Orbion

I have bad news for you... If $BTC don't reclaim key resistance level at $80K, it might break down back to $40K Keep watching

Oh fuck...

YOU ARE F*CKING WELCOME I begged you to join the $1WIN presale, those who listened to me have already made 3x But if you didn't, you have 1 more chance Here’s what makes this setup interesting if you missed presale Over $61M competed for just $3.9M worth of tokens, 15.64x oversubscribed Around $57M went back as refunds Those investors wanted more tokens than they received, meaning they'll buy more at this point That’s potential demand worth watching as early sale buyers take profits 1win has been operating since 2016 with millions of players One recent tracked month alone showed around $135M in crypto deposits The part I care about is whether that existing activity translates into sustained token demand Revenue-funded buybacks are part of the plan The first buyback and burn are planned for roughly one month after TGE The burn mechanism targets 10% of tokens spent on eligible platform products My bet is that the team keeps building liquidity while rolling out those mechanisms My first valuation checkpoint is $100M FDV With a 1B token supply, that means $0.10 per token I’m watching SHFL and RLB as sector benchmarks for the longer-term opportunity For now, I expect volatility around the launch Sale allocations are fully unlocked, so early profit taking wouldn’t surprise me Early trading also started in user-created Meteora and Raydium pools before the official launch Some early pools reportedly charged 10% swap fees Check the pool and route before swapping Binance is also being mentioned among potential listings I’m holding for what the team builds after launch

Hey, @grok, what would happen to crypto if someone hacked this wallet?

THE FULL STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST CRYPTO HACK EVER Around $6.3 billion stolen from Binance Billions frozen But the attacker had already borrowed nearly $45 million in ETH against stolen USDT Here is how the attack unfolded The preparation began on October 28 with small withdrawals from Tornado Cash That funded transaction fees while obscuring the original funding source The attacker then deployed a sweeper contract and tested it on their own wallets Its job was to transfer assets from a controlled wallet to the attacker Only the attacker’s address could trigger it, preventing competing bots from interfering Then came the critical step: obtaining valid signatures from Binance’s wallets Binance initially pointed to a potentially compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop That access may have allowed unauthorized requests through an internal service container The exchange later disclosed additional breach points It also said it had found no evidence that wallet private keys had leaked A key can remain inside a signing system while an attacker manipulates the requests it approves The blockchain sees a valid signature It cannot inspect Binance’s internal approval process The exact path through those systems still needs to be established On Ethereum, the attacker used EIP-7702 This feature lets a regular wallet authorize execution of smart contract code Binance 14 signed authorizations pointing to the attacker’s sweeper That allowed the malicious code to execute with the wallet’s authority The attacker prepared 50 signed authorizations covering consecutive nonces A nonce is the wallet’s transaction counter Binance 14’s counter kept changing as withdrawals processed The range increased the chance of an authorization matching when submitted These were valid signatures obtained beforehand The attacker still needed access to signing authority Around 20:20 UTC on October 29, the delegation landed Minutes later, one transaction swept 167,464 ETH plus approximately 1.615 billion USDT Dozens of other tokens went with them Roughly $2.53 billion left Binance 14 in that transaction alone Just 24 seconds later, Binance 16 sent another 28,005.6 ETH Other tokens were drained too A linked account was subsequently used to withdraw large USDC balances Meanwhile, withdrawals were happening across other networks The stolen assets included approximately 18,270 BTC plus 233 million XRP Another 970,500 SOL and more than 612 million USDT on Tron were taken Those transfers used ordinary valid signatures The activity across different blockchains points toward a broader compromise of the signing infrastructure Then the attacker kept coming back The Ethereum delegation remained active after the first sweep Newly arriving funds were still exposed Roughly another $200 million in USDT was taken Pausing customer withdrawals did not automatically remove the delegation already installed on Ethereum It was reset shortly after midnight, almost four hours after installation By then, the race against the stablecoin issuers was underway Tether initially reported freezing more than 1.567 billion USDT Circle froze approximately 823 million USDC Other issuers restricted additional tokens Estimates of secured assets grew toward $3 billion Those figures varied by timestamp and methodology Frozen funds still needed a recovery process The attacker was already converting stablecoins into ETH and TRX Speed came at a cost One analyzed batch exchanged approximately 325 million USDT for around 122,300 ETH The attacker paid substantially above the broader market price to complete the conversion quickly Bitquery estimated roughly $119 million was lost against market prices across the rushed swaps But selling was only one route into ETH Between 20:58 and 21:01 UTC, an attacker wallet supplied approximately 60 million USDT to Aave V3 It then borrowed 19,762 WETH, worth roughly $44.6 million at the time WETH is wrapped ETH used by Ethereum applications The sequence was simple: Stolen USDT → Aave collateral → borrowed WETH The USDT provided borrowing power The WETH came from Aave’s available lending liquidity Here is the detail many posts missed Supplying USDT transfers the underlying tokens into Aave’s reserve contracts The supplier receives a claim represented by aTokens Blacklisting the supplier’s personal address does not automatically freeze USDT already inside that reserve The collateral remained in Aave while the attacker controlled the borrowed WETH Tether’s USDT blacklist could not freeze that WETH The debt still existed Aave reported that the position was overcollateralized and subject to normal liquidation Interest continued accruing Because the debt was denominated in ETH, a rising ETH price could push the position toward liquidation Walking away would leave the collateral exposed Aave began emergency market freezes at 21:42 UTC, roughly forty minutes after the borrowing ended The restrictions blocked new supply and borrowing across affected markets They could close further borrowing routes, but could not retrieve WETH already borrowed Meanwhile, the attacker’s ETH balance kept growing Approximately 200,000 ETH was taken directly from Binance wallets Later snapshots counted more than 500,000 ETH after conversions and borrowing The widely shared 197,460 ETH figure described one wallet rather than the entire cluster Some assets were secured through network intervention Arbitrum’s Security Council moved approximately 8,426 ETH and 74.6 million ARB out of the attacker’s reach Recovery options depended on the network as well as the asset On October 31, the FBI attributed the theft to North Korea’s TraderTraitor activity Binance said it had set aside more than $6.34 billion to cover the incident Its October 31 update reported that 90% of affected assets had been replenished That included replacement purchases using company resources and insurance funds Replenished customer backing does not mean that percentage was recovered from the attacker The technical report still needs to explain how the signing permissions were obtained Why were the delegations approved? How did access extend across so many networks? Valid signatures enabled the withdrawals Persistent delegation exposed later deposits Stolen stablecoins then supported an ETH loan before restrictions arrived By the time billions were frozen, part of the money had already changed form

