Milosh (@MiloshOffical) profile picture

THE GLOBAL LEDGER | Markets. Money. Geopolitics Independent analysis of the forces shaping global financial markets, economic policy and international affairs.

📍Belgrade, London, Moscow
Joined April 2025
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😂 @MarioBojic blocked me? So much for the Student List’s grand commitment to the “freedom of the press” and open debate. Apparently, freedom of expression is sacred right up until someone expresses an opinion you can’t handle. Imagine wanting to lead a country but being unable to handle a comment on social media. If you can’t survive a disagreement on X, how exactly do you plan to survive parliamentary scrutiny, hostile interviews, or the responsibility of governing Serbia? You don’t defend democracy by blocking criticism. You demonstrate that your commitment to free speech comes with conditions. The Student List wants the keys to Serbia, but its representatives can’t even handle the comments section. Imagine handing them the country. 🇷🇸
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Students in Name Only: The Student List’s Sudden Courtship of Europe There is something increasingly difficult to ignore about the political evolution of Serbia’s so-called Student List (@studentblokade). For months, the blockade movement (@studentblokade) has presented itself as a student-led uprising, claiming moral authority through the language of youth, civic resistance and democratic renewal. Yet the further this movement moves into formal politics, the harder it becomes to distinguish its student branding from an increasingly conventional political project. Consider the latest announcements. Representatives of the Student List are now arranging meetings with French government officials, members of the French Parliament, German Bundestag representatives and the Council of Europe. Their stated agenda includes European integration, judicial reform, Serbia’s political future, the rule of law and the formation of a new government. These are legitimate subjects for political discussion. There is nothing inherently wrong with engaging foreign diplomats or European institutions. Serbia is a European country, and diplomatic dialogue is part of normal international relations. But the contradiction deserves scrutiny. For a movement that has repeatedly positioned itself as the defender of Serbian sovereignty, independence and democratic self-determination, its sudden enthusiasm for courting European political establishments raises an obvious question: why is international political validation becoming such an important part of its domestic campaign? And perhaps an even more fundamental question needs asking: who exactly are these people representing? The term 'students' is being used as a political identity, a source of legitimacy and a shield against criticism. Yet the individuals now presenting themselves internationally are political candidates, not a parliamentary delegation of students. Their ambitions, policy positions and political accountability should be examined on precisely those terms. A political candidate does not become a student representative simply because a movement retains the word in its name. There is also a striking contrast in the movement's attitude towards foreign involvement. When allegations of external influence concern its political opponents, the subject is treated as evidence of compromised sovereignty. Yet when representatives of the movement seek meetings with European governments, foreign parliamentarians and international institutions, the same scrutiny appears considerably less welcome. Foreign engagement cannot be condemned selectively. Either international political involvement deserves consistent scrutiny, or it does not. The European meetings themselves are not the problem. The problem is the political narrative surrounding them. If the Student List (@studentblokade) intends to become a serious political alternative, it should stop relying on the borrowed moral authority of a student movement and start presenting itself honestly as a political organisation. It should publish its programme, explain its economic proposals, identify its political leadership and answer difficult questions about its domestic and international relationships. That is what democratic accountability looks like. Serbia does not need political representatives who seek legitimacy abroad while claiming an exclusive mandate at home. Nor does it need a movement that treats its opponents' international contacts as suspicious while celebrating its own diplomatic access as a democratic achievement. By all means, meet France, Germany and the Council of Europe. Present your proposals. Defend your positions. Explain what you intend to do with political power. But stop hiding behind the word 'students'. Students are not a political trademark. Serbia's future is not a diplomatic audition, and a series of meetings in European capitals does not constitute a mandate from the Serbian people. If you want to govern Serbia, have the courage to stand before Serbian voters as politicians, answer as politicians and accept accountability as politicians. The student label will not be a permanent substitute for political legitimacy. nitter.gq/studentblokade/status/…
Представници Студентске листе настављају разговоре са представницима међународних институција и дипломатских делегација. У наредном периоду планирани су сусрети са представницима Француске, Немачке и Савета Европе, на којима ће бити отворена питања европских интеграција, будућности Србије, владавине права и сарадње са европским партнерима. САСТАНЦИ СА ФРАНЦУСКОМ ДЕЛЕГАЦИЈОМ Са француске стране састанцима ће присуствовати министар делегат за Европу, и амбасадорка Француске у Србији, заједно са представницима француског парламента, Министарства за Европу и спољне послове и стручњацима. Студентску листу представљаће наши кандидати: Дејан Шошкић Јасмина Ђорђевић Владан Јовановић САСТАНАК СА ПРЕДСТАВНИМОМ НЕМАЧКОГ БУНДЕСТАГА У среду, 18. новембра, од 15.45 до 16.45 часова, одржаће се састанак са Борисом Мијатовићем, послаником немачког Бундестага из редова странке Зелени. Теме разговора биће актуелна ситуација у Србији, планови за формирање нове владе, као и односи Србије са Немачком и Европском унијом. Студентску листу представљаће кандидаткиња Јасмина Ђорђевић. Разговори са Саветом Европе Такође, у среду, 18. новембра, у 16 часова, планиран је састанак са представницима Савета Европе. Разговор ће бити посвећен могућностима сарадње и подршке у областима људских права, правосуђа и владавине права. Посебне теме биће борба против корупције, реформа правосуђа и Устава, изборни процес, медији, демократско учешће грађана, инклузија и поверење јавности у институције. Студентску листу представљаће кандидат Владимир Јовановић. ОТВОРЕНИ ЗА ДИЈАЛОГ, ОДГОВОРНИ ПРЕМА ГРАЂАНИМА Сусрети са међународним партнерима прилика су да непосредно разговарамо о ситуацији у Србији, представимо своје ставове и разменимо искуства. Сматрамо да је важно градити односе засноване на отворености, међусобном поштовању и сарадњи. У тим разговорима полазимо од вредности и принципа које заступамо, као и поверења које су нам грађани указали. Желимо партнерства која доприносе развоју Србије, уз очување самосталности у доношењу одлука о њеној будућности. Захваљујемо свим саговорницима на исказаном интересовању и спремности за дијалог. О нашим сусретима и разговорима наставићемо да благовремено обавештавамо јавност. Студенти победише!
