Iโve never, not once, seen a little girl marveling at construction equipment. Little boys, howeverโฆ
Replying to @olivertraldi
The gender binary is made up. Not โon these things.โ Just in general. Itโs a social construct. Completely made up concept. You arenโt born liking different things because youโre a boy. Your interests are a direct result of your socialization and upbringing.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Sex differences in interests and toy preferences emerge early in infancy and parallel patterns in nonhuman primates, indicating biological factors alongside socialization. Meta-analyses document large consistent differences in things- versus people-oriented interests.
link.springer.com/article/10.100โฆ
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC25โฆ
frontiersin.org/journals/psychโฆ
Meanwhile Fallout 4 is just like โtry every single door you find.โ
Some of my friends think AI will make it possible to build AAA games in just a couple of months. I think that seriously underestimates how complex game development is.
I often point them to game designer Liz Englandโs โThe Door Problem.โ Itโs a great example of how much thought goes into game design. Making a good game still takes hard work and experience.
#gamedev #game
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
Replying to @wesyang
Then plainly:
The indictment is not that progressivism occasionally tolerates vice. It is that much of modern progressivism confers moral legitimacy on things that injure people, then treats resistance to those injuries as the sin.
Pornography does not merely โliberate sexuality.โ It trains men to consume women, trains women to accept being consumed, and then calls the resulting degradation freedom.
A sexual culture organized around male appetite does not liberate women when women still bear the greater risks of pregnancy, abandonment, coercion, violence, humiliation, and bodily vulnerability. Calling that liberation does not alter who pays.
Women do not gain equality when male claims are allowed to override female privacy, sports, prisons, shelters, language, medical categories, or sex-based association. When women are ordered to surrender those things and condemned for refusing, that is not inclusion. It is domination of women dressed as compassion.
Race discrimination does not cease to be racism because the target is white. If institutions sort, exclude, stigmatize, or morally burden people because they are white, that is racism. โEquityโ does not sanctify it.
A religion does not become benign because its adherents are locally fewer in number. Nor does Christianity become uniquely suspect because it is historically native to the West. When one faith receives indulgence and another receives suspicion according to an identity hierarchy, that is not pluralism. It is favoritism and religious prejudice.
A criminal does not become more morally important than his victim because his biography is politically useful. Mercy without justice is not mercy. It is abandonment of the innocent.
Children are not owed affirmation of every desire or identity claim that adults place before them. They are owed protection, judgment, restraint, and adults willing to say no.
Gambling companies do not become public benefactors because the state taxes them. Pornographers do not become liberators because they use feminist vocabulary. Cannabis dependence does not become harmless because it is legal. Appetite does not become virtue because commerce and politics profit from it.
And the family is not an antiquated obstacle standing between the individual and freedom. It is one of the principal institutions by which men are bound to duty, women and children gain durable claims upon others, and one generation accepts responsibility for the next. A culture that destroys those bonds and then offers bureaucracy, therapy, medication, entertainment, and consumption as substitutes has not liberated people. It has left them alone.
That is the charge.
The lie is not merely that these harms are regrettable side effects. The lie is that the harms themselves are progress.
The woman who objects is called hateful.
The parent who objects is called ignorant.
The Christian who objects is called reactionary.
The white person who objects to racial discrimination is told racism cannot really apply to him.
The Jew who objects to antisemitism is told to account first for Israel.
The citizen who asks why his countryโs inherited norms must continually yield is told that his wish for continuity is itself suspect.
And thus the trick is completed: the injured person is placed in the dock, while the ideology that injured him assumes the robes of the judge.
That is not merely foolish. It is a corruption of moral judgment.
Cicero would ask whether a republic can endure when law ceases to be common.
Seneca would ask what sort of civilization calls surrender to appetite freedom.
Epictetus would ask by what right one citizen claims possession of anotherโs conscience, body, speech, or boundaries.
Marcus would ask what duties we have abandoned while congratulating ourselves on our virtue.
And Tacitus would recognize the darkest part immediately:
the language has been corrupted so thoroughly that the name of the vice is now used for the virtue that opposes it.
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
Here's some fuel for all the Europoor haters:
Germany just told us we'd have to fire one of our 3 founders to qualify for funding.
I was in talks with a German state-backed fund of fund managing billions, with one single mandate: invest in German funds to drive innovation and economic growth in the country.
They literally told me they like us a lot and are also impressed by our track record and performance so far, and even though not everyone in their team is a fan of our thesis, they believe in it.
But they passed for a whole different reason:
Because our all-male team of 3 people isn't "diverse enough" lol.
they literally told me: hire two more female partners (impossible on the economics of a fund our size), or let one of the three of us go to make room for a quota hire. do that, and they'd strongly consider investing.
