Yojomojo

I have always believed Strategy functions as a hub within the Financial Cartel, buying as much $BTC as possible and giving hedge funds greater leverage to influence short term price movements, potentially delaying broader adoption. Saylor therefore deserves more scrutiny. My concern is that $KAS Wallet #1 could be serving a similar purpose.

Binance se está autodestruyendo. Nunca pensé que caerían tan rápido. A partir de diciembre te van a empezar a cobrar por tener activos en su plataforma. Un mínimo de 10€ o 0.025% mensual. Un robo en toda regla. Así te afecta:

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🚨 BITCOIN IS BEING MANIPULATED, AND I HAVE PROOF Everyone is talking about how Bitcoin went down $3,500 in 15 minutes. Everyone’s posting about it… But almost nobody is explaining what actually caused it. Stop staring at the chart. Look at the flows: Within minutes, wallets tied to Coinbase, Binance, Wintermute, and ETF-linked addresses all became active simultaneously. Large blocks moving between exchanges. MASSIVE market sells hitting thin order books. Why? To trigger PANIC, liquidate longs, and pull new shorts into the market. Here’s what really happened: – Liquidity was thin – Leverage was heavily stacked – Funding was already stretched So price gets pushed lower aggressively. But here’s the part almost nobody is watching: On November 27, one of the BIGGEST Bitcoin options expiries of the month hits. And the level insiders are watching is $74,700. That is where the manipulation gets interesting. They push Bitcoin lower. Liquidate longs. Trigger panic. Force retail to short the breakdown. And drag price toward $74,700 before expiry. WHY? Because that is where the options positioning becomes most profitable for the players already on the right side of the trade. Insiders opened the positions first. Then they move the market toward the level they need. And once November 27 passes? The pressure disappears. The manipulation is finished. And Bitcoin is free to continue higher. That is why I’m watching $74,700 more closely than ANY other level right now. And insiders don’t have to choose one side. They can attack both: Push Bitcoin lower. Liquidate longs. Trigger panic. Pull new shorts into the market. Make everyone believe the bull run is OVER. Then, once retail starts panic-selling and the leverage is gone… BUY THE SAME BITCOIN BACK CHEAPER. If you’re new to this market, understand one thing: Bitcoin almost never makes violent moves like this because of headlines alone. It moves toward liquidity. Watch funding rates. Watch open interest. Watch the liquidation map. Reminder: I called the Bitcoin top at $126,000 and told you to start buying again around $60,000. The next call will matter even more. When I EXIT the markets completely, I’ll post it here publicly like I always do. Turn notifications on. If you’re not following yet, you’ll understand why that was a mistake later.

In the Past 24 Hours 8B $KASPY tokens from #CoinEX rotated through a middleman wallet and started dumping on #MEXC. We're happy to report that that 80% has been aquired and has now moved from paper hands into the diamond hands of Whales. Soon the last 20% will be in the same hands and we can get back to business. Never would we have imagined getting to load up at 2X mint prices. You can't defeat the #TrilemmaCat! $KASPY on $KAS #kaspa #memecoin #crypto

The Binance incident exposed at least three mistakes that were entirely avoidable: 1. Development and operations environments were not fully isolated. Anyone with production access should operate from a dedicated machine used for nothing else, with no third-party software installed on it — coding, chat, and web browsing all belong on a separate device. 2. The operations stack had no meaningful 2FA. A single key was enough to operate production services, which means that once the key leaked, the attacker had full production access. The right approach is to run production operations through something like AWS's browser-based Session Manager, with a hardware security key enforced as a second factor, so that a single leaked credential is never enough to constitute a breach. 3. The MPC multisig existed in name only. The signing parties performed no substantive independent verification, so compromising one node brought down the entire scheme — a multisig that behaves no differently from a single signature. Multisig only works when the signers are mutually distrustful: each party must independently verify the transaction itself, rather than trusting whatever request comes from upstream. None of these require sophisticated technology. What was missing was discipline.

Not before 11:11. Kaspet, a pet that lives on Kaspa, hatches 11 November at 11:11 GMT. kaspet.app #kaspa #kaspet #KiiLabs