Michael J Murphy (@MidlifePlaylist) header
Michael J Murphy (@MidlifePlaylist) profile picture

History, Photography

Washington, D.C.
Joined March 2015
Photo by Michael J Murphy (@MidlifePlaylist)Photo by Michael J Murphy (@MidlifePlaylist)Photo by Michael J Murphy (@MidlifePlaylist)Photo by Michael J Murphy (@MidlifePlaylist)
"The Luhansk Oblast occupation administration appears to be pursuing limited bilateral cooperation with Republika Srpska... On November 7, two universities in occupied Luhansk Oblast - St. Luke’s State Medical University and Vladimir Dahl State University - signed a cooperation agreement with the University of East Sarajevo, Republika Srpska. Republika Srpska Minister of Scientific and Technological Development and Higher Education Draga Mastilović attended and oversaw the agreement’s signing and told TASS that Republika Srpska is “fully open” and “ready for cooperation” with universities in occupied Luhansk Oblast." Why exactly is Republika Srpska and the University of East Sarajevo signing cooperation agreements with the illegal occupying administration in Ukraine?!? And why with an institution - Vladimir Dahl University - which, as ISW notes, has integrated military drone training for students into its curriculum? The willful blindness to the danger posed by Mr. Dodik and his agenda to American interests in BiH by the current administration beggar's belief. It verges on the comical that the administration continues to claim that it has Mr. Dodik "under control", and it is increasingly difficult to accept at face value its claims to care about BiH's stability and territorial integrity.
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I gather that Republika Srpska considers the BiH decision to join the United States in voting against the UN resolution to be a bad decision. Republika Srpska apparently would have much preferred BIH vote against the United States and in favor of a resolution that is a Russian disinformation and propaganda tool. Important safety tip follows: if you don’t want people to see you as a Russian proxy, don’t act like one.
БиХ је у УН гласала ПРОТИВ резолуције о борби против величања нацизма и неонацизма. Ко је донио такву одлуку? На основу чијих инструкција и уз чију сагласност је Мисија БиХ при УН тако гласала? Спољна политика БиХ није приватна политика сарајевског политичког кружока. Дипломатија која заступа искључиво ставове сарајевских бошњачких политичких кругова није и не може бити званична спољна политика БиХ.
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Mr. Dodik doubles down on his effort to embarrass his U.S. interlocutors by again discussing the deal he cut with the administration to have the High Representative removed and sanctions against him lifted. The administration has sought to portray its actions in BiH as a successful diplomatic effort to resolve the country's political crisis and keep BiH stable. Mr. Dodik's comments make the administration look inept, and they raise questions about whether something more dangerous to U.S. interests is driving the administration's policy. Is Mr. Dodik's goal to provide the new Congress with ammunition for the anticipated oversight hearings on U.S. BiH policy?
“Look at the very way that cretin [former High Representative Christian] #Schmidt was thrown out of 🇧🇦," Milorad #Dodik said in an interview this morning after he returned from a Mar-a-Lago #MAGA event, where according to him he also met 🇩🇪 AfD parliamentarians. Dodik claims that Schmidt "was complaining in certain circles that I was the one who did it. That flatters me." He explained it was not him alone since his own approach would have been not to "just quietly let him slip into a car and leave." Dodik explained that he "contributed something at one point, when we had the chance to resolve some important matters. And then we said: 'yes, but what about Schmidt?' And then they said, well, what about him? He has to go. When? Immediately, as far as we're concerned. So we agreed to do it but later. And it was done. So it wasn't without our influence."
