
building stablecoin and fiat banking @solayer_labs @mpcvault
Palo Alto, CA
Joined February 2012
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my take: @cursor_ai deserves 90% of the blame, @fireworksai_hq the other 10%.
the biggest problem: cursor shared unredacted credentials with fireworks via an s3 bucket. those credentials allowed access to internal tools and even updates to cursor’s extension marketplace cache.
those credentials should never have been in that bucket.
and credentials found in traces from 2025 still worked? apparently without sufficient ip restrictions?
reading “what we’ve done,” here’s what i’d want to see:
rotating keys is necessary but insufficent. replacing long-lived static keys with short-lived credentials is better. use oidc or workload identity wherever supported.
for example for s3 sharing, use scoped cross-account iam roles instead of access keys.
if all you do is rotate static keys, expect a poisson distribution for when the next leak happens.
We’ve published an update on our recent security incident. See a detailed overview of what happened and our remediation steps here: cursor.com/blog/security-inc…
jason retweeted
there are a thousand ways to root your system.
racing to patch every time a fix comes out is something you have to do, but in parallel you should also put as much network isolation in place as possible.
sharing our security practice at @mpcvault.
isolate your production servers from direct internet access as much as possible. you don’t want anyone who has your server’s ip address to be able to reach its ports directly. one way to do this is through @cloudflare.
set up cloudflare in proxy mode so user requests always hit cloudflare first. cloudflare then forwards them to your server from its published set of ip addresses. restrict inbound traffic on your server to only those cloudflare ip ranges. (published here cloudflare.com/ips/)
this also lets you turn on cloudflare’s default firewall and bot protection rules, which cover most of the basic attack vectors.
this should protect you from most zero-day vectors that need direct access to your server, because cloudflare does a very good job of inspecting payloads and mitigating attacks.
never assume that just because cloudflare is in proxy mode, you don’t need to lock down the origin. you still have to set the inbound ip restriction on the origin, because your origin ip is not hard to find. there are ways to discover your origin ips even when you hide behind a proxy. and once a vulnerability is public, many exploits are run as full scans of the internet. restricting the allowed ip addresses is the key.
there’s one more step you should take: enable authenticated origin pulls (origin client certificates). cloudflare ip ranges are shared by every cloudflare customer. anyone can sign up for a free account, point their own domain at your origin ip, and bypass all the firewall rules you set up.
to truly protect your server, once authenticated origin pulls is on, run your origin in mutual tls mode. it should only accept connections that present the private certificate you uploaded to cloudflare. this check proves the traffic really came from your zone and not someone else’s.
cloudflare also offers a ready-made global origin pull certificate, but it is shared across all cloudflare accounts, so it has the same weakness as the ip list. that’s why we created our own private root and one leaf certificate per zone.
Our security researchers built an autonomous cyber vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and patching pipeline.
In a single run with an upcoming cyber model, it validated and generated patches for 948 local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel at a total API cost of $1.2 million.
there are a thousand ways to root your system.
racing to patch every time a fix comes out is something you have to do, but in parallel you should also put as much network isolation in place as possible.
sharing our security practice at @mpcvault.
isolate your production servers from direct internet access as much as possible. you don’t want anyone who has your server’s ip address to be able to reach its ports directly. one way to do this is through @cloudflare.
set up cloudflare in proxy mode so user requests always hit cloudflare first. cloudflare then forwards them to your server from its published set of ip addresses. restrict inbound traffic on your server to only those cloudflare ip ranges. (published here cloudflare.com/ips/)
this also lets you turn on cloudflare’s default firewall and bot protection rules, which cover most of the basic attack vectors.
this should protect you from most zero-day vectors that need direct access to your server, because cloudflare does a very good job of inspecting payloads and mitigating attacks.
never assume that just because cloudflare is in proxy mode, you don’t need to lock down the origin. you still have to set the inbound ip restriction on the origin, because your origin ip is not hard to find. there are ways to discover your origin ips even when you hide behind a proxy. and once a vulnerability is public, many exploits are run as full scans of the internet. restricting the allowed ip addresses is the key.
there’s one more step you should take: enable authenticated origin pulls (origin client certificates). cloudflare ip ranges are shared by every cloudflare customer. anyone can sign up for a free account, point their own domain at your origin ip, and bypass all the firewall rules you set up.
to truly protect your server, once authenticated origin pulls is on, run your origin in mutual tls mode. it should only accept connections that present the private certificate you uploaded to cloudflare. this check proves the traffic really came from your zone and not someone else’s.
cloudflare also offers a ready-made global origin pull certificate, but it is shared across all cloudflare accounts, so it has the same weakness as the ip list. that’s why we created our own private root and one leaf certificate per zone.
Our security researchers built an autonomous cyber vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and patching pipeline.