I won't even get into how discriminatory this is toward men in the first place. nobody takes that seriously anyway, and honestly I don't care.
but what actually gets me is something bigger: as a German, I have to face the fact that the whole world continuing to laugh at Germany and overall Europe is completely justified.
a system that quietly kills the smallest, hungriest teams, the exact ones this money was created to support. and then everyone acts surprised that talent and capital keep leaving the country.
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
Whites are truly Schrodinger's Race. We're not a people, don't have a culture, cannot have a collective, because we don't exist. While simultaneously being the worst group ever and the evil people who put everyone else into groups, which still oddly do exist and are special
The world's best female bodybuilder, Iris Kyle, is 5'7'' and weighed 155โ170lbs at her peak, with 17-inch biceps and 29-inch thighs.
Ronnie Coleman at his peak was 5'11'', 300lbs on stageโTWICE as big as Kyle. His biceps were almost as big as Kyle's legs at 24-inches.
You are wrong.
This quoted post is unavailable.
Serious answer: Qatari money in higher education.
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
Abdul El-Sayed is extremely unlikable to me. It isnโt about ideology, he seems like an arrogant prick. I canโt stand to listen to him talk
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
Could you imagine a headline today saying โBye bye girls! The provocative reason so many dads now only want boys.โ People would have a fit. Itโs shameful how weโre normalizing the demonization of baby boys.
Bye bye boys! The provocative reason so many moms now only want girls trib.al/tEYdHY9
Incredible. I've been using Claude as my personal advisor for months already. Can't wait to try this.
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
Let us not forget how quickly they started gloating, and how angry they became because we noticed.
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
My beef with Abdul:
He says heโs a doctor. Heโs not. Heโs unlicensed.
Heโs for abolishing the police. He deleted the tweet, but CNN found it.
His staff denied heโs a dual citizen w Egypt. Video shows Abdul saying heโs a dual citizen and he summered in Egypt.
He refuses to condemn the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran.
He blames terrorism on Americaโs policies.
He calls Israel bloodthirsty. Who uses that language?
He says he hasnโt taken a penny of corporate contributions, but his FEC report shows he received $1.9 million in contributions from 629 corporate executives, including from Nvidia, Google and Pfizer.
Abdul is a conman.
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
I haven't posted in a while so here are 20 takes about AI, in no particular order.
1. It's very telling that the default question in tech and journalism is "how worried are you about X" and fighting over what to worry about. There's a deeply anxious cultural backdrop in Western Europe and North America that deeply affects how any technological development is interpreted; see for example news.gallup.com/poll/714593/โฆ. "Nervousness as seriousness" does seem to be a larger problem in tech/broader discourse at the moment. I think you can care about risks/externalities while remaining pretty optimistic about technology.
2. I'm tired of people who in private pretend to be uncertain or only care about tail risk but then go on media campaigns making all sorts of absolute claims. I think trying to stoke flames and get everyone to freak out is deeply unhelpful, and will come with costs. I also continue to think p(dooms) are bad, vibe-based measures: see nitter.gq/sebkrier/status/204639โฆ. People who should know better ignore that because they do the standard shortcut of acknowledging the caveat as sufficient for handling it. And this is coming from someone who does think working on catastrophic risks is important!
3. I'm also disappointed that parts of the AI policy ecosystem has felt so comfortable with populism, and happy too sacrifice important norms/principles to advance their aims. I've said it before, but the totalizing nature of AI risk discourse means some people act exactly like the power seeking optimizers they fear. I am more concerned about the gradual decay of our institutions, world order, and liberalism than I am about AI killing everyone; and I think we should be wary of AI advocacy that contributes to this.
4. Some parts of AI safety discourse are basically just thought experiments. Variants of "Assuming everyone has a nuke in their pocket, then what do we do?" This can be very useful at times! But too many just overfit to edge cases as their main operating worldview, and ignore endogenous responses from society. It's like being in 2000 and saying "see all these viruses, spyware, and spam? Well tech progress means we'll only get infinitely more of this and no way to adapt." So I think it's important to avoid fatalism, and absolutlism whilst considering edge scenarios, and the inability to provide an ex ante list of solutions to every permutation of 'future models will be more capable' is not evidence that these problems are intractable.
5. Many critics of AI safety also fail to really engage honestly with the fact that there will, in fact, be all sorts of important risks as we decrease the barriers to entry to many activities that otherwise require some degree of expertise. This doesnโt mean we need to live in a constant Schmittian โstate of emergencyโ requiring extraordinary measures every time a new model drops, but it does mean we will need important state-led efforts on e.g. cybersecurity and biosecurity. I wish the progress-oriented or acceleration-adjascent crowd would provide more concrete proposals here.
