Turning random hashes into aha-moments. Coffee fueled. Views mine.

Joined February 2010
🚨 Discovered a global campaign of ~2800 compromised sites delivering AMOS Stealer for MacOS 🔹 Vector: ClickFix & EtherHiding obfuscation via Binance 🔹 IOCs: technavix[.]cloud, salorttactical[.]top 🔹 Blog for analysis + domain list: badbyte.io/infostealer-macos… VT: 9efddeb9e09eef067c3d2d307f38371ba0baf4c8fceaba01b9f007a50350a55c @L0Psec BlockChain: 0x53fd54f55C93f9BCCA471cD0CcbaBC3Acbd3E4AA @patrickwardle @RussianPanda9xx @malwrhunterteam @BleepinComputer @500mk500 @theJoshMeister @BushidoToken @DarkReading @ViriBack @DaveLikesMalwre @DarkWebInformer #Stealer #MacOS #Clickfix
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1/ The token-supabase[.]com phishing going around today looks interesting. It was posted from a compromised account: Tyler Shukert's (dshukertjr). That's why it looked credible.
hey @supabase @kiwicopple I think Tyler's account's been compromised
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3/ Same redirector, same trick, two more cases today. An impersonator account "Liquid[.]af" (TradeOnLiquid) pushing liquid-af[.]com, and a separate chain targeting ONINO sending users to oninofoundation[.]com. All three destination domains registered in the last 48h.
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4/ x-loading[.]com does not look X-owned. The issue is that X resolves whatever is in url= for the link card, giving attackers full control over what domain users see before clicking.
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🚨 Odyssey Stealer C2 Panel 🎯 http[:]//194.26.29[.]217 AS 206728 Rotating infostealer infra. @malwrhunterteam @ViriBack @g0njxa @500mk500 @DaveLikesMalwre
Looks Aurotun stealer sample, "main.exe": 64366026bd9a8e783516a479c479d4087a24073f39f5ff8c1085e1aee2fd2572 From: https://luckyseaworld[.]com/main.exe 194.26.29[.]217
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Lumma customers claim to have received this message on Telegram, apparently on Lumma customers group
Seems like some #Lumma Stealer panels have started to display a banner of seizure /tsoi-zhiv.com /anna-akhmatova.com
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Microsoft has partnered with others across industry and international law enforcement and facilitated a disruption of Lumma infrastructure and the marketplaces in which the stealer malware was sold to other cybercriminals. msft.it/6011Sd2zc
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🚨 Introducing Mave Stealer C2 Panel: 🎯 web.mavedashboard[.]lol 🎯31.57.156[.]135 (AS210538) 🧬ea8aebfaedd0d287ac10c39a5a3c4de6 @onyphe Mave Stealer appears to have been launched on Apr 25. [@]squ4ts🐀<🐈 :) Any samples? @malwrhunterteam @ViriBack @g0njxa @RussianPanda9xx @500mk500 @DaveLikesMalwre @bruce_k3tta
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🚨 Odyssey Stealer C2 Panel 🎯 odyssey-st[.]com 🎯 83.222.190[.]214 @malwrhunterteam @ViriBack @g0njxa @RussianPanda9xx @500mk500 @DaveLikesMalwre
🚨 New Odyssey Stealer C2 Panel 🎯 hxxp://5.199.166[.]102/login This is the third C2 spin-up in a matter of days. Favicon: 9108dde25ad958b27f6a97d644775dee #Threathunting #Odyssey #Stealer #ThreatIntel @malwrhunterteam @ViriBack @g0njxa @RussianPanda9xx @500mk500 @DaveLikesMalwre @censysio @L0Psec