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A few thoughts on what the midterm elections might mean for U.S. BiH policy. 1) The Democrats will control Congress, but the preponderance of power over foreign policy in the U.S. system rests with the Executive Branch. So, unless the administration decides to adjust course after the midterms, the expectation should be for continuity. There is unhappiness among voters with the administration’s embrace of American adversaries, such as Russia, and its attacks on American allies. The new Congress may use its limited authority over foreign policy to address this, but expect the focus to be on NATO, especially Canada (see below), and Ukraine, not the Western Balkans. Mr. Dodik is a Russian proxy, one of the many reasons the administration’s support for him is so misguided, but at this point, there is little reason to believe the administration’s tilt towards Dodik will change. This makes a swift return of sanctions against him unlikely. 2) Congress will assert itself early on Iran and tariffs, not least because both touch upon cost of living in the U.S. Voters sent a clear message that they were unhappy with the administration’s failure to bring down the cost of living after the inflation of the Biden years. On Iran, Congress will have to be mindful of the key political lesson from Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal (i.e., voters wanted out, “but not like that”). The vast majority of Americans are baffled by the administration’s trade war with Canada, and Congress’ action on tariffs will probably start here. The administration’s policy in BiH, as bad as it is, does not impact the cost of living in the U.S. The pressure for a change in BiH policy will have to come from elsewhere, and the Western Balkans has not been a “first order” foreign policy concern since the 1990s. If the administration “digs in” on BiH policy, and it may, then the countervailing pressure against it will have to be significant. 3) Voters were unhappy with corruption, and the new Congress will make corruption part of its oversight of administration policies, including foreign policy. Congressman Keating, now poised to chair the House Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Europe, will almost certainly hold oversight hearings on the administration’s Western Balkans policy that he promised earlier this year. I am skeptical these will uncover the corruption some analysts have claimed is driving U.S. BiH policy, but we’ll see. Regardless, these hearings are probably months away. Botton line: The midterms are unlikely to produce big change in U.S. BiH policy, at least in the near-term.
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Here are a few thoughts on OHR’s 70th Report to the UNSC and the U.S. reaction to it. If anyone thought OHR would pull its punches because it is led by an American “controlled” by the administration, the report proves them wrong. OHR’s 70th Report to the UNSC makes a tight, clear, and concise case about the dangers Mr. Dodik’s rhetoric and actions continue to pose to the DPA and BiH’s territorial integrity. This raises fundamental questions about the administration’s claims that it has Mr. Dodik “under control.” It doesn’t, it hasn’t, and the Report proved the point. Despite this, the administration did not attack the Acting High Representative or the Report. It did the opposite and praised Lou Crishock’s work. In other words, the administration did not embrace Mr. Dodik’s or Ms. Cvijanovic’s criticisms of the OHR or the Report, which were ridiculous – the usual sound and fury designed to throw a smoke screen over their own bad behavior. The two cannot make credible fact-based arguments about the situation in BiH because the facts do not support their claims. Nonetheless, BiH-based analysts would be wise not to read too much into this. Mr. Dodik’s attacks on OHR are not going to prompt a rethink in the administration about its BiH policy. That’s in part because the administration wants OHR closed. This has been the goal of every administration since 2008, when the PIC laid out its 5+2 conditions for OHR’s closure. OHR could have closed years ago if its political leaders had taken a more constructive approach to implementing the 5+2 conditions. The lion’s share of the blame for this failure rests with Mr. Dodik. The sad fact is BiH has regressed since 2008, which means BiH is not “closer than ever to fulfilling the fulfilling the promise of the Dayton Accords,” as the administration claimed. Those actually making policy in BiH probably know this, but likely don’t care. Unlike their predecessors, they may be prepared to press ahead with closure irrespective of the 5+2 conditions, which would be consistent with the administration’s de facto tilt towards Mr. Dodik. The administration joined the chorus of international voices calling for rapid government formation – at all levels – post-election. This echoes the policy of the U.S. in 2022, a rare point of agreement between the current and previous administration. Long, drawn out government formation processes (or no new governments at all) are not conducive to the peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future inside Euro-Atlantic institutions the U.S. has traditionally sought for BiH. Of course, neither is embracing Mr. Dodik’s world view, something the administration did when it made its deal with him over sanctions relief and the removal of the High Representative. How does the administration square its call for rapid government formation, let alone its claim to support BiH’s territorial integrity, with its embrace of a man, who just this month has declared BiH “dead” and “an impossible country” that “makes no sense?”
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The crash of a EUFOR helicopter in BiH was a tragic reminder of the risks the men and women of EUFOR take to provide for a safe and secure environment in BiH and defend the Dayton Peace Agreement. My heartfelt condolences go out to the victims and their families as well as to the entire EU family in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I am deeply saddened by the loss of lives in an @EUFORAlthea helicopter crash near Brčko, Bosnia and Herzegovina. My thoughts are with the victims, their families and all those affected. EUFOR personnel serve every day to support peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, their work remains vital. I have conveyed my heartfelt condolences to @Antonio_Tajani and @GuidoCrosetto. Europe stands in full solidarity with Italy at this difficult time. We remain in close contact with the EUFOR Commander and our EU representatives on the ground.
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Let’s be clear about what happened in this interview. Mr. Dodik boasts about the 2025 deal he struck with the U.S. administration for it to lift sanctions against him as well as remove Christian Schmidt as High Representative. As Mr. Dodik describes it, his U.S. interlocutors didn’t know what they were doing because they asked him only for the repeal of RSNA legislation that had already been annulled by the BiH Constitutional Court. Mr. Dodik then played on his U.S. interlocutors’ ignorance by making an additional demand – Schmidt’s removal – which American officials accepted. Mr. Dodik’s description makes his U.S. interlocutors look foolish; he essentially makes them look like a bunch of suckers. Mr. Dodik’s assertions also directly undercut the administration’s claims about its negotiating prowess and how its brilliant diplomacy put and an end to BiH’s political crisis. The administration repeated these claims at the September 15 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the administration’s BiH policy. Finally, and to add insult to injury, Mr. Dodik describes how he celebrated his diplomatic triumph over his American interlocutors in Russia. If Mr. Dodik’s intention was to make his new found American friends look like fools, he succeeded. At a minimum, he blew a large whole in their claims about U.S. BiH policy and how it has been made. Mr. Dodik also handed the administration’s critics some terrific material for oversight hearings should they occur after the U.S. mid-terms. This comes on the heels of the American political scandal he just provoked over the visit to Banja Luka by Republican political operatives. What the interview underscores is just how much arrogance Mr. Dodik possesses and how little judgment.
This evening Milorad #Dodik told his side of the story on the negotiations that led to the lifting of 🇺🇸 sanctions and Christian #Schmidt’s resignation, as well as how he celebrated the lifting of 🇺🇸 sanctions in a #Moscow restaurant. Full transcript: Milorad Dodik: "So at one point we told them [Trump administration]: 'You're deceiving us, we don't want this any more — thank you.' They said: 'No, no, we're not deceiving you.' I said: 'If you're not deceiving us, then lift also the sanctions put on me.' Then they said: 'Hold on.' We told them: 'OK, what are you missing?' And then they asked for those two or three laws — the ones the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina had struck down, laws of Republika Srpska. I said: 'Okay, the Court repealed them anyway; we'd have to go back to the assembly and do a lot of other things.' But I said: 'Fine, but that's too little from your side.' So they said: 'How is it small?’ We said ‘It's small.' Then they said: 'What else is needed?' Then I said: 'Get rid of this Schmidt.'" Journalist: “And the Americans listen to you?” 
Dodik: "Well, I don't know if they listen to me, but in any case — he's gone now." Journalist: “And did they kick him out?” 
Dodik: [laughs] "No, no — I don't think they listen to me. Let's just say that circumstances were created." Journalist: “Wait, wait. You say: get rid of that Schmidt — and he leaves, right?” 
Dodik: "Well, circumstances came together." Journalist: “And who told him to go?”
 Dodik: "You know — the one who was supposed to say it." Journalist: “The one with the cap [Donald Trump]?” 
Dodik: "Someone said it. Anyway, when he [Schmidt] went over to America, they told him: 'You've finished your job, you can go straight to Germany.' Then he cried and asked just to go and collect his things in Sarajevo. And that's how it went — he went, picked up his things, and disappeared." Journalist: “What did you drink in Moscow? Do you mix whisky and vodka?”