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THE PERFECT CANDIDATE? ALEKSANDAR ČUPIĆ'S €2 MILLION QUESTION For months, New Speaker of Serbian Parliament Aleksandar Čupić has been presented as the morally incorruptible, respectable academic, the intellectual face of a movement claiming to represent a new political standard for Serbia and But that carefully cultivated image is now facing some very uncomfortable questions. First, scrutiny of his academic credentials and doctoral supervision under Professor Dušan Teodorović. Now, allegations concerning seven apartments and two garages in Voždovac, with a reported property value exceeding €2 million. And the questions are becoming increasingly difficult to avoid. LET'S START WITH THE NUMBERS. Čupić's reported monthly salary as an assistant professor (docent) is 142,000 Serbian dinars, approximately €1,207. That amounts to roughly €14,484 annually. On that income alone, accumulating €2 million would require approximately 138 years of gross salary, without spending a single euro on food, housing, family or any other living expenses. Of course, salary is not the only possible source of wealth. Property can be acquired through business partnerships, inheritance, investments, development agreements or accumulated capital. But that is precisely why the public deserves a proper explanation. WHAT DO THE PROPERTY DOCUMENTS SAY? According to reporting on the documents presented during the parliamentary debate, an agreement dated 3 June 2013 concerned the joint financing and construction of a building, with the parties agreeing to share certain costs and divide the resulting property. The subsequent allocation reportedly attributed seven apartments to Čupić, with a combined residential area of 281.56 square metres, alongside two garages measuring 53.94 square metres. That is a total of 335.5 square metres. The question is not simply whether these properties exist. It is how the arrangement was financed, what each party contributed, what the properties were worth at the time and what ownership interests Čupić retains today. N1 (Vucic Opposition News Media CNN owned) independently established that a person named Aleksandar Čupić has an ownership interest in the building, although it could not independently verify the identity of the registered owner from the publicly accessible records. THE QUESTIONS THAT NEED ANSWERING SOURCE OF WEALTH: What was Čupić's financial position before entering the 2013 development agreement? What legitimate sources of capital enabled him to participate in financing the construction? THE ORIGINAL INVESTMENT: How much money did he personally contribute? What was the value of his contribution, and was it cash, land, financing, development work or another form of investment? THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTY: Who was the other party to the agreement? Who financed the remaining construction costs, and how was the final allocation of seven apartments and two garages negotiated? THE ACTUAL VALUE: What were these properties worth when the agreement was signed in 2013? What is their current independently assessed market value? Is the reported €2 million valuation accurate? CURRENT OWNERSHIP: Does Čupić still own all seven apartments and both garages? Have any been sold, transferred, gifted or placed under another ownership arrangement? RENTAL INCOME: Are the apartments rented out? If so, how much rental income has been generated annually, and has that income been properly declared? THE GARAGES: Were the two garages subsequently converted into commercial premises, as alleged during the parliamentary debate? If so, were the necessary planning approvals, building permits and changes of use obtained? TAX COMPLIANCE: Have all relevant property taxes, rental-income taxes and other applicable fiscal obligations been fulfilled? DECLARATION OF ASSETS: Have all relevant property interests, income streams and changes in financial circumstances been declared to the Serbian Anti-Corruption Agency in accordance with the law? THE ACADEMIC RECORD: Why was Čupić presented publicly as a professor when his formal academic title is docent? What are his academic publications, research contributions and record of promotion since receiving his doctorate in 2014? DOCTORAL SUPERVISION: What was the academic justification for appointing Professor Dušan Teodorović as doctoral supervisor? What specific expertise and research references established his suitability to supervise a dissertation concerning postal transport networks? PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: Will Čupić publish the relevant financial and property documentation and provide a detailed explanation of the arrangement, rather than leave the public to piece together the information from parliamentary allegations and property records? These are questions of public interest, not conclusions of wrongdoing. They deserve documentary answers. THE BIGGER POLITICAL QUESTION For a movement that has made integrity, transparency, accountability and the fight against corruption central to its political identity, this is an important moment. The Student List has presented itself as a departure from the established political order, promising a different standard of public conduct. But a different standard cannot simply be a campaign slogan. It must apply to its own candidates, its own leadership and, above all, the people it puts forward to occupy the highest institutions of the Serbian state. If Čupić has legitimate explanations for his property interests, he should provide them. If the documents have been misrepresented, he should correct the record and produce the evidence. But silence cannot substitute for transparency. You cannot demand that Serbia account for every dinar while expecting the public to overlook questions involving hundreds of square metres of property and millions of euros. The public does not need another political lecture about morality. It needs answers, documents and accountability. THE IMAGE OF THE PERFECT CANDIDATE IS ONE THING. THE FINANCIAL AND ACADEMIC RECORD IS ANOTHER.
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LISTEN, NATAŠA: SERBIA DOES NOT NEED YOUR MORAL PERMISSION Listen, Nataša (@natasakandic), we get it. You and your late husband, Lazar Stojanović, spent all your entire adult lives criticising Serbia and challenging its national identity. Your hostility towards Serbian institutions, traditions and expressions of national identity has been a recurring feature of your public activism for decades. But here is something you seem unwilling to accept: Serbia does not belong to you, and neither does its moral compass. Your latest intervention over Bojana Selaković (@bojana_mala) and the performance of “Oj, Kosovo, Kosovo” at the Enlargement Forum is another example of the same familiar approach. Anyone who expresses affection for Serbian cultural heritage or refuses to adopt your interpretation of Kosovo is quickly reduced to an SNS bot, a nationalist or someone who supposedly does not care. What exactly do you expect? That Serbians should apologise for remembering Kosovo? That a traditional Serbian song must be treated as an embarrassment? That national identity should be quietly put away whenever someone in Brussels or an NGO finds it uncomfortable? You are entitled to protest. You are entitled to disagree with Selaković. But you are not entitled to dictate how millions of people should relate to their history, culture and national identity. Accountability is not the exclusive property of NGOs, activists or political commentators. Nor does it require an entire nation to abandon its historical memory. And perhaps that is the fundamental problem with your argument: you appear far more comfortable questioning the patriotism and motives of those who disagree with you than accepting that Serbia is a diverse society in which people are perfectly entitled to hold views different from yours. You have spent almost six decades demonstrating your hatred towards Serbia and its people. We get it, Nataša. The hatred in your heart is hardly a secret, and the bitterness and venom you direct towards your own country have been evident for decades. Your public conduct has revealed a deeply troubling hostility towards everything Serbian. But after almost six decades of demanding that Serbia answer questions, perhaps it is time to recognise that Serbian citizens are equally entitled to question you, your activism and the positions you have spent a lifetime defending. You do not own the moral high ground, and you certainly do not speak for Serbia or it people. nitter.gq/natasakandic/status/21…
Niko ni reč iz NVO o stavu koordinatorke Nacionalnog konventa o EU Bojane Selaković povodom mog protesta zbog izvođenja Oj,Kosovo, Kosovo na Forumu o proširenju. Ali je dobila pohvale hiljade SNS botova i drugih "nedavača" Kosova.
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Real Serbian men bled, fought and gave their lives for Serbia. They didn't whine, play victims or turn politics into theatre. They stood their ground, defended their homeland and understood the meaning of sacrifice. Today, Serbia is represented in Parliament by men like Oliver Tošković of the Student List, lamenting what this country has supposedly done to deserve this. Perhaps he should take a moment to remember what generations of Serbian men endured and sacrificed so that Serbia could stand today. There is a world of difference between sacrifice and political theatrics.
