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Are the Kurds at a Political Turning Point? Critique of Optimism Regarding the Kurds’ Geopolitical Power: On Öcalan’s Call and Turkey’s Strategic Manipulation The article “Are the Kurds at a Political Turning Point?” published in Foreign Policy on April 16, 2025, presents the rising geopolitical power of the Kurds and Abdullah Öcalan’s February 27, 2025, call to dissolve the PKK as a turning point: “The combination of PKK and SDF announcements indicates that the Kurds are no longer an isolated geopolitical force. Over the past two decades, they have forged strategic alliances across borders, expanded their political influence, and strengthened their military capabilities. While vulnerable to the volatility of regional power games, Kurdish groups possess a leverage that was previously unavailable. Öcalan’s call has triggered a profound geopolitical recalibration—the ultimate impact of which will depend on how skillfully all actors, including the Kurds, navigate the evolving landscape.” However, this optimistic narrative fails to adequately address the hypothesis that Turkey is using Öcalan to weaken the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and buy time for assimilation, as well as the PKK’s historical resilience, ideological contradictions, and external dependencies. Drawing on Soleimani and Shojai’s (2024) Kurdish Paradox of Statelessness: Öcalan’s Confederalism and Turkeyification Strategies, this article critiques the Foreign Policy article’s concluding section by analyzing the lack of transparency in negotiations, the absence of third-party mediation, Öcalan’s captivity, the PKK’s historical resilience, Turkey’s domestic political dynamics, Erdoğan’s political calculations, internal divisions in Rojava, Israel’s Syria policy, the impact of the Palestinian card, and Öcalan’s ideological credibility. The conclusion highlights the reasons why Mashuq Kurt and Bilal Ata Aktaş’s scenario is unrealistic, emphasizing the complexity of the Kurdistan issue based on external dependency and Turkey’s pressure. The Geopolitical and Ideological Context of the “Kurdistan” Issue The Kurdistan issue has persisted as a complex and multifaceted problem within the geopolitical and ideological landscape of the Middle East. Kurdish communities in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran have continued their struggles for identity, autonomy, and rights within nation-state borders, emerging as significant actors in regional power games. The Foreign Policy article frames Öcalan’s February 27, 2025, call to dissolve the PKK (Euronews) and the SDF’s March 10, 2025, integration agreement with the Syrian interim government (Reuters) as a “turning point.” However, this optimism overlooks Turkey’s historical assimilation policies (Carnegie Endowment), its domestic and regional manipulation strategies, Öcalan’s ideological contradictions, and the Kurdish movement’s external dependencies. Soleimani and Shojai (2024) critique Öcalan’s democratic confederalism and “Turkeyification” project as an attempt to integrate Kurdish identity into a status-oriented modernity but fail to sufficiently focus on Turkey’s domestic political dynamics and current events. Theoretical Framework: Democratic Confederalism and the Turkeyification Project Developed after Öcalan’s 1999 arrest, democratic confederalism aims to purify Kurdish identity of “feudal” elements and integrate it into a modern, status-oriented framework (Pluto Books). Öcalan’s simultaneous criticism and emulation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, while drawing on Mahir Çayan’s tradition, can be read as a Jacobin-style “Turkeyification” project, as supported by his own statements. Öcalan’s captivity conditions in İmralı Prison—limited communication, isolation, and Turkish state oversight—raise questions about the sincerity and feasibility of this ideological transformation (Global Rights). The application of democratic confederalism in Rojava has faced challenges due to internal contradictions and external pressures, exposing the theory’s practical limitations. The Foreign Policy article presents Öcalan’s call as a peace opportunity without discussing his ideological credibility. Transparency of Negotiations and Lack of Third-Party Mediation While praising Öcalan’s call as a “geopolitical recalibration,” the Foreign Policy article overlooks the lack of transparency in negotiations and the absence of third-party mediation. The 2008–2010 Oslo talks and the 2013–2015 Peace Process included mediators like Norway, enhancing credibility (BBC). However, the current process lacks such oversight, increasing Turkey’s potential to manipulate negotiations (Chatham House). Soleimani and Shojai (2024) describe this as an “asymmetry between the state’s legal continuity and the Kurdish movement’s conditional legitimacy.” The failure of past peace processes, such as the 2015 collapse of the Peace Process, has fostered caution among Kurds (Crisis Group). The hypothesis that Turkey aims to weaken the SDF and buy time for assimilation is strengthened by this lack of transparency, a risk the Foreign Policy article fails to address. Öcalan’s Captivity and the Sincerity of His Call Öcalan’s imprisonment in İmralı raises questions about the independence and sincerity of his call. Statements made under Turkish state control risk serving Ankara’s strategic interests (Abdullah Öcalan). His limited communication and isolation create uncertainty about whether his call reflects the Kurdish movement’s interests or Turkey’s strategy to weaken the SDF and pursue assimilation. Soleimani and Shojai (2024) describe Öcalan’s call as an “ideological hegemony pursuit” but underemphasize the impact of his captivity conditions. The Foreign Policy article insufficiently addresses this issue. PKK’s Historical Resilience and Ideological Consistency The PKK has demonstrated strategic resilience through name changes like KADEK (2002–2003) and KONGRA-GEL (2003–2005) (History