Raplouf retweeted
Dédicace à Caroline Fourest, à franc-cireur et leur portrait qui fâche à venir, et à tout le printemps républicain 🤗
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Pour rappel :
La France c’est 28 millions de tonnes de gazole/an.
Autour de 76 000 tonnes/jour.
INSEE - 2024
insee.fr/fr/statistiques/211…
🔴 CRISE DES CARBURANTS
L'Elysée annonce « la sécurisation, pour la France, de 200 000 tonnes de diesel par mois en provenance du Bahreïn et des Émirats Arabes Unis. »
Dans le détail, 100 000 tonnes proviendront du Bahreïn et 100 000 tonnes des Émirats.
Ces volumes supplémentaires s'ajoutent aux 95 000 tonnes par mois de diesel déjà sécurisés via l'Arabie Saoudite pour octobre et novembre.
« Nous sécurisons les quantités avec un objectif : que les Français ne manquent de rien et qu’on fasse baisser les prix.
Dans cette situation de ni paix ni guerre, il faut sécuriser tout ce que nous pouvons sécuriser », affirme l’Elysée
L'acheminement sera géré par Total.
À quand un effet sur les prix ? « Quand on apporte plus de volumes ça aura un effet sur le prix mais on ne sait pas le quantifier » répond-on au Palais. @BFMTV
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Dans le monde merveilleux de Macron, la réalité dépasse toujours la caricature...
Qui aurait pu prévoir que pour palier le manque d'enseignants, le ministre Édouard Geffray utiliserait la recette imaginée par "Les Inconnus" il y a plus de 30 ans !
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🔴 Communiqué de presse de mes avocats.
Je me défendrai contre ces accusations vagues et sans fondement qui ont suffi à prononcer ma mise au ban politique, alors même qu’aucune plainte pénale n'a à ce jour été déposée ⬇️
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1/ 🧵 La DGFiP a confirmé le 13 août un accès pirate à son SI. ~678 000 contribuables potentiellement concernés. Le vrai sujet n'est pas « une faille » : il n'y en a pas eu. Quelqu'un est entré avec un badge volé. Décryptage ⬇️
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La communication de la police nationale, c'est la @policia nacional espagnole qui la fait le mieux. Ici, des images d'une opération conjointe avec l'OFAST français, qui a démantelé en Espagne une branche du Cártel mexicain Jalisco Nueva Generación. 2,5 tonnes de Méthamphétamine, 7 perquisitions simultanées, 13 arrestations dont 12 placés en détention provisoire.
🚩Desarticulada una rama del Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación dedicada al tráfico de metanfetamina diluida en líquido de vainilla
👮Introdujeron casi 2,5 toneladas de metanfetamina disuelta en 12 toneladas de este producto procedente de #México
7⃣ entradas y registros: Barcelona (5), Lleida (1) y Tarragona (1)
1⃣3⃣ detenidos (12 han ingresado en prisión)
🤝Op. conjunta con la #OFAST
ℹ️👉youtube.com/watch?v=9NC93YZN…
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Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec et Tremolada à côté de l'affiche Bal au Moulin Rouge Place Blanche.
1892. Paris
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#Iran’s Lebanon Dilemma: Has Tehran Abandoned Hezbollah?
🔹The massive Israeli strikes in Lebanon – coming less than a day after the U.S.-Iran ceasefire announcement – have injected immediate uncertainty into planned negotiations in Islamabad. From Tehran’s perspective, any ceasefire that excludes Lebanon is fundamentally incomplete and unacceptable.
🔹Iranian officials have consistently emphasized that, based on understandings reached through Pakistani mediation, the ceasefire was supposed to be regional in scope. The exclusion of Lebanon is therefore not seen as a technical oversight, but as a political shift.
🔹In Tehran’s reading, that shift reflects a deliberate decision by Donald Trump to align more closely with Israeli priorities following consultations with Benjamin Netanyahu.
🔹This has already reinforced a long-standing concern in Iran, i.e., the unreliability of U.S. commitments. Entering negotiations under these conditions is seen as strategically risky and politically costly.
🔹At the same time, Iran has drawn a firm red line. It has made clear that it will not participate in negotiations while Israeli strikes against Hezbollah continue. A reduction in the tempo of attacks is not sufficient, and Tehran is demanding a complete halt.
🔹This position reflects deeper structural pressures – both regional and domestic – that constrain Iran’s room for maneuver.
