BIRTHS, EXPECTED BIRTHS AND MISCARRIAGES IN GAZA 2025-2026 I have here combined the number of births (blue) and miscarriages (grey) in Gaza January 2025 to September 2026, with the rate of expected births (yellow) and the pre-war adjusted number of miscarriages (red). Miscarriages (red): The adjusted number of miscarriages during the period (red) is based on the fact that in Gaza the rate of before the war was around 137-140 miscarriages per 1,000 live births, or 13.7-14%. That gives 100/14=7.1, which means that for each miscarriage around 7.1 live births occurred pre-war. This number is then multiplied to the rate of miscarriages and then adjusted 6 months forward in time, because most miscarriages occurs in the beginning of a pregnancy, not the end of one. This together gives a line that is comparable to the number of births we saw, with a overall clearly lower rate of miscarriages than occurred in 2025-2026 and that is the only period we have exact data of births and misscarrys, since the war began in October 2023. Expected number of births (yellow): The expected number of births (yellow) is based on the average of the seasonal fluctuation in birth numbers that can be seen in the only monthly pre-war Gaza MoH data available, from 2019, 2021 and 2022. This data clearly shows that the birth numbers where much lower in February to June during these year. That is normal because February is the shortest month of the year and this period also follows nine months after the extremely warm summer months, where fewer people want to be "close to each other". In addition, these birth numbers where also adjusted monthly after the number of people leaving Gaza in this period, 110,000 until June 2024 and 150,000 until May 2025, in addition to the loss in population because of violent and natural deaths (only makes tiny differences). What this means: When these dips in births also occurred in February to June in 2025 and 2026, during the current conflict, Gaza MoH, the media, NGOs and the UN all has reported it as enormous fall in births that took place because of horrible life conditions in Gaza. But as seen, they has mostly followed the seasonal average and when more intents fighting took place, sometimes higher, sometimes lower but it is not showing any indications of horrible life conditions. When it comes to miscarriages the rate has even been lower in comparison to what was expected. If it had followed the blue line it would have followed the pre-war average of miscarriages per live birth. Now it is clearly lower, meaning the rate has fallen.

📊HOW MUCH OF GAZA WAS DESTROYED DURING THE WAR AND HOW MANY DEATHS/INJURIES OCCURRED AT THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME? After two years of fighting, when the war ended on 10 October 2025, 123,464 structures out of Gazas 245,000 pre-war structures had been destroyed according to UN damage assessment. That is 50.4% of the structures that Gaza had before the war started. As seen on the satellite images from Gaza, shared in my thread below, most of the destroyed areas are close to the Israeli border. And when it comes to the major cities in Gaza, except for Rafah, most of the city centers are still intact. 50.4% of structures destroyed, but that covers more of the smaller structures in Gaza than the larger inner city ones, according to satellite images from Gaza, and that is missed when looking at the overall destruction numbers. But how did the destruction actually match the death toll and the injures? I have matched the available UN damage assessments from 2023 (Oct and Nov), 2024 (Jan, Feb, Apr, May, July, Sep and Dec) and 2025 (Apr, July and Oct), with the number of deaths and injures at the same curve. This is seen in the two graphs below. Note: 1. First, the damage assessments are most often from the end of the month. However, it not always 100% direct comparable at all times to the casualties. 2. Second, the boxes without a number in the upper graph are averages, based on the closest UN damage assessment before and after. 3. Third, the black number in the top are total numbers for all destroyed and damaged structures together, and the same for injuries and deaths, while the red numbers is the confirmed destroyed buildings and deaths. 4. The death toll includes is what Gaza MoH counts as violent deaths. However, they also includes accidents in that number. Of these violent deaths at least 3-4,000 are accidents. What can be seen here? The amount of destruction of course follows the casualties mostly pretty closely. The two first months had lower destruction in comparison to deaths, 21.4% vs 26.52%. In the end of January 2024, when 45.33% of the deaths had occurred, the destruction where at 39.6%. Then they followed closer the rest of the war. Around 0.7 structures, that most often includes several or many housing units per structure, were damaged or destroyed per casualty (including both deaths and injures). 