartest humans in this field couldn’t solve for over 25 years. And, to put icing on the mathematical cake: two of the guys who originally came up with the theory are now helping review the Ai’s work. Anyway, I studied econ and cog sci so don’t quote me on this, just thought I’d try to explain it since it’s making the rounds.
An internal model at OpenAI has produced a claimed refutation of ETH! Russell Impagliazzo, Mohan Paturi, and I have been asked to help organize an open and independent examination of this claim. 1/4
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‼️ UPDATE - Tailscale confirms the Tailworm SSH flaws are real. Its new investigation page says most of what it found is privilege escalation and calls the issues “serious.” Fix targeted within 24 hours — no CVE or patched version out yet. Mitigate now: → Set TS_SSH_DISABLE_FORWARDING=1 in the tailscaled service and restart → Tighten SSH access rules to the users/devices that need them Read: thehackernews.com/2026/10/un…
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You wouldn’t believe how many startup CEOs I talk to who would be royally screwed if one of their vendors got hacked. A few months ago, this wouldn’t have mattered for most startups. But we’re entering cyber armageddon. This is going to happen to you. It’s just a question of when. The good part is that it’s very manageable. You just need the right mindset and a few processes in place before anything happens. Here’s what I’d be thinking about today. First (don’t kill me): do you have cyber insurance? And the real question: have you ever actually talked to your broker about using it? I know this is the last thing you want to deal with, and it’s boring as hell. But please, please call them and make them walk you through it. If your cloud provider gets breached tomorrow, who do you call? What help do they arrange? What needs their approval? What do you pay out of pocket? Get the actual phone number, and save it somewhere you can reach if your work email is down. Then figure out if your lawyer handles breaches. If they don’t, ask who does and get introduced. Find out how hiring them works with your insurance. You want to know this person exists before you need them. Next, pull up your customer contracts, especially the big ones. What did you agree to tell them if something happened? You’d think every CEO would know this by heart. Almost none of them do. What triggers a notification, and who’s supposed to get it? Have someone qualified work through it with you, right now. You might have agreed to something eight months ago and forgotten. Someone at the customer may remember, and if they do and you don’t, you could be very liable. One angry customer with a contract claim can be enough to sink a startup. Same deal with any security questionnaires you filled out. What did you say you do? Are you doing it? Is it still true? Then come the business problems. How long could your product be down before you have a real cash problem? What if a big customer pauses payment while you’re also paying outside help? Run the numbers and see where things get uncomfortable. And who can spend money in an emergency? If everything needs your approval and you’re asleep or on a plane, what happens? Who can take the product offline? This came up in the replies to my last post. Rotating keys can mean an outage, and someone has to decide whether to accept it. Figure out who has that authority before it matters. Who talks to customers while your engineers are busy? Give that job to one person and make sure they get accurate updates. Otherwise your engineers are investigating while answering the same question from five people. You can draft the bones of those updates now: what we know, what we’re checking, what you need to do, when we’ll update you next. Leave room for uncertainty, and don’t promise things you haven’t confirmed (this happens more often than you think, and can get you in hot water). Have someone keep a timeline: facts, times, decisions, things you tried that didn’t work. Everyone will be tired and distracted. You will forget. And where does all of this live? If your plan, contracts, and contacts are all behind the login that’s down, you have a second problem. Try reaching what you’d need without your normal work setup. Make damn sure you can (offline copies are useful here). Take a look at what you’re exposing, too. Old customer files, exports, recordings, and especially whatever your agents can access. Do you need all of it? Who decided to keep it? Who knows everything you’ve connected, what your agents do during an investigation, and where they’re sending information? Someone needs to own those questions, because every piece of it is future work if something goes wrong. Then practice. Sit down with whoever would be involved and walk through it. At some point everyone will look at each other and nobody will know the answer. Write that down, and start there. Bookmark this so you have it when you need it.
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I used to be the person companies called after they got hacked. And I noticed something early on. The hack almost never sank them. The cover-up did. Every time, the team’s instinct was the same: wait until we know more, wait until we're sure, wait until we have the perfect statement, etc. And some of the biggest companies in the world have learned what that waiting costs. In 2016, Uber got hacked. Instead of telling anyone, it paid the hackers $100K to delete the data and stay quiet, and labeled it a bug bounty. The truth came out a year later. Uber paid $148M to settle with all 50 states, and its former security chief was criminally convicted. That same year, Yahoo revealed that a 2014 breach had exposed 500M accounts. The news landed in the middle of Verizon buying the company. Verizon cut $350M off the price. And in 2017, Equifax discovered a breach affecting over 140M Americans, then waited 40 days to tell the public. During that window, an executive who'd figured out what happened sold nearly $1M in stock. He went to prison for insider trading. Meanwhile, hackers don't wait. They post your data. They email your customers directly. And when customers hear it from a stranger first, that trust is gone for good. Telling customers early doesn't mean admitting fault. It can be as simple as: "We found suspicious activity. We're investigating. Here's what you should do right now. We'll update you as we learn more." On Tuesday, I'm sharing the exact framework I'd use to write that email if I were in your shoes. Follow and turn on notifications so it's there when you need it. Customers will forgive you for getting hacked. Most of them expect it by now. What they won't forgive is finding out you knew and said nothing.
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🚨 850+ compromised GitHub accounts. 13,500+ malicious branches. Researchers uncovered 'Gheist,' an ongoing campaign using stolen tokens to plant GitHub Actions workflows that dump private repo secrets into logs. Attackers download the logs, then delete the runs. Details: thehackernews.com/2026/10/gh…
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🚨 UPDATE: The Brotli flaw (CVE-2026-111497) goes beyond Node.js and web traffic. • .NET: patched by Microsoft • FFmpeg: hit via a crafted JPEG XL image • ClickHouse: one request crashes it, fix not yet released • Apache Arrow: no fix yet Details ↓ thehackernews.com/2026/10/br…
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Never seen a more flagrant and violent breach of privacy in my life, and probably never will. Doubtful that a privacy violation will ever even be able to compare to the scale of this evil and deliberate attack. Samsung should be eviscerated for this. Criminal charges please
turns out it classifies what audio it hears, before reporting back to samsung. sensor preferences, dog-barking and baby-crying event counters, and camera streaming duration are built into telemetry paths.
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MantisClone retweeted
banned for reverse engineering work? that’s wild oh well, -$500, and a bunch of banked resets) but gained motivation to get 3 more machines and finish my cluster. i have never used openai to exploit or find vulnerabilities, only local reverse engineering which tripped daybreak.
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