Sara Nowacka

Quick analysis of the agreement reached between the SDF & Syrian government: • To anyone who followed the negotiations between the SDF & Damascus closely, it is jarring to compare the current deal with what Damascus was willing to accept even earlier this month. In early January 2026, the SDF refused a deal that would have allowed the incorporation of 3 regional divisions (spanning Hassaekh, Deir Ezzor & Raqqa) + mutual control over the borders + constitutional amendments to guarantee Kurdish rights. Now they have to hand over borders, and the SDF will join the Syrian Army as individuals, not units. • The maximalist position of the SDF appears particularly bewildering given their knowledge that they lack genuine support among Arab tribes, and thus, government forces would be able to advance rapidly in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and southern Raqqa countryside. • The SDF appeared to be counting on 2 main factors to remain in power, despite its lack of legitimacy in Arab areas: 1. Repression: over 2025, the SDF arrested over 800 Arabs on political charges of expressing support for Damascus or engaging with it. More on why the Arab tribes & the SDF Arab commanders flipped to the government's side: nitter.gq/Elizrael/status/201268… 2. The U.S. preventing any attack east of the Euphrates, despite the growing impatience of the top U.S. leadership handing this file. The U.S. indeed opposed such an offensive, but the rapid pace of advance of the Syrian Army, supported by armed tribesmen and cells it planted and armed by the Syrian government (a months-long project overseen by @zakorahmed0) in Arab SDF-controlled areas, imposed a fait accompli. • There are still many details about the deal that need to be worked out, but now that the SDF lost much of the territory it once controlled & its illegitimacy among Arabs became apparent (with even tribes that have long aligned with the SDF flipping, such as the Shammar), the SDF's leverage is incredibly limited. • What does appear clear from the text of the deal is that Kurds will maintain security in majority-Kurdish areas. This is incredibly important for preventing abuses by Arab Syrian government forces and tribal fighters. • There are multiple issues of concern to Kurds that have not been addressed in the deal. Among them are: 1. The fate of children, mostly Kurdish, who were kidnapped or joined the PKK/YPG/YPJ/Asayiş. Just as the deal obligates the SDF to remove foreign PKK cardo from Syrian territory, it ought to be tasked with returning these children to their families. 2. What the Asayiş's control over internal security in Kurdish areas means for opponents of the PYD/PKK. There are thousands of Kurds exiled from northeastern Syria due to persecution by the Asayiş and PKK structures such as Ciwanên Şoreşger (Revolutionary Youth Movement), who want to return and rebuild political life in Kurdish areas. 3. The integration of the local Kurdish-language education system into the broader educational system in Syria. Tens of thousands of Kurdish youths graduated from the Kurdish-language education system run by the Autonomous Administration, but their diplomas were not recognized anywhere, preventing them from pursuing higher education outside of the unrecognized universities in Kurdish areas. 4. Restoration of Kurdish property in Efrîn, Serê Kaniyê/Ras al-Ayn and Tel Abyad that were illegally seized by Turkish proxy factions and return of IDPs to those towns. Tens of thousands remain displaced. While some Kurds have been able to return over the past year, many of them were forced to pay exorbitant sums to the armed factions (now SAA units) to reclaim their own property. • The implementation of the agreement will surely face stumbling blocks on the Kurdish side. The SDF's leadership (Mazloum Abdî) does not genuinely control all the Kurdish fighters inside Syria. PKK networks answerable to the leadership in Qandil or its representatives inside Syria, have engaged in kidnapping of children into the ranks of the PKK, sent explosive-laden cards into Turkish-occupied areas after 2019, and engaged in cross-border smuggling into Turkey through tunnels, against the wishes of Abdi. These cadros and members refused to abide by the orders of Abdî to withdraw from Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo & kept holed up at a hospital for hours, until they too agreed to surrender & be displaced. • The bottom line: the conduct of the SDF's senior commanders, particularly over the past two weeks, reflects a failure of leadership and judgement. Their maximalism rested on false assumptions, ignoring Western officials and independent mediators urging a course correction. For decades, Syria’s Kurds were denied basic rights, subjected to economic marginalization, and targeted by repeated campaigns of ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering. It is a tragedy that those entrusted with negotiating the future of this community in post-Assad Syria prioritized factional interests and so badly misread the balance of power.

A Palestinian residing near Douma in the occupied West Bank called the Israeli Police after Israeli settlers raided his home & stole feed for their livestock. They were accompanied by an armed soldier-settler. The Palestinian has been detained incommunicado for the past day.

Israel will never admit it, but I am confident that so many of the successes Israel has had vs. the Iranian axis is not due to Israeli genius but due to the stupidity of the men who make up the rank-and-file and commanders of these militias & Iranian regime. Having spent 903 days in the captivity of an Iraqi militia servicing Iran, I can tell you that I've never met more ignorant people in my life. Commanders who think tracking devices can be planted in teeth, but don't know white [non-silver] fillings exist. Commanders who think Masons rule the world. Senior commanders who are literally illiterate. An Iranian commander who thinks there is such a thing as spoken vs. written Hebrew (diglossia). What a travesty that Iraqis, Yemenis, Gazans, Iranians and Lebanese are subject to the rule of these brutal ignoramuses.

According to local sources, the Israeli Army is deforesting newly occupied areas in northern Quneitra to create line-of-sight for its forces, but won't allow Sunni villagers from Jubatha al-Khashab & Tranjeh to at least collect the firewood, but is allowing Druze villagers from Hadher to collect it.