BertholdStauffenberg

#Merz' Kritik an der #Windenergie fokussiert sich stark auf die aktuelle Ineffizienz: Windräder produzierten Strom, der mangels Leitungen nicht im Süden ankomme, was zu teuren Entschädigungszahlungen und instabilen Netzen führe. Doch diese Argumentation greift zu kurz, da sie die Ursache-Wirkungs-Kette ausblendet. Der stockende Netzausbau ist kein Argument gegen die Windkraft, sondern ein politisches Versäumnis der Vergangenheit; ein Ausbaustopp würde lediglich den Druck nehmen, die notwendige Infrastruktur endlich fertigzustellen. Zudem ignoriert der Fokus auf die fehlende „Grundlast“ moderne Systemlösungen: Überschüssiger Windstrom ist kein Abfall, sondern die Basis für die Wasserstoffwirtschaft und Batteriespeicher der Zukunft. Wer den Ausbau bremst, statt die Speicherung und Sektorenkopplung zu fördern, zementiert die Abhängigkeit von teuren Importen und verkennt, dass Windenergie heute die günstigste verfügbare Stromquelle ist. #Energiewende

My overall view of the provisional ceasefire agreement: 1. It is a good thing. If the war continued it would be devastating for all. 2. This war should not have been started in the first place, when it was started. The timing was wrong and its objectives could have been acheived in a different way. 3. Israeli and American objectives diverged from the start. The U.S. wanted to degrade Iranian capabilities and force capitulation to American interests in the region. Israel wanted regime change, weakening of the state, and the rise of (de facto) Israeli empire in the region. 4. The Americans demonstrated tactical dominance and hit almost all of the targets they sought. They deployed new weapons and that will have been seen by Russia and China. No other global military compares to the United States. 5. Iran demonstrated tactical resilience. Despite the hits, their military capabilities survived to the end of the latest battle. Not only that, they were able to hit very accurately U.S. military assets and strategic locations inside Israel. 6. Iran also demonstrated continued power projection through proxies, and the Houthis, Hezbollah and PMU all still are strong, armed, and ready to fight. 7. Israel has shown that despite continued 2.5 years of warfare after October 7, 2023, has failed to defeat Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or even Hamas. Thus while it has assassinated leaders, degraded capabilities, and hit new targets, every single one of its enemies still stands. 8. Despite this being a tactical American victory, Iran going into the negotiations holds a strategic edge. It withstood American power, still has strong military capabilities, has been able to have a leadership transition of its leadership, and successfully threatened its rivals in the region. They have yet to 'give up' anything, and the frameworks agreed to show that (including on enrichment). 9. Despite this being a strategic edge for Iran, America acheived its military objectives. But from an overall power projection, it is weakened. It was unable to protect its Gulf allies, the Iranian regime is intact despite 5 weeks of war, and this will be seen by Russia and China. 10. This is ultimately (so far) a strategic victory for China as it played 'proxy' behind Pakistan, and ultimately set the terms for the settlement. Ahead of Trump's trip to Beijing that is itself a sign. 11. This is a blow for the neoconservatives. It is likely they along with pro-Israel elements will try to restart the war. Given the many variables, it could easily restart. 12. Domestically, Trump and his coalition are significantly weakened. But there is a long time to the midterms, and the coalition can be rebuilt. Gas prices will come down. 'Red meat' issues can be put on the table for the base. And Trump has the ability to mend fences quickly. 13. It is likely that the outcome in Iran now will still be negotiated and it could lead to a prolonged stalemate, a restart of the war after the midterms, or even earlier. Nothing is done yet, and unless there's a shadow agreement, either war restarts, the US attempts a regime change another way, Israel tries to go it alone, and so forth. 14. Trump is not done with foreign policy. This may only embolden an approach on Cuba, not the other way around, to ensure he has a victory. 15. Everyone in the region will breathe a huge sigh of relief. This is not a perfect interim result, and the Gulf countries will be upset that they were threatened without a elimination of Iranian capabilities. But over time, people will accomodate whatever is the balance of power that emerges. 16. Finally, Turkey will be extremely strengthened, and the future of the region will have an emerging security architecture that will need to be balanced between what remains of Iran, Israel, Turkey and perhaps some combination of Algeria/Egypt, with the US playing only a supporting role. Thank you for your attention to this matter.