In a single run with an upcoming cyber model, it validated and generated patches for 948 local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel at a total API cost of $1.2 million.
having operated custody systems at scale, here are my thoughts on what happened today and some suggestions for @binance. many people think using multi-party computation or a hardware security module automatically makes a system secure, but the reality is far from that. authorization runs throughout the stack, and that’s often where things go wrong.
the fact that the attacker was able to get 50 arbitrary 32-byte digests signed points to a compromise of the signing system’s authorization controls, though not necessarily the private key itself.
binance has revoked the malicious contract delegation from binance 14 and appeared to have starting using this address again. but unless it has a complete, tamper-proof log of everything signed during the compromise and can rule out outstanding malicious authorizations, the binance 14 key should be permanently retired. otherwise, the attacker may still hold pre-signed authorizations for future nonces, potentially a million nonces down the road, allowing them to delegate the account again to another contract they control. revoking the current delegation alone would not eliminate that risk. for the same reason, all keys accessible through the compromised signing system should be rotated. @cz_binance
what’s interesting is that binance scheduled ethereum wallet maintenance for october 28, shortly after reporting dprk-linked infiltration attempts reported over the preceding week. this raises the question of whether some attack vectors remained undetected. if the maintenance involved new code or secrets, a supply chain compromise or an already compromised authorization path could have provided an opening.
today’s incident happened after binance had already identified infiltration attempts. given the attacker’s sophistication, we should assume they may have left additional ways back in. i expect binance will identify the immediate attack vector quickly, but i suspect there may be other footholds it has yet to uncover. binance should conduct a full sweep of its systems to identify any backdoors or other persistent access that could enable another attack.
another issue is tss node level payload validation. binance 14’s signing infrastructure appears to have allowed signatures without adequately enforcing what the payloads actually authorized. a signing service should not sign arbitrary bytes simply because the caller has permission to access it. the signing servers should independently validate the payload and enforce policies on exactly which actions are allowed. policy violations should trigger alerts and, where appropriate, pause signing for human investigation before operations resume.
given binance 14’s role in deposit consolidation and its limited set of outbound destinations, stronger checks should be enforced at each signing node. assuming a threshold signing architecture, each node should independently validate the payload and enforce transaction policies. these checks should create independent barriers to unauthorized signing, so that compromising a shared authorization layer alone is not enough to obtain a signature. if every node simply trusts the same authorization decision, distributing the key across multiple nodes leaves the system only as secure as a single authorization key.
binance 16 may use a different system from binance 14. its transfer of 28,005.6 eth to the attacker appears consistent with an internal withdrawal request following the same path as a legitimate user withdrawal, rather than the attacker gaining direct access to the signing server.
so to explain a little bit more for everyone: bitcoin and ethereum avoided the traditional P-256 curve developed by NIST, because it was suspected that the NSA handpicked some kind of secret value when generating it, so they could build a hidden weakness into the curve and therefore, they could decrypt any communication that used this curve for ECDSA.
so bitcoin went and chose a different curve instead — the K1 curve (secp256k1), whose parameters looked transparently chosen, no mysterious NSA numbers attached.
but anthropic just found and proved that the old curve's seeds were actually generated at random. turns out it was just a 1990s random number generator seeded with the computer's clock — P-256's seed is literally the 1,842nd batch of random bytes after 1997-08-16 01:52:34. that proves the curve was secure all along, and there was never a backdoor.
and this actually matters, because while bitcoin and ethereum use the K1 curve, most other applications are still on P-256: passkeys, a huge share of HTTPS connections, SSH keys, sign in with apple and etc.
billions of signatures every day, on a curve that's now proven clean!
now i know my passkeys are safe
anthropic.com/research/ecdsa…
known josh since the college dao days and had the chance to work closely with him through solayer.
he’s always had the founder mindset — high agency, full of initiative, relentless energy, and incredibly smart. easily one of the best people i’ve had the chance to work with.
very bullish on josh’s next chapter and what he’s building with @morphic_io 🚀 very excited to be one of his early supporters.
today we launch @morphic_io: the sovereign AI platform around one core principle.
human knowledge is our most precious asset and needs to compound for the people contributing it.
we unlock our potential only when experience does not walk out the door every time someone leaves
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Congrats to the @OpenReserveBank team on the fundraise. Great people behind this one and I’m bullish on anything with “Open” in the name.
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Features are easy to add but hard to remove. Bullish on the team.
Phantom and Sui have decided to end Sui support on Phantom on September 24, and leave open the opportunity to explore other collaborations in the future.
Your funds remain safe and fully under your control. Before 9/24, you can move your wallet to another app that supports Sui, or swap your Sui into a supported asset on Phantom with our fee waived.
This guide covers both plans: help.phantom.com/hc/en-us/ar…
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jason retweeted
We’ve talked about Hinkal’s Go SDK before.
Worth bringing it back because the idea is simple:
Privacy shouldn’t mean adding another runtime to your stack.
Hinkal lets Go-based payment infrastructure integrate protocol-level privacy without Node.js, WebAssembly or a separate process.
Private transfers, withdrawals, batch payouts, swaps and cross-chain transfers — inside your existing Go service.
And you keep control of the signing infrastructure.
If your payments stack runs on Go, why should privacy be different?
Docs: hinkal-team.gitbook.io/hinka…
Ever since we started @mpcvault, users have asked us to build a consumer product. Today, I’m excited to announce that it’s finally here:
Altus @altushq: a new way to invest in U.S. stocks using USDC through a regulated U.S. brokerage.
Altus takes a different approach from most wallets. When DeFi first emerged, wallets were designed as general-purpose gateways to permissionless applications. That flexibility unlocked enormous possibilities, but it also introduced significant complexity, from managing keys and permissions to avoiding scams, phishing attacks, and malicious approvals.
But not everyone needs a wallet that connects to everything. Most people simply want a few essential things to work exceptionally well: sending and receiving stablecoins, investing in U.S. assets with USDC, and accessing markets such as perpetual futures and prediction markets.
Altus is purpose-built around those needs, offering a more focused user experience with a smaller risk surface. It gives users direct access to the products they want while abstracting away the underlying complexity.
The next phase of the platform will bring multiple financial venues into one unified experience, including platforms such as @HyperliquidX, @tradexyz and @Polymarket. Our long-term goal is to enable portfolio margin across these venues and the U.S. stocks held on Altus so users can hold cash and securities in a brokerage account while also taking long or short positions in on-chain markets, all with a simple tap.
Wherever cryptography is required, Altus is powered by the same multi-party computation technology that has underpinned @mpcvault for the past several years. On top of that foundation, we’re building layers of abstraction that make moving money between trading venues more efficient and, ultimately, invisible to the user.
Our vision is to bring finance on-chain. Altus is the next step toward making that vision available to everyone.
This quoted post is unavailable.
spaceX is public. $SPCX priced at $135, closed +19% at $160.95, ~$2.3T cap.
but the number that matters isn't the price — it's the float. Only ~4% is actually trading. Here's how that changes over the next 12 months
on neobank @mpcvault did 8.96B in the last 7 days
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Feature Proposal
Build a search field that allows users to copy and paste their private keys to verify whether there is a match.
you private keys are leaked!
..well, technically, yes. there's a website called keyslol and it stores all private keys that ever been (or could be) generated.
yes, all your private keys are stored there. and ANYONE could find it and steal all your assets.
or could not? the total amount of addresses is 2 to the power of 160.
there are about 7.5 x 10^18 grains of sand on earth, which is about 2 to the power of 76.
so if, for every grain of sand on earth, there were a couple hundred other planets just like earth, then the number of grains of sand on all those planets would be about equal to the number of ethereum addresses.
the amount of pages on this website is 904625697166532776746648320380374280100293470930272690489102837043110636675
if you managed to find my private key there, i can only appreciate the grind and let you take my stuff.
go for it.
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jason retweeted
1/ we’re hiring! join us to build the next generation of on-chain finance
if you like shipping fast, taking responsibility, and building where it matters, you’ll fit right in👇
jason retweeted
With an MPCVault card, you can spend USDC directly, anytime and anywhere in the world. 🌍💳
Don’t have it yet? Apply now: mpcvault.com/card
Big Crypto Cards List (2025)
112 crypto card projects are actively growing in 2025.
Among them are major fintech players with strong brand recognition: @Revolut, @raincards, @MetaMask, @gnosispay.
A significant share comes from leading exchanges: @binance, @BitgetWallet, @cryptocom, @UpholdInc, @WhiteBit, and others.
There are also card products originating from blockchain ecosystems such as @solana, @Cardano, @avax, @SonicLabs.
Each project offers its own infrastructure, unique conditions, and a wide range of opportunities for the crypto community - from seamless top-ups to advanced payment features.
The most commonly supported deposit networks include: @0xPolygon, @solana, @ethereum, @base, @avax.
Find your favorite crypto card in the list and tag it in the comments 👇
jason retweeted
🔥Exciting update: Plasma is now live!🎉
Our latest update adds support for @Plasma , a high-performance, scalable, and secure Layer 1 blockchain purpose-built for stablecoins. Experience Plasma support on MPCVault with our free version!
Here’s what you can do:
🔹Effortlessly create wallets for Plasma tokens
🔹Explore the Plasma ecosystem and interact with dApps via MPCVault's browser extension
🔹Establish access controls and USD volume-based transaction policies
Try it now at mpcvault.com! 🚀
we’re setting up our new HQ on University Ave in Palo Alto @solayer_labs — and we’re hiring engineers!
come meet us in person 🚀






















