John from Maine (@SnipersEdge69) header
John from Maine (@SnipersEdge69) profile picture

I question everything! I am here to have fun. Tech geek. BOOMER. Married. Retired. https://nitter.gq/t.co/sztvpdg5nU

Maine, USA
Joined May 2011
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This is a pretty striking snapshot of Middle East tanker flows. For Oct. 23–29, 2026, TankerTrackers shows a 7-day average of 18.74 million barrels/day, roughly 13 tankers per day. That is 1.13 Mbpd below the pre-war level, a 5.7% decline. The most important part is where the oil is moving: Strait of Hormuz: 13.18 Mbpd effective Arabian Sea: 15.45 Mbpd Saudi Red Sea: 2.99 Mbpd Gulf of Oman: 2.27 Mbpd Iraqi Mediterranean: 0.30 Mbpd Israel–Eastern Mediterranean: 0 Syria–Eastern Mediterranean: 0 Yemen–Gulf of Aden: 0 So despite all the tension around Hormuz, the chart does not show Middle Eastern oil exports collapsing. It shows flows running below normal, but still enormous, with Hormuz remaining the dominant artery. And that −5.7% matters: a loss of 1.13 million barrels per day is substantial in a global oil market, even though it is nowhere close to a total Hormuz shutdown. The other thing that jumps out is the routing through the Saudi Red Sea and Gulf of Oman, suggesting alternative/export routes are carrying meaningful volumes while the region remains disrupted.
Middle East Crude Oil Exports over the past seven complete days #OOTT #IranWar #Tankers
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🚨 EVERYBODY CALM DOWN — THERE IS NO CONFIRMED RADIATION EMERGENCY IN KYIV. Reports now indicate the frightening “radiation danger” warning sent through mobile alerts may have resulted from a compromised or malfunctioning alert system. There is currently no verified evidence of a radiation release, and available Ukrainian monitoring does not show a radiological emergency. Claims that Russia hacked the alert system are circulating, but I have not yet found authoritative confirmation tying the incident to Russian hackers. Bottom line: false radiation warning appears increasingly likely. Actual radiation event: NOT confirmed. Russian hack: awaiting confirmation. Don’t let a terrifying notification become a terrifying rumor.
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John from Maine retweeted
A bonafide Halloween massacre for Russians at the front the past 24 hours, posting the 3rd largest daily personnel losses of the entire war. Top 10 Days for Russian Personnel Losses 1. October 21, 2026 — 2,250 2. December 19, 2024 — 2,200 3. October 18, 2026 — 2,100 (tie) 3. October 31, 2026 — 2,100 (tie) 4. September 27, 2026 — 2,090 5. November 28, 2024 — 2,030 6. October 4, 2026 — 2,020 7. December 29, 2024 — 2,010 8. October 25, 2026 — 1,990 (tie) 8. December 22, 2024 — 1,990 (tie)
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🚨 BREAKING — REPORTS OF UKRAINIAN STRIKES NEAR OCCUPIED MELITOPOL Reports are coming in that the Ukrainian Defense Forces are striking Russian targets in the Melitopol area right now. Melitopol is one of Russia’s key military and logistics hubs in occupied southern Ukraine — and Ukrainian forces have repeatedly targeted Russian command, communications, drone and logistics infrastructure there. Targets and damage from tonight’s reported strikes are not yet independently confirmed. Watching closely. 🇺🇦
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IF THIS FIGURE IS CONFIRMED, RUSSIA MAY HAVE JUST SUFFERED ITS WORST MONTHLY MILITARY PERSONNEL LOSS SINCE WORLD WAR II. Ukraine’s General Staff estimates 54,200 Russian personnel losses in October alone, roughly 1,750 every single day. October 2026 would not only be the worst month of the entire full-scale invasion for Russian personnel losses, it could also rank as Russia’s worst monthly military loss since WWII. Russia’s estimated total has now climbed to roughly 1.59 MILLION personnel losses since February 2022. The October number is staggering: 54,200 personnel losses in 31 days. A new record for this war, and potentially Russia’s worst month since World War II.
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WHAT THE HELL IS THIS? A largely intact jet-powered one-way attack UAV has appeared on a Russian roadway, and right now, there is no responsible way to put a confirmed name on it. Look closely. Dark composite airframe. High-speed swept/delta configuration. A prominent dorsal vertical stabilizer. No propeller. An airframe built for speed, not the slow Shahed-style profile most people recognize. And here's where it gets interesting: It does NOT cleanly match the familiar Geran-3/Shahed-238. It does NOT match the published UJ-25. It is NOT a UB120W. It does NOT cleanly match the publicly photographed Bars strike drone. Geran-4, however, cannot be dismissed. Russia's newer Geran-4 is a completely redesigned jet-powered delta UAV, not simply a jet engine stuffed into the old Shahed airframe. It has a reinforced high-speed structure and a central dorsal fin, making it one of the strongest known candidates. But candidate is not identification. One photograph does not give us the markings, dimensions, engine, internal components or wreckage details required to call this Geran-4 with confidence. And Ukraine is fielding an expanding family of jet-powered deep-strike weapons whose configurations are not all publicly documented either. So for now: 🔥 UNIDENTIFIED JET-POWERED ONE-WAY ATTACK UAV 🔥 ORIGIN UNRESOLVED 🔥 GERAN-4 IS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY 🔥 A NEW OR PREVIOUSLY UNSEEN UKRAINIAN CONFIGURATION ALSO REMAINS POSSIBLE Get the wreckage. Get the markings. Get the engine. Then identify it. Until then, we have a mystery, and a very interesting one.
