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စိတ်ဓါတ်ခိုင်မာသူနိုင်မယ်။ စစ်အစိုးရကိုအပြီးတိုင်အမြစ်ဖြတ် #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar - a nationwide uprising for democracy. Against any form of dictatorship.

Joined August 2019
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"This struggle is not a civil war. It is a revolutionary struggle to extricate the military from the country’s politics on a permanent basis." Op-ed by Dr Zaw Wai Zaw Minister of Health of the legit gov @NUGMyanmar #Myanmar #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar thediplomat.com/2023/07/what…
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The ICJ opened Pandora’s box accepting broader standing (erga omnes partes) in The Gambia vs. MM. Next, it lowered the evidentiary bar and thus allowed to become a political weapon in activist lawfare. Myanmar, the small fry, is made an example. Israel, the big fish, is next.
"All the Right Words, for All the Wrong Reasons" That's a fitting title to describe the ICJ judgment published in the 🇬🇲 v 🇲🇲 genocide case today. And the expanded standards for an affirmative "genocide" finding expressed now have profound implications for @Israel years from now when the Court eventually publishes the merits judgment in the 🇿🇦 v 🇮🇱 case. The purpose of this post is to highlight how 3 specific aspects of today's judgment, taken together, drastically expand the circumstances pursuant to which the ICJ can derive an affirmative finding in cases brought before it pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention as compared to jurisprudence that existed before today. These factors, in turn, inform the likelihood that the Court will return a similar affirmative finding against 🇮🇱 later. Bottom line up front (as we frequently express in the military), or the tl;dr version (common parlance on social media) is this: The majority judgment of the ICJ is careful to give the impression that material aspects of the genocide standard remain consistent with existing jurisprudence. However, careful scrutiny reveals this judgment constitutes a significant expansion of that standard. This makes it far more likely that the Court will, in future, continue the precedent established today of concluding that genocide has occurred - even when this finding isn't necessarily convincingly the only reasonable inference. Given the present platform & the page length of the majority's judgment combined with the various separate & dissenting opinions, the present analysis cannot aspire to comprehensively cover every important aspect of today's decision. Instead, for present purposes I will focus on the 3 most important aspects involving the drastic expansion of the genocide standard developed today: 1) Clarification of the "only reasonable inference" standard; 2) Special regard for "independent" bodies such as fact-finding missions or commissions of inquiry appointed @UN; 3) The Court's understanding of the relationship between the commission of genocide and the practical application of the law of armed conflict (LOAC, or "international humanitarian law" in the Court's preferred parlance) Each of these considerations will be addressed below, in that order since each successive factor complements the one before it. 1) Clarification of the "only reasonable inference" standard This was perhaps the most anticipated aspect of today's judgment - with the exception of the final "genocide" determination - and for good reason. The existing "only reasonable inference" standard of proof is incredibly high, as it should be when a Court is determining whether the "crime of crimes" has been committed. The most relevant passages involving the application of this standard - in the present judgment & for future precedent - is ¶¶ 438-443 (pic 1). As the judgment recalls in ¶ 438 (green highlight), the "only reasonable inference" standard has previously been articulated by the Court in the 2007 Bosnia Judgment & 2015 Croatia Judgment. The Court then describes what each party to the dispute indicated in evidence they provided throughout the proceeding (¶¶ 439-40), as well as the views of select intervening states (¶ 441). In relation to intervening states, it is worth pointing out that what is referred to as the "joint Declaration" - from 🇨🇦🇩🇰🇫🇷🇩🇪🇳🇱🇬🇧 - itself encourages a broader interpretation for "only reasonable inference" by suggesting this test should apply "only between alternative explanations that have been found to be reasonably supported by the evidence" (pic 1, blue highlight, which is a direct quote from ¶ 52 of the joint declaration - available here: icj-cij.org/sites/default/fi…). This suggestion from these 6 countries is fundamentally at odds with the "only reasonable inference" standard because, by definition, if there are alternative explanations that have been found to be reasonable and the Court is selecting one rather than the other(s), it stands to reason that the inference selected was not the ONLY reasonable one. In any event, after explaining the precedential basis for the "only reasonable inference" standard & presenting various views