 Dodik: "We were flying from Minsk to Moscow. When we boarded the plane, there was no talk of it [lifting of sanctions]. We land at Moscow airport. A message comes through: all sanctions lifted. And that's how we found out. And of course, then came the hunt for a good restaurant — and for Serbian music. There was a student of ours there studying music; we gathered them all in one restaurant and celebrated the lifting of the sanctions. That's true. What else could we do? I couldn't wait until I got back to Banja Luka. We had to celebrate..." Journalist: Well, where else?
 Dodik: "[We're] true Serbs." Journalist: “And did you mix whisky and vodka? I'm not asking for no reason.” 
Dodik: "Once I've had a bit to drink, then I no longer [keep track]..." Source: youtu.be/UlJucPz2BW0
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I think if you read the President’s statement about Chris Lacivita’s and James Blair’s trip to Banja Luka, it is pretty clear that the President doesn’t know what Republika Srpska is or where it is, or who Mr. Dodik is. That is a poor return on the 9 million dollars Mr. Dodik spent on lobbyists. And thanks to this scandal, many Americans who support the President and had no idea who Mr. Dodik was now know exactly who Mr. Dodik is: a pro-Russian stooge, who put his interests ahead of the President’s interests at a critical time in the American political calendar. These Americans will now associate this with Republika Srpska. Finally, I think the scandal illuminated for Members of Congress the dangers posed to American interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans of the embrace by some member of this administration of Mr. Dodik and his agenda. At this point, Mr. Dodik might consider retiring and turning over leadership of his party to President Cvjianovic. She is smarter and smoother than he is, and maybe the RS taxpayers would see more of their money spent on services and programs that benefit them rather than spent on Mr. Dodik and his family.
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Here are some quick thoughts about the BiH elections – some winners and losers. Let’s start with the winners. 1. The CEC, Christian Schmidt, and SDA: The CEC’s performance with the introduction of the new election technology was outstanding, especially given efforts by some parties to prevent it from happening (i.e., SNSD and HDZ BiH). There were some glitches, but they were minor. Christian Schmidt made this possible by imposing election integrity reforms in March 2024, over the objections of the EU. It was the right decision. The fact that SDA and the voting public knew of the Bosniak party’s big victory on the same day votes were cast, rather than days or weeks later, was a win for democracy in BiH. 2. Mr. Dodik: SNSD, HDZ BiH, and SDA all had big nights. Still, Mr. Dodik was the biggest winner among the three. Mr. Dodik’s assertion that he owes his success, in part, to the U.S. administration’s change in BiH policy is right. The administration embraced his agenda and helped him climb out of the six foot hole he was in at the end of 2024. This and Mr. Dodik’s win created new dangers to BiH’s territorial integrity. The EU may come to regret its decision to downplay the threat posed by Mr. Dodik and effort to appease him rather than help drive a stake through his heart when it had the opportunity. 3. Mr. Covic: It is sometimes lost in the focus on Mr. Dodik, but Mr. Covic, too, has benefited from the U.S. administration’s shift in policy. His agenda is much more compatible with a U.S. BiH policy driven principally by Christian nationalism. Mr. Covic also knows how to win elections and has for a long time – this, not Christian Schmidt, is what makes him and his party a force in Federation politics. Though his party sought to derail implementation of election integrity technology, its use gives HDZ BiH’s results greater legitimacy than they have enjoyed in the past. Now, for the losers. 1. Bakir Izetbegovic: SDA had a great night, but Mr. Izetbegovic lost his race for the presidency for the second straight election cycle. Voters don’t like him, and that’s not a good look for a party leader. Mr. Covic will embrace Mr. Izetbegovic this time – after complaining bitterly about him and jettisoning him in 2022 – because he sees an untrustworthy Mr. Izetbegovic as a better partner than an obstreperous Troika, which performed poorly, in any case. Mr. Izetbegovic may see this as a lifeline; it shouldn’t be. 2. Civic nationalism: DF may find itself in government at the state and entity levels if Mr. Covic allows it, but the party fared poorly on October 4. Mr. Komsic was forthright about it, which is to his credit. He is also right that the election outcome more broadly says something about the state of “civic BiH.” Mr. Izetbegovic has never been a genuine proponent of a civic BiH despite his posturing over the last several years. That mask could drop completely as Mr. Izetbegovic makes the deals he has to get back into government with Mr. Dodik and Mr. Covic. 3. The EU Perspective: Mr. Dodik has long opposed adoption of the reforms required to advance BiH’s EU aspirations even as he sometimes paid lip service to BIH’s EU perspective. Over the last 18 months, Mr. Dodik was extremely critical of the EU, and this election cycle he actively campaigned against it. That bodes ill for BiH’s EU perspective, assuming the EU remains serious about its own standards. The Law Court will be an early test. Mr. Dodik’s openly anti-EU posture will present challenges for Mr. Covic, who has been able to present himself as pro-European even while drafting in Mr. Dodik’s wake to water down those EU reforms he found objectionable for ethnonationalist or financial reasons.
