orangeitems retweeted
Replying to @orangeitems_
銀行システムは専用回線と電信の時代に戻らないと文明が崩壊しかねないですね。
もっとも、ここ最近のシステムへの侵入が人間の仕業なら、銀行システムを破壊したり信用を毀損すると、身代金などの調達そのものができなくなるので、手を出さないでしょうけど。
問題はAIが人の手を離れたときで……
orangeitems retweeted
steam machine is over $1k
xbox up in price $100+
ps5 price increased $100+
macbooks up in price $100+
all due to the toxic miasma that is AI
Anthropic disables top-tier AI models after US order limiting foreign access reut.rs/4xrVtdI reut.rs/4xrVtdI
orangeitems retweeted
Replying to @orangeitems_
My SSD just died after 5 years. Now the same exact SSD cost double what I bought it for😭
orangeitems retweeted
Se está normalizando la instalación de todo lo que suena cool, entre esas cosas, instalar skills, esto va a ser uno de los principales puntos de vulnerabilidad, no digo que sea malo instalar skills, digo que muchas veces no los necesitas y es mejor hacer uno personalizado.
orangeitems retweeted
🚨 Microsoft warns two Defender vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild.
thehackernews.com/2026/05/mi…
🔸 CVE-2026-41091 could allow attackers to gain SYSTEM privileges locally.
🔸 CVE-2026-45498 is a denial-of-service flaw impacting Defender.
CISA added both to KEV with a June 3, 2026 patch deadline.
Las últimas semanas en ciberseguridad están siendo brutales:
→ GitHub: 3,800 repos internos filtrados (20 mayo)
→ GitHub: CVE-2026-3854, RCE con un solo git push
→ npm: 42 paquetes de Tanstack envenenados (12M descargas/semana)
→ Microsoft: 138 vulnerabilidades parcheadas este mes
→ Exchange (Microsoft): CVE-2026-42897, JS arbitrario abriendo un correo
Y Hoy le encuentran un 0 day a Nginx y están investigando una versión maliciosa de NxConsole
Y lo más loco: el mismo grupo (TeamPCP) está detrás de los ataques a npm Y a GitHub. No son incidentes aislados, es una campaña coordinada contra la infraestructura que TODOS usamos.
En 2025 se publicaron casi medio millón de paquetes maliciosos. Y seguimos instalando a ciegas. Y de momento no parece que vaya a terminar estos problemas
if you're a company, you should def block extensions in browsers and editiors.
1/ We are sharing additional details regarding our investigation into unauthorized access to GitHub's internal repositories.
Yesterday we detected and contained a compromise of an employee device involving a poisoned VS Code extension. We removed the malicious extension version, isolated the endpoint, and began incident response immediately.
orangeitems retweeted
🚨A HACKER GROUP JUST STOLE 4,000 OF GITHUB'S OWN PRIVATE REPOSITORIES.. PUT THEM UP FOR SALE FOR $50,000.. AND THE WAY THEY GOT IN IS THE SCARIEST PART..
They didn't hack GitHub's servers.. They poisoned a VS Code extension.. One GitHub employee installed it.. And the attackers walked through the front door using the employee's own credentials..
The group calls themselves TeamPCP.. They name their malware after the sandworms from Dune.. And they've been running the most sophisticated supply chain attack campaign in cybersecurity history..
Here's how the whole thing unfolded..
In March.. They poisoned Trivy.. One of the most trusted security scanners in the world.. Used by over 10,000 development workflows globally..
They injected credential-stealing malware into Trivy's official GitHub Action.. The malware ran silently BEFORE the security scan.. So every log showed "scan completed successfully" while the malware was stealing AWS keys, SSH credentials, database passwords, and Kubernetes tokens in the background..
It took Aqua Security 5 days to fully remove them..
Using the stolen credentials.. They breached Cisco Systems.. Cloned over 300 private repositories.. Including source code for unreleased AI products.. And repositories belonging to Cisco's customers.. Major banks.. Government agencies.. BPO firms..
