NIK (@_Now_I_Know) header
NIK (@_Now_I_Know) profile picture

#bitcoin⚡️Researcher of different topics related to bitcoin. Likes to brainstorm about the future #nostr: npub1w6rtkskec4tvhudzr8qarl9cesytjel9td5ukz2qe7uwvlj5m

Joined August 2018
“I think we’ve run out of sellers at this point.” @_Checkmatey_ on time pain, seller exhaustion, and what it takes to end a bitcoin bear market.
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Just to provide some context… bitcoin:native hit $15.8K the day Lyn tweeted this. 35 months later, it hit $128K
Replying to @LynAldenContact
Bitcoin is dead right now. It fell 70%. Let's check back in 2-3 years during the next rising liquidity cycle and PMI cycle.
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Bitcoin is dead right now. It fell 56%. Let's check back in 2-3 years during the next rising liquidity cycle and PMI cycle.
Replying to @LynAldenContact
Bitcoin is dead right now. It fell 70%. Let's check back in 2-3 years during the next rising liquidity cycle and PMI cycle.
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Good evening. This seems like a good time to point out that literally every single ounce of monthly leveraged longs in bitcoin has been blown out, and $12.7 billion of leveraged shorts are now stacked above. Have a great night.
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$STRC is sub $95 pre-market, and I think it makes sense to revisit this post from August. Stress | risk assessment from Bitcoin and from the capital structure will flow through to Digital Credit. Therefore, when it comes to Digital Credit, the market is evaluating three separate risk components: [1] Bitcoin Exposure Risk: Asset valuations, price volatility, and forward expectations surrounding $BTC function as a primary transmission channel of risk and price action. [2] The "Parent Equity" ($MSTR | $ASST) Risk: The views and expectations around corporate health, leverage, issuance dynamics, and broader sentiment toward the underlying security that is supporting the preferred shares. This channel is fairly dominant and highly regime-dependent. [3] Perceived Dividend and Payment Risk: The likelihood that distribution obligations are met fully and on schedule. This specific risk is what USD reserves, dividend coverage, and buybacks attempt to directly mitigate. @Strategy has worked to address Payment Risk [3] by expanding its USD Reserve, clarifying distribution policies, adjusting dividend rates, and executing buybacks to eliminate future obligations. While these capital structure initiatives (in theory) should enhance the optics of the preferred layer, they do not neutralize or meaningfully mitigate $BTC Risk [1] or Parent Equity Risk [2]. Empirically, price variance across preferred offerings is overwhelmingly driven by $BTC, underlying parent equity, and the markets relative pricing among the other preferreds as an asset class. At this point it's rather evident that rate increases, rate frequency, USD Reserves and buybacks do not, and perhaps cannot, keep these instruments at par. As I have been saying for months, this isn't a flaw nor does it mean that Digital Credit is "broken". Creating a yield curve on top of a volatile asset base will naturally have more volatility than average. But the proper guage for that volatility should be in relation to $BTC, not market credit instruments, MMFs, or other low volatility offerings. These offerings are "credit like" instruments second, meta-derivatives first. The price action after $2.67B in buybacks should make this clear.
If de-leveraging mitigates the risk profile of $STRC why wouldn't share buybacks and deleveraging drive a higher market price, all else equal? This is a valid question, and the answer depends on what specific category of risk is being priced. Using a traditional credit and equity framework, yes, retiring obligations and de-leveraging the preferred stack reduces risk for $STRC, which should in theory bolster prices assuming ideal conditions. But these preferred offerings are not traditional and they most certainly are not operating in isolation or under ideal conditions. In reality, the market is likely evaluating (3) separate risk components: [1] Bitcoin ($BTC) Exposure Risk: Asset valuations, price volatility, and forward expectations surrounding $BTC function as a primary transmission channel of risk and price action [2] Parent Equity ($MSTR) Risk: Overall corporate health, leverage, issuance dynamics, and broader sentiment toward the underlying equity supporting the preferred shares. This channel is equally dominant (recently even more so) and highly regime-dependent. [3] Perceived Dividend and Payment Risk: The likelihood that distribution obligations are met fully and on schedule. This specific risk is what USD reserves, dividend coverage, and buybacks directly target. @Strategy has worked to address Payment Risk [3] by expanding its USD Reserve, clarifying distribution policies, adjusting dividend rates, and executing buybacks to eliminate future obligations. While these capital structure initiatives enhance the optics of the preferred layer, they do not neutralize or meaningfully mitigate $BTC Risk [1] or Parent Equity Risk [2]. Empirically, price variance across preferred offerings is overwhelmingly driven by $BTC, underlying parent equity ($MSTR or $ASST), daily short volume flows, overall trading volume, and relative pricing among the preferred peer group. Note: the same dynamics hold true for $SATA, and its parent equity $ASST and its relationships with Strategy prefs, though relationships manifest differently. What this means for buybacks is that they operate within the aforementioned environment where the potential for additional equity issuance, continuous short interest, daily short volume pressure (recently ~20% daily volume for $STRC and ~30% for $SATA), and dynamic re-evaluations of $BTC and $MSTR risk, all exert their forces on the price action. Buybacks narrow credit spreads and caps some of the tail risk on dividend payments, but cannot override the “risk premium" that's set by the broader market. Within this broader context, the impact of de-leveraging is there, but it's (at best) secondary, and current data shows that it is tertiary. So while shrinking preferred claims does improve *overall* capital structure; external factors still dominate market pricing. As long as that market perceives macro and parent equity risks as material or elevated, preferred shares can continue trading below par despite falling payment risk. Buybacks and deleveraging as capital structure tools were never designed (or disclosed) as price levers. The market is correctly (from a subjective risk pricing standpoint) looking at these offerings through their $BTC and parent equity risk.
