Non-state actors and conflicts / mostly East Africa / Ohioan / Defections Operations Coordinator at the Bridgeway Foundation / @SAISHopkins alum
Joined March 2014
- Tweets22.7K
- Following2K
- Followers15K
- Likes14.4K
Pinned Tweet
Very excited to announce that our new book "Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront" by @warnjason with myself, @MENASTREAM and @Pol_Sec_Analyst is now available! hurstpublishers.com/book/the…
RDF/M23/Twirwaneho had seized the position in July 2026, and retaking it is logistically critical for sustained operations on the plateaux itself, as roads to both Minembwe and Mikenge pass through Point Zéro.
Point Zéro, located ~1100m above the plain below, would be a challenging objective for any military. RDF/M23/Twirwaneho units defending Point Zéro have excellent visibility of advances coming towards them from below, all the more so with extensive use of ISR drones.
Regarding Tim Kennedy, it’s very weird that people are still talking about “Rwanda-backed M23 insurgents” as if it’s just some insurgency supplied by Kigali. It’s not. This is a conventional interstate war involving three state militaries and ~100k auxiliary militia combatants.
JUST IN: Forces tied to Erik Prince’s Vectus Global were ambushed in South Kivu in Congo on September 17 while moving between locations, Reuters reported today.
About 20 people were killed or wounded, including at least seven Congolese and a former New Zealand SAS operator. Former UFC fighter and Green Beret Tim Kennedy was also wounded.
Sources said the attack’s sophistication points to Rwandan forces backing M23 (March 23 Movement), the main rebel group fighting the Congolese army. One government source said those forces may have tracked a Vectus surveillance drone to the team.
Vectus, which also works in Haiti, had been hired to help secure mineral revenue and earlier supported Congolese troops around Uvira.
This also isn’t an example of how the proliferation of drones has increased the capabilities of militias in Africa. Cheap FPV drones aren’t jamming GPS over hundreds of kilometers or shooting down strike aircraft.
This is nothing like Iraq or Afghanistan. This is a high-intensity war with modern weapons systems, ISR and strike drones, electronic warfare systems, anti-aircraft missile systems and tens of thousands of soldiers in regular combat units and auxiliary militia armies.
This is all to say that this is not some ragtag insurgency. This is a state military deploying tens of thousands of troops to seize territory within the borders of its neighbor, where it then established a local auxiliary army and state-like administrative apparatus.
Other assets have included counter-UAV radar trackers/classifiers and area monitoring systems made by @WBGroup_PL, likely used to create detection screens around RDF positions.
RDF have also deployed long range one way attack drones, heavy bomber drones, kamikaze/FPV drones, heavy artillery, Israeli GPS-guided mortars, sophisticated electronic warfare systems, and Chinese mobile short range air defense systems. xitter.cf/ryanmofarrell/status/2…
Construction at Kamembe began in October 2021, prior to "M23's" first incursion, and was operational by January 2023. New satellite imagery shows an additional hanger being built over the last year. Rumor has it that RDF have now acquired Akinci drones. xitter.cf/wammezz/status/1749514…
New satellite imagery shows Turkish-origin TB-2 #drone in use by the #Rwanda Air force at Kamembe air base, close to the #DRC border in January 2024. As noted by @ryanmofarrell, construction for drone ops at the base started earlier last year kampalapost.com/content/rwan…
That invasion and occupation is backed by substantial modern military assets, including TB2 drones. RDF’s TB2s are based at Kamembe airport, just across the border from Bukavu, and have carried out hundreds of air strikes inside Congo.
M23 operates more as a subordinate military formation of RDF, similar to how Donetsk and Luhansk separatists operated under the Russian army.
Rwanda has repeatedly co-opted Banyamulenge rebellions, but it has historically been a far more contentious relationship than M23, whose origins lie in a different Congolese Tutsi community in North Kivu.
Twirwaneho has been around long before this war began, the latest version of Banyamulenge rebellions against state repression and ethnic discrimination by the government and rival ethnic militias.
The third component is MRDP, popularly called “Twirwaneho.” Mobilizing amongst the Banyamulenge, a Congolese Tutsi ethnic group in South Kivu, Twirwaneho is its own cohesive formation allied with M23 and RDF, fielding 2,500-3,000 fighters.
When RDF and M23 seize new territory, local officials are systematically mobilized to produce quotas of local young men who are sent to training camps. While it’s hard to put a total figure on these round-ups, documented instances give some indications.
But the bulk of this rapid expansion is through a massive, involuntary conscription campaign in eastern Congo and the forced enrollment of captured FARDC, police and “Wazalendo” militia, around 4,000 of whom were captured in the battles for Goma and Bukavu.
The leadership and core of M23 are veterans of previous mutinies by FARDC units loyal to Rwanda (RCD > CNDP > M23 1.0). This was bolstered by substantial recruitment of Congolese refugees in Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and elsewhere.
It has also spurred a rapid expansion of their M23 auxiliaries from ~3,000 in 2023 and 2024 to ~5,000 in April 2025 and then, most dramatically, to more than 30,000 by early 2026.
This is by far the largest and most costly combat deployment for RDF since the Second Congo War ended in 2002. Satellite imagery of Kanombe military cemetery in Kigali shows at least 1,171 new graves since 2021.