174,437 structures in comparison to 242,856 cautalites in total. At the same time, 122,464 structures were destroyed in comparison to 72,166 deaths in total, which is a rate of around 0.41 deaths per destroyed structure. That is a very low ratio of deaths in comparison to how the rate of destruction was. Several things are clear from this: 1. If Israel wanted to kill or injure as many Gazans as possible, the rate of casualties, and especially the rate of deaths, would have been much higher than the amount of destroyed structures. That is clear. 2. If Israel wanted to kill as many as possible, and also didn't have any related military objectives, they would have destroyed the inner cities of the larger cities in the Gaza Strip. Not just primarily the structures at the border to Egypt, that was used for smuggling, and the smaller structures that were closer to Israel and the structures in the outskirts of the largest cities, that indicates typical urban warfare patterns. 3. Israel has the capability to kill people if the wanted. The statistics show they didn't want to. The demographics of the death toll heavily indicates around 30,000 fighters dead. 4. Gaza already had huge problem with limited groundwater, over-usage and saltwater intrusion. Destroyed structures, and especially terror tunnels, will always make water supply harder. It is often portrayed as limited water supply is Israel's fault but it mostly comes from the fact that Gaza is a very small area, that is a desert, heavily over populated, where Hamas has used a large part of the civilian infrastructure for terror purposes.

🚨 Gaza’s own 2025 health data demolishes the narrative of both famine and claims of horrible life conditions during the war. This is some of the most important details we know: 1. Malnutrition amoung children under five years old, the most vulnerable age group, showed GAM (WHZ) = 0.5%, which is lower than Germany & Finland. 2. Stunting (May 2026): 12.2% (up from 9% pre-war), lower than Egypt & Morocco that are not in war, and around half the global average. That is a long term evidence that shows no widespread starvation took place the years before. 3. Neonatal mortality (children who dies first 28 days after births) = 9.1/1,000 people (up from 6–7 pre-war and still clearly better than most Arab neighbors). 4. Low birth weight: 10% (same as in 2020). 5. Miscarriages: lower than 2022 and the ratesclosely follows the number of children being born months later. This shows reports about much higher rates was actually just more women being pregnant. 6. 98.4% of births occurs in hospitals, meaning a still working healthcare system. 7. The first year of the war had 60,000 births (compared to an average of 56,139/year 2018-2022). In 2025 the number was over 50,000. However, the births followed expected seasonal patterns and also stayed at the expected pre-war rates of accounting for the number of people that left Gaza and the deaths (image 1). 8. Population rose during the war period by MoH’s own figures, with many tens of thousands and around 72,000 until September 2026, if comparing births vs deaths. 9. No famine occurred and none of IPC’s own thresholds were even close to be met. 10. Malnutrition deaths stayed very low compared to what IPCs Phase 3-5 classifications predicted (image 2). Gaza MoH reported 407 deaths in 2025 according but their own data shows that many of these didn't have malnutrition, some even died of violent attacks, and their 2025 report actually only indicates around 280 malnutrition related deaths during the year. A large share of the reported "malnutrition deaths" involved pre-existing conditions, not starvation that came from lack of food. 11. In every other famine in the world mostly children under the age of 5 dies. The normal rate is around 1/2 to 2/3 of the deaths, like IPCs guidelines says, famine experts and data from famines. In Gaza during the famine claims in 2025 75% of the malnutrition related deaths where adults even though Gaza has one of the youngest populations in the world (image 3). That's because Gaza MoH added many eldery who died of heart related causes. 12. Thousands of accidents are also included in the death toll, in additions to terrorists killed inside Israel participating in the October 7 attack. This even though this death toll figure it is presented as only including violent deaths by Israel in Gaza. 13. Much more food entered Gaza during the war than pre-war (image 4), 114 food trucks/day on average in 2024, 116/day in the first half of 2025 and then hundreds more in the second half of 2025 abd 2026. That in comparison to 2015-2023 when the pre war average was 73 food trucks/day and that included food that were much less kcal dense. 14. By 2025, natural deaths (including malnutrition) weren’t even meaningfully above pre-war levels. Meaning: No mass starvation. No collapsed health. No demographic collapse. The official data from Gaza itself says the opposite of the media story. No genocide.