🔹In Iran, analysts increasingly interpret the situation as a calculated strategy by Washington and Tel Aviv to push Iran into a lose-lose scenario.
🔹If Iran escalates militarily in response to Israeli actions, it risks being blamed, especially domestically, for breaking the ceasefire. This is particularly sensitive given widespread public fatigue with war.
🔹A significant portion of the Iranian population, while not necessarily supportive of the regime, welcomed the ceasefire as a pathway toward stability. Renewed escalation could therefore trigger public backlash.
🔹This is compounded by an existing perception among many Iranians that the government invests heavily in regional conflicts, particularly in Lebanon and Gaza, at the expense of domestic priorities.
🔹In such a context, any Iranian military response could be framed internally not as national defense, but as a war fought on behalf of external actors. This interpretation that carries serious political risks.
🔹At the same time, restraint is not cost-free. Failing to respond risks alienating the Islamic Republic’s core ideological base, which has significant sympathy toward Hezbollah and expects tangible action.
🔹These constituencies – though smaller – are highly organized and politically significant. Their frustration with perceived inaction is already visible.
🔹As a result, Tehran finds itself navigating between two competing domestic pressures: a war-weary public on one side, and a mobilized ideological base on the other.
🔹Iran’s current approach reflects an attempt to balance these pressures. Rather than escalating directly, it is combining diplomatic maneuvering with indirect forms of pressure.
🔹On the diplomatic front, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has engaged regional and European counterparts, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive, region-wide ceasefire.
🔹At the same time, Iran has avoided direct military escalation against Israel and instead turned to its most critical leverage point, namely the Strait of Hormuz. The aim is to push the U.S. to constrain Israel.
🔹Despite expectations that maritime traffic would return to normal after the ceasefire, only a handful of ships passed since yesterday, indicating a deliberate effort to sustain pressure.
🔹From the perspective of some Iranian analysts, this form of economic and maritime pressure is more strategically valuable than missile retaliation. There is a growing view that limited missile strikes against Israel would achieve little beyond signaling solidarity, and could even play into Israel’s hands.
🔹The argument here is that Israel may actually prefer continued escalation, and that its demonstrated resilience in absorbing Iranian strikes has exposed the limits of Iran’s long-range missile deterrence. This has shifted the debate within Iran. The question is no longer whether to respond, but how.
🔹One camp argues that Iran could resume direct strikes against Israel while maintaining the ceasefire with the United States, effectively decoupling the two fronts.
🔹In this scenario, Washington – if genuinely interested in de-escalation – might tolerate limited Iran-Israel confrontation, allowing negotiations to proceed in parallel. Proponents see this as advantageous: it would sideline the United States and allow Iran to confront Israel directly.
🔹The opposing camp is more skeptical. They argue that even without direct U.S. offensive involvement, Washington would continue to provide Israel with logistical, defensive, and intelligence support. From this perspective, the idea of U.S. disengagement is largely illusory.
🔹Moreover, restricting the conflict to Iran and Israel would reduce Iran’s strategic flexibility. Tehran’s most effective leverage has come from its ability to target U.S. interests across the region, not just Israel itself.
🔹This creates a stark strategic dilemma: either escalate broadly, including against U.S. interests, or maintain the ceasefire and pursue diplomacy.
🔹Beyond these immediate tactical debates, Iranian analysts are increasingly focused on two broader strategic concerns.
🔹The first is reputational. Failure to support Hezbollah risks undermining the principle of mutual support that underpins Iran’s regional network.
🔹If Tehran does not act, allies in Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere may begin to question whether the costs of supporting Iran are reciprocated. Such a shift would weaken Iran’s deterrence posture and erode its influence across the “axis of resistance.”
🔹The second concern is structural: the future balance of power in the region.
🔹Iran appears to view the current moment as a rare opportunity to reshape that balance, particularly through its leverage in the Persian Gulf.
🔹From this perspective, continued Israeli operations in Lebanon are not just tactical, but they are strategic moves aimed at fragmenting Iran’s regional network.
🔹By isolating and pressuring individual nodes like Hezbollah, Israel may be attempting to prevent coordinated, multi-front responses. Over time, this could create a new strategic reality in which Iran’s allies are weakened sequentially, leaving Tehran itself more exposed.