presented to the Court on the subject throughout the proceeding, the judgment goes on to explain the Court's understanding of the test ( ¶¶ 442-43). This is where the judgment goes off the rails - at least in terms of existing jurisprudence - while giving the impression that nothing has changed at all. According to today's judgment, "When some elements of the evidentiary record may allow additional intentions to be inferred, but the totality of the evidence can only be explained by the perpetrator's genocidal intent, the only reasonable inference standard is met" (pic 1, red, emphasis added). Now, you can see from the text I italicized that this passage refers to the existing standard: "only reasonable inference." However, this is the first time the Court has ever explicitly added a totality of the evidence component to this existing standard, and this represents the subtle - though significant - departure from previous jurisprudence. This subtle change is significant because ... there is no mention of a process for independently evaluating the individual aspects of evidence consulted to aggregate this new "totality" standard. So, dozens of separate pieces of information can now be aggregated - whether or not each one is individually credible & whether or not each one itself supports the inference of genocidal intent - together to represent the "totality of the circumstances". This can then be regarded as the "only reasonable inference" of genocidal intent, thereby displacing all other potentially reasonable inferences, and this is now sufficient to support an affirmative finding of genocide. The problem here, of course, is that the Court has maintained the existing "only reasonable inference" standard on the surface, but it has now fundamentally altered how it will apply that existing standard - and it has done so in a manner that drastically elevates the prospect of an affirmative finding. The joint dissent of 6 judges published along with the main judgment raises this issue, but the separate dissent of Judge Sebutinde presents the most compelling objection to this new approach that uses existing terminology. As she observes, the "totality" standard cannot "transform evidence capable of supporting a reasonable inference of genocidal intent into proof that genocide is the only reasonable inference. Where the evidentiary record continues reasonably to support a non-genocidal explanation of the established conduct, its cumulative character cannot cure that deficiency" (¶ 78, part of the broader discussion from ¶¶ 67-78). Another problem with this implicit expansion of the "only reasonable inference" standard is that there is ample evidence in the public record regarding how it is applied in practice. For example, the first @UN Commission of Inquiry report to accuse 🇮🇱 of "genocide" claimed that the "pattern of conduct" observed from Israeli officials was the "only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the totality of the circumstances" (pic 2, top). However, careful scrutiny of this analysis reveals that individual elements of "evidence" either themselves do not indicate that genocidal intent is the "only reasonable inference" and much of that evidence is itself of questionable reliability. In the context of the September 2025 UN CoI report that adopts the "totality of the circumstances" standard while accusing 🇮🇱 of "genocide" reveals that Judge Sebutinde's caution that this standard cannot "transform evidence capable of supporting a reasonable inference of genocidal intent into proof that genocide is the only reasonable inference" applies just as much to the CoI "finding" as it does to the majority judgment in the present case. For another example of the "totality of the circumstances" standard that adopts a similar methodology, consider the "Subhuman" report published by @amnesty in Dec 2024 that uses the exact same terminology to accuse 🇮🇱 of genocide (sec 7.4, amnesty.org/en/wp-content/up…). What the Court has done today, then, is purport to retain the "only reasonable inference" standard from existing jurisprudence while adding the "totality of the circumstances" method of applying that existing standard. In doing so, it aligns ICJ jurisprudence with entities such as the UN CoI and Amnesty International that have demonstrated in practice that this represents a broader method for deriving an affirmative "genocide" finding - while still referring to the "only reasonable inference" standard. One consideration that makes this development even more troubling is the first time the ICJ has adopted the "totality of the circumstances" standard to supplement the "only reasonable inference" test, which is adopted verbatim from the UN CoI report that has previously accused Israel of committing genocide is that the ad hoc judge appointed by The Gambia for this case is none other than Navi Pillay - who also happened to be the chair of that Commission in September 2025 when that report was published. It is of course reasonable to consider whether it was appropriate in the first instance to allow Pillay to remain on a panel of judges that would be in a position to shape ICJ jurisprudence in Gambia v Myanmar, which will of course go on to impact the outcome of the South Africa v Israel case later, when she was also chair of a UN Commission that already has formally accused Israel of genocide in 2025. That prospect may have been abstract before today. But now that the ICJ has adopted the "totality of the circumstances" standard to augment the existing "only reasonable inference" test, and this modification is taken verbatim from the same UN Commission of Inquiry report that has already formally accused Israel of genocide, concern regarding the independence of the ICJ today in relation to the merits judgment to come in South Africa v Israel is no longer theoretical. This is especially concerning considering how the ICJ conveyed today the particular weight it is prepared to ascribe to "reports by international organizations that are specifically mandated to monitor the situation in a given area" (¶ 99). 2) Special regard for "independent" bodies such as fact-finding missions or commissions of inquiry appointed by the UN. Once again, this is a seemingly subtle new development for what at first glance appears to be an existing standard. In today's judgment, the Court begins a section called "third-party fact-finding" (p. 37) by observing: "In evaluating evidence from third-party fact-finding, the Court has generally considered the independence and qualifications of the author, the methodology used in the preparation of the evidence, and the comprehensive nature and overall quality of the evidence" (¶ 97). The Court then recalls 3 factors established in previous genocide jurisprudence it will utilize to evaluate the weight that should be afforded to such third-party reports: "Their value depends, among other things, on (1) the source of the item of evidence (for instance partisan, or neutral), (2) the process by which it has been generated (for instance an anonymous press report or the product of a careful court or court-like process), and (3) the quality or character of the item (such as statements against interest, and agreed or uncontested facts)" (citing 2007 Bosnia Judgment ¶ 227 & 2015 Croatia Judgment ¶ 190). No big deal, right? The Court in Myanmar, after all, is just applying precedent established in previous genocide judgments, is it not? Actually, it isn't. But before considering what has changed, it is useful to pause to reflect on what is different regarding the various third-party fact-finding mechanisms over the years. In general, these reports used to be fairly conservative in their factual determinations and legal conclusions. For example, a 1992 UN special rapporteur report that included an assessment of activity in the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1993/46) observed "a certain reluctance in the international community to use the term 'genocide', even when reference is made to situations of particularly grave violations of the right to life which seem to clearly match the criteria contained in the" Genocide Convention (¶ 687). That report then suggests, "All measures should be taken to prevent acts of communal violence from degenerating into large-scale killings that may reach the dimension of genocide." Building on that rapporteur's work, a subsequent Special Rapporteur for the Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, submitted a number of reports on that situation to the Human Rights Commission. Although this extensive work output suggested atrocities such as war crimes & ethnic cleansing had been committed, no allegation of "genocide" was ever included in these reports. Likewise, in relation to the situation in Myanmar, a UN fact-finding mission concluded "there is sufficient information to warrant the investigation and prosecution of senior officials in the Tatmadaw chain of command, so that a competent court can determine their liability for genocide in relation to the situation in Rakhine State," this recommendation stops short of explicitly alleging Myanmar is responsible for genocide (A/HRC/39/64, ¶ 87, emphasis added). Although the ICJ appears to be simply continuing with existing jurisprudence in relation to how third-party reports are regarded, it is worth remembering that the UN CoI assigned to report on Israel's conduct has repeatedly & explicitly alleged Israel has and continues to commit genocide. This is composition of third-party reports is fundamentally different than anything the ICJ has encountered before - including in the Myanmar situation for which it issued its judgment today. With that unique landscape in mind, let's return to the matter of whether the ICJ truly has merely continued with its existing jurisprudence in relation to third-party fact-finding mechanisms. Once again, the change in approach appears subtle yet it is actually rather profound in practice. That's because today, for the first time in a genocide case, the ICJ has adopted the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact" standard to apply when the applicant experiences various challenges in acquiring evidence to provide to the Court. Now, the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact" standard