GOP is in for a fight for its political life.
“What we’re entering is going to be one of the most aggressive periods of congressional investigations in recent memory.”
Replying to @JillHVogel
@JillHVogel spoke with @politico about the surge of inquiries the firm received since Election Night as likely targets of Democratic oversight prepare for the next Congress.
“What we’re entering is going to be one of the most aggressive periods of congressional investigations in recent memory.”
politico.com/news/2026/11/05…
#CongressionalInvestigations #CongressionalOversight #Midterms
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ᖴᑌᗰIE retweeted
STUDIO MAPPA is reportedly in talks to acquire the rights to ‘TOKYO GHOUL’, with plans to completely reboot the franchise from the ground up.
The project would reportedly scrap all non-canon elements from previous seasons, giving the series a full, uncensored adaptation faithful to Sui Ishida’s original dark fantasy manga.
ᖴᑌᗰIE retweeted
Dr. Larissa Portnoff courageously shares her story of Trump allegedly targeting her as a child: “Donald Trump repeatedly targeted me, and sexually exploited me… It was very clear that he knew what he was doing”
Replying to @shelbystardust
Trump took this Elvis thing too far. Don't you think, Haley?
🤖 Made with AI
The message to Iran is stockpile for an emergency means we're ready for the worst they're going to throw at us. 💡The US military Psych Opperations department is working overtime. nitter.gq/taylorkennytv/status/2…
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Remember to vote for Dan, either one, it's the same person anyhow.
Federal judge dismisses Trump attempt to interfere in Alaska Senate race nbcnews.com/politics/2026-el… via @nbcnews
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A nuclear strike on Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain facility (near Natanz) would be an extremely high-risk, low-reward action with cascading strategic, humanitarian, and long-term consequences. The site is a real, deeply buried complex in hard granite, estimated at roughly 80–150 meters (260–500 feet) underground, which makes conventional bunker-busters (such as the GBU-57) of uncertain effectiveness.
It would break the post-1945 nuclear non-use norm. Nuclear weapons have not been used in combat since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This long-standing restraint—sometimes called the nuclear taboo—has held through multiple wars involving nuclear powers. Crossing it would signal that nuclear weapons are usable tools for conventional targets rather than last-resort deterrents. Other states (or their leaders) could interpret this as lowering the threshold for their own use in regional conflicts, raising the odds of further nuclear employment elsewhere.
Military results would likely be incomplete while escalation risks would be extreme. Even a nuclear earth-penetrator is not guaranteed to fully destroy a dispersed, hardened granite facility of this depth; residual knowledge, materials, or other sites could allow reconstitution. At the same time, Iran retains ballistic missiles, proxy forces, and the ability to intensify attacks on shipping, U.S. bases, or Gulf infrastructure. A nuclear first use would almost certainly produce a far larger Iranian (and possibly broader) response than conventional strikes have, with higher chance of drawing in other powers or expanding the conflict beyond the nuclear program.
Radiological and regional effects would be severe. A ground-burst nuclear explosion creates substantial local fallout and contamination far beyond what conventional attacks on enrichment sites have produced (which have generally been localized with limited off-site radiological impact). Depending on yield, weather, and exact placement, fallout could affect nearby populations and potentially contribute to longer-term contamination risks in the wider region. Gulf states rely heavily on desalination from the Persian Gulf; any meaningful contamination of water sources or related infrastructure would threaten drinking water for tens of millions, disrupt energy and shipping further, and impose lasting economic and public-health costs.
Strategic and political costs would outweigh any short-term gain. International reaction would be strongly negative, eroding U.S. alliances and soft power while likely accelerating nuclear proliferation incentives among other states. Domestically and regionally it would strengthen hardline elements in Iran, complicate any subsequent diplomacy, and risk prolonged instability in global energy markets already strained by conflict. Diplomacy or continued conventional pressure (or even a negotiated settlement) remain lower-risk paths to constraining Iran’s program without opening this precedent.
In short, the combination of incomplete military payoff, high escalation probability, environmental and humanitarian harm, and irreversible damage to the nuclear non-use norm makes this option disproportionately dangerous relative to the problem it is meant to solve. Tucker Carlson’s specific claim of an imminent decision remains unverified by official sources.
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