Orius International Investment LLC

Mihai’s attacks are once again designed to create confusion within the community. The parameters of the money markets have always been monitored and adjusted since the inception of the protocol to ensure a secure and efficient economic environment. In fact, multiple changes to the parameters of the various money markets have been made since the launch: BUSD Gradual Collateral Factor Decrease 80% -> 70% -> 55% -> 25% -> 0%: (Depreciation of a money market) explorer.multiversx.com/tran… explorer.multiversx.com/tran… explorer.multiversx.com/tran… explorer.multiversx.com/tran… sEGLD Collateral Factor Increase 70% -> 72.5%: explorer.multiversx.com/tran… HTM Collateral Factor Increase 57% - 60%: explorer.multiversx.com/tran… wTAO Collateral Factor Increase 62.5% -> 72.5%: (After Binance Listing) explorer.multiversx.com/tran… swTAO Collateral Factor Increase 62.5% -> 72.5%: (After Binance Listing) explorer.multiversx.com/tran… wETH Borrow Cap Increase 103 wETH -> 250 wETH: explorer.multiversx.com/tran… wBTC Borrow Cap Increase 7 wBTC -> 13 wBTC: explorer.multiversx.com/tran… MEX Supply Cap Increase 450MM -> 750 MM: explorer.multiversx.com/tran… These adjustments are perfectly normal and are performed by the team after thorough market analysis until governance goes live, at which point token holders will be responsible for them. In his post, Mihai suggests that the price magically rose when we increased the cap, and intentionally forgets to mention the temporality of the events. In facts, the changes on the HTM Money Markets took place AFTER the price had already surged. How could an increase of a cap of any asset result in the increase of its price and why should we have decided to increase the HTM cap to protect a position while the price was rising ? This is nonsense and the opposite of his claim. Price of HTM 08 FEB (20:00 => 21:00) Changes on HTM Money Market: 08 FEB (21:21 => 21:59) First modification at 21:21 : explorer.multiversx.com/tran… Last Modification at 21:59 : explorer.multiversx.com/tran… Back to the original value 23:38 : explorer.multiversx.com/tran… And it's easy to prove that the accounts used for supply did nothing else, and exited immediately once the original supply cap was restored. This was btw already present in my original post made in November, no borrow has been made in relation to this event which only lasted a few hours. We never denied Hatom's position in the protocol with a summary of all of them publicly shared in a post in November on our own initiative. His goal is once again to confuse the community by spreading false information and manipulating the narrative, sharing cherry-picked transactions and price graphs without specifying the timeline of actions. To debunk this specific claim and why the cap has been increased, on February 8th, the team detected that a specific and new created address funded with 29,000 EGLDs and 150,000 HTMs was buying aggressively a significant amount of HTM in a very short time—more than 145,000 HTM : explorer.multiversx.com/acco… After analyzing this behavior and observing that the accumulation occurred without regard for price impact, the team suspected it could be part of a potential attack against the protocol. The goal appeared to be creating a large sale aimed at manipulating the money market, even at the cost of incurring significant losses. The team took immediate and a preventive measure to protect the protocol. After further analysis and confirmation that the intent of this address was not harmful, the team completely reverted the parameters to their previous settings. Throughout this process, both before and after the adjustments, no borrow has been taken, no positions were at risk of liquidation, and there was no issue with performing liquidations. If Mihai has any on-chain proof to the contrary we invite him to share them. He has been attacking us for the past 8 months, constantly jumping from one topic to another after each of his claims was clarified and explained to the community. These attacks began when he decided to work on his own products, and Hatom is neither the first nor the only project he has targeted, this behavior has always been the same with all his competitors. Our actions since the launch of the protocol have consistently aimed to create value and foster the growth of MultiversX’s DeFi ecosystem through meaningful contributions, but now, let’s address the on-chain attack Mihai performed against the protocol, even though it harmed our staking provider partners to benefit his own staking agencies. (P.S.: The manipulation of protocols is legally punishable. The team had the option to pursue legal action but chose not to do so at that time to avoid harming the ecosystem.) The SC of the Attack : explorer.multiversx.com/acco… The Owner Address : explorer.multiversx.com/acco… Mihai not only used a weakness in the selection algorithm to target his own staking providers, he also used it to remove his EGLDs from other providers, to supply them back to him. Through this SC developed expressly for this purpose, he supplied the first time 12,692 EGLD which he supplied to Xoxno, his own validator, he then sold the sEGLD via AshSwap to loop his technique, redeposited 12,625 EGLD on Xoxno again and targeted a withdraw of the same amount at @MGStaking (owned by @BlackHatNetwork) which is one of the other builders with whom he attacked multiple time without proof and which were also answered each time by the BHat team. explorer.multiversx.com/tran… After removing the EGLDs from this provider, he redelegated 9100 natively on TrustStaking and he will later use this technique again to loop a supply of 3000 EGLD twice to TrustStaking while retrieving its original EGLDs via AshSwap. In the end, with only 12,700 EGLDs, he enabled his validators to capture around 40k EGLDs, either by jeopardizing the sEGLD<>EGLD pool on AshSwap, or by removing them from other providers. The 2,687 remaining EGLD will then be sent to the following account with the herotag: "FoxyScam", 1319 of which will be used to buy his own token explorer.multiversx.com/tran… This account is directly connected to other fancy herotag typical of the persona “Carmen” like "bhatscambyjeetoras" as his telegram bio attests: “BHAT and Flopix are scams by Jeetoras” but also received the profits from the Bobber Battle SC by the deployer of this smart contract. (please note that we're not accusing or essentializing Mihai's actions at the Bober Team which has nothing to do with this) This is a clear attack not only on Hatom, but even more on our Staking Providers. We could have decided after I discovered this attack to remove his multiple Staking Providers from Hatom, and penalized him for the EGLDs he acquired thanks to this. But despite his constant attacks on us to which we have done nothing but deny, we didn't take this decision at the time to show our good faith, so as not to feed this conflict and add yet another drama to the community. Such a decision cannot be taken unilaterally, especially because we're not the only ones hurt by this attack, which affected our validators, the community and MultiversX as a protocol. With the arrival of staking V4, this action enabled him to protect the TrustStaking nodes he was losing because he had fewer EGLDs per node than the NQT at that time, but also to gain an unfair advantage by capturing more nodes with Xoxno at the expense of providers in direct competition with TrustStaking, thus increasing his share, while Meria, IversVision, PartnerStaking and others saw their number of nodes sharply reduced by the competitiveness of delegation. To be precise : Xoxno stake per node before the attack on August 18th : 4249 EGLD/Node - 199,726 EGLD delegated for 47 nodes NQT on August 19th : 4241 EGLD Xoxno stake per node after the August 19th attack : 4489 EGLD/Node - 224,476 EGLD delegated for 50 nodes TrustStaking stake per node before the attack on August 29th : 4177 EGLD/Node - 401,061 EGLD delegated for 96 nodes NQT on August 30th : 4254 EGLD TrustStaking stake per node after the attack on August 30th : 4335 EGLD/Node - 416,163 EGLD delegated for 96 nodes Despite its multiple attacks, we don't want to play tit for tat, there's nothing to be earned both personally and as an ecosystem, but we won't oppose at removing his nodes from Hatom Liquid Staking and redistributing the damaged EGLDs to the affected providers when governance is in place, if that's its choice. (PS: the attack vector used on the Liquid Staking protocol was fixed in September just after its discovery) Now, back to building.