Asst Prof of Comparative Politics @GUQatar • Economic shocks, authoritarianism, class, populism, health • #FirstGen • Formerly @EuropeAtHarvard & @Cambridge_Uni

Joined August 2014
Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Serbian 🇷🇸student/civic two year democratic movement incarnated politically today as the "Student List - Students Win" - makes historic electoral victory, and gains a full majority in Parliament, defeating the 14 year elective authoritarian regime of Alexander Vučić.
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
A young blonde woman with an American accent in Israel says that all the Arabs must be kicked out of Gaza because it is "our land" since "God commanded us to take it." The Palestinians should be kicked out to any other Arab state, she continues, except Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, "because they are ours." "Or we will kill them," she adds Can we stop pretending that this is a marginal view in Israel? That these are the comments of a fringe minority? They are not. Israel has been on this path for quite some time. Western governments know it fully - yet they continue to fund and enable Israel's genocidal policies.
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Wow! This graph depicting the Palestinian vs. Israeli death toll from 1940 to the present shows exactly when the genocide begins - and why it is a genocide...
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Join us on Oct. 21 for How Democracies Revive with @gscheiring and @MSnegovaya. You won't want to miss it! Register here: tinyurl.com/2v5wzhce
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
It took me a while, but I finally put my forthcoming book on my webpage! (Crazy semester) sociology.berkeley.edu/facul… *** sup.org/books/politics/socia…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Alternativ för Tyskland växer bland unga, arbetare och företagare – och starkast där industrisamhället gått sönder. Demokratiforskaren Gábor Scheiring (@gscheiring) menar att ytterhögerns ökade stöd är ett svar på en ekonomisk modell som slutat fungera. flamman.se/inget-alternativ-…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Capitalism didn't invent markets. It made people dependent on them to survive: jacobin.com/2026/09/markets-…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
People struggling financially have voted predominantly for the AfD in recent elections. Not in Berlin. The Left put socializing corporate landlords on the ballot, and won the election and this group. Our constitution allows the socialization of means of production for the common good because a key lessons of the Nazi era was: democracy needs an economic defense.
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
The Left party just won a historic victory in Berlin with 24.5% of votes according to exit polls. Elif Elrap would be the first mayor of Turkish descent in a city that is home to the largest Turkish community outside Turkey. This has been a housing affordability election. The Left’s agenda? Socialize the housing stock of corporate landlords. Socialization has been the expressed will of the majority of voters in a referendum. Socialization has been deemed legal by an expert commission, yet the referendum remained without consequence to date.
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Daron Acemoglu’s attention to how institutions distribute power, shape technology, and organize social life is one the Left should take seriously. But his case for working-class liberalism has serious limits. jacobin.com/2026/09/review-a…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Pundits have widely explained the rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland in terms of cultural backlash or the eastern German psyche. Yet its rise is no passing disturbance but a symptom of a much deeper crisis in Europe’s social model. jacobin.com/2026/09/afd-cris…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
The rise of Germany’s AfD reflects a crisis in democracies across Europe. Far from just voicing the cultural conservatism of blue-collar east Germans, the AfD is a dynamic reactionary force with powerful capitalists behind it: jacobin.com/2026/09/afd-cris…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Pundits have widely explained the rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland in terms of cultural backlash or the eastern German psyche. Yet its rise is no passing disturbance but a symptom of a much deeper crisis in Europe’s social model. jacobin.com/2026/09/afd-cris…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
Replying to @samirsaran
@samirsaran at Bled: “From Vietnam to Gaza, the US has not changed. There were no values. “Values” was just the opium for Europeans. This continent needs to stop lecturing us about values.”
