Philipp Rotmann

"Nationaler Sicherheitsrat im Kanzleramt" kommt. Ohne GG-Änderung "im Rahmen des Ressortprinzips", getrennt von Bund-Länder-Krisenstab. Mit neuer Ressortaufteilung (CDU Außen, SPD Verteidigung+Entwicklung) eine Chance für Sicherheitspolitik aus einem Guss, aber Teufel im Detail.

Der Grünen-Vorschlag zur Sicherheitsausnahme von der Schuldenbremse weist in die richtige Richtung, Schwarz-Rot sind gut beraten ihn aufzunehmen: 1. Verteidigung inkl. Dienste und "Systeme kollektiver Sicherheit" (EU/NATO) 2. Ukrainehilfe, Stabilisierung 3. Zivilschutz, Cyber 1/

Aha, das klingt wieder sehr restriktiv im Moment. Wäre interessant zu wissen, welche Optionen für eine Öffnung bestehen, die rechtlichen Ansprüchen an Trennschärfe genügt. Schon die Auslandsdienste sind großteils nicht aus EP14 finanziert (auch wenn man da schieben könnte).

My @gppi colleague @Abigail_Watson7 helped me find the source: Starmer promises "+13.4 billion pounds for defence every year from 2027", as well as (next paragraph) another 0.1% of GNI for the intelligence services. 2/ hansard.parliament.uk/common…

Countries that achieve peace after war are those that do get more money for peace — but as conflicts grow, peace&security budgets shrink. Important to see the topic gather interest in Brussels at the EU @GPPi & @CEPS_thinktank w/ my colleague @Abigail_Watson7 presenting our work

While Ukraine gets it own special deal, all the other big hotspots that directly threaten EU interests are at risk of being inadvertently underfunded, just because the system is not flexible enough to accommodate the larger-than-anticipated level of chaos these days. 4/

Find the money somewhere else? Not quite: most EU funding remains long-term and slow to be mobilized. Also, the big push is toward the Commission’s flagship Global Gateway investments. They require security and predictability, which tend to be absent in countries in crisis. 3/

What's the problem? The EU has money for major crises in its 7-year budget. The current one is for 2021-27, so we're at the midpoint -- but 80% of the "emerging challenges" cushion & 74% of "rapid reaction" €€€ are already committed, leaving very little for 2024-27... 2/

The most disingenious part is everyone going along with the Finance Ministry's idea of "returning to pre-crisis levels of foreign spending". Well, crises are aplenty, and growing. And worse: we're already there. Rampant inflation made sure:

The most disingenious part is everyone going along with the Finance Ministry's idea of "returning to pre-crisis levels of foreign spending". Well, crises are aplenty, and growing. And worse: we're already there. Rampant inflation made sure: