Start with something like PopperPad.
PopperPad is scientific memory for humans and agents: an append-only, falsification-first knowledge ledger for hypotheses, recipes, evidence, counterexamples, artifacts, and typed relationships between claims.
github.com/TheDarkLightX/Pop…
D.#dwards retweeted
The ETH result has affected me more than the others, probably just proximity. What possible structure could there be in *all* boolean circuits? In common? How does that even make sense?
D.#dwards retweeted
Replying to @matthew_d_green @OpenSSLFact
Within a few weeks of Heartbleed, suddenly the idea that software libraries were critical infrastructure didn’t seem so silly. Money started flowing. Within a few weeks there was a new organization run by the Linux Foundation called the Core Infrastructure Initiative.
D.#dwards retweeted
Replying to @esrtweet
I'm hoping that question will be resolved soon, just out of pure intellectual curiosity.
All the evidence so far is making stronger the case that if P=NP, we'll only get galactic algorithms with huge polynomials for problems previously in NP.
I agree with this take. Open weight labs have no reason to make "vibe cybersecurity" a thing. People with skills don't need it. People without skills could abuse it. No one wins. This doesn't mean it should be gated, but why make it "vibe" easy to make exploits?
I am okay with Kimi 3.1 deliberately leaving out top-end offensive cyber capabilities from their training data.
Discriminating against use cases is MUCH less bad than discriminating against users. And the world does need all the time it can get to prepare, harden, check old code, (properly) formally verify new code, etc before the full weight of very powerful cyber attacks is upon us.
And if this first big wave of AI risk is not handled well, then we may well get a dystopia of highly locked down models, KYC gating on everything, highly intrusive surveillance on everything, a society where you may be a second or third or fourth-class citizen in terms of model access based on your credentials and nationality.
D.#dwards retweeted
Replying to @Mike5tevenson
Exactly. I don’t think a lot of large orgs realize that gpt 6 Luna is a super smart model costing a tiny fraction of what opus 4.5 cost a year ago. And that’s not to mention various local models that are now way better
Replying to @MikeHowton @AISafetyMemes
Hardware CVEs are rare. NIST reported only ~131 total HW CVEs as of Feb 2024. BSI tracked ~75 new hardware/microarchitecture vulns in the latest July-June period (+10% YoY). CWE analysis of 2021-2024 found ~1,026 hardware-related root-cause CVEs (refined to 478 with clear mapping). They form just 0.2-4.5% of all public CVEs; no full public yearly table exists beyond these aggregates.
I have an idea Mr Altman, if you read this. Set up a reward pool, offer global bug bounties for anyone willing to patch the bugs. Give free usage credits to anyone who successfully submits a bug patch. You'll be getting patches faster than you can review.
Bug bounties. Give generous rewards for patches. When people can make good clean money, most will choose that. But if the companies of the world want to be cheap, the situation will remain as is.
The only way out is through.
They're calling it the Bugpocalypse. LLMs are being used to find long-hidden cracks in the software infrastructure, and it's happening at a furious rate. 3% of all compromises in computing history happened in the last week, claims one source? I believe it.
There are people saying public access to the frontier models ought to be locked out, or heavily guardrailed, over this. The problem with that idea can be summed up in one sentence: when lockpicks are outlawed, only outlaws will have lockpicks.
The lockpicks will be Chinese open-weight models, if nothing else. There's no way to stop those from becoming ubiquitous.
There are two futures in front of us. One in which only the bad guys have lockpicks, and security holes go undiscovered until they're exploited. Another in which everybody has lockpicks and is aggressively red-teaming their own software so it gets fixed before the holes are exploited.
The corpus of human code is huge but finite. The number of defects in it has to be finite too. We can fix those defects now; we have a million friendly robots to do it with.
The only way out is through.
D.#dwards retweeted
"A Fix for Softmax and Cross-Entropy"
Turns out two of the most fundamental functions in deep learning have numerical bugs that can actually destabilize training.
This paper proposes simple fixes to softmax and cross-entropy that prevent tiny gradients from incorrectly rounding to zero, or remaining nonzero when they should vanish, as these errors can cause sudden loss spikes and interfere with knowledge distillation.
On small-scale grokking benchmarks, the fixes eliminate Slingshot loss spikes and improve test accuracy from 94.3% to 100% in one setting. They also prevent student models from drifting away from their teachers during distillation, without requiring higher numerical precision.
alphaxiv.org/abs/2610.31642
D.#dwards retweeted
The first bug is "Softmax Collapse", first identified (but not directly fixed) by Prieto et al. 2025. When one logit is much larger than the others, its gradient silently rounds to zero (see figure), but the others *don't*, causing gradients to not sum to zero. Here's the fix:
D.#dwards retweeted
Hi all, I have a new result I'm excited to share. It turns out that *all existing implementations* of softmax and cross-entropy (that's JAX, PyTorch, textbooks, etc) have a subtle bug --- two bugs, actually. A simple rewrite fixes both, and eliminates "slingshots" when grokking:
D.#dwards retweeted
arxiv.org/abs/2610.31642
Fixing numerical precision problem in softmax.
The success of LLM is undeniable, and does not match my earlier predictions. I already admitted that on several occasions over this year, and I'll do it here too now. My mathematical analysis of the capabilities (or lack thereof) of machine learning and of the transformer algorithm, is correct. What is mathematically impossible, remains so. However there are two things that I didn't take into account.
One is the huge computational resources invested in LLM: if you take a bad algorithm (i.e. with very low complexity-theoretic power and even then with far-from-optimal implementation) yet give it so much compute time and space, it will give nice results. The second is a real shame: again I made the classical mistake of overestimating humans, forgetting that doing better than humans, is not that hard, and this is pretty much where current AI stands. It works similarly to humans, i.e. broad but not very deep. Logical solvers, on the other hand, can go exponentially deeper but on narrower scopes.
Transformers proved an important theoretical point: a cap on what does it take to be fluent in natural language. Now that we know that, we can try to do better by many other means. This is an effort I started a few months ago, taking core lessons from transformers and studying them in frameworks that spend less on the unknown, and by that I mean: transformers give a very abstract skeleton of how things should work (quadratic forms over the history, then MLP, and repeat), then using SGD to tune all its many parameters. The part to learn (in the machine learning sense) is huge. I'm working under the guideline of "solve more, learn less" by having a skeleton that leaves much less degrees of freedom, using lessons learned from transformers, and using the expressive power of the logical frameworks I'm dealing with over the last years. To this end I also formulated the basis of theoretical machine learning in those frameworks, suggesting new aspects and giving rise to a fruitful combonation of the approaches. Empirically, some of the new settings managed to beat small transformers on lower wall-time even though they ran on CPU while the transformers ran on GPU.
Cybersecurity experts worldwide, immediately port all the C code to Rust. PHP and the whole family of memory exploits can be avoided with a language switch. C has and will always have memory safety bugs.
github.com/immunant/c2rust





