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It’s not the lobbyists that according to Murphy are the deciding factor. “The current administration,” he believes, “functions as a room where only those who are inside have access to influence. These people are there for ideological reasons, or because they have connections to the region, and the policy that's being pursued flows unfiltered from them - not from an assessment of what is best for U.S. interests.” According to the Bosnian news outlet, Klix, the Americans had prepared his [Landi's] candidature since September or October 2025. Murphy also believes that the plans for Landi’s candidature were planned in advance. “I think, they were already moving in that direction in the summer of 2025,” he says, referring to both the High Representative candidature and the lifted sanctions. USA’s nye venner i Republika Srpska magasinetroest.dk/usas-nye-v…
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In my earlier post (see below), I highlighted three things the Keating report on U.S. BiH policy, released on September 15 by U.S. Congressman Bill Keating, got right. In this post, I highlight three things I think the report got wrong. 1) The report makes headline grabbing claims about corruption driving U.S. policy in BiH, but it fails to prove them. Instead, it justifies this conclusion largely by referencing the administration’s generally unsavory character and pointing to better substantiated allegations of corruption outside of BiH. Perhaps the information gleaned from oversight hearings on BiH policy, which the report promises, will uncover the corruption it claims. We’ll see. 2) The report suffers from a failure of imagination in as much as it attributes the administration’s “Tilt Towards Dodik” to corruption rather than consider that this policy shift represents genuinely held, if terribly misguided and ill-informed, beliefs on the part of administration decision makers. The administration’s right-wing Christian nationalism offers more explanatory power for the embrace of Mr. Dodik (and to a lesser extent Mr. Covic) than corruption. This is also what makes the administration’s policy more dangerous and destabilizing. 3) The report’s take on state property is disappointing. It lacks the detail and nuance required to do the topic justice. While there is certainly a danger that U.S. policy on state property could shift in Mr. Dodik’s direction, it is difficult to imagine how this alone could produce the outcome the report rightly fears, especially since it is the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, not the Bosniak member of the Presidency, that must adopt legislation on state property. There is no prospect that MPs from Bosniak or civic parties will do so, and the report fails to provide a credible scenario under which they might. It is also hard to see any High Representative using the Bonn Powers to resolve state property along Mr. Dodik’s preferred lines, not least because no country on the PIC supports using for Bonn Powers for much of anything.