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🚨 Clickfix - Binance Phishing delivering VIDAR 🎯 193.24.123[.]165 🎯 traderai[.]name C2: t[.]me/m00f3r, steamcommunity[.]com/profiles/76561199851454339 (couple more IPs in the title). VT: c3ac276122e6af6459eda55251a70ebf8bb091a620314f18ada33a6259fe10b1 @malwrhunterteam @ViriBack @g0njxa @RussianPanda9xx @500mk500 @DaveLikesMalwre #clickfix
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NEW BLOG: Investigating ClickFix Incidents ClickFix/Fake Captcha has emerged as a popular technique to deliver malware to users. This blog discusses the first stages of a ClickFix investigation to determine the impact on your organisation. kqlquery.com/posts/investiga…
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👽Disruption Update: 1: technavix[.]cloud, salorttactical[.]top are no longer resolving 2: TA has stopped delivering ClickFix (for now) for both Windows and Mac 3: Binance transactions are still happening in the background for almost all compromised sites so there is a chance of infrastructure rotation 4: 🎯nc1.overallwobbly[.]ru is still operational (Windows payload delviery) All the BSC contracts for EtherHiding observed: 0x9179dda8B285040Bf381AABb8a1f4a1b8c37Ed53 0xa6165aa33ac710ad5dcd4f4d6379466825476fde 0x8FBA1667BEF5EdA433928b220886A830488549BD 0x53fd54f55C93f9BCCA471cD0CcbaBC3Acbd3E4AA Thanks @NCSC
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All the BSC contracts for EtherHiding: 0x9179dda8B285040Bf381AABb8a1f4a1b8c37Ed53 0xa6165aa33ac710ad5dcd4f4d6379466825476fde 0x8FBA1667BEF5EdA433928b220886A830488549BD 0x53fd54f55C93f9BCCA471cD0CcbaBC3Acbd3E4AA
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🚨 Same Threat Actor is now delivering Windows Payload through the ~2800 compromised sites using ClickFix It dinamycally changes depending on platform (user-agent) Mac/Win 1: https://e.overallwobbly[.]ru/au1 (Dropper1: era-stau1.a) → PowerShell → Stage 1 Script (AutoIT) 2: https://e.overallwobbly[.]ru/era-std → PowerShell → Stage 2 Code 3: https://nc1.overallwobbly[.]ru/googlerestricted.ide → Final Payload (heavily obfuscated) Probably using LOLBin. Hash era-stau: d2465b8f9b36fa3139bcdcacab54591490753cc7f8843f8dddb0831094ef53ac Hash of dropped Zloader: 4e72ca1baee2c7c0f50a42614d101159a9c653a8d6f7498f7bf9d7026c24c187 Thoughts? @malwrhunterteam @RussianPanda9xx @500mk500 @ViriBack @Big_Bad_W0lf_ @DaveLikesMalwre @g0njxa @JohnHultquist #ThreatIntel #ClickFix
🚨 Discovered a global campaign of ~2800 compromised sites delivering AMOS Stealer for MacOS 🔹 Vector: ClickFix & EtherHiding obfuscation via Binance 🔹 IOCs: technavix[.]cloud, salorttactical[.]top 🔹 Blog for analysis + domain list: badbyte.io/infostealer-macos… VT: 9efddeb9e09eef067c3d2d307f38371ba0baf4c8fceaba01b9f007a50350a55c @L0Psec BlockChain: 0x53fd54f55C93f9BCCA471cD0CcbaBC3Acbd3E4AA @patrickwardle @RussianPanda9xx @malwrhunterteam @BleepinComputer @500mk500 @theJoshMeister @BushidoToken @DarkReading @ViriBack @DaveLikesMalwre @DarkWebInformer #Stealer #MacOS #Clickfix
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🚨 ClickFix Delivering XWorm 🎯 hxxps://lbkequityexchange[.]com/i.cmd 🎯 hxxps://lbkequityexchange[.]com/EQTRN.exe 🎯 Prob C2: winservicesconsole[.]duckdns.]org - 45.154.98[.]252 ASN 210558 💻 Fake CAPTCHA → Runs PS script → Downloads i.cmd → Deploys XWorm while mimicking a crypto transfer 🧬 Hash i.cmd: fda2f3d8e7905cfcbc8deb708275638e4da02a7185314d70ff6b0851481b1033 🧬 Hash EQTRN.exe (xWorm): 80aebd0486bcc05a3759210d58dfec22 @malwrhunterteam @ViriBack @g0njxa @500mk500 @DaveLikesMalwre #threatintel #clickfix #threathunting
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