James Alexander

The IDF are conducting another assault in the North of Gaza, around Jabalia (see @2023gazawar’s excellent map, below). Critics are asking why the IDF are repeatedly going into areas they have already cleared and claiming this is a flaw in operational design. These critics have totally misunderstood what Israel is trying to do. Here’s what I think: The answer is simple: the IDF have absolutely no intention of using the clear / hold / build counterinsurgency tactics the West tried in Afghanistan. Why would they? Those tactics were a disaster in Afghanistan. The flaw in Western analysis is always the same: “we wouldn’t do it that way”. See Russia in Ukraine for another example of another country catching out Western analysts (me included). If you look at what’s possible, what the best version of “success” looks like, and what Israel are doing… I put it to you that in Gaza we are seeing a masterpiece of operational design. Ignore the “destroy Hamas” political rhetoric. The IDF are not *trying* to clear Gaza. So what are they doing? What’s possible? Any kind of political solution? Definitely not. No-one on the international stage has expressed any interest in helping with governance in Gaza. According to polling, 2% of Gazans support an Israeli-backed administration. The majority want Hamas back. Israel’s solution? Let them have Hamas. But the version of Hamas they’ll get is one heavily degraded militarily, but most importantly, with vast swathes of their tunnels and civilian-embedded infrastructure destroyed. “Never again is now” isn’t just an empty slogan. Israeli operational design isn’t built around destroying Hamas, or regime change, or political change in Gaza. Those things aren’t possible. The operation is built around making sure 7th October can never happen again. Absent the possibility of any enduring political solution, that’s what success for them looks like for Israel. Israel have methodically razed what civilian-embedded Hamas infrastructure they could find in Gaza City, Khan Younis, and now Rafah. They have secured the Netzarim corridor (middle of the map) to control freedom of movement from South to North. It looks like they are trying to do the same thing along the Philadelphi corridor and Gaza’s southern border with Egypt, to cut off the inflow of weapons and supplies to Hamas (see the blue, bottom right corner of the map as the IDF break in to Rafah). Facial recognition software in controlled areas allows the IDF to stop known Hamas commanders moving around. This also allows the IDF to strike as and when concentrations of Hamas are identified, to degrade their manpower, then withdraw again (see the Shifa hospital operation and the current Jabalia operation). At the same time they have destroyed buildings to create a 1km buffer zone around the Gaza border. This will prevent any repeat of 7 October. Nobody in Gaza is getting anywhere near the border. The operational end state here is significant infrastructure destroyed, Hamas fighting capability degraded, and the border secure; with the IDF retaining the capability to strike into Gaza at will. All whilst shifting hundreds of thousands of civilians out of harm’s way and minimising innocent casualties (Hamas’ human shield tactics aside). The downsides: the destruction of Hamas-infested civil infrastructure has caused enormous damage. Urban warfare always comes with civilian casualties. The Egyptians look very twitchy about Israeli control of the Southern border. This isn’t a long-term political solution. The destruction has, of course, drawn huge international condemnation. Failure to communicate the plan has damaged Israel’s international standing, and they have been crushed in the global information war for the narrative. But: none of these are show-stoppers yet, strategically speaking. Debate the morality in the comments. But, militarily, this is quite brilliant operational design within the bounds of what was realistically possible.