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NIK retweeted
Good news for Strive shareholders. SATA is getting stronger and the numbers prove it. It has fallen below $90 three times this year. Each time, Bitcoin has closed between $60k and $63k, yet SATA's floor kept rising. 1. 5 Feb, SATA closed at $82.50 with Bitcoin at $63k after a 14% crash in a single day. 2. 25 June, SATA closed at $83.53 with Bitcoin at $60k. 3. 19 Nov, SATA closed at $88.31 with Bitcoin just below $62k. Bitcoin closed lower yesterday than it did in February, yet SATA closed nearly $6 higher. All while SATA has grown from 2 million shares at IPO to over 14 million today. It's a much bigger instrument, defended at a much higher level. This time round there's also SATS, a second Strive preferred paying 15% and competing for the same capital. Despite this, SATA has still put in its highest low yet. The market is pricing Strive's credit as less risky each time Bitcoin gets tested. Moving from 13% to 13.25% from December costs Strive around $3.5M a year on roughly $1.4B of notional. If another rise to 13.5% follows, that would take the total extra cost to around $7M a year. That is tiny for a company holding over 43,000 Bitcoin. At $88.31, SATA's effective yield is around 14.7%. From December, that becomes around 15%. A slightly higher rate and a stabilising Bitcoin price should bring SATA back to par. The credit is improving.
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NIK retweeted
Saylor revealed a lot tonight. It's probably one of the most important interviews I've ever seen him give. As I predicted earlier, net Bitcoin per share and minimising STRC's volatility are Strategy's guiding lights. He's prepared to take STRC's notional all the way down to $5 billion if need be. It currently sits at $7.7 billion. That means Strategy will keep selling MSTR to buy back STRC. Failing that, it will sell Bitcoin to buy back STRC whenever it trades below par. He thinks 12% for STRC is "very rich" and that is where he is drawing the line in the sand, even if credit spreads widen across the spectrum. Essentially, take it or leave it at 12%. He wants the credit markets to come to him, rather than meeting them where they are. He also made it clear that credit holders are the priority. The aim isn't to be the fastest growing. Those were his words. Strive, by contrast, is willing to meet the market where it is. It has raised SATA's rate to 13.25% effective from December. It launched SATS at 15% and kept adding amplification as Bitcoin has fallen. Strategy and Strive have now diverged significantly in their aims, outlook and strategic direction. The next 12 months are going to be fascinating.
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The excitement of a $1.5 Trillion company with a -$104 Billion GAAP net loss on $33B of revenue…
Anthropic $ANT just rang the opening bell for the stock market today at the NASDAQ exchange
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$STRC traded over $600M yesterday, the only one of 456 U.S.-listed income preferreds to do so this year. We intend to keep buying below $100. Repurchases facilitate liquidity and lower dividend obligations. We believe they strengthen the credit and benefit common shareholders.
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If selling STRC via ATM is revenue, then buying back STRC (and paying dividends) is COGS. And if revenue is less than COGS, then a business is in trouble. So we must be logically consistent. I am perfectly fine with saying issuance is like revenue in this case. I think I was saying this before anyone else. It is central to the $MSTR thesis. And it is for this reason that I say buybacks must be handled with extreme care. You can't just switch up the meaning of things when it doesn't suit you anymore. You can revise your model or worldview, but if you do, revise it in its entirety and be objective. Is there a point where buybacks should be done? Yes. Anytime a pref is well below the liquidation preference, that is a buyback that is guaranteed to be highly accretive to the Net BPS metric. The larger the discount being bought back, the larger the accretion. The TLDR is buyback the most discounted prefs. If Net BPS is so important to the common stock (which it is, since this is the new mNAV denominator), then that should be the metric to improve.
