@YorktownInst, @LSEIRDept. Author of Arsenal of Democracy (Hoover Press, November 2025), Breaking the New Axis (Naval Institute Press, April 2026)

Joined January 2012
This story is fascinating, mainly because of what it tells us about Russian negotiations. It’s a remarkable prelude to Kushner and Witkoff. The real question is why release this story now?/1
At one of the tensest points in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, two Americans teamed up with a former GDR spy to stop nuclear war. They just needed to tell Putin. On the cover of @FTMag this week, one of the most extraordinary stories I've ever reported: ft.com/content/dcb57f30-bbfe…
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The remarkable parallel with Kushner and Witkoff today is that the Russians again can use multiple channels to avoid getting pinned down. Americans would be far more effective if they did the same./4
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One wonders why this story is out now, shortly after the Trump admin’s latest round of pressure against Ukraine./5 END
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An alternative explanation is that the Saudis don’t want to do this themselves for fear of Iranian retaliation. And why would they, after six months of no peace no war, mixed messaging from the US, and a burnt bridge with the UAE?
Something very strange is going on with the Saudi Air Force. They have 250 modern aircraft, including Typhoons and F-15Es, but they’re incapable of launching airstrikes on their own border? This bears watching closely.
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This argument contains a lot of truth but misses WHY Ukraine’s specific system exists. ZSU divides between Force Management (CGS) and C2 (CINC) in a manner not seen in the post Soviet space. That choice matters as much as civmil culture. /1
Fedorov's dismissal and his feud with Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi is not a unique incident. It's the latest result of Ukraine's disbalanced civil-military relations that persisted for years before the full-scale invasion. A recent academic paper by Renz & Whitmore proves this 1/12
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Bankova should be able to solve personnel conflicts. But real divided responsibilities are more apparent there. Bankova runs a secondary government parallel to the ministries, a defect of UA political structures that has existed for multiple admins. /7
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Cultural concepts matter a lot. But the case particulars matter too. Civvies have to want to impose an unequal dialogue and have the structures to do so. The latter is hard to identify in UA. Military empirics reinforce this. /8 END
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This NYT piece on US Ukraine-Russia policy in 2025 provides a useful opportunity to take stock. Its blind spots help us think about trajectories in 2026. The US made two mistakes, overestimating Russian openness and Ukrainian capacity./1 nytimes.com/interactive/2025…
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US refusal to designate a contact point for talks, and acceptance of multi-track, allows RU to manipulate pace and UA to wriggle out from constraints. Unlikely this changes before 2H2025, making a deal harder./24
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All wars must end. But they can escalate before they end. RU still has opportunities to push Europe, which is weakest link in UA-Europe-US chain, especially with its objectives still expansive and talks largely incoherent./25
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