was initially adopted in the Corfu Channel cases merits judgment from 1949 (p. 18). It was then applied as well in the DRC v. Uganda reparations judgment (2002, ¶ 157) and, more recently, in the Ukraine v. Russia (ICSFT & CERD) judgment (2024, ¶ 169). As the Court explained in the latter reference (🇺🇦 v 🇷🇺), "The Court has also recognized that a State that is not in a position to provide direct proof of certain facts 'should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence' (citing Corfu Channel & DRC v Uganda). Seems fairly consistent with previous jurisprudence as well, right? WRONG. And that's because the Court has explicitly refused to apply the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact" standard in previous genocide cases. For example, in the Bosnia judgment (2007), the Court notes that the applicant acknowledged it bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that genocide had been committed by the respondent. However, under the particular circumstances of that case, the applicant contended "that in certain respects the onus should be reversed, especially in respect of the attributability of alleged acts of genocide to the Respondent, given the refusal of the Respondent to produce the full text of certain documents" (¶ 204). In refusing to endorse this suggestion, the Court noted it had "long recognized that claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive" and therefore it must "be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings, that the crime of genocide or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed, have been clearly established" (¶ 209). In the Bosnia judgment, then, the Court could have extended the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact" standard from Corfu Channel when the applicant claims its efforts to meet the applicable burden of proof have been frustrated by, for example, refusal of the respondent to cooperate. The Court refused to do so given the "exceptional gravity" of the genocide allegation. In that case, then-vice president Al-Khasawneh even directly criticized the refusal to adopt the "more liberal recourse" standard from Corfu Channel in his dissenting opinion (¶ 34). For the next genocide case, Croatia (2015), the Court once again had occasion to consider adopting the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact" standard in a circumstance wherein the applicant complained of challenges meeting the burden of proof due to exclusive control by the respondent of relevant evidence (¶ 170). Once again, the Court declined (¶ 174). That jurisprudential precedent regarding the burden of proof specific to genocide cases changed today when the Court endorsed the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact." In relation to third-party fact-finding mechanisms, the Court observes: "As a general rule, a State is not obliged to grant United Nations mechanisms access to its territory. The Court has found, however, that in cases where one of the parties exercises exclusive control over a territory, rendering the other party 'unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility', the latter State 'should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence'" (¶ 130, emphasis added). In this passage, the Court cites to previous decisions in Corfu Channel & DRC v Uganda & Ukraine v Russia for support. And, it is of course true that these cases do implement the "more liberal recourse" standard. What the Court fails to mention today, though, is that this is a departure from prior precedent specific to genocide cases in which it has explicitly refused to adopt this test given the "exceptional gravity" of genocide allegations. Continuing on the same topic, this is how the Court justifies the new precedent set today: "In the present case, neither the Applicant nor the United Nations fact-finding bodies on which The Gambia substantially relies had access to evidence within the territory where the alleged acts occurred. The Court observes that The Gambia is thus at a disadvantage with respect to direct access to certain kinds of evidence. Accordingly, in the assessment of the evidentiary record, the Court takes into account both Myanmar’s failure to genuinely investigate the alleged atrocities itself (see paragraphs 511-516 and 553 below) and its refusal to allow access to evidence and witnesses in its territory and to respond to the requests of the fact-finding bodies established by the United Nations to investigate the matter" (¶ 131). That passage explains the new precedent, and here is the new precedent that has now been extended to genocide cases for the first time in ICJ history : "The Court may therefore have more liberal recourse to inferences of fact in relation to events with respect to which Myanmar has largely or wholly exclusive knowledge and for which it has not provided a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see paragraph 111 above)" (also ¶ 131, emphasis added). At first glance, then, the ICJ maintains the "only reasonable inference" standard that has also been established by prior precedent in genocide cases. However, it