of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – Wikipedia). While this flexibility highlights the organization’s adaptability, it raises doubts about ideological consistency. The Foreign Policy article overlooks these dynamics, exaggerating the impact of Öcalan’s call. The PKK’s resilience may limit Turkey’s ability to manipulate the dissolution call, as past name changes helped the organization resist pressure, making the long-term outcomes of the current process uncertain. Turkey’s Domestic Political Dynamics: CHP-AKP Rivalry Turkey’s domestic politics, shaped by the Kemalist-based rivalry between the CHP and AKP, influence the Kurdish issue. Kemalism’s emphasis on Turkish nationalism and state integrity has hindered recognition of Kurdish identity (openDemocracy). The 2025 arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu (Reuters) signals ongoing pressure on the opposition and the potential instrumentalization of the Kurdish issue in domestic politics. The Foreign Policy article ignores these dynamics, while Soleimani and Shojai (2024) indirectly highlight how CHP-AKP rivalry complicates the peace process and supports Turkey’s manipulation hypothesis. Erdoğan’s Political Calculations Erdoğan’s inability to run for president in 2028 due to constitutional limits increases the likelihood of him using the Kurdish issue as a political tool (Middle East Institute). Öcalan’s call may serve Erdoğan’s efforts to gain legitimacy domestically and internationally, aligning with Turkey’s goal of neutralizing the SDF and bolstering its regional power. Turkey’s economic crisis and military burden in Syria heighten the need to control the PKK through Öcalan (Crisis Group). The Foreign Policy article overlooks these calculations. Internal Divisions in Rojava: PYD-ENKS Disagreement The postponement of the planned National Conference in Rojava on April 18, 2025, highlights Kurdish internal divisions and organizational challenges (ANHA). This weakens their ability to present a unified front in negotiations with Turkey and Syria, a factor the Foreign Policy article ignores, exaggerating their geopolitical power. Regional Dynamics: SDF Integration, Israel’s Syria Policy, and the Palestinian Card The SDF’s integration agreement with the Syrian interim government risks autonomy loss and assimilation. The interim constitution lacks provisions for Kurdish autonomy and minority rights, and Ahmed al-Shara’s controversial background raises credibility concerns (BBC). Turkey aims to erode SDF autonomy by pushing its integration with the Syrian regime, with the SDF’s agreement with Damascus effectively receiving Turkey’s “green light” (Reuters, 2025). The Syrian interim government’s establishment with Turkey’s support suggests SDF integration may mean Ankara’s oversight (Reuters). The SDF’s survival depends on U.S. military support, but Al Jazeera (2025) warns that a potential U.S. withdrawal could leave the SDF vulnerable to Turkey and the Syrian regime. U.S. actions under Trump and Biden, including withdrawal decisions and arms embargoes, indicate the Kurds are seen as “expendable.” Israel instrumentalizes the Kurdish issue to legitimize its Palestinian policies, highlighting Kurdish oppression to advance its interests (Jacobin). The Foreign Policy article insufficiently addresses these dynamics. Why the Foreign Policy Scenario Is Unrealistic? The Foreign Policy article’s concluding section presents the Kurds’ geopolitical power and Öcalan’s call as a turning point but fails to adequately address Turkey’s manipulation potential, domestic and regional dynamics, Öcalan’s ideological contradictions, and the Kurdish movement’s external dependencies. The following reasons explain why its scenario is unrealistic: External Dependency: The SDF’s survival relies on U.S. military support, but Al Jazeera (2025) notes that a potential U.S. withdrawal could leave the SDF vulnerable. U.S. actions under Trump and Biden suggest the Kurds are “expendable,” while Israel’s use of the Kurdish issue in its Palestinian policies increases the movement’s fragility (Jacobin). Turkey’s Pressure: Turkey aims to erode SDF autonomy by forcing its integration with the Syrian regime, with the SDF’s agreement with Damascus occurring under Turkey’s “green light” (Reuters, 2025). The Syrian constitution denies Kurdish autonomy, and the interim government’s establishment with Turkey’s support suggests SDF integration aligns with Ankara’s oversight. Turkey’s economic crisis and military burden in Syria heighten its need to control the PKK through Öcalan, yet it continues to restrict Kurdish language and cultural rights (Human Rights Watch). Historical Precedent: The PKK’s past “dissolution” tactics (e.g., KADEK and KONGRA-GEL name changes) suggest Öcalan’s call may be tactical. The PKK’s resilience could limit Turkey’s dissolution strategy (Crisis Group). Power Asymmetry: Kurdish geopolitical gains are fragile under Turkey’s military and political pressure. Turkey’s ultimate goal is to weaken the SDF and integrate Rojava into Damascus, eroding Kurdish autonomy (Reuters). Divisions: The Kurdish movement’s fragmented political structure, evident in the postponement of Rojava’s National Conference, hinders a unified strategy (ANHA). The lack of transparency in negotiations, absence of third-party mediation, Öcalan’s captivity, the PKK’s resilience, CHP-AKP rivalry, Erdoğan’s calculations, Rojava’s internal divisions, SDF integration risks, Israel’s influence, and Öcalan’s “Turkeyification” project undermine the Foreign Policy article’s optimistic narrative. Inspired by Soleimani and Shojai (2024), this article deeply analyzes Öcalan’s captivity conditions, ideological contradictions, and regional dynamics in response to the Foreign Policy article authored by Mashuq Kurt, associate professor at the University of London’s Royal Holloway Sociology Department, and Bilal Ata Aktaş, former coordinator of Le Monde Diplomatique’s Kurdish edition. @mimkurd - @aktasbilalata @KamalKajiw - @BehroozShojai foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/16…