Engineering Director for Cryptography at Trail of Bits
Joined April 2022
- Tweets114
- Following155
- Followers447
- Likes52
Jim Miller retweeted
Special election day blog by the @trailofbits crypto team. Learn how electronic voting works:
nitter.gq/TheMijCipher/status/21…
Jim Miller retweeted
Congrats to Ryan Keegan for being the first to exploit the simulator we used to validate the secret quantum circuits: blog.trailofbits.com/2026/04…
It kills me that the (now fixed) bugs were simple (we didn't port the op validation code from C++ to Rust!), but that's to be expected.
Jim Miller retweeted
Going further, there’s a way to protect the guest program even against potential compiler bugs: formally verify the guest RISC-V assembly code, like I’m experimenting with in evm-asm.
Jim Miller retweeted
Great write up of how Trail of Bits was able to find vulnerabilities in Google’s zero knowledge prover and generate a fake proof:
blog.trailofbits.com/2026/04…
Jim Miller retweeted
Google used a ZK proof to disclose a quantum breakthrough that cuts the cost of breaking cryptocurrency by 20x without handing attackers the circuit. We found anyone could forge a “proof” of an even stronger attack. 🧵
Jim Miller retweeted
Lets break down these attacks:
nitter.gq/tjade273/status/197310…
First up is wiretap.fail
The key insight is that TEEs do not randomize their memory encryption. This is because the encrypted data needs to fit in the same space as the plaintext, so there is no room for a nonce or IV.
The typical cipher mode is AES-XEX or the related AES-XTS.
en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xor%…
Every memory location acts like an independently keyed cipher, so it’s not quite ECB Tux level bad, there is a sort of _temporal tux_ problem. Every time a value is encrypted at a particular memory location, the ciphertext is the same.
IMO these two attacks spell the beginning of the end for SGX, TDX and SEV-SNP in self-hosted contexts. These DRAM bus attacks were always the glaring hole in the threat model, and I expect DDR5 to fall soon as well.
These attacks are explicitly written out of the threat model so they won’t be patched by Intel and AMD, and it’s not clear how they could do so anyway.
Jim Miller retweeted
The $1.5B Bybit hack marks a new era in cryptocurrency security. Attackers have moved beyond technical exploits to sophisticated operational attacks. Read our initial analysis of this historic breach and its industry-wide implications: blog.trailofbits.com/2025/02…
Jim Miller retweeted
.@trailofbits had one of the best weeks ever! From groundbreaking ML research to advancing post-quantum crypto, here's a summary of last week:🧵
Jim Miller retweeted
Two days ago, @NIST finalized three post-quantum cryptography standards. Today, we are announcing an open-source Rust implementation of one of these standards, SLH-DSA, now available in RustCrypto!
blog.trailofbits.com/2024/08…
Jim Miller retweeted
Will these algorithms start to become widely supported? Yes! Our crypto team anticipated this and implemented the stateless hash-based digital signature scheme (SLH-DSA or SPHINCS) in Rust, now part of RustCrypto.
buff.ly/3SN6Lq1
Jim Miller retweeted
It's official, NIST has finalized 3 post-quantum cryptography standards!
Quantum computers could imperil the security of confidential electronic information, such as emails. To counter this threat, NIST has finalized its set of three encryption algorithms designed to withstand a future quantum computer’s cyberattacks: nist.gov/news-events/news/20…
ALT Collage illustration of servers, laptops and phones is divided into left "Old Encryption Standards" and right "New Encryption Standards."
Jim Miller retweeted
We break down the cryptography services offered within Google Cloud Platform —Cloud KMS, Secret Manager, and Confidential Computing—helping you decide which tools are right for your project. buff.ly/3WQB69S
Jim Miller retweeted
We are now a proud member of the @MPCAlliance, where we will work with other industry leaders to help push forward the secure adoption of privacy technology enabled by MPC.
buff.ly/3xQkHZc
Jim Miller retweeted
Introducing Decree by @TrailofBits: A new tool that helps devs define, enforce, and understand their Fiat-Shamir transcripts. Check it out!
buff.ly/3KUnALC
Jim Miller retweeted
Check out this awesome tool for eliminating mistakes while implementing Fiat-Shamir!
Introducing Decree by @TrailofBits: A new tool that helps devs define, enforce, and understand their Fiat-Shamir transcripts. Check it out!
buff.ly/3KUnALC
Jim Miller retweeted
\We’ve open-sourced our pure Rust and Go implementations of the post-quantum Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures (LMS)! Explore secure digital signatures designed to withstand quantum attacks. blog.trailofbits.com/2024/04…
Jim Miller retweeted
Any serious attempt to attack lattices/LWE that doesn’t change the status quo should increase our confidence in their security.
Chen’s paper has a bug, independently discovered by Hongxun Weng and Thomas Vidick, that he doesn’t know how to fix. If I understand correctly, in its current form the paper doesn’t yield any improvement on prior algorithms.
eprint.iacr.org/2024/555
Jim Miller retweeted
Update:
Chen’s paper has a bug, independently discovered by Hongxun Weng and Thomas Vidick, that he doesn’t know how to fix. If I understand correctly, in its current form the paper doesn’t yield any improvement on prior algorithms.
eprint.iacr.org/2024/555
Jim Miller retweeted
Presenting our paper "Weak Fiat-Shamir Attacks on Modern Proof Systems," a collaboration with @QuangVDao & @pag_crypto from @CarnegieMellon, @RealWorldCrypto this Wednesday. Let's look at some critical vulnerabilities that we found as part of that research eprint.iacr.org/2023/691