has now added a "totality of the circumstances" component that allows consideration of factors that do not individually support an inference of genocide. And the Court has now extended the "more liberal recourse" standard that was previously excluded from genocide cases for circumstances in which the respondent refused to cooperate with third-party fact-finding mechanisms. This "more liberal recourse" standard will work in tandem with the "totality of the circumstances" standard to dilute the "only reasonable inference" test - all while the Court claims it has remained consistent with existing precdent. Given that Israel has not cooperated with the UN Commission of Inquiry, the Court can now also be expected to extend the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact" standard that did not apply to genocide cases before today. And with a more activist Commission of Inquiry than has ever been considered for previous genocide cases (Bosnia, Croatia, and now The Gambia), the "more liberal recourse to inferences of fact" standard will almost certainly result in far greater evidentiary value being given to a third-party fact-finding mechanism that has persistently & strenuously insisted 🇮🇱 is responsible for genocide in #Gaza. One additional reason this is especially troubling is that the extraordinarily low standard of proof - "reasonable grounds" - adopted by the CoI (pic 2, top) allows it to make findings of fact & conclusions of law based on shockingly little evidence. For example, in the "essence of childhood" conference room paper published by the Commission in June 2026 alleging (among other accusations) @IDF troops deliberately targeted children as additional evidence of "genocide", the CoI conveys factual circumstances claiming children in Gaza were shot by Israeli quadcopters (pic 3). However, no source - including the Commission - has conclusively established that 🇮🇱 even operates quadcopters with "sniper rifles." And the evidence relied on by the report includes testimony that was conveyed from family members to medical professionals then from medical professionals to the Commission, as well as projectiles the Commission says medical professionals told them were extracted from the victims / patients. This "double hearsay" is arguably insufficient to meet even the "reasonable grounds" standard of proof. Yet the Commission of Inquiry has determined it does, while this & similar evidence of questionable credibility has been aggregated to reach the conclusion that 🇮🇱 has committed genocide. Now, the Court has affirmed that it will "not ascribe any probative value to the legal assessments contained" in third-party fact-finding reports (¶ 100, emphasis added). Even so, the new "totality of the circumstances" & "more liberal recourse" standards, combined with the fact that 🇮🇱 has routinely refused to cooperate with the UN CoI, mean the findings of fact developed by the Commission will almost certainly be regarded as far more probative than ever before. Since the UN CoI has already determined, on the basis of the "totality of the circumstances" (which the ICJ adopted for the first time today) that 🇮🇱 is responsible for genocide, it is reasonable to expect the ICJ will reach the same conclusion based on the same facts - and now implementing the same standards. 3) The Court's understanding of the relationship between genocide and LOAC. One additional section that warrants particular attention for this initial analysis is the manner in which the judgment today engages with the relationship between genocide & what the Court refers to as international humanitarian law (or, according to one's preference - including mine - the law of armed conflict) (¶¶ 296-305). Given the already rather extensive analysis presented in the two preceding points, for present purposes I will simply raise this issue then defer a full analysis until a later date. At the end of this section, the judgment indicates: "The Court concludes that although compliance with another body of international law, including [IHL], may inform the identification of intent with respect to the actus reus of genocide, as well as genocidal intent, such compliance does not exclude conduct from the scope of the Genocide Convention" (¶ 305, emphasis added). From a doctrinal perspective, this passage is concerning because LOAC compliance is actually fairly compelling evidence that intent is not to destroy a civilian population, in whole or in part, as such. And it is particularly troubling given how incompetent the ICJ has historically been when interpreting & applying LOAC as it exists in doctrine (see, for example, ¶ 304, which adopts an error from the 2015 Croatia genocide judgment by articulating the LOAC proportionality rule on a campaign level based on incidental damage "caused" rather than on the intent of personnel responsible for each attack to be analyzed). ___ Much more to come in the days & weeks ahead. As an initial matter, the intent of the above analysis is to identify & clarify the subtle shifts in existing precedent that can combine to have a profound impact on the merits at the ICJ in 🇿🇦 v 🇮🇱 in future.