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Accountability for Serbia, Excuses for Kosovo: The Double Standard of Its Government The Kosovo government has spent years demanding that Serbia confront its wartime past, accept responsibility and answer for alleged crimes. It presents accountability as an unquestionable principle when directing accusations at Belgrade. But what happens when accountability reaches Kosovo's own political establishment? Suddenly, the language changes. When four former senior Ex Terrorist KLA commanders received a combined 81 years in prison in September for War Crimes against humanity against own Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo's political leadership was quick to condemn the judgment. Prime Minister Albin Kurti described it as an unacceptable injustice, questioned the court's approach and promised support for the convicted former commanders through the appeal process. Now, following Ex President of Kosovo Hashim Thaçi's additional 17-month sentence in a separate case involving the disclosure of confidential information and attempts to influence witnesses, the familiar pattern has returned. Thaçi himself dismissed the ruling as “politics, not justice,” while political figures and former KLA supporters have denounced the proceedings. The Kosovo government's latest statement is more carefully worded, reaffirming respect for judicial decisions while repeating concerns about transparency and fair-trial standards. Those concerns can be legitimate. Every defendant is entitled to due process, and every judgment can be challenged through the proper legal channels. But that principle cannot be reserved for one side. The question is straightforward: why does Kosovo insist that Serbia must accept judicial accountability, while its own political leadership repeatedly casts doubt on the legitimacy of proceedings when former KLA commanders are the ones being held responsible? Does the rule of law apply only when the verdict is politically convenient? Kosovo cannot demand that Serbia respect international judicial institutions while simultaneously encouraging a political narrative that portrays those same institutions as illegitimate whenever their decisions are unwelcome. It cannot insist that allegations against Serbian officials be taken seriously while treating proceedings against former KLA leaders as politically motivated by default. And it cannot expect the international community to accept one standard for Belgrade and another for Pristina. There is a difference between defending the right to appeal and attempting to discredit the institution delivering an unwelcome judgment. There is a difference between scrutinising a court and dismissing its decisions because they challenge a preferred national narrative. Kosovo's political establishment needs to decide whether it genuinely believes in accountability or simply wants accountability imposed on Serbia. Because the rule of law is not a political instrument. It is not something to invoke against your opponents and abandon when it reaches your own doorstep. Accountability isn't a one-way street. Kosovo's political leadership cannot continually demand that Serbia meet the democratic and legal standards it associates with the United States and the United Kingdom, while questioning those same principles when they apply to its own former leaders. Kosovo always presents itself as as Europe's most pro-American societies and looks to Washington and London as models of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. But those principles are not a political convenience. They do not change depending on whose interests are at stake. Accountability isn't a one-way street. Kosovo must accept accountability for its own guilty actions, and its political leadership must be prepared to accept exactly the same standard it demands of Serbia. You cannot invoke democracy, the rule of law and the most Pro American in Europe when judging others, then question those very same deomcract principles when they apply to your own political establishment. nitter.gq/BlitzzNewss/status/212…
Conviction in The Hague: Former Kosovo President Hashim Thaci Sentenced for Obstructing Justice A European Union-backed court in The Hague convicted Kosovo’s former president, Hashim Thaci, of attempting to obstruct justice and contempt of court, sentencing him to 17 months in prison. This term will be added to the 25-year war crimes sentence he is already serving. Judge Christopher Gosnell stated that Thaci disclosed confidential witness information and conveyed instructions on how to testify. Removing his headset during the hearing, Thaci declared, «This is politics, not justice.» His defense attorney announced plans to appeal. #Kosovo #TheHague #Balkans #Justice #News
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My DMs are being flooded with messages of sympathy for Kosovo Albanians from Student List supporters, and, of course, Albanians lecturing me about Serbia, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Oh, the irony. 😂 Did we all suddenly forget September, when four former KLA commanders were handed a combined 81 years in prison for war crimes? And today's little reminder: Hashim Thaçi gets another 17 months for witness tampering and obstructing justice, only to complain to the court that this is "politics, not justice." Oh, how convenient. When the court is dealing with someone else, it's justice. When it's dealing with convicted War Criminal Thaci and associates, suddenly it's politics. 😂 But please, keep flooding my inbox with lectures about Serbian accountability. Perhaps start by having that same conversation at home. The irony really does write itself. nitter.gq/AravotEN/status/212278… kosovotwopointzero.com/en/fo…
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ALEKSANDAR ČUPIĆ: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER-KING — A LITTLE LESS HAGIOGRAPHY, A LITTLE MORE SUBSTANCE @studentblokade, are you actually taking the piss? Is this a political movement or a medieval royal court preparing the coronation of its spiritual leader? The Student List's (@studentblokade) description of Aleksandar Čupić is extraordinary. A long beard reminiscent of the great Enlightenment philosophers, a noble and perceptive gaze, profound anthropological understanding of humanity, an exceptional spiritual constitution. Apparently, we are no longer introducing a parliamentary candidate. We are being presented with Serbia's very own philosopher-king. Who exactly are they trying to convince? Let's look at the actual public record rather than the carefully manufactured mythology. Čupić is an Assistant academic professor at the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering. He graduated in 2003 (took him 8 yrs to finish 4 yr BA degree), completed his master's in 2007 and defended his doctorate in 2014. He has worked at the faculty since 2004. His wife, Ana, is a medical specialist. Together they moved from Belgrade to Sopot in 2012, have six children and developed a certified organic agricultural business, which received certification in 2017. These are legitimate aspects of his biography. Nobody disputes that. But they do not automatically establish political wisdom, exceptional moral authority or some extraordinary understanding of the human condition. His public profile within the student movement was significantly elevated after he and his family accommodated students travelling towards Kragujevac in their greenhouses. That was a generous gesture. It deserves recognition as an act of hospitality. But hospitality is not a political qualification, and helping students does not confer intellectual infallibility. There are also identifiable professional and institutional connections worth understanding, including his academic career at the University of Belgrade and the academic supervision of his doctoral work by Professor Dušan Teodorović. These should be examined on their actual merits, not turned into insinuations or treated as evidence of wrongdoing. And here is where the Student List's presentation becomes particularly revealing. Instead of allowing the public to evaluate Čupić through his ideas, policies, professional record and political positions, they are wrapping him in the language of spiritual superiority. They describe his physical appearance as though it were evidence of intellectual depth. They romanticise his personality and elevate ordinary biographical details into a narrative of exceptional moral character. Why? Because there is a fundamental difference between presenting a candidate and manufacturing a personality. Čupić has academic credentials. Fine. But what is his actual political philosophy? What is his economic programme? What does he understand about the workings of the Serbian state, international relations, public finance and the realities of governing a country? Where is the serious examination of his positions? And why should anyone accept this almost reverential portrayal without asking difficult questions? The Student List cannot demand accountability from everyone else while surrounding its own personalities with an atmosphere of untouchability. If Čupić wants to occupy one of the highest constitutional positions in Serbia, he should expect scrutiny, not literary worship. A doctorate does not make someone a philosopher. A beard does not make someone a sage. Hosting students does not make someone a statesman. And writing extravagant descriptions of a man's gaze certainly does not establish his moral or intellectual superiority. Serbia needs public officials who can demonstrate their competence through decisions, arguments and accountability. It does not need a political movement auditioning candidates for the role of a spiritual patriarch. Enough with the theatre. Show us the substance. nitter.gq/studentblokade/status/…
Стасит и висок, појавом природно и спонтано ауторитативан, дуге браде која буди асоцијацију на ликове старих просветитеља, мислилаца и народних мудраца, са племенитим, проницљивим погледом у којем се огледа дубоко антрополошко разумевање човека и његове крхкости, он по својој духовној конституцији не припада онима који политичку снагу траже у заглушујућој буци, демагогији и међусобном надвикивању. Наш Александар Чупић!