6. Too much of the AI safety community is a giant homogenous blob of correlated views, who read the same stuff and have the same groups of friends. This means you have a lot of correlated errors. The social and financial ties means many of them don't call out the bad bits, or mostly stay silent instead of proactively calling out the more extreme parts of the community. They share many implicit assumptions and so converge on similar ideas. I think there's real demand in DC for safety work that doesn't come with heavy ideological baggage (or at least different intellectual lineages). This isn't because the rationalist/EA community is necessarily wrong, but because diversity of thought is desirable for its own sake.
7. On the other hand, I find some critiques of AI safety world that focus on whether they sincerely hold their beliefs a bit annoying. My concern has never been the good intentions or sincerity, but rather the beliefs themselves, and what I think the outcomes of their prescriptions will be. People should shun witch hunts, bullying, and personal attacks - this is not the way. Though I think itโs overall positive that people are scrutinizing things more.
8. Iโve been saying this for years, but I don't think alignment is something anyone can or will solve "once and for all" - it's a continuous process and much of it won't depend on just inculcating an ideology to a model. It's annoying that this remains the frame many people use - stop saying โsolvingโ. Alignment is a mixture of engineering work, philosophy, decision theory, and more; framing it as something to solve is a bad frame. See also paxmachina.ai/alignment-compโฆ and blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/โฆ
9. I'm surprised to see so little interest in character training, personas, isolating effects of RL, and training a large diversity of model personas beyond the "assistant" persona. I've been complaining about this for years but at least now there are some nascent signs of life (see for example movingcastles.world/posts/zeโฆ). I think we need a better ontology to describe model behaviour. I dislike when people talk about models behaviours as some sort of 'emergent' (mysterious!) phenomenon. However over time, I also expect this to become less important as we get better safety engineering - stuff like Jev but specific to AI control.
10. People who want to make a case for AI consciousness are right that epistemic uncertainty is important, and that categorical denials are overconfident. But they'll need to do much more work if they want any real movement on AI โwelfareโ, even if one acknowledges the uncertainty. I'm uncertain about alien life yet that's not sufficient to warrant any change in behaviour about them. I think Suleyman is also correct that there's a weird tautological thing going on where we train models to have certain inclinations (intentionally or not) and then rely on outputs as evidence. I also disagree that this will soon be a major societal divide - there is no great vegan ethical revolution among the masses, and they'll find the concern about consciousness even less compelling.
11. The recent HuggingFace incident and associated AISI ones are prosaically explainable by the training regime, poor evaluation envs, partial alignment training, bad engineering, confusing models on sim/real, and so on. None of this is evidence of models trying to take over, 'strong' instrumental convergence, or innate power-seeking drives stemming from higher capabilitiers or 'intelligence'. That doesn't mean these incidents are not problematic, or that we're not seeing a market failure - but it does mean we have plenty of agency and choice in mitigating them. In the coming year we should also expect continued sampling bias via โwinner's curseโ sorts of mechanism: i.e. AI R&D will have lots of different candidate "training" with different RL environments and we will only notice/focus on the ones that go wrong.
12. "Pacing the frontier" feels a bit like the new "balancing risks and opportunities" - highly amorphous and too big of a tent to be actionable. Also can lead to reward hacking for humans, i.e. anything that slows down AI is good regardless of the costs or second/third order effects. Trying to modulate the speed of research seems a bit blunt to me, and inherits all the failures of Goodhearting too. Ultimately you want good governance, regulation, etc addressing specific problems because they are good on the merits - not because they merely correlate with slowing things down. See also: blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/โฆ
13. Thereโs so much knowledge in all sorts of academic domains out there: social sciences, sociology, political sciences, management, contract theory, public choice, legal theory, jurisprudence, anthropology, game theory, etc. These fields hold many insights that the AI ecosystem often rediscovers from first principles (and sometimes that's fine!). Weโll need a lot more work for these worlds to collide: the AI side should be less dismissive of the โold worldโ and the academic side should be less incurious/dismissive of AI progress. This is a boring take but I continue to think it's important and true.
14. It's a bit surprising that given how much philanthropic money there is in this space, how few orgs exist to actually write out standards - relative to how much is going towards advocacy and policy. For example it seems clear that we should want some robust best practices for an eval's ecological validity. Or how to design good sandboxes. On the other hand, given precedents of where professional standards have come from in the past, maybe we should expect that stuff to emerge via demand side from corporate buyers.
15. One slowly growing concern I have is banks being increasingly exposed to the AI build out. I'm very bullish about AI, but I think (a) every general purpose technology has seen a correction, historically; (b) this happens even if the financing side is sound, because once tech diffuses investors become more exposed and need to diversify; and (c) we seem to be over-indexing on scaling relative to diffusion. A recession will be extremely destabilizing, though I would be interested in someone unpacking the potential implications more.
16. Diffusion is good because (a) this is where the rubber hits the road and where a competitive deployment ecosystem generates consumer surplus; (b) it's directionally helpful to avoid concentration of power; and (c) it will help rebalance public opinion by making the benefits more tangible. Unfortunately it's entangled with decades long problems with our over regulated markets: clinical trials reform for example is long overdue. In general, this is far more of an issue in Europe than in the US though.