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
IMO Woke 1 really starts after the Obama 2012 victory because it was a mobilization-rather-than-persuasion victory. He lost the white vote by 20(!) points, lost the South, still won comfortably. There was a great deal written about how this dominating coalition of minorities + urban/educated whites, with particularly good margins among young voters, was just the beginning of a long-term trend that would deliver, if not something quite as a durable and long-lived as the New Deal coalition, then close to it. Dems needed to simply sit back and let demography work its magic, in time turning Sunbelt states reliably blue (even Texas would fall soon enough...), while older white voters high in racial resentment died out and new younger, diverse, progressive voters took their place. This deranged absolutely everyone. On the Right, it led to a panicked abandonment of democratic principles altogether, and investment in a political movement that was premised on establishing and entrenching permanent GOP rule by hook or by crook--while simultaneously trying to reverse the demographic tide that was sure to overwhelm them (through e.g. stemming new immigration). I really believe their derangement was less about Obama himself being Black, and much more about their sense that the *electorate* could now overrule the supermajority preferences of the white vote--something wholly unprecedented in American political history. No one had won a national election while losing the white vote by 20 before. THAT is what made them go insane. On the broad Left (meaning center-left Dems, liberals, progressives, and the actual Left, which was just starting to reemerge as a genuine force thanks to social media allowing heterodox beliefs to flourish amidst the collapse of the liberal elite's cultural hegemony), this deranged us in a mirror image of the Right: we, too, could abandon the arduous and persuasive work of democracy, and let our demographic destiny carry us into the brighter future. No more pandering to Bubba. Fuck Bubba! We could finally say it! No more of this humiliating Clintonian two-step to appease or at least anesthetize Middle American chuds. We could just fucking steamroll them with our Coalition of the Ascendant. This, combined with the simultaneous rise of social media platforms as this urgently-contested space for normative cultural power, focused our energies inward: we'd won the Culture War, so now it was time to fight over who got to administer Cultural Reconstruction. The Chuds were doomed, powerless, flailing and moronic (just look at their flight to increasingly absurd and laughable figures like Trump!), and we would get to impose the new order over their Oxycontin-addled complaints. What, then, would that new order *be*? Who would run it? What would they accomplish? What you see here is a parallel abandonment of basic democratic principles of persuasion and coalition-building; on the Right, the fascist drive to entrench themselves in unaccountable minority rule (clearly the much more serious and evil threat, particularly in a country where the Constitution makes this entirely feasible), and on the Left an intra-elite competition to see who would be in charge of this new coalition that could finally dispense with the debasing and grimy work of mass politics and persuasion. Of course, we turned out to be completely wrong. Looking at the Obama coalition and projecting it out linearly into the future was a bad idea for many reasons--including that it was pretty tenuous to assume the massive turnout and insane margins among minority voters for the First Black President would simply reappear on demand for any Democrat--and it led to a lot of bad assumptions. We ended up with a discourse that was honed for internal competition, and relied extensively on social pressure and ostracism--but in a modern, liberal democracy where people can simply leave your political community if they don't like it. And a lot of people did; we successfully ostracized them out of respectable liberal or progressive/leftist institutions and communities, and so they just found new homes on the Right. And it turned out, of course, that minority groups are not just identity hive-minds which reliably allocate the same proportion of votes to one party or the other independent of any other concerns. "The Black vote," "the Hispanic vote"--even "the youth vote" turned out to be malleable, dependent on candidate quality, economic concerns, ideological fit, just like any other group of voters. Trump 1 didn't really break the spell because it felt like a fluky, unlucky nightmare. He didn't win the popular vote, the margin was razor-thin in the midwestern Blue Wall, and Hillary was a bad candidate--and despite all that, Dems retained near-Obama margins with voters of color and young voters. Surely, the Coalition of the Ascendant was still on track; this was just a speedbump. The closeness of the 2020 election and then Trump 2 (with his popular-vote win and the apparent "racial depolarization" of the electorate) fully shattered this narrative. Instead, people remembered we would in fact have to do politics. We would in fact have to compete for people's votes, and persuade them to share our values--and the articulation of those values in policies and behaviors. The center responded to this, as they usually do, by offering immediate capitulation wherever possible to chase the median voter (the center is actually quite bad at persuasion; their response to disagreement is generally to just concede and beg, rather than any attempt to move the audience towards their own positions). The Left responded, thankfully, by showing a great deal of maturation--away from subcultural/counter-cultural criticism and attempts to pressure elites into adopting our values through social pressure campaigns, instead moving towards actual mass politics. DSA has proven this can work, and is working, even if we are still quite early. We would be insane to retreat from that lesson; instead we have to double down on it. That's what Woke 2 needs to be--not cynical abdication of values/principles to chase the median voter, but a genuine persuasive attempt to build a Left mass politics. But persuasion, by definition, requires talking to people *who do not yet agree with you*. You can't *persuade* someone who is already *on your side*. It requires enticement, intellectual and emotional empathy (for people you really might dislike, and for legitimate reasons!), and discipline. It is not nearly so satisfying and immediate as putting people in the public stocks of social media for collective humiliation. It is not as simple as imposing your will over the objections of those who don't agree with you. It requires a certain kind of humility--not "the voters rejected our ideas so we have to get new ideas"; you can still authentically believe what you believe--but a humility about *power*, and about *democracy*. You have to recognize that "I don't have the power to just impose my ideology; and frankly it's good that I don't, because democratic legitimacy is itself an intrinsic good and if we cultivate a democratic mass politics of the Left, that will be more durable and innovative and resistant to attack than anything imposed from above."