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THE MELTDOWN OVER A SERBIAN SONG There is something extraordinary about watching the reaction to a post defending the right of Serbs to express their historical and cultural attachment to Kosovo and Metohija. A Serbian song becomes a controversy. A few paragraphs defending Serbian historical memory provoke an avalanche of indignation. Albanian commentators enter the debate, Nataša Kandić (@natasakandic) weighs in, and suddenly the discussion is no longer about the lyrics of a song. It becomes an argument about whether Serbs are entitled to express their own national identity without first obtaining someone else's approval. The reaction has been truly revealing. The original argument was straightforward: the historical origins of a song deserve discussion, but they do not give anyone the authority to dictate what that song means to every Serbian person who sings it today. The year 1989 matters. The political circumstances matter. The lyrics matter. But none of those considerations automatically establishes that every person singing the song is advocating another war. If critics believe particular lyrics explicitly call for violence, they should identify them, quote them and explain their argument. That is how a serious discussion works. Simply labelling a song propaganda and then treating everyone who sings it as politically suspect is not historical analysis. It is collective attribution. And this is where the reaction becomes particularly interesting. Why does a Serbian song expressing attachment to Kosovo provoke such an intense response? Why does the continued existence of Serbian historical memory appear to be so difficult for certain commentators to accept? Kosovo is not an incidental geographical reference in Serbian history. It occupies a central place in Serbian medieval history, Orthodox religious heritage, literature and national consciousness. The monasteries, churches and historical monuments of Kosovo and Metohija are part of a cultural inheritance that predates the political disputes of the modern era. One does not have to agree with Serbia's political position to acknowledge that history. Yet there appears to be an expectation that Serbian identity must be expressed within carefully prescribed boundaries. Serbs may remember their history, provided that their memories do not make anyone uncomfortable. They may express cultural attachment, provided that it does not challenge another political narrative. They may speak about Kosovo, provided that they do so in language approved by their critics. That is not reconciliation. It is an expectation of political conformity. Nataša Kandić's (@natasakandic) intervention is part of a much wider debate about the relationship between Serbian national identity, historical responsibility and political memory. Accountability for crimes committed during the wars of the 1990s is essential. The suffering of civilians must never be dismissed, and historical facts should never be distorted to serve political convenience. But accountability is not collective guilt. Criticism of nationalism is not a justification for treating Serbian national identity itself as something that requires permanent correction. These are two entirely different questions, and deliberately confusing them makes honest discussion impossible. The response from Albanian commentators has been equally revealing. Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and received recognition from the United States and numerous other countries. That is the present diplomatic reality. But recognition does not erase the history that preceded it, nor does it extinguish the historical attachment that millions of Serbs feel towards Kosovo. International recognition is a political and diplomatic fact. It is not a mechanism for rewriting centuries of history. And if Kosovo's sovereignty is secure, why should a Serbian song provoke such extraordinary anxiety? Why should a social-media post defending Serbian cultural memory be treated as a threat? A confident society should be capable of hearing an expression of another nation's historical identity without interpreting every word as a challenge to its existence. There is a difference between expressing national identity and advocating violence. There is a difference between remembering history and attempting to reverse it through force. Those distinctions should be obvious, particularly to people who claim to support European democratic values. The Western media also has a responsibility to approach this subject with greater consistency. Serbian national expression is too often examined exclusively through the political controversies of the 1990s, while the deeper historical and cultural context is pushed aside. This creates a distorted picture in which Serbian identity itself becomes inseparable from the actions of particular political leaders. That is neither fair nor intellectually serious. The purpose of this debate should be to examine history honestly, not to establish which nation has the right to remember it. Serbs do not need to deny the suffering of others to acknowledge their own historical inheritance. Nor should they be expected to apologise for the existence of that inheritance. The extraordinary reaction to this debate has only reinforced the central point: Serbian identity cannot be defined by those who object to its expression. People are entitled to disagree with the song. They are entitled to criticise its origins, its lyrics and its political associations. What they are not entitled to do is turn that criticism into a demand that Serbs abandon their historical memory or submit their cultural identity to external approval. If a song and a social-media post can provoke this much outrage, perhaps it is time to ask why the expression of Serbian identity remains such a sensitive subject. Serbia's history belongs to its people. Kosovo and Metohija remain part of that history and of the Serbian national consciousness. No amount of outrage, condemnation or political pressure can change that. Serbs do not need permission to remember who they are. nitter.gq/BigQ__42/status/212270…
"Rewrite the meaning of serbian identity...." No one was talking about your identity.... but about a song written witj the pure purpose of propaganda... who's lyrics call for new wars.... And the year it was written, just as the purpose of why it was written mean a lot....
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Here you have it: Marija Radovanović, secretary of the Faculty of Medicine, pouring yoghurt over Serbian actress and politician Lidija Vukićević. And this is the political culture the Student List wants to present as an alternative for Serbia. Remember the names. Remember the behaviour.
