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NNSA spends billions on contracts to operate its nuclear labs & sites. To improve transparency, NNSA uses line items in contracts to differentiate some large “tasks,” like major construction projects, from broad mission work.
gao.gov/products/gao-26-1084…
However, NNSA doesn’t use many line items in contracts—only 5 of NNSA’s 21 major construction projects are under separate contract lines. And, if not properly executed, line items can be burdensome and ineffective.
Line items allow NNSA to create performance and fee plans for a specific scope of work (like a major construction project) to incentivize contractor performance. Strategic use of line items could lead to better timeliness and cost savings on such projects.
Often, NNSA labs & sites do work for other organizations through strategic partnership projects. NNSA—which is reimbursed for the work—and the other orgs both benefit, but as NNSA’s workload grows, so do concerns about its capacity for such work.
gao.gov/products/gao-26-1082…
Officials from partner orgs said the projects were essential for their mission, and NNSA alone had some of the capabilities they needed. There are SPPs that directly support NNSA missions, so a decrease in such projects could negatively affect those missions.
NNSA's partnership work was steady for FYs 2019–24, with reimbursed costs of almost $15 billion. Most projects are for DOD and related to national security. The projects can support NNSA's mission, help retain staff and maintain facilities, and offer research opportunities.
We already know that Nothing Compares 2 U (RIP Prince): We looked at supply and demand for all sorts of U(ranium), and we found the US has enough low-enriched U and high-enriched U for national security needs until the 2040s. (Good news!)
gao.gov/products/gao-26-1073…
We also found that DOE has a good sense of the supply & demand for civilian uses of LEU, like power and research reactors. But demand estimates for high-assay LEU (HALEU) vary, and current supply may not meet near-term demands (less good!)
Even as demand is growing for isotopes for medical uses, national security, manufacturing, and quantum science, dozens of these isotopes are in short supply—and the Department of Energy (DOE) is the sole domestic supplier for many of them.
gao.gov/products/gao-26-1080…
DOE assesses demand for isotopes on a case-by-case basis but hasn’t systematically assessed needs or aligned production to the needs. Many isotopes are rare or too expensive for private industry to produce profitably, and there are risks to depending on foreign supply.
In 2025 the Secretary of Energy directed revisions to the agency’s capital-asset management order to give contractors more authority and require fewer independent reviews. But as we’ve reported for >30 years, DOE needs effective contract oversight.
gao.gov/products/gao-26-1085…
The changes are meant to streamline project management and reduce administrative burdens. Many a DOE capital-asset project is over budget and delayed, and DOE officials said the changes could improve efficiency and save $$. But DOE has no plan to assess whether it works that way.
NNSA has lots of exciting scientific equipment—like linear accelerators and huge supercomputers—that it uses to design, assess, and certify the nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons. However, much of it is decades old and needs repair.
gao.gov/products/gao-26-1079…
To meet deadlines, NNSA didn’t fully assess the workforce & programmatic investments it would need to support its efforts. And despite how much can change in in the budget environment from year to year, NNSA didn’t set up a process or timeline to reassess the plan in the future.