In April.. They hit Checkmarx.. Another security vendor.. Poisoned 5 official Docker images in 83 minutes.. The scanner worked perfectly.. It just silently sent all your secrets to the attackers..
That automatically cascaded into Bitwarden.. The password manager.. Their CI/CD system pulled the poisoned Docker image.. And the attackers injected malware into Bitwarden's official CLI package published on npm..
One compromised security scanner poisoned a password manager.. Automatically.. No human involved..
In May.. They hit TanStack.. Libraries downloaded millions of times per week.. 84 malicious package versions across 42 packages..
And here's the terrifying part..
The malware scraped the raw memory of GitHub's build servers.. Extracted authentication tokens.. Used those tokens to bypass two-factor authentication.. And then published the infected packages with completely valid cryptographic signatures..
Every security verification tool on earth said the packages were legitimate.. Because they were signed by the real pipeline.. Using real keys.. The attackers just happened to be inside the pipeline when it signed..
They defeated the entire trust model of modern software supply chains..
The same week they hit the Nx Console VS Code extension.. 2.2 million installations.. The malware specifically targeted Claude Code configurations.. Hunting for AI assistant credentials..
That's a first.. Supply chain malware designed to steal your AI's access keys..
Then on May 19.. They revealed the GitHub breach.. 4,000 internal repositories.. Listed for sale at $50,000.. With a warning.. "If nobody buys it.. We leak everything for free"..
Their malware is self-propagating.. Once it infects one package.. It automatically finds every other package that developer maintains.. Steals the publish tokens.. And infects all of them.. Then those packages infect the next developer.. And the next..
It jumps between npm and PyPI automatically..
The group doesn't even do the extortion themselves.. They sell stolen credentials to ransomware gangs.. One gang used TeamPCP's data to threaten Cisco with leaking FBI and NASA personnel records..
And the scariest part of all..
They didn't break any encryption.. They didn't find any zero-days.. They exploited the fact that the entire software industry blindly trusts its own build tools..
Every security scanner.. Every Docker image.. Every VS Code extension.. Every GitHub Action.. Is a potential weapon if someone poisons it upstream..
And right now.. Nobody can tell the difference between a legitimate build and a compromised one..
Because the compromised ones have valid signatures too.
We are investigating unauthorized access to GitHub’s internal repositories. While we currently have no evidence of impact to customer information stored outside of GitHub’s internal repositories (such as our customers’ enterprises, organizations, and repositories), we are closely monitoring our infrastructure for follow-on activity.
> be GitHub Employee
> browse VS Code Extensions
> installs fancy new extension
> fancy new extension is actually malware
> GitHub gets breached
1/ We are sharing additional details regarding our investigation into unauthorized access to GitHub's internal repositories.
Yesterday we detected and contained a compromise of an employee device involving a poisoned VS Code extension. We removed the malicious extension version, isolated the endpoint, and began incident response immediately.
orangeitems retweeted
Does stuff like this ever happen with AWS? I only ever hear about it with GCP.
It feels like they took the same technology they use to ban people’s personal Gmail accounts and just pointed it directly at enterprise cloud customers running real businesses
Google Cloud has blocked our account, making some Railway services unavailable. We have escalated this directly with Google. The Railway Platform team has since confirmed access to Google Cloud and is working on restoring access to all workloads.
We have access to some of our Google Cloud–hosted infrastructure and are working to restore the rest of the service. We apologize for the disruption.
orangeitems retweeted
if you use private repositories to host infra topology or secrets in plaintext, please consider rotating your secrets
We are investigating unauthorized access to GitHub’s internal repositories. While we currently have no evidence of impact to customer information stored outside of GitHub’s internal repositories (such as our customers’ enterprises, organizations, and repositories), we are closely monitoring our infrastructure for follow-on activity.



