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A reminder that the genocide of the Yazidi people committed by ISIS — one of the most atrocious and barbaric acts in recent history — has never been prosecuted in an international court, only domestic ones. It is obvious to any neutral observer that the increasing tendency of the institutions of international law is to presumptively legitimize all forms of Islamist terrorism, while seeking maximal legal measures against any one who retaliates against them.
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Fascinating that a BBC journo’s first instinct after the ICJ ruling is to focus on Aung San Suu Kyi. Political and ideological tunnel vision.
There is no way Aung San Suu Kyi can escape being tarnished by the ICJ verdict. This will be a sensitive discussion. She’s a victim too of the Myanmar military; she did not control the forces which unleashed such savagery on Rohingya civilians. But she refused to condemn
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Sun Thu retweeted
Let me get this straight. 9/10 posts i am seeing is all about hate towards ASSK. But Twitter warriors willfully ignorant of MAL, the very same man who ordered this genocide.
There is no way Aung San Suu Kyi can escape being tarnished by the ICJ verdict. This will be a sensitive discussion. She’s a victim too of the Myanmar military; she did not control the forces which unleashed such savagery on Rohingya civilians. But she refused to condemn
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နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့် အမှန် တကယ်မလွတ်မြောက်သေးဟု ရန်ကုန်မြို့ ဂျာမနီ သံရုံးအကြီးအကဲ Mathias Licharz က ရန်ကုန်မြို့ရှိ နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတဦးဝင်းမြင့်၏ နေအိမ်ရှေ့မှတဆင့်ဝေဖန်ထောက်ပြ (ရုပ်သံ) youtube.com/shorts/_1vDydntJ…
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Young men are forcibly abducted and dragged into vehicles by security personnel affiliated with the junta regime, in full view of local residents for being porters and army recruitment purpose during nightime in the Sanchaung township in Yaong city of Myanmar. These young men are reportedly targeted for their potential roles as porters or for coerced military conscription. Netizens are documenting this distressing event in real-time, capturing video footage in which the young men are heard pleading for assistance. Video/CJ
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မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင် ခုခံတိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသူတွေ ကြုံတွေ့နေရတဲ့ တကယ့်မြေပြင်အခြေအနေ
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A viral online video reveals that the junta regime may have lost control of one of its key strongholds—the Western Regional Command Headquarters in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine—to the Arakan Army (AA). This development is particularly alarming, as the AA has reportedly seized an extensive array of weapons, military hardware, and essential equipment. While local media in Rakhine are claiming that Sittwe has fallen under the control of the Arakan Army, AA is yet to provided any official confirmation or statement about this pivotal event. Video/AA Soldier
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Replying to @GreenAngelsss
Je me dis la même chose parfois je me dis heureusement que mon père n’est plus la. 🙏
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【ミャンマーの縫製産業に危機 ①】 🇲🇲では少なくとも17の外資系縫製工場が2026年中の閉鎖を申請。多くは中資本で、ヤンゴンの工業団地に集中している。 縫製産業は年間約46億ドルを輸出し、50万人以上を雇用。その8割以上が女性。 工場閉鎖が相次げば、大量失業が懸念される。
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Right. Similarly, the human rights lobby goes on weakening the struggle against dictatorship spearheaded by Arakan Army (admittedly the strongest EAO now) by constantly reframing the admittedly messy complications of warfare/governance as “genocidal actions” against Rohingyas.