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The Keating report, released on September 15 by U.S. Congressman Bill Keating, was a welcome addition to the debate over the current U.S. administration’s BiH policy. It is well worth the read. In this post, I highlight three things the Keating report got right. While it got much more right than just these three things, I limited myself to only three to keep this post reasonably short. 1) The report’s claim that the administration’s BiH policy represents a departure from 30-years of bipartisan policy towards BiH is correct. Past administrations had recognized the threat posed by the country’s ethnonationalists to BiH’s territorial integrity, and hence to American interests. Consequently, they sought to defend the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), BiH, and state-level institutions as well as to help shepherd BiH’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. All this is gone. 2) The report is correct that the decision to lift sanctions against Mr. Dodik and his supporters was deeply misguided. Mr. Dodik and his agenda remain the greatest threat to BiH’s territorial integrity. This territorial integrity is the sine non qua for “stability”, a point clear to everyone except those determining U.S. BiH policy. Despite the administration’s decision to lift sanctions, Mr. Dodik has continued with his destabilizing rhetoric, including calls for the dissolution of BiH. Within the last week alone, Mr. Dodik proudly proclaimed he was preparing for RS secession and even Greater Serbia. Rhetoric has consequences, especially in BiH. 3) The report’s accusation that the administration failed to make use of its leverage to ensure long-term compliance by Mr. Dodik to the (terrible) deal it cut with him is spot on. To start with, the administration failed to secure the repeal of all the anti-Dayton, secessionist legislation adopted by the RS under Mr. Dodik, something it conceded during the September 15 HFAC hearing. The administration could and should have done more, but it was in a hurry because those making the decision wanted to lift sanctions on someone whose world view they largely shared. As the report suggests, the administration’s claim that its diplomacy resolved BiH’s crisis are laughable.
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After more than a week of silence, the administration finally had something to say about the recent glorification in Serbia and the Republika Srpska of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladic. It should not have been too difficult to unequivocally condemn the celebration of a man convicted of committing genocide and other war crimes, but for some in Washington, it was. The administration’s statement, provided to Raport.ba, essentially draws a moral equivalency between Mladic’s crimes and all other crimes committed during the 1992-1995 BiH war. The statement was sophomoric and purblind. It is not an open question whether Mladic and others, including elements of the Army of Republika Srpska, committed genocide in and around Srebrenica in July 1995. It has been established well beyond a reasonable doubt by two international tribunals and the forensic evidence. When considered alongside other elements of the administration’s BiH policy, it seems clear that the statement’s historical illiteracy was a choice, not merely a function of the drafters’ ignorance. If there was any doubt about the tilt in this administration’s BiH policy, this statement should dispel it. State Department tells Raport regarding the glorification of war criminal Mladić: Regional stability has been undermined for too long; do not turn the crimes of the 1990s into political theater. raport.ba/iz-state-departmen…
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There has been a tremendous amount of earned criticism for the EU's clumsy handling of the Mladic funeral. Lost in all this furor has been the complete silence of the U.S. administration about Serbia's and Republika Srpska's glorification of a convicted war criminal, a man who was an architect of the genocide that occurred in and around Srebrenica in July 1995. As I noted in my September 4 essay in Oslobodjenje, this is likely because "core U.S. policy towards BiH reflects the views of a few individuals who share, for the most part, Mr. Dodik’s world view." This is something people should find much more alarming than they seem to.
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There has long been an infatuation in both U.S. and EU with the notion that if Serbia is “fixed,” the Western Balkans are fixed. Intellectually, this makes sense. Serbia is the region’s most populous country and largest economy. An abandonment by Serbia of the policies and politics that underpinned the break-up of Yugoslavia coupled with a decisive turn to the West would constitute a positive sea change in the region. However, since the fall of Milosevic, the U.S. and EU effort to “win” Serbia has too often ignored or looked the other way as Serbia engaged in actions detrimental to regional stability, especially in BiH and Kosovo, but also Montenegro. Far too much faith has been placed in the EU carrot’s transformative power, which quite clearly has not worked. Time and time again, the U.S. and the EU have convinced themselves that “this Serbian leader” was different, only to be disappointed. Despite U.S. and EU investment in Serbia, the country remains wedded to its old politics and world view, including many of its dangerous Milosevic era beliefs and its pro-Russian posture. Sadly, it has been much easier for the West to persist in the delusion that Serbia has changed than to come to terms with the need for a policy that treats Serbia as the challenge to Western interests that it is. The Western strategy of fixing Serbia, and by extension fixing all of the Western Balkans, has failed. It is time for a new and different approach.
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“Core U.S. policy towards BiH reflects the views of a few individuals who share, for the most part, Mr. Dodik’s world view (or for those with affinities to BiH’s Croats, Mr. Covic’s)… New people could mean new policies, especially in an administration where personality and policy are more tightly intertwined than in most… but success isn’t possible if policy is not tied to a hard-nosed assessment of U.S. interests. This means support for the DPA, for BiH as a state, and for BiH institutions. An embrace of Mr. Dodik’s, Mr. Covic’s, or Mr. Izetbegovic’s ethnonationalism will be self-defeating, even if the embrace is gussied up with the label “stability.”” MICHAEL J. MURPHY: Kakva je politika SAD-a prema Bosni i Hercegovini? oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/kolum…
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There have been numerous “think pieces” written about Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) over the last 12 months or so, much of them by lobbyists paid to peddle ethnonationalist mythology, misinformation about BiH, its history, and the Republika Srpska, and legal fantasies that would not survive an encounter with a mock court for first year law students, but this “think piece” is by far the most “insane” as @LukeDCoffey aptly put it. But, hey, a couple members of the BiH Presidency may want to give some of its ideas a try by putting forward a decision for BiH to recognize Kosovo and another offering the United States a base in BiH. American forces could return to Tuzla, where they operated for years after the 1992-1995, or set up shop in Brcko. Both would be timely.
🇧🇦 An op-ed in the Washington Examiner, shared by Bosnian Serb officials, calls for: - the US to “let” Bosnia and Herzegovina collapse - President Trump to recognize Republika Srpska (RS) as a country - US support for RS to become a functional country like Kosovo - the Pentagon to build a base near Banja Luka - mutual recognition between Kosovo 🇽🇰 and RS - RS to replicate Kosovo’s pro-American strategic orientation - both Kosovo and RS to become “Major Non-NATO Allies” of the US
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The EU and the OSCE are correct, the harassment of individuals associated with the Srebrenica Memorial Center by RS authorities is concerning, something the United States would have once recognized, but oddly, it has remained silent. Perhaps this shouldn’t come as a surprise when the U.S. no longer seems capable of making a clear statement acknowledging the 1995 Srebrenica genocide or condemning a Serbian minister’s endorsement of ethnic cleansing. That’s not “rebalancing” or ending “nation building”. That’s something much worse and more dangerous.
The @eubih and @OSCEBiH on developments related to the questioning of individuals who are or were professionally engaged with the Srebrenica Memorial Centre🔽
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Tomorrow, July 11, people from around the world will gather at the Potocari Memorial Center in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to commemorate the genocide that took place in and around Srebrenica in July 1995, and families will gather there to bury loved ones who were victims of that genocide. The world has an obligation to remember the tragic events that unfolded after the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) overran Srebrenica, a town the international community had promised it would protect. What happened after the now-convicted war criminal Ratko Mladic strutted down Srebrenica’s main street has been established beyond a shadow of a doubt by forensic evidence and two international tribunals: elements of Mladic’s forces systematically killed more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in what was the most horrific war crime to take place in Europe since World War 2. Those who choose to remain silent about what took place in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 do not erase it from history, but their silence reflects poorly on them by, among other things, lending aid and comfort to those who deny the Srebrenica genocide. Their silence facilitates efforts by genocide deniers in BiH to avoid their responsibility to acknowledge the facts, teach the truth to future generations, honor the victims, locate, recover, and identify the missing, and investigate and prosecute the suspects who still walk free. Genocide denial is a cancer on the body politic of BiH, and it is metastasizing. The only road to a future that reconciles the people of BiH, that heals and binds their wounds, and that guarantees a just and lasting peace for the children and grandchildren of those who suffered and died between 1992 and 1995, is acknowledgement of the Srebrenica genocide and the other horrible war crimes that occurred in BiH. I extend my deepest condolences and sympathies to the families of the victims of the Srebrenica genocide.
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It was a terrific evening of soccer in the United States. I was happy to see the U.S. team come away with a win but sad to see BIH knocked out of the tournament. I would have preferred to see the two teams meet in the finals. Regardless, the BIH team’s performance in its qualifying round and World Cup matches was inspiring. I hope everyone in BiH - from Sarajevo to Mostar to Banja Luka - is proud of what they accomplished.
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