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Would $BTC be higher without the Bitcoin Treasury Companies? No. In my view, BTC-TC’s like @Strategy [$MSTR] and @Strive {$ASST] have been a net positive for the financialization and adoption of Bitcoin. If people are curious as to why $BTC isn’t higher, I’d look at what else has been competing for the capital: A.I. If we use January 2023 as a starting point, (the start of the first full calendar year after ChatGPT launched) - through 11-18-2026, just 13 tickers in an “Index” of A.I. equities that I track recorded $128.09T in trading volume: Hyperscalers: $AMZN, $META, $GOOGL, $MSFT - $33.41T Vertical AI Integration: $AAPL, $TSLA - $37.36T Compute | Architecture: $NVDA, $AMD, $AVGO - $43.00T Memory | Interconnect: $MU, $MRVL - $10.11T Core Tech | Manufacturing: $ASML, $TSM - $4.20T (This doesn’t include $BTC Miners, Neoclouds, etc) Over this same period, Coin Metrics data records $17.23T in $BTC spot trading across the markets it covers. Spot $BTC ETFs add ~$2.26T. That’s $19.49T combined over the same period. $NVDA alone traded $28.99T, roughly 49% more. Capital, leverage, overall monetary velocity flows towards the “big” trades and there has never been a bigger or more secular trade than A.I. So if the question is “why isn’t Bitcoin higher”, I’d look at the scale of the A.I. trade and what's competing for the capital before I’d blame the companies buying $BTC.
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Bank adoption of $BTC is accelerating.
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$STRC has funded roughly 130,000 Bitcoin for $MSTR (so far) That’s over 15% of their entire treasury and 300%+ more Bitcoin than the next public company even owns To call STRC a failure is absolutely wild at this point
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What a day for $STRC. Closed at $96.11. Traded $625.7M in volume - its daily highest since the June collapse to $71, and the subsequent recovery to $80. Watching it buckle from $99+ sucks, but a real panicked sell-off amid the latest BTC collapse was probably due. Thoughts?
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We might be back at 2021 price levels, but those levels were heavily overvalued then and are now not fair value but undervalued.
RATIONAL ROOT AT BITCOIN AMSTERDAM 2024: YESTERDAY'S OVERVALUED BTC CAN BECOME TODAY'S FAIR PRICE 🟠 THAT WAS HIS MODEL'S HISTORICAL VIEW, NOT A GUARANTEED FORECAST. 👀 DO YOU THINK THE FOUR-YEAR CYCLE STILL HOLDS?
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$98 Million in volume traded across $SATS and $SATA today. 4.7% of the $2.1 Billion notional outstanding. $JPM.PRD JP Morgan preferred traded $9.1 Million 0.53% of the $1.69 Billion today, $SATS and $SATA combined provided 8.6x the turnover liqudiity than the JP Morgan pref equity.
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All eyes on $ANT tomorrow. First day of trading. Priced at $83. ~ $1.5 Trillion market cap $81 billion capital raise, with green shoe option for additional $12.2 Billion ($93 Billion in total.) Anthropic will wake up with $81 Billion in capital tomorrow, and Anthropic investors will have their first cut at public market liquidity. $ANT would be valued at $2T market cap with share price of $109, if the green shoe option is exercised.
We’ve priced our IPO at $83 per share, with trading expected to begin on Nasdaq tomorrow. anthropic.com/news/anthropic… Legal disclaimer: A registration statement relating to the Class A common stock was declared effective by the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 18, 2026. The offering is being made only by means of a prospectus. Copies of the final prospectus may be obtained, when available, from: Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Attention: Prospectus Department, 200 West Street, New York, NY 10282, by telephone at (866) 471-2526, or by email at [email protected]; or Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Attention: Prospectus Department, 180 Varick Street, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10014, or by email at [email protected]
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$STRC was $97.22 when I wrote the original post. Almost 3 months later: $97.79 "...A reversion to par, and the ability to maintain par with sustained independent demand, will occur when the fulcrum improves, meaning: [1] When $BTC stabilizes or strengthens and [2] the risk premium attached to $MSTR either diminishes or is offset by price appreciation. The buybacks, and to an extent the USD Reserve and dividend rate or frequency, can help at the margin on perceptions around payment risk, but they cannot override the dominant forces within the system..."
As I have said re: $STRC: "...A reversion to par, and the ability to maintain par with sustained independent demand, will occur when the fulcrum improves, meaning: [1] When $BTC stabilizes or strengthens and [2] the risk premium attached to $MSTR either diminishes or is offset by price appreciation. The buybacks, and to an extent the USD Reserve and dividend rate or frequency, can help at the margin on perceptions around payment risk, but they cannot override the dominant forces within the system..."
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Seller exhaustion will come long before Saylor exhaustion.
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