Replying to @Reaproy
@Telegraph @FCDOGovUK @brouklondon @UKUN_NewYork On the contrary, I think it will go down very well with the Burmese people. It shows that at the highest levels in the UK Suu Kyi is not forgotten. Maybe she wouldn't have had to spend 5 years in detention if the human rights lobby hadn't demonised her and sought to undermine her struggle for democracy in Myanmar at every stage. Was: hrw.org/news/2020/10/05/myan… your own personal contribution to the military coup against her?
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Replying to @Reaproy
@Telegraph @FCDOGovUK @brouklondon @UKUN_NewYork On the contrary, I think it will go down very well with the Burmese people. It shows that at the highest levels in the UK Suu Kyi is not forgotten. Maybe she wouldn't have had to spend 5 years in detention if the human rights lobby hadn't demonised her and sought to undermine her struggle for democracy in Myanmar at every stage. Was: hrw.org/news/2020/10/05/myan… your own personal contribution to the military coup against her?
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Spot on! 🙏
Replying to @Reaproy
@Telegraph @FCDOGovUK @brouklondon @UKUN_NewYork On the contrary, I think it will go down very well with the Burmese people. It shows that at the highest levels in the UK Suu Kyi is not forgotten. Maybe she wouldn't have had to spend 5 years in detention if the human rights lobby hadn't demonised her and sought to undermine her struggle for democracy in Myanmar at every stage. Was: hrw.org/news/2020/10/05/myan… your own personal contribution to the military coup against her?
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1/2 Various sources say #Myanmar military leaders in Sittwe - Rakhine capital - fled the city in recent days, leaving lower level staff to defend territory Myanmar army had been firing warning shots in outskirts of town, fearing Arakan Army’s approach
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AA Commandos Reportedly Raid Military Medical Battalion in Sittwe, Seize Large Quantities of Medicine Narinjara News – October 21, 2026 Arakan Army (AA) commandos reportedly carried out a brief raid on a Military Commission medical battalion along the Sittwe–Yay Chan Pyin Road on the night of October 20, seizing large quantities of medicine from its warehouses, according to local sources. A Sittwe-based source told Narinjara that AA commandos temporarily occupied the military medical facility and removed medical supplies from its storage warehouses. The source said the battalion had only a small number of guards, while its patients had reportedly been transferred to Sittwe General Hospital. The facility is located near the Rakhine State Parliament building, between the parliament complex and a military logistics unit. Infantry Battalion 270 (IB-270) is also stationed beyond the facility. Meanwhile, intense fighting continues around Yay Chan Pyin, where the AA has reportedly captured several smaller Military Commission outposts. The alleged raid has become a widely discussed incident among local residents, although the details remain independently unverified. Narinjara said it had contacted AA spokesperson U Khaing Thukha for confirmation and was awaiting a response. The reported raid, if confirmed, would indicate that AA units have been able to penetrate military positions within the Sittwe area despite the continued presence of Military Commission forces.