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NATAŠA KANDIĆ AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT CONDEMNATION There is something deeply revealing about Nataša Kandić’s (@natasakandic) latest intervention and her familiar posture of moral superiority whenever Serbia is concerned. For decades, she and those closest to her politically have positioned themselves as permanent judges of Serbia, its history, its institutions and, increasingly, the very expression of Serbian national identity. Once again, rather than engage with the substance of Serbia’s political and institutional realities, Kandić turns the discussion into another exercise in moral condemnation, as though she alone possesses the authority to determine what Serbs may sing, celebrate, defend or identify with. Her latest intervention concerns the broadcasting of the song “Oj, Kosovo, Kosovo” and her frustration that activists did not respond with the expected apologies and protests. She insists that her criticism is directed at Serbian institutions, not Serbs as an ethnic group. That distinction might sound reasonable in isolation. But it raises a much bigger question: why does almost every discussion involving Serbian history, national identity or expressions of attachment to Kosovo and Metohija become another occasion for public moral prosecution? Let us establish something fundamental. Kosovo and Metohija is just another political talking points. Both occupy an important place in Serbian history, cultural heritage, religious tradition and national consciousness. A song expressing that attachment does not constitute nationalism or extremism, nor does its broadcasting, in itself, establish institutional wrongdoing. Context matters. So does the distinction between cultural expression and political conduct. There is a world of difference between holding an institution accountable for a demonstrable action and demanding that expressions of Serbian national identity be subjected to constant public denunciation. Kandić is entitled to protest and to criticise the Serbian government and its institutions. She and her late husband, Lazar Stojanović, were engaged in political activism and criticism of the Yugoslav and Serbian political establishment from the early 1970s onwards. But nearly six decades of political activism, accompanied by what is regarded as a deeply adversarial relationship with Serbia and its people, doesn't confer a monopoly on moral authority. Nor does a lifetime spent criticising Serbia entitle her to dictate how Serbs understand their history, express their national identity or defend their heritage. The question is not whether Kandić has the right to criticise Serbia. Of course she does. That is a fundamental right in a democracy. The real question is this: who gave her the authority to decide that Serbia, its people and their national identity must forever stand in the dock while she assumes the role of judge, prosecutor and moral arbiter? That is the distinction she's unwilling to confront or accept. What is particularly troubling is the recurring asymmetry in this approach. Serbian national symbols and expressions of historical attachment are frequently subjected to extraordinary scrutiny, while the broader political and historical context is often relegated to the background. A genuinely universal standard of accountability cannot operate selectively. If the principle is opposition to nationalism, it must apply consistently. If the principle is institutional accountability, it must apply to everyone. And if the principle is respect for national and cultural identity, Serbs are entitled to that respect just as much as anyone else. Nor is this a conversation that began yesterday. Kandić and her late husband have a political and intellectual history stretching back to the 1970s. That history, their public positions and their political convictions deserve scrutiny just as much as those of the Serbian institutions and political figures they routinely criticise. Nobody should be exempt from questions about consistency, accountability or their own historical record simply because they have spent decades presenting themselves as defenders of moral principles. Serbia has every right to confront its history honestly. It also has every right to defend its sovereignty, cultural heritage and national dignity. These principles are not mutually exclusive. Acknowledging historical wrongdoing does not require an entire nation to accept permanent collective suspicion, nor does historical accountability mean that Serbian identity must forever be treated as something requiring justification. The question Kandić should be prepared to answer is straightforward: where does legitimate institutional accountability end and the perpetual condemnation of an entire nation's history, heritage and identity begin? Serbia’s history belongs to its people. Its identity is not subject to the approval of Nataša Kandić, her political associates or anyone else labouring under the delusion that they possess some superior moral authority to lecture an entire nation on how it should remember its past, express its identity or define its future. Serbia does not need their permission, their approval or their moral certification to be Serbia. nitter.gq/natasakandic/status/21…
Da prestanem da insistiram da se "izvinjavamo i protestujemo"... To mi poruči Bojana Selakovć, koordinatorka Nacionalnog konventa o EU, u odgovoru na moj protest zbog odsustva reakcije aktivista na emitovanje nacionalističke pesme Oj, Kosovo, Kosovo... Ako se to odnosi na institucije Srbije - neću da prestanem ... Ako se odnosi na Srbe ili pripadnike nekog drugog etničkog identiteta, to nije moje polje.
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First it was labelled nationalist. Then racist. Now apparently extremist. The labels keep escalating, but where is the actual argument? The song was performed instrumentally in Brussels; the lyrics were not even sung. Are we now going to treat every Serbian patriotic or historical reference to Kosovo as evidence of racism or extremism? If those are serious accusations, they deserve something more substantial than an ever-expanding list of political labels.
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NATAŠA KANDIĆ, POLITICAL MEMORY AND THE SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF FREEDOM Nataša Kandić (@natasakandic), before lecturing everyone about Serbian identity, nationalism and historical responsibility, perhaps we should examine the political history surrounding your own public life. You participated in the 1968 student movement and spent the 1970s working within Yugoslavia's municipal and trade-union structures. Your former husband, Lazar Stojanović, was himself a member of the Communist Party before becoming one of the country's most prominent dissidents. His film Plastic Jesus challenged Tito's political establishment and cost him three years in prison. That history makes the question of freedom of expression particularly relevant. Today, you describe the performance of a Serbian song in Brussels as shameful, invoke NATO bombing and mass graves, and question why Serbian civil-society representatives did not demand that the music be stopped. But where is the distinction between historical accountability and the permanent political policing of Serbian cultural expression? Nobody should erase the victims of the Yugoslav wars. Nobody should excuse crimes. But neither should every expression of Serbian identity automatically be treated as an endorsement of war. You cannot build reconciliation by demanding that one side continually apologise for its history while treating its cultural identity as something that requires prior approval. And surely the experience of your former husband under Tito should make the importance of freedom of expression especially clear. A song is not a war crime. A musical performance is not a military operation. And historical responsibility should never become a licence to silence an entire culture. Perhaps it is time to apply the principles of freedom and reconciliation consistently. nitter.gq/natasakandic/status/21… nitter.gq/natasakandic
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WHEN A SONG BECOMES A NATIONAL SECURITY INCIDENT: THE FRAGILITY OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE Apparently, a Serbian nationalist song performed in Brussels was enough to trigger political outrage in Kosovo, diplomatic commentary, expressions of regret from the European Commission and an apology from the musicians. Let that truly sink in. We are talking about a song. Not a border incursion, not a military operation, not a diplomatic ultimatum. A song. And yet the reaction tells me something worth examining. Sovereignty is supposed to rest on institutions, political stability, territorial administration and the confidence of a society in its own statehood. It should not depend on what music someone performs at an event in Brussels. If a melody performed thousands of kilometres from your political institutions becomes a diplomatic incident, perhaps the question isn't why the song was played, but why the reaction was so disproportionate. There is a difference between defending sovereignty and constantly demanding that everyone else demonstrate sensitivity towards it. A confident state does not need to police every song, every performance or every historical reference to reassure itself of its existence. If your Kosovo Albanians sovereignty needs a diplomatic intervention every time someone presses play, perhaps it's time to turn down the outrage and turn up the confidence. Apparently, the playlist now requires diplomatic clearance. 😂 nitter.gq/ditmirbushati/status/2…
The performance of a 🇷🇸 nationalist song in Brussels rightly triggered reactions in 🇽🇰. @EU_Commission expressed regret. The music band apologized. Yet some reactions have taken an unnecessarily alarmist turn. Although the incident was serious, there is no basis for such claims.