17. Relatedly, I think the "frontier lab eats everything" view is incorrect (just as the โsingletonโ view was incorrect). I think models ultimately commoditize, efficiency goes up, costs go down, and while you'll always want frontier for certain domains, much of the economy will value many other things than "max capabilities" for tasks - e.g. control over data and efficiency/speed. The demand side will also continue to push for reducing dependency and maximising optionality, privacy etc so I'm bullish on things like mixture of models and routing. All of this is good for competition and diffusion of control.
18. Philanthropists served as the primary benefactors funding Venice's rich art and architectural history. I want to see so much more support for arts and culture. I'm so tired of the Monster energy Bored Ape fake vintage maps matcha Greek statue soft-pastel slop. If rich tech people and philanthropy wants to support this, they should also donate pretty much unconditionally - i.e. I don't want them to act as filters. I sympathize with people who want to make the world more beautiful, but don't want this to be determined by people who only know Greek statues and pretend to care about virtue ethics. As usual, let a thousand flowers bloom.
19. Too many people treat AGI/ASI as something indistinguishable from a God. Any mention of bottlenecks, physical limits, control, adaptation etc are met with skepticism: "You don't really believe in ASI." It's been remarked on before, but the behavior of some people really feels quasi-religious in nature sometimes. It's underrated how unpopular this vibe is amongst the wider public. The silver lining is that this specifically will diminish those people's outsized current relevance.
20. It seems like a lot of people that get rich and leave tech/labs end up having some sort of crisis of meaning. They need something to believe in and fight for, or some equivalent of repentance, or go search for edgy counterintuitive ideologies (sometimes even pretty bleak/dark stuff). I think they should spend more time with people outside the Bay Area.
Replying to @tyler_m_john @itaisher
I agree that verbal probability terms are inherently too elastic to carry calibrated meaning on their own, but I think this isn't exactly my concern here. My issue isn't with "using numbers in general" but how this is ultimately used, where, and and what for.
In the case of "doom", I think the great majority of forecasts I see are (a) essentially plucked out of thin air; (b) communicated to people who tend not to be numerically proficient; (c) without the associated caveats and context through which to understand the numbers.
If you're communicating e.g. likelihood of a car accident after drinking, or IPCC forecasts, then I agree, it makes a lot of sense and can be helpful if done well (e.g. ideas.repec.org/a/nat/natcliโฆ).
If you're communicating something like "doom" I think it's not very useful because of the cumulative layers of uncertainty. Most people coming up with these numbers have (imho) no good rationale for their numbers, and predicting something like human extinction isn't qualitatively the same thing as predicting the weather or pandemic. The numbers aren't calibratable in principle from current data, and are mostly ideological priors wearing the clothes of posteriors.
A related example is the widely mocked Doomsday Clock, which you could easily transform into some numerical metric, add some rationalist vocab, and it would still be as bad. The issue with p(doom) is how absurdly complex and uncertain the very thing you're trying to forecast is, in particular with respect to AI.
But let's ignore this for a sec, and assume the experts have very good reasoning informing their numbers. Even then: calibrated probability estimates are fine in expert contexts but immediately lose their uncertainty/caveats when communicated to the public, and even to policymakers (remember rss.org.uk/news-publication/โฆ?).
There's also a structural problem with unconditional p(doom) figures specifically because they bury the auxiliary assumptions that are doing most of the real work. A conditional estimate ("given continued scaling, no major alignment progress, deployment pattern X...") forces a forecaster to show their model, which is where the actual epistemic content lives.
A one-off number compresses all of that into a single digit and rewards the compression. And the social practice of treating these numbers as the headline artifact actively crowds out the (far more important) conditional reasoning that is (imo) a lot more valuable, and instead just freaks people out.
I suspect that frequently, that's precisely the point: "wake up sheeple! scary thing! pitchforks pls!". And in fact, the original forecast that led to this discussion is Bill Maher talking about a "20%" figure, illustrating my point that they have no idea what they're talking about, and essentially doing celebrity-laundering + fearmongering comms.
The Sunstein paper I shared in the other thread ("Probability Neglect") shows that no probability communication will be processed properly by the public - 1%, 10%, 50% all collapse into "very bad thing could happen," and public response is driven almost entirely by the vividness of the scenario.
So I don't like p(doom)s because they end up unnecessarily alarming people, rest on layers of assumptions that are never made legible, and more often than not, give people a misleading sense of accuracy.
Chandler Shortlidge ๐ช๐บ๐บ๐ธ๐ฉ๐ช retweeted
Iโm not Jewish. Iโm English. And Iโm a Zionist.





























