Private messenger. Post-quantum encryption, sealed sender, Tor. No phone number. Open crypto core: https://nitter.gq/t.co/tOfn3vmslu
Joined October 2026
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Umbera is a private messenger built on one rule: the server should never know who talks to whom.
- No phone number, no email. Sign up with a username only.
- Post-quantum end-to-end encryption for every message.
- Sealed sender: the server delivers messages without seeing who sent them.
- End-to-end encrypted voice and video calls, groups and conferences.
- Built-in Tor support for extra network privacy.
- Your message history stays on your device.
App Store: apps.apple.com/app/id6805525…
Google Play: play.google.com/store/apps/d…
Web: umbera.app
#privacy #encryption #messenger
ALT Umbera logo over a glowing purple solar eclipse. Text: Post-quantum, sealed sender, Tor. No phone number. The server can't see who talks to whom. umbera.app
No phone number. No email. The whole messenger in two minutes, on a real iPhone and a real Android phone:
- Sign up with a login, a nickname and a password
- A 12-word recovery phrase restores your account on any device
- Share a nickname, a QR code or a quant address instead of a number
- Nobody can message you until you accept their request
- Messages, photos and voice notes between iPhone and Android, encrypted on the device
- Encrypted calls and built-in Tor
Three days free on the App Store and Google Play: umbera.app
#privacy #encryption #cybersecurity
Most messengers ask you to trust them. We made a 3D film that shows what actually happens to a message in Umbera.
- Keys are generated on your phone
- Each message is encrypted on the device with the Double Ratchet, then sealed in an outer X25519 + ML-KEM-1024 envelope
- Sealed sender: the server does not see who sent it
- Fixed-size padding and anonymous mailboxes
- Photos lose location and device data before sending
- Built-in Tor
Honest note: the post-quantum layer protects the outer envelope. The ratchet inside is classical.
The crypto core is open source. Verify it: umbera.app/proof
#privacy #encryption #postquantum
Stop giving messengers your phone number.
Umbera never asks for it.
No email. No contacts. No address book. No metadata trail.
The server doesn’t know who is talking to whom.
Sealed sender hides the sender even from us.
Mailbox addresses rotate weekly.
Traffic can go through Tor with one switch.
Post-quantum encryption (X25519 + ML-KEM-1024).
Open cryptographic core — verify it yourself.
Real anonymity starts when the service can’t link you to anyone.
umbera.app
#Anonymity #Privacy #NoPhoneNumber #SealedSender #NoMetadata #Tor #PostQuantum #Encryption #ZeroKnowledge #PrivateMessenger #CyberSecurity #OpSec #DontTrustVerify #E2EE #SurveillanceResistance #Crypto #PrivacyFirst
🤖 Made with AI
Most messengers know who you talk to.
Umbera’s server doesn’t.
It only receives a padded ciphertext and a rotating mailbox address that changes weekly.
No sender. No recipient. No message content.
Even we can’t see who is writing to you.
umbera.app
#SealedSender #Privacy #ZeroKnowledge #Encryption #PrivateChat #CyberSecurity #NoMetadata
🤖 Made with AI
Run it yourself, it takes a minute:
git clone github.com/Vahe327/UMBERA
cd UMBERA/core && cargo test --test proof
7 tests, 7 passed.
New write-up: how Umbera seals every message with X25519 + ML-KEM-1024, what our server can and cannot see, and how call setup is protected from DTLS fingerprint swaps.
With Rust tests you can run yourself.
dev.to/umberaapp/dont-trust-…
Don't trust, verify. We published a proof that only the recipient can read an Umbera message and only the participants can hear a call. Every claim can be checked:
1. Code: the sealing of every message (X25519 + Kyber, HKDF, AES-256-GCM) and the encryption of call setup are public.
2. Tests: clone the repo and run cargo test --test proof. They show the recipient opens a message, any other key fails, breaking X25519 alone is not enough, and tampering is rejected.
3. Traffic: capture a call in Wireshark. You will see a DTLS handshake, then only encrypted SRTP.
The assumptions are listed too: an infected phone, or a recipient who forwards your message, is outside what encryption can solve.
Proof: github.com/Vahe327/UMBERA/bl…
#privacy #cryptography #postquantum
The server is not supposed to know who you talk to.
No phone number. Sealed sender. Post-quantum encryption. Open crypto core.
umbera.app
#privacy #encryption #postquantum #messenger
🤖 Made with AI
We have published the cryptographic core of Umbera.
This is the code that decides what our server can and cannot see:
- Hybrid post-quantum key agreement: X25519 + Kyber (ML-KEM-1024)
- Dilithium (ML-DSA-65) identity signatures
- Sealed sender: the server never learns who sent a message
- Rotating rendezvous addresses: it never learns who talks to whom
- Double Ratchet for chats, MLS for groups
- Full protocol specification
Read it, run the tests, check our claims.
Code: github.com/Vahe327/UMBERA
App: umbera.app
#privacy #cryptography #postquantum