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Apparently, a Serbian song is enough to send Pristina into a diplomatic meltdown. Emergency statements, demands for explanations and lectures about European values — all because Serbian culture was heard at an EU event. If a song can cause this much panic, perhaps the problem is not the music but the insecurity of a political narrative that cannot tolerate a Serbian perspective. Serbia has a history, a culture and a national identity. None requires permission from Pristina. And here is the challenge to Pristina: if you are so confident in your claims of sovereignty and European values, why does the mere expression of Serbian identity provoke such an extraordinary reaction? You cannot demand tolerance from everyone else while refusing to show it yourselves. nitter.gq/VjosaOsmaniPRKS/status…
European values cannot be defended with one hand while undermined with the other. It is deeply disturbing that, at an EU Enlargement Forum celebrating “unity”, a Serbian nationalist song denying Kosovo’s sovereignty was given a stage, while Kosovo itself was absent. This is not a musical choice without consequences. It is a political message with a history. Regret is not enough. Who selected it, who approved it, and most importantly, who takes responsibility?
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These student communists are becoming more unhinged by the day.
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REDISTRIBUTION IS NOT PROSPERITY: THE STUDENT BLOCKADE MOVEMENT'S COMMUNIST ECONOMIC THINKING, THE DANGEROUS POLITICS OF EQUALITY — REMEMBER 1917! There is one word that should define the debate surrounding the Student List's economic programme: REDISTRIBUTION. Strip away the political language, the promises of equality and the technical explanations of progressive taxation, and the underlying economic philosophy becomes considerably clearer. The Student Blockades wants to change who pays, who receives and how the state redistributes the income generated by the Serbian economy. But there is a fundamental problem with this approach: redistributing wealth is not the same as creating wealth. And Serbia cannot build a prosperous future by concentrating on dividing the economic output it already has while failing to demonstrate how it intends to substantially increase that output. 1. REDISTRIBUTION DOES NOT CREATE WEALTH The Student List proposes increasing the progressivity of personal taxation, reducing the tax burden on lower-paid workers and increasing taxation on larger property holdings. It also proposes abolishing the existing annual personal income tax and introducing progressive monthly tax brackets. On paper, this can be presented as a fairer distribution of the tax burden. But the real economic question is what happens to the people and businesses responsible for generating investment, employment and economic growth. Entrepreneurs, business owners, investors and professionals do not simply represent convenient sources of additional tax revenue. They are participants in the productive economy. They commit capital, employ people, develop businesses, take commercial risks and create economic opportunities. When governments continually increase the fiscal burden on particular categories of income and wealth, they must consider the behavioural consequences. Capital is fugal, it's liquid, capital has no flag. Investment decisions change. Business structures can be reorganised. Entrepreneurs can postpone expansion or choose jurisdictions offering more predictable returns. This does not mean every progressive tax increase automatically drives investment away. It means the Student List must demonstrate that its proposed system will generate the additional revenue it expects without undermining the productive activity on which that revenue depends. Where is that analysis? 2. WHO PAYS FOR THE PROMISES? This is perhaps the most uncomfortable question for the Student Leaders. Its programme contains commitments involving workers' rights, pensions, public services, housing, taxation and a new Development Bank. All of these initiatives have financial implications. Yet the programme does not provide a sufficiently detailed, independently assessable costing of the combined commitments. The proposal to redistribute more income does not, by itself, explain how the government will finance its obligations. Nor does the promise to eliminate corruption constitute a budgetary calculation. Recovering public money, improving procurement and eliminating waste are legitimate objectives, but projected savings must be identified, quantified and demonstrated before they can responsibly be committed to permanent expenditure. Otherwise, Serbia risks accumulating promises without a credible financing framework. 3. THE INVESTMENT QUESTION THEY CANNOT AVOID Serbia operates in an international market for capital. Investors compare taxation, labour costs, infrastructure, political stability, regulatory certainty and expected returns before committing money. Serbia is not competing in isolation. It is competing against other countries in Central and Eastern Europe for factories, technology investment, manufacturing capacity and international business. The Student Blockades wants to move away from an economic model based on attracting foreign manufacturers through subsidies and comparatively inexpensive labour. That is a legitimate subject for debate. But what replaces it? You cannot simply announce that Serbia will transition towards a "knowledge economy" and expect the investment, technology, research and skilled employment to appear. Those things require capital, institutional capacity, private-sector participation and years of sustained investment. If the proposed tax changes weaken incentives for domestic investment while the government simultaneously reduces reliance on existing investment incentives, the transition will become considerably more difficult. 4. THE REDISTRIBUTION TRAP There is a broader economic danger here. Once redistribution becomes the central political objective, governments can become increasingly focused on determining how existing wealth should be divided rather than creating the conditions for substantially greater wealth creation. That creates a difficult economic cycle. Higher fiscal demands can affect investment decisions. Weaker investment can constrain productivity and employment growth. Slower growth can limit the tax base. A smaller-than-expected tax base then makes ambitious spending commitments harder to finance. The result could be precisely the opposite of what the programme promises. This is not an inevitable outcome of progressive taxation. It is a risk that the Student List must address with credible economic modelling rather than political assurances. 5. SERBIA NEEDS AN ECONOMIC GROWTH STRATEGY, NOT JUST A REDISTRIBUTION STRATEGY Let us be clear about what Serbia actually needs. It needs more productive businesses, more domestic investment, stronger exports, higher productivity, technological development and better-paying private-sector employment. It needs entrepreneurs to expand rather than hesitate, investors to commit rather than relocate, and businesses to compete internationally rather than become increasingly dependent on government decisions. A credible economic programme must explain how it will achieve these objectives. It must provide measurable targets, realistic fiscal projections, a clear investment framework and an honest assessment of the consequences of its tax proposals. The Student Leaders cannot answer legitimate economic criticism simply by invoking equality or presenting redistribution as a moral obligation. Economic policy is not judged by the intentions behind it. It is judged by the results it produces. THE QUESTION IS VERY SIMPLE Where is the wealth creation strategy behind all this redistribution? Where are the independently assessable projections showing how the proposed tax changes will affect investment, business formation, employment and government revenue? Where is the evidence that Serbia can finance these commitments while maintaining its international competitiveness? And what happens if the projected revenue does not materialise? These are questions that deserve answers before Serbia commits itself to a substantial change in economic direction. You cannot redistribute your way to prosperity. You cannot finance permanent promises with uncertain future revenues. And you cannot build a competitive economy by overlooking the incentives that make wealth creation possible. Serbia needs an economy that produces more wealth, attracts more capital, creates more businesses and generates sustainable employment. Redistribution should never become a substitute for economic growth. That is the fundamental weakness the Student Blocakdes must address in its programme. One doesn't need a PhD to understand that you cannot redistribute wealth that you haven't created, tax your way to prosperity or build a competitive economy by punishing the very people who invest, employ and produce. Serbia needs wealth creators, not another communist ideological experiment in redistribution. History has already proven us what happens when Marxist ideology takes precedence over economics. Perhaps it's time we learned the lesson. nitter.gq/d_pavlovic/status/2122…
