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Don't rush to conclude that a country is attacking Indonesia just by looking at a Cyber Threat Map. Recently, FortiGuard Threat Map visualizations have been circulating on X, with some users interpreting traffic originating from certain countries as evidence that those countries are actively attacking Indonesia. However, there are several important distinctions to understand: 1. Detected activity is not necessarily a successful cyberattack. Threat maps visualize suspicious activities detected through threat intelligence infrastructure. 2. Some activity may originate from honeypots. These are deliberately deployed decoy systems designed to attract, detect, and study malicious behavior. 3. IP geolocation does not establish attacker identity. An IP address registered in a particular country does not mean the attacker is physically located there or is affiliated with that government. 4. Not every suspicious connection represents a compromise. Scanning, reconnaissance, exploitation attempts, and successful intrusions are different stages of malicious activity. 5. Attributing an attack to a nation-state requires substantial evidence. This involves infrastructure analysis, TTPs, malware intelligence, forensic evidence, and threat actor attribution. Indonesia certainly faces real cybersecurity threats. But identifying who is behind those threats requires more than interpreting lines and locations on a global threat map. IP Geolocation ≠ Attacker Identity. Detected Activity ≠ Successful Breach. Threat Intelligence ≠ State Attribution. Cybersecurity analysis should be driven by evidence, not assumptions. Reference: fortiguard.fortinet.com/thre… #CyberSecurity #OSINT #ThreatIntelligence #Indonesia

INDONESIA'S 2026 FOREST FIRES: CORPORATE INVESTIGATION & FOREIGN BUSINESS LINKS These companies are not all accused of the same offence. Some are corporate suspects, some received regulatory notices, and others were identified through hotspot research. The public deserves transparency about concession ownership, ultimate beneficial owners, corporate structures and accountability. Forest fires destroy ecosystems, threaten public health and affect millions of people. Who ultimately owns and controls these companies? And who should be held accountable if negligence or wrongdoing is proven?

Does the Indonesian National Police actually use a LIMS, or do they only obtain CDR data?

http[://]k7m4x2p9v5n8c3b6z1q0r4t7y2w5h8j3m6p9v2k5x7n4c8b1z3q6[.]onion/ *Only traffic routed through Polish Tor Exit Nodes is accepted.

Several Indonesian palm oil companies and plantation concessions have reported ownership links to Singapore-based entities.

Coretax is extremely weak. Even the encryption used to wrap the data can be decrypted quite easily. Is there a lack of resources on your side? @DitjenPajakRI @KemenkeuRI

Some printers do leave a hidden “signature” on their printed output, so in theory it is possible to trace which printer was used and when the document was printed. This practice is known as printer tracking or the Machine Identification Code (MIC).

I thought this was the funniest comedy from Komdigi at the end of the year. Have they seriously never heard of Cloudflare before? 🤣🤣

Wrong! That’s not the Coretax server. Those results are from Shodan Search, using query "Coretax". https://www[.]shodan[.]io/host/115.178.135.157 The organization and ISP belong to PT Core Mediatech, which is different from the Coretax server managed

Over 5,000 users, company devices, and employees of Coretax DJP (Indonesia’s tax system) have been compromised by stealer logs, with their data being sold on dark web markets.

With pride, they claimed to have caught Bjorka, but in reality, it was nothing more than a ridiculous joke LOL🤣. He is "Wahyu FT", who desperately wants to be called Bjorka by reposting data breach results that are not his own work. Maybe just to look cool.

This is how indonesian intelligence monitors social media.

Back in 2013, HackingTeam & NICE flagged BAIS & BIN as ‘real opportunities’ in Indonesia. Plans included Galileo demos & comparison vs FinFisher. Target: selling spyware to Indonesian intel agencies.

oh snap 😱, we just leaked our location

1. Child of Hercules Rozario Marshal in the Indonesian Solidarity Party. 2. Hercules owns a fishing boat. Is he a businessman? perizinan.kkp.go.id/assets/d…

It would be a significant mistake for Indonesia to take Trump's complaints about QRIS and GPN seriously. Your country needs to establish its own payment system. Avoid combining QRIS with Visa or Mastercard! I think you know who behind visa and mastercard en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/QRIS

Do you want to play? Name: ANDI HERMAWAN National ID Number (NIK): 3509071708870002 Family Card (KK): 3509070910200002 Gender: MALE DOB: JEMBER, 17-08-1987 Family Address: Pucu'an Hamlet, RT 1 RW 2, Sidomulyo, Semboro, Jember Regency, East Java Phone: 6282329220617