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Shared with you by a Times subscriber [Derek Tonkin] Delightful photos of Suu Kyi at Clarence House in 2012 with the then Prince Charles and Camilla. There is a calendar on the wall in the GNLM report which looks as though it is highlighted on Tuesday 6 October. In forwarding these materials for delivery to Suu Kyi, the UK would have taken into account the possibility, indeed probability of regime publicity. That the UK Head of State has been able to send a "diplomatic pouch" apparently unopened to Suu Kyi should give us reason to ponder on what might be afoot. During the 1990s, before her release from house arrest, Suu Kyi received regular visits from the British Embassy when they could have delivered any books and materials which she might have wanted. I accompanied the then British Ambassador John Jenkins on one such visit. thetimes.com/world/asia/arti…
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Full Testimony of Conscript Soe Min Thein, Who Defected to the Arakan Army Narinjara | October 20, 2026 The Arakan Army (AA) Information Department released the testimony of Private Soe Min Thein, service number PS-219760, who defected from the Military Commission during fighting on the Kyaukphyu front in Arakan. His testimony, released on October 20, describes allegations of forced military recruitment through fabricated drug charges, physical abuse, harsh frontline conditions and his eventual escape to the Arakan Army. The following is the English translation of his testimony. Q: Please introduce yourself, including your service number, rank, name and parent battalion. A: My service number is PS-219760. I am Private Soe Min Thein, assigned to Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 218 under Division 11. I lived on Chindwin 4th Street, Ward 67, Dagon Seikkan Township, Yangon Region. There are six children in my family, and I am the youngest. My father's name was U Myat Soe, and my mother's name was Daw Aye Than. Both have passed away. I am married and have one son. I worked in textile dyeing and printing. Q: How did you end up at the military training school? A: On May 8, 2026, while we were returning from work, we were stopped on the road by authorities who said they needed to conduct an inspection. After searching us, they took us to an office. At the office, they placed illegal drugs in our hands and photographed us. They then asked, "Will you join the military, or do you want to go to prison?" When we asked what we had done wrong, they refused to explain. Instead, they tortured and beat us. Because of the beatings, we eventually agreed to join the military. They contacted another office and arranged for us to be transferred there. We were detained at that office for two nights, with our legs restrained in wooden stocks. Afterward, we were transferred to the Bayinnaung Interrogation Centre, where we spent another two nights. From there, we were sent to No. 2 Advanced Military Training School in the Hmawbi–Taikkyi area. Q: How were you sent to the frontline? What difficulties did you experience, and why did you decide to defect? A: We underwent three months of military training, followed by another month of additional training. After completing training, we were assigned to Battalion 218, where we stayed for 15 days. We were then transported to Kyaukphyu by ship from Botahtaung Port in Yangon. After arriving in Kyaukphyu, we stayed overnight. The following day, all 18 of us, who were conscripts and friends, were sent to a hilltop position near Sanay. Once we arrived, we were divided into smaller groups, with three soldiers assigned to one position and two to another. We were forced to perform hard labor, including digging trenches and carrying timber logs. Whenever we could not complete the work, we were beaten, shouted at and threatened. We suffered greatly. Almost every day, we were verbally abused. We were also required to stand guard for six hours at a time. The experienced soldiers did not have to perform these duties. Only we conscripts were assigned to guard duty and forced labor. The conditions were extremely difficult. We also witnessed terrible incidents among fellow conscripts. Some soldiers shot themselves in the neck, while others shot themselves in the legs. We regularly saw wounded soldiers being evacuated from the frontline. Almost every day, four, five or six wounded soldiers were carried away on stretchers. These experiences severely affected our morale. My friends and I discussed our situation, but we did not know what to do. Eventually, another conscript and I decided to escape from the hilltop position. As we ran down the hill, Military Commission soldiers spotted us and opened fire. Fortunately, neither of us was hit. We continued running until we encountered AA personnel. We approached them and asked for help, explaining that we wanted to defect. The AA soldiers welcomed us and treated us well. They told us they would take us to a safe location, and they brought us here. Q: What message would you like to send to your family and fellow conscripts? A: I want to tell my family not to worry about me. We have already defected to the Arakan Army. We are treated like brothers here, and we are living peacefully and comfortably. To my fellow conscripts, I want to say: Defect as soon as possible. Here, we are treated peacefully and like brothers. If you want to stay alive and see your families again, I encourage you to defect to the Arakan Army. We are already here, and I urge you to join us. Source: Narinjara, October 20, 2026, reporting on testimony released by the Arakan Army Information Department.
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JUST IN: Myanmar spokesperson says King Charles sent “sealed letter and diplomatic bag” to Aung San Suu Kyi Home affairs officers delivered items to Suu Kyi around 10:30am local time Spokesperson referred to Suu Kyi as “special detainee”
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Nearly 10,000 workers stand to lose their jobs as four garment factories in Yangon are shutting down in October due to raw material shortages and declining orders. #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar
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