ЈОШ О ПОРЕСКОЈ ПОЛИТИЦИ СТУДЕНТСКЕ ЛИСТЕ: СИНТЕТИЧКИ И ЦЕДУЛАРНИ ПОРЕЗ Из јуче објављеног програма Студентске листе види се да је њена пореска политика у великој мери редистрибутивна и егалитарна: настоји да смањи пореско оптерећење оних који зарађују мање, а повећа га онима који зарађују више. Међутим, један важан инструмент такве политике, синтетички порез на доходак, у програму се напушта. Уместо њега остао би цедуларни систем, уз увођење прогресивних стопа на зараде. Цедуларни порез се плаћа на појединачне врсте прихода, сваку засебно. Најчешће се наплаћује већ приликом исплате: послодавац обрачунава порез и уплаћује га држави. Код неких прихода ту обавезу има сам прималац (на пр., ако примате хонорар иностранства или издајете стан) Синтетички порез, напротив, полази од укупног дохотка. На крају одређеног периода сабирају се сви приходи и на њихов збир обрачунава се порез. Није, дакле, пресудно само колико је неко зарадио по једном основу, већ колико је укупно зарадио. Такав порез постоји у Србији у облику додатног годишњег пореза на доходак грађана. Плаћају га они чији годишњи доходак прелази троструки износ просечне годишње зараде у Србији. Истина, наш годишњи порез није потпуно синтетички, јер не обухвата све приходе (изузети су дивиденде и капитални добици, итд.) Сада се, међутим, предлаже његово укидање. Синтетичко опорезивање омогућава већу хоризонталну правичност, јер полази од укупног дохотка појединца. Плата није једини доходак који човек може да остварује. Поред ње, могуће је примати ауторске хонораре, накнаде по уговору о делу, приходе од допунског рада и самосталне делатности, дивиденде, камате, капиталне добитке, приходе од издавања стана и друге приходе. Свака од ових врста прихода има посебан порески третман: различите стопе, основице и пореске олакшице. На пр., онај ко прима хонораре од иностраног наручиоца може да не плати порез ако му укупан квартални приход не прелази 110.647 динара. Постоије, како видимо, у нашем систему приходи који су невидљиви за преске власти. Отуда особа која, поред плате, има и друге изворе прихода може бити у повољнијем пореском положају од особе која исти укупан доходак остварује искључиво од плате. Први има више могућности да искористи различите пореске стопе и олакшице. Штавише, такве разлике подстичу и такозвани income shifting – пребацивање дохотка из једне пореске категорије у другу, повољнију. На пр., предузетник може настојати да део прихода од рада прикаже као приход од капитала, ако се овај опорезује по нижој стопи. Тако се нарушава начело хоризонталне пореске правичности, које омогућава синтетички порез: да два човека са истим укупним дохотком плаћају исти порез, без обзира на то из којих извора њихов доходак потиче. Цедуларни порез сам по себи не обезбеђује такву једнакост. Технички, ово је лако извести. Сваки порески обвезник имао би свој порески идентификациони број, под којим би се евидентирали сви његови приходи. Исплатиоци би пријављивали исплате под тим бројем. Пореска управа би на крају године сабрала све приходе, применила јединствену прогресивну скалу и од коначне пореске обавезе одбила порез који је већ плаћен.
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SERBIA 2003–2026: THE DATES, THE EVENTS AND THE QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN BETWEEN OCTOBER 5th 2000 - October 25, 2026. Look carefully at this timeline. The dates matter. The sequence matters. But, above all, the connections between these political events deserve serious scrutiny. This is not simply a collection of historical incidents. It is a timeline spanning more than two decades of Serbian politics, Kosovo and Metohija, changes of government, international pressure and moments of national crisis. 1 February 2003 — Zoran Đinđić calls for the return of 1,000 Serbian soldiers and police officers to Kosovo and Metohija. 12 March 2003 — Đinđić is assassinated. 17 August 2007 — An adviser to Vojislav Koštunica calls for the return of 1,000 Serbian soldiers and police officers to Kosovo and Metohija. 11 May 2008 — Koštunica loses power. The SPS returns to political respectability. 23 August 2011 — Boris Tadić tells Angela Merkel that elections are approaching and that discussions about abolishing Serbian institutions in Kosovo could take place afterwards. 6 May 2012 — Tadić loses power. 16 December 2022 — Aleksandar Vučić formally requests the return of 1,000 Serbian soldiers and police officers to Kosovo and Metohija. 3 May 2023 — The Ribnikar school shooting takes place. What follows becomes the subject of competing political interpretations and accusations of attempts to destabilise the government. 1 November 2024 — The Novi Sad railway station canopy collapses, triggering mass protests and a political crisis. The station renovation involved Chinese companies. 25 October 2026 — Vučić loses power. Western Backed Pro EU Student Blockades are elected. November 10, 2026- Student Blockaders Serbian allowed Kosovo for 1st time in over 20 years. THE CONNECTIONS WILL NOT SIMPLY BE IGNORED Look at the recurring Kosovo question. Look at the political figures, the changes of government, the international actors and the moments of national crisis. From Đinđić in 2003, through Koštunica and Tadić, to Vučić in 2022, the question of Kosovo repeatedly returns. Different governments, different political circumstances, but the same unresolved national issue. My argument is that these developments belong to a much bigger political story about Serbia's sovereignty, its international relationships and the competing interests seeking to influence its future. The assassinations, political transitions, protests and national crises must each be examined on their own evidence. But that does not mean we should ignore the wider political context or refuse to ask whether these developments intersect. And now we arrive at the Student Blockades and the Student List. They want political power. They want to replace the existing political order. They present themselves as an alternative capable of determining Serbia's future. But where does Kosovo and Metohija fit into their plans? What is their position on Serbian institutions? What would they do about the security of Serbs in Kosovo? What is their position on the Brussels Agreement and the Ohrid framework? Do they support the return of Serbian soldiers and police officers under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244? And, most importantly, what would they actually do differently? These are not secondary questions. They go to the heart of Serbia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security and future. The Student List cannot demand the responsibility of governing Serbia while expecting the public to accept silence on its most consequential national question. Serbia has changed governments before. It has heard promises before. It has watched political movements rise and fall before. The Serbian public deserves to know who stands behind the political alternatives being presented, whose interests their policies serve and what consequences their programme would have for the country. Do not look at each event as though it exists in a vacuum. Examine the timeline. Examine the people. Examine the interests. Ask the difficult questions. Because changing the government is one thing. Understanding who benefits from that change, what comes afterwards and what happens to Kosovo and Metohija is another. Before celebrating another political transition, demand answers. Serbia's future is too important to be decided on slogans, promises and unanswered questions. nitter.gq/KoSSevnews/status/2120…
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ALEKSANDAR ČUPIĆ: YOU HAVE THE CHAIR. NOW ANSWER FOR YOUR POLITICAL CONVICTIONS. Aleksandar Čupić now has the responsibility of presiding over Serbia's National Assembly. That is no small appointment. It is one of the most important constitutional offices in the country, and the Serbian public has every right to know exactly who occupies it and what he stands for. One documented detail deserves serious attention: your doctoral supervisor at the University of Belgrade was Professor Dušan Teodorović. Your doctorate was defended in December 2014 under his supervision. Teodorović is a prominent academic who has publicly advocated NATO membership for Serbia, sanctions against Russia and an agreement on Kosovo. He has also made highly controversial statements about Serbian nationalism and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Let me be clear: I am questioning whether you and Dušan Teodorović are, politically and ideologically, one and the same. He supervised your doctoral research and was an important figure in your academic development. His publicly expressed positions on NATO, Russia, Kosovo and the Serbian Orthodox Church are well known. So tell Serbia directly: do you share his worldview? Are these your convictions as well? Because the person now presiding over Serbia's National Assembly cannot expect the public to accept a distinction between himself and the political outlook he appears aligned with without explaining where he actually stands. Are you and Teodorović advancing the same political vision for Serbia? These are not academic exercises. They concern Serbia's sovereignty, foreign policy, national identity and future. You cannot present yourself as the face of a new political movement, take one of the country's highest parliamentary offices and then expect difficult questions to disappear. You have the chair. You have the responsibility. Now demonstrate the transparency you and your movement have repeatedly demanded from everyone else. Serbia does not need another politician hiding behind slogans. It deserves to know exactly what the person presiding over its parliament believes. kompletnadokumentacija.com/?… radiosarajevo.ba/amp/metroma…
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"anarchist and communist from Croatia".......in there own words.