🔹Iran’s objective, by contrast, is to preserve its model of collective deterrence, in the sense that any attack on one actor should trigger a broader regional response.
🔹This logic explains Tehran’s insistence on including Lebanon in the ceasefire. For Iran, this is not a secondary issue, but central to preserving its regional architecture.
🔹Ultimately, the current crisis is being interpreted in Tehran as both a tactical challenge and a strategic inflection point.
🔹How Iran navigates this moment – balancing domestic pressures, alliance commitments, and great-power dynamics – will shape not only the fate of the negotiations, but probably also the contours of future of the future regional order.
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Nous, journalistes pigistes et de médias indépendants nous désolidarisons de la couverture médiatique de la guerre au Moyen-Orient.
Pour les journalistes xn--intress-dyae.es de la signer :
docs.google.com/document/d/1…
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Trump’s “all over the place” presser appears to have had two key objectives: A) Calm the markets by signalling the conflict may soon be over because it has been so "successful,” and B) Prepare the ground for Trump ending the war through a unilateral declaration of victory.
Though ending a war that never should have been started in the first place - rather than fighting it endlessly in the pursuit of an illusory victory as the US did in Afghanistan - is the right move, it won’t be as easy as Trump appears to think.
Tehran also has a vote - and there is little to suggest that it will agree that the war is over.
Tehran objects to what it would consider a premature ceasefire out of fear that it would only give the US and Israel time to regroup, rearm, and then re-attack Iran. For the conflict to be ripe for a ceasefire, Tehran believes that enough cost must have been inflicted on the US, regional states, Israel, and on the global economy that all states conclude that starting the war was a mistake - and as a result, no state will seek to restart it.
Moreover, if the war ends now, Iran will be in a worse situation than it was before the start of the war. Much of its infrastructure has been destroyed, its missile capabilities have taken hits, its ability to export oil has been damaged, and most crucially, its prospects for sanctions relief have been obliterated. Indeed, who will and can help rebuild Iran under these circumstances?
This would leave Iran not only in a weakened position but also in a continuously weakening state. Which, in turn, would make another war of aggression by the US and Israel more, not less, likely, since it is Iran’s perceived weakness that prompted Trump and Israel to see an opportunity for war.
As such, it appears likely that Iran will continue to target Israel, even if the US declares victory and withdraws its military. Even GCC states may continue to be targeted. And Tehran will very likely try to keep the Straits of Hormuz shut. (At least for now, there are no signs that Tehran has lost its ability to do these things).
This will create a dilemma for Trump. It will be difficult for him to stay out while Iran and Israel continue to go at each other. But if he reenters the war, the hollowness of his declared victory will have been revealed. Markets will react negatively, and all the costs Trump is currently trying to avoid will likely intensify dramatically.
Iran, of course, does not want, nor can it afford, an endless war. But it will likely demand some significant steps in order to accept a ceasefire. This may include a commitment from Trump not to restart the war (though I don’t understand the value of such a commitment). But more importantly, it will likely require sanctions relief and release of its frozen funds abroad.
Trump will, of course, bark, but if the outcome is continued war, that will put a lot of pressure on him. Here, the role of some GCC states may prove crucial due to their willingness and ability to find an arrangement that could leave both Trump and Iran feeling that they “won.”
Whether Israel will allow that to happen, of course, is a different matter.
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Il décide de devenir millionnaire pour échapper à l’impôt sur le revenu legorafi.fr/2026/03/05/il-de…
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Replying to @FoxNews @seanhannity
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Il suffira dorénavant que Némésis dise "on va aller s'opposer a tel meeting" pour que le gouvernement fasse interdire le meeting en question.
C'est même plus un état policier, c'est un gouvernement de grouillots au service de 3 pingouins fascistes.
Mort de Quentin à Lyon : plus de meetings dans les universités en cas de risques à «l’ordre public», annonce le ministre de l'Enseignement supérieur, ce mardi matin
➡️ l.leparisien.fr/Qv9f
Replying to @CarolineYADAN
Voyons comment Israël a qualifié les différents rapporteurs de l'ONU sur la Palestine, avant Albanese, sur un quart de siècle.
Tous qualifiés d'antisémite, d'anti Israël.
- John Dugard
- Richard Falk
- Makarim Wibisono
- Michael Lynk
et maintenant Francesca Albanese






