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Lily Lynch put it perfectly: by the very same criteria that part of the Western and "good Russian" public sphere uses to discuss "cracks in Putin's regime," Ukraine has long been in a state of deep and worsening political crisis. I disagree only that the political situations in the two countries are "remarkably similar." On the contrary, Russia has demonstrated far greater sociopolitical cohesiveness under intensifying pressure. The question is whether this difference is merely quantitative or qualitative: simply the result of a more effective authoritarian regime holding disintegrative tendencies in check, or the emergence of genuinely new sources of cohesion. newleftreview.org/sidecar/po…
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
People defend capitalism because they confuse it with commerce. They believe “capitalism” is when people start businesses and sell things. If people understood that the thing they call capitalism and love so much is actually just commerce and that it’s not the same thing as capitalism, they would feel very different. This is because a local baker selling bread, a mechanic fixing cars, or an artisan selling wares on a digital storefront is a sign of commerce in a market economy, which is simply a mechanism for exchanging goods and services based on supply and demand. Needless to say, this has existed for thousands of years before capitalism was created. As economic historian Fernand Braudel pointed out, commerce and capitalism are not only distinct; but historically, they have often operated at cross-purposes. According to Braudel, ordinary commerce is competitive and transparent, while capitalism is anti-competitive and deliberately opaque, making it a zone of privilege held by a small elite who bend the rules in their favour. Braudel further argues that commerce, or the market, is horizontal, transparent, and competitive and as old as civilization itself. It involves individuals or small groups trading goods, where barriers to entry are low, no single player dominates, and profit is a reward for fulfilling a specific need. Capitalism, meanwhile, is a specific institutional arrangement that emerged relatively recently in human history, around the 16th to 17th centuries. It is NOT just people “trading stuff”. It is instead the legal and financial system where the means of production are privately owned, and the primary objective is the continuous, infinite accumulation of capital. Because of this accumulation-obssessed nature of capitalism, when it scales up, it seeks to eliminate the free play of commerce to protect its investments. True market competition is risky for massive capital as it drives prices down and threatens profit margins. Braudel contended that capitalism only begins where commerce ends. It is the zone of high finance and state collusion. Because it operates across vast distances such as the 17th-century spice trade, information takes months to travel, which creates a deliberate lack of transparency. Braudel noted that the great capitalists of the early modern era in Madeira and Venice or the Dutch East India Company, never wanted to compete in a fair, transparent market because competition slices profit margins to the bone. Instead, they secured royal charters, exclusive trading rights, and naval protection. At the same time, the state granted them legal monopolies, effectively outlawing competition. Therefore, capitalism naturally trends toward creating monopolies and securing state interventions like bailouts, subsidies, and regulatory capture to shield itself from the very market forces it claims to champion. In fact, the most important takeaway from Braudel’s analysis is that capitalism is NOT the natural evolution or the highest form of the free market, it is its dark shadow. So, when our lizard overlords use “free market” and “capitalism” interchangeably, they’re deliberately hiding this distinction and using the moral legitimacy of the hard-working, transparent business owner to defend the structural privileges of the protected financial elite and its regulatory capture. If ordinary people could comprehend these distinctions, many self-described “capitalists” would realise they are just pro-commerce, and actually anti-capitalist, because it would be clear that defending “capitalism” means defending the right of a small parasite class to bypass the market entirely.
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
1. Tractors on O’Connell Bridge. Whitegate blockaded. One hundred petrol stations dry across Munster and the west. This is not a fringe revolt. It is what the growth-democracy-climate trilemma looks like when a government refuses to name it.
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Gabor Scheiring retweeted
How to Connect Zotero with Claude Code A step-by-step tutorial This tutorial is written a simple and accessible language. It contains a few technical details, but you don't need any technical knowledge of coding expertise to follow this.
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