Blockchain

Whether post-quantum migration is a config change or a flag day is decided by one question, and it is not about the algorithm. It is whether the protocol can ask the other side what it supports. TLS can. A server operator adds X25519MLKEM768 to supported_groups and has post-quantum confidentiality that afternoon, against every client that already does hybrid key exchange. Clients that do not just negotiate the old group. No coordination, no deadline, reversible. Code signing cannot. Firmware, secure boot, S/MIME, DNSSEC: the verifier was fixed when the device shipped or the trust anchor was published. You cannot negotiate with a boot ROM masked in 2019. So the order inverts. Every verifier has to accept the new algorithm before one signer is allowed to use it. DNSSEC is the sharpest case. RFC 4035 says a resolver that supports none of the algorithms in an authenticated DS record "SHOULD treat the child zone as if it were unsigned". The first zone to sign with ML-DSA does not break on old resolvers. It quietly stops being protected on them. Here is the part worth sitting with. Negotiation was the vulnerability. FREAK, Logjam and POODLE all exploited negotiation and fallback, and TLS 1.3 answered by taking the flexibility out: no renegotiation, no static RSA, and DOWNGRD written into the ServerHello random so a client can detect a forced downgrade. Twenty years of hardening spent shrinking the negotiation surface, and negotiation is the only reason the web has an incremental path at all. The protocols never permitted to negotiate are the ones with no path. Migration difficulty was never a property of the cryptography. It is a property of who chooses the algorithm, and when. Where the receiver asks, it is a config change. Where the receiver was fixed in advance, it is a census.

Raspberry Pi ran a capture the flag against the security hardware in its RP2350 and paid out four prizes. Not one of the winning attacks broke a cipher. One injected a voltage fault on a single pin, switched the permanently disabled debug cores back on, and read the secret out. One glitched the USB module into rebooting out of secure mode with code already staged in RAM. One exposed the die and used a laser to walk past the anti glitch circuitry. One used a focused ion beam and read the memory. Four different rigs, one shape of attack. Every one of them changed the answer to a yes or no question the chip was asking itself. The key was never the target. The branch was. The part I keep seeing stated backwards is that results like this raise the stakes on algorithm choice. They lower them. Moving to a post quantum signature changes which mathematics an adversary cannot solve. It does not change how many decisions sit between a fault and a released secret, and lattice implementations tend to add branches rather than remove them. There is a tell for this already in the literature. Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton showed that one faulty RSA CRT signature is enough to factor the modulus, and the standard countermeasure is to verify the signature before releasing it. The countermeasure is a branch. Checks are what fault injection is good at. A secret released after a test passes is worth the cost of skipping the test. A secret derived from device state is worth the cost of reproducing that state, and there a skipped check hands over a wrong key rather than the right one.

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I'll ship AI that says "this looks risky." I won't ship AI that says "this is safe." One is a tool that sharpens your judgment. The other is a liability that replaces it, and it's wrong at the worst possible moment. Flagging risk is honest. Certifying safety is a promise no model can keep.