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SARAJEVO, TEHRAN AND THE PALESTINE CONNECTION: THE RELATIONSHIP THAT DESERVES CLOSER SCRUTINY Yesterday, I raised questions about the connections between Palestine, Bosnia and the political and ideological narratives surrounding the Muslim world in the Balkans. Today, another development deserves very serious attention. Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, one of the most senior religious figures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been in Sarajevo attending the ceremony marking the formal installation of Nedžad Grabus as the new Reis-ul-Ulema, the head of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Islamic Community. This is not an ordinary diplomatic guest. Arafi is a member of Iran's Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts. He also heads Iran's national religious seminary system. In March 2026, he briefly served on the country's interim Leadership Council following the death of Ali Khamenei. His presence in Sarajevo therefore deserves more than a passing mention. But it is what he said during his interview with Bosnian news outlet Klix that makes this visit particularly interesting. Arafi openly stated that Iran wants to deepen and expand its relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina across multiple fields, including culture, intellectual life, education and the arts. He went further. Discussing the Bosnian War and the Iranian experience, Arafi drew a parallel between the two countries' histories of resistance. He specifically identified what he called the literature of resistance as an area in which Iran and Bosnia could develop cooperation. He also stated that Bosnia's wartime experience occupies a special place in Iran's educational programmes, including its religious institutions and universities. These are his own words, not an interpretation imposed on them. And they raise an important question: what kind of relationship is Tehran seeking to develop with Bosnia, and what role does religious and cultural engagement play in that relationship? THE PALESTINE CONNECTION Arafi himself connected Iran's religious outlook with its involvement in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Gaza, describing assistance to people facing injustice as a religious obligation. This is significant because Iran's regional position is not limited to conventional diplomacy. Its political and religious identity is closely connected to its declared support for the Palestinian cause and what its leadership describes as resistance. This is where the direct connection becomes impossible to ignore. Iran is not merely engaging with Bosnia through conventional diplomacy. Its senior religious leadership is establishing direct religious, cultural and intellectual ties with Bosnia's Islamic institutions, while openly promoting a shared narrative of resistance that connects Bosnia's wartime experience with Tehran's political and ideological position on Palestine. These connections deserve to be examined for what they are: a developing relationship between religious institutions and a state whose regional influence is deeply intertwined with its political agenda. When a senior Iranian religious authority visits Sarajevo, speaks openly about expanding institutional, intellectual and cultural cooperation, and identifies common ground through the language of resistance, these are legitimate subjects for public scrutiny. BOSNIA, IRAN AND THE GROWING RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL CONNECTION The relationship between Bosnia and Iran did not begin with this week's visit to Sarajevo. It has deep roots in the Bosnian War of the 1990s, when Iran established itself as an important supporter of the Bosnian Muslim side during the conflict. Tehran's involvement went beyond expressions of solidarity. Iran provided assistance to the Bosnian government, and its wartime relationship with Bosnia created political, religious and institutional connections that continued long after the Dayton Peace Agreement. That history matters when examining what is happening today. Iran has maintained an interest in Bosnia through religious diplomacy, cultural programmes, educational exchanges and engagement with Muslim institutions. The presence of Ayatollah Alireza Arafi in Sarajevo is a contemporary illustration of that relationship. This is not simply a meeting between two religious representatives. It brings together a senior figure of the Islamic Republic, a state whose political system is built around the authority of its religious establishment, and the highest religious institution representing Bosnia's Muslim community. Arafi's own statements make the connection even more relevant. He has spoken about expanding cooperation, shared historical experiences and the importance of resistance literature. He has also connected Iran's experience with Bosnia's wartime history and the Palestinian cause. There is a broader ideological dimension here that cannot be ignored. Iran has consistently positioned itself as a leading political and religious supporter of the Palestinian cause. Its concept of resistance is central to its regional foreign policy. By drawing parallels between Bosnia's wartime experience, Iran's own history and Gaza, Arafi is placing these different conflicts within a shared political and religious narrative. That is a significant connection. Bosnia's historical relationship with Iran, its Muslim religious institutions and Tehran's contemporary engagement with Sarajevo deserve serious scrutiny. The question is how these relationships have developed, how deeply they are embedded institutionally, and what role they may play in Iran's wider ambitions in the Balkans. Bosnia's European future and its relationship with the wider Muslim world are not mutually exclusive. But understanding the influence of a foreign state with an explicitly ideological political system is essential to understanding the geopolitical environment in which Bosnia operates. THE QUESTIONS THAT NEED ANSWERS How extensive are Iran's religious, cultural and educational relationships with Bosnian institutions? What formal agreements, exchange programmes and financial relationships exist? How much of Iran's political and religious messaging is being incorporated into cultural and educational cooperation? And what does Tehran ultimately hope to achieve by deepening its relationship with Sarajevo? These are not abstract questions. They concern the historical relationship between two countries, the influence of a regional power in the Balkans and the intersection of religion and geopolitics. Yesterday's discussion about Palestine and Bosnia must therefore be viewed in a wider context. The historical relationship between Iran and Bosnia, combined with Tehran's declared interest in expanding its presence, gives this subject a contemporary dimension that deserves much closer attention. The connection between Sarajevo and Tehran is real, it has a history, and it is developing. Understanding its political, religious and geopolitical implications is not optional for anyone concerned with Bosnia's future. klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ajatolah… amp.dw.com/en/bosnia-herzego…
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