Prof Richard Buckland

Yep, that's what you want from a voting system; you want its security to benefit from that well known gold standard of cyber security: 'security through obscurity'.

Finally the included PwC report claims that the limited number of eligible voters has allowed "...the system to benefit from ‘security through obscurity’, and therefore, the level of risk management of iVote at present is appropriate based on current scale and scope of its use."

And we shouldn't worry about coercion because Prof Smith contends coercion "is simply not part of the culture or social mores of Australian elections and has not and is not likely to be an issue." Neither was shoplifting from supermarkets, but self-service checkouts changed that.

... how is that not a receipt? If you can reveal how you voted then you have a receipt, it doesn't matter if it is a physical receipt or a 'virtual' receipt.

On the issue of coercion the report misses the point so widely as to be dumbfounding. Apparently it isn't a concern as "There is no receipt that reveals the content of the vote, although it would be possible to use the verification process to reveal the content of the vote." ...