Victor Muatine

A Kenyan man living with a disability sought to transform his daily mobility by importing a 2018 Range Rover Sport from Japan. Relying on statutory tax exemptions designed to ease transport barriers for persons with disabilities, he submitted his medical documentation, council registration, and formal exemption requests to the Kenya Revenue Authority. Instead of receiving clearance, however, he watched his vehicle remain stranded at the port. Frustrated by what he described as demeaning conduct, shifting compliance demands, and informal solicitations for facilitation fees, the importer turned to the High Court in Awino v Commissioner General, KRA & 4 Others. Framing his suit around constitutional guarantees, he argued that the agency’s prolonged inaction violated his fundamental rights to dignity, fair administrative treatment, and property ownership. In defense, the tax authority maintained that high-value vehicle import exemptions demand rigorous vetting to safeguard public revenue against fraud and illicit proxy arrangements. During administrative interviews, revenue officers uncovered significant discrepancies regarding the applicant’s reported profession, declared earnings, and the ultimate source of funds used to purchase the luxury vehicle. Because correspondence was ongoing and critical financial records remained outstanding, the authority clarified that the petition had never been outright denied—it was simply still under scrutiny. Delivering judgment, the High Court declined to intervene, dismissing the petition and ordering the applicant to pay costs. The court affirmed that while constitutional petitions serve vital public-interest functions, they cannot be deployed prematurely to sidestep ordinary administrative and statutory mechanisms under customs law when a final decision has not yet been rendered. Furthermore, the court emphasized that grave allegations of official extortion and discriminatory abuse cannot rest on general assertions; without specific dates, identifiable officers, and contemporaneous evidence, such claims cannot stand.

PMO, the poet Between the glowing, restless glass And leaves of vellum bound in thread, A silent border came to pass, Where little of the heart was said. ​You measured love in trending light, In fleeting sparks and sudden pace; I kept my vigil in the night, And studied shadows on your face. ​You skipped the plays of tragic kings, Too impatient for their rhyme, While I was tied to heavier things— The patient architectures of time. ​Then, sudden as a flash of screen, You reached across the century To ask for life to bridge between Your frantic pulse and history. ​I held your gaze; the answer fell Without a plea, without debate. Some stories end before they swell, To save them from an unmade fate.

The Supreme Court just changed the Court of Appeal rules. This is important in the drafting of pleadings In Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE) & 3 others v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others, the Supreme Court of Kenya definitively addressed two fundamental questions of appellate practice: when the apex court may depart from its own precedents, and whether an interested party can mount an appeal in its own right. The ruling arose from an application by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), which sought to challenge provisions of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act. Having been joined as an interested party in the High Court in 2018, the LSK asked the Supreme Court either to depart from its earlier decision in Mbaazi Avenue Residents’ Association v Metricon Home Nairobi Company Ltd—which bars interested parties from appealing—or to waive that restriction in its favor. A five-judge bench comprising Deputy Chief Justice Philomena Mwilu and Supreme Court Judges Smokin Wanjala, Isaac Lenaola, William Ouko, and Mohammed Warsame dismissed the application, reaffirming the high bar for departing from precedent and settling the procedural boundaries governing non-principal litigants. ​Addressing the standard for departing from its own decisions, the Court clarified the boundary between review proceedings and requests to overrule precedent. While the narrow review grounds under Section 21A of the Supreme Court Act apply to judgments obtained through fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or repealed law, a plea to overturn precedent is governed exclusively by the principles articulated in Jasbir Singh Rai v Tarlochan Singh Rai Estate. The Court confirmed that a party seeking departure must file a formal application served on all respondents, but emphasized that departure remains an extraordinary measure. The Court may choose between its own conflicting decisions or set aside a ruling delivered per incuriam, but it will never depart from precedent merely because its current bench doubts the correctness of the earlier decision or might reach a different conclusion today. Because Mbaazi was grounded in a consistent line of jurisprudence extending from Mumo Matemu through Muruatetu and Macharia, it was not decided per incuriam, and the challenge against it failed. ​On the question of appellate standing, the Court firmly held that an interested party cannot file an independent appeal or join proceedings as a co-appellant. The appellate process is reserved strictly for aggrieved principal parties who initiated or defended the primary suit. An interested party is admitted solely because it holds an identifiable stake in the outcome; it must align with an existing side and cannot frame fresh causes of action or broaden the dispute. Crucially, the bench ruled that invoking public interest, constitutional rights under Article 22, or a statutory mandate under Section 4 of the Law Society Act does not carve out an exception to this doctrine. Having voluntarily applied to join the suit as an interested party eight years earlier, the LSK could not retrospectively claim an involuntary status to convert itself into an appellant. ​The Court concluded by directing the High Court and the Court of Appeal to maintain procedural discipline, ordering that interested parties must remain recorded strictly as interested parties rather than being redesignated as appellants or respondents at different appellate tiers.