🚨BREAKING Binance Hot Wallet has reportedly been drained for $2.5B in over 60 tokens

2022 BOTTOM SETUP IS BACK ON $BTC And most of you already got shaken out of it Same structure, almost step by step -> A big run up and a distribution top -> A hard dump into a long ugly range where most people got rekt -> A manipulation phase at the lows to shake out whoever was left -> Then a slow grind up out of the range before the real breakout Last time that grind ended with $BTC breaking out to $42K This time the fake pump before the drop was even more violent and it wiped out around 95% of the market And right now we are sitting at the very start of that grind If the fractal keeps playing out, the next leg is up and most people will miss it because they are still scared from the last dump Save this chart and check back in a few weeks

🚨BREAKING: 4-year cycle is still alive And the biggest $BTC dump is coming... 2017: $19K PEAK -> 2018: $3K BOTTOM 2021: $68K PEAK -> 2022: $15K BOTTOM 2025: $126K PEAK -> 2026: $32K BOTTOM

🚨I'M SELLING MY HOUSE TO BUY MORE bitcoin:native The next halving comes in 537 days and this pattern worked every cycle so far Cycle low: 500 days before halving Cycle high: 500 days after halving This is your last chance to make generational wealth on bitcoin:native

If your parents had bought S&P 500, NVDA or AAPL, you'd be a millionaire now If you want your kids to be a millionaire, buy $BTC now

Are you ready for the biggest $BTC rally?

I can't be more bullish on $BTC Expanding Triangle is the only logical pattern for BTC from here

Buy $BTC and sell in 2028 It's simple

You still have so much things to learn... If you know half of what I know, you would never even think about selling $BTC

Oh fuck...

🚨BREAKING: $BTC WILL BOTTOM IN 3 WEEKS 2014: BTC bottomed 71 days after midterms 2018: BTC bottomed 39 days after midterms 2022: BTC bottomed 13 days after midterms 2026: midterms are coming in 3 weeks $BTC already dumped 8% in 3 days Looks smart to start shorting BTC right now