W.Max (@_William_Max) profile picture

Solidity developer for #Defi. Auditor @code4rena.

Etherum
Joined November 2022
Photo by W.Max (@_William_Max)Photo by W.Max (@_William_Max)Photo by W.Max (@_William_Max)
Godd, but wen? If released today, I wont be astonished $ERN will reach $1b TVL Lol.
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$oath = great dev + great project + greate audit
Keen to dig into asset management accounting, or maybe issuance and redemption logic? 🔎 Get amongst all of the above (and more!) in @EthosReserve's audit, with $144,750 USDC in the reward pool for Wardens who can find vulns. Start hunting now: rebrand.ly/C4-ethos-reserve
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What is $fUSD and why its development is crucial for $FTM in a Thread! 5 Minutes Reading:👇
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why again... market was attacked last year in April, Midas(Jarvis Network) last month. Now @dForcenet . I have tweet about Madis attack before.
wstETH/ETH Curve gauge vaults on Arbitrum & Optimism were exploited a few hours ago, and we immediately paused the dForce Vaults - other parts of the protocol remain intact and user funds are SAFE with dForce Lending. We will come back with a detailed report and remedies soon.
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Wait, we're seriously discussing removing `payable` modifier for solc `0.9.0`? Is this really worth the 24 gas savings? github.com/ethereum/solidity…
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Awesome
Big news today... @PwningEth just received his THIRD Whitehat Hall of Fame card for his crit report in Moonbeam / Astar / Acala, which saved $200m in funds and earned him a $1m payout. He can't keep getting away with it... Read more here: medium.com/immunefi/pwning-e…
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Cool but never do things like this Lol.
So, @devtooligan, here's a cursed ERC20 that puts all logic inside events AND passes the solmate tests. Gist in the usual location. Thanks to @drdr_zz for pointing out bugs in the first draft.
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It's cool but who can provide more $DOLA ?
🚨 New Lending Pool We are excited to announce the deployment of a new stable lending pool, for USDC-DOLA LP! @VelodromeFi @InverseFinance @optimismFND $DOLA
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Rage Trade's risk-on delta-neutral vault is at -8.2% after $GMX longs took an additional $2m in profit today. GMX really needs to find some way to balance out the long-short OI skew in a bull market, or most of these delta-neutral vaults will have a very hard time. $RAGE #DeFi
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Hey, noticed something interesting on $MATIC and $aMATICc. In @ankr, you can get 1 aMATICc with 1.1082 $MATIC.(Shown in P1) However, after this transaction happens(buy 9,975.4 aMATICc at price of 1.1127 MATIC):polygonscan.com/tx/0x1dc8943…. price soars but no any bots found it.
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After the whale bought it, the price rises to 1.1205 $MATIC. This was shown on @defiwars_, but no one noticed it until 10 hours later an account finally realized this and finally make the price balanced.
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To sum up: 1) Arbitrage opportunities not found by bots still exsists. 2) The trader did not find that there are better ways to get aMATICc (by staking). 3) DEX aggregators are not 100% perfect. (As some Defi tokens has ways to get the token not by swapping).
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COOOOOOOL
can we bring back this ui style next cycle?
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Humans are an API to ChatGPT. ChatGPT is an API to Python. Python is an API to C. C is an API to assembly. Assembly is an API to binary. Binary is an API to physics. Physics is an API to the machine that runs the universe. It's computation all the way down.
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It's cool being an auditor @code4rena! I have been doing smart contract security research for more than a year and I recently joined code4rena to do practical works. Having fun reviewing all the codes - either perfect or imperfect. Moving on to build #Web3 security system!
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For number 4, I remember doing research on the Profanity private key attack. Address should be random, private key should be random. Never use a beautiful-looking address which may make you hacked!
Top 5 attack vectors for blockchain protocols. You can add "reward manipulation" as well. Number 3 is where I have found the most bugs and Number 1 often gets overlooked as a threat by protocols. This was a slide from @iphelix presentation on yAcademy, link in comment
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I believe this is the right way. However, as most non-complicated contracts does not need to reentry itself, I do suggest using non-reentry modifier for every write function. Later comes the "reentry-read" problem - which I suggest calling back at the very end of any function.
Don't look at reentrancy like "If contract is sending Eth then recipient fallback function can reenter". Think more of it like "If the contract is doing unsafe external calls is it possible that the callee calls the contract back while it is in a weird intermediary state?"
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For any external call, the contract execute flow is possible to be controled by attackers. So make sure when doing external call, the state of the contract is suitable for being read. refer to Curve's reentry-read security issue.
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As I have noticed the @MidasCapitalxyz pool was exploited(jarvis network exploit): The attacker used the same method as a hacker early in 2022 who attacked the Curve & Market protocols. See this thread.
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