We came across an interesting UAV today, likely a Ukrainian strike drone-kamikaze, the UB120W. Experts, what are your thoughts?
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Russia’s official statistics agency has been hit by a major cyberattack, and the potential implications are enormous! Rosstat has confirmed targeted cyberattacks from Oct. 29 through Nov. 1. Now Silent Crow and the Belarusian Cyberpartisans say they penetrated Rosstat’s internal systems and stole roughly 23 TERABYTES of data, allegedly including records tied to Russian military losses in Ukraine. That claim is explosive. Rosstat says its databases were not compromised and no protected information was leaked. The hackers say otherwise. So keep the facts straight: The cyberattack is confirmed. The 23-TB theft is claimed. The alleged casualty records are not independently verified. If those records are authenticated, they could rip open one of the Kremlin’s most tightly controlled secrets: the true human cost of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Confirmed hack. Claimed theft. Unverified casualty records. And if the hackers can prove what they say they stole, this story gets much bigger.
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Russia has just suffered its worst month of the entire war, with 54,400 personnel losses in October – the highest monthly total since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. October surpassed the previous record of 48,670, set back in December 2024.
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Former KGB Lt. Col. Vladimir Popov is stripping away the Kremlin’s excuses. Russia was not “forced” into this war. It invaded a neighboring country, occupied its land, and has spent years demanding that Ukraine accept the theft as the price of “peace.” Popov’s answer is blunt: “Only victory. In this case, Ukraine’s.” He says Putin is leading Russia toward ruin, while Russia’s huge security apparatus is still being outmaneuvered by Ukrainian intelligence. And now the war Putin promised would stay far from ordinary Russians is coming home: refineries burning, airports shutting down, economic pressure mounting, and the consequences of invasion becoming harder to hide. The Kremlin spent years telling Russians that Ukraine would collapse. Ukraine didn’t collapse. Instead, Russia is bleeding money, equipment, credibility and lives in a war Putin chose. A former KGB officer is now saying the quiet part out loud: Ukraine is fighting for its survival. Russia is fighting to keep what it stole. Those are not morally equivalent positions.
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Forget the headlines about a “breakthrough.” There is no deal. There are no confirmed direct U.S.-Iran talks. The core dispute is still unresolved. What is happening is much more dangerous: Qatar is trying to keep diplomacy alive while both sides prepare for the possibility that diplomacy fails. Mojtaba Khamenei has ordered Iran’s top commanders to raise readiness, expand their target bank to U.S. and Israeli assets, and prepare for an immediate response without geographic limits. At the same time, U.S. officials are keeping a renewed high-intensity military campaign on the table if negotiations collapse. That does not mean an attack after the November 3 midterms is guaranteed. But it does mean this is not some relaxed peace process. Iran is negotiating while preparing to fight. Washington is negotiating while preserving the option to strike. That is the reality. The next few days may determine whether this ends at a negotiating table, or on a battlefield.
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There is currently no evidence that the Kaliningrad blackout and Russia’s recent cluster of military-aircraft losses were parts of one coordinated operation. The October 30–31 blackout was attributed by regional authorities to an emergency protective-system trip at Kaliningrad CHP-2, which knocked part of the plant offline. Power was shifted to other generating stations, while Rosseti Yantar reported no faults on its own grid infrastructure. That matters because Kaliningrad now operates as an isolated power system. When a major generating unit suddenly trips, there is no external grid available to help balance the loss, making wider outages possible without any attack or sabotage. Russia’s recent aviation losses are real, but they involve different locations, dates and causes: Ukrainian strikes on aircraft and airbases, training accidents such as the Su-30SM crash near Kaliningrad about ten days earlier, and other reported losses including a Tu-95MS. Nothing currently establishes a common trigger or connects those incidents to the CHP-2 failure. Both stories matter. But the evidence supports concurrent vulnerabilities, not a single mysterious operation.
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Trump is framing the current U.S.-Iran confrontation as the continuation of tensions dating to the 1979 hostage crisis, rather than as something initiated by recent American military action. The remarks themselves are authentic, but the description of Iran as having been “waging war” on the United States continuously since 1979 is a political characterization rather than a neutral historical description of a formal, unbroken state of war. Casualty figures Trump has used across different speeches, “thousands and thousands” in the Daytona Beach remarks and higher numbers elsewhere, should not be treated as established totals without supporting evidence. Nothing in these comments by itself confirms that a new U.S. strike against Iran has been authorized.
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Putin CAN’T Pay His Own Soldiers? Russia is now proposing something it hasn’t done in nearly two decades: delaying December military pay for some personnel until January. Frontline troops fighting in Ukraine would remain exempt. It is another sign of mounting financial pressure on the system sustaining Russia’s wartime manpower. Qualifying recruits were promised cancellation of certain debts up to 10 million rubles, yet creditors have challenged some claims. Regional governments are also cutting benefits. Saratov will slash its additional regional death payment by 90% from November 1, while other regions have reduced military-related payouts even as Moscow continues spending heavily to attract recruits. Economist Janis Kluge estimates roughly 10% fewer military contracts were signed in January–September 2026 than during the same period last year, despite increased regional spending per recruit. Investigators have also uncovered alleged criminal schemes targeting vulnerable men and taking control of enlistment payments. Meanwhile, Russia’s draft 2027 budget directs roughly 44% of federal expenditure to defense and security combined. The Defense Ministry is also seeking broader military-police powers to locate absent soldiers, including patrols, roadblocks and ambushes. Russia can raise incentives, cut benefits, increase coercion or reduce its manpower requirements, but each option carries costs. The bigger issue is trust. Recruitment depends not only on what Moscow promises soldiers and their families, but whether they believe those promises will actually be honored.
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