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Asseb ๐ค ๐๐๐The Truth !!!
In 1950, the United Nations wrote down something about Ethiopia that many people today want the world to forget.
On 2 December 1950, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 390 A (V). In its preamble, the world body took into account Ethiopia's "legitimate need for adequate access to the sea."
Read that again. Not a wish. Not a threat. A legitimate need, recognised by the United Nations itself.
And it was not one voice. In 1949โ50, while the UN debated Eritrea's future:
๐ Ethiopia argued, "in particular, its need for adequate access to the sea."
๐The Soviet Union proposed a trusteeship "with territorial concessions to Ethiopia to provide access to the Red Sea through the port of Assab."
๐The Italo-Eritrean Association proposed "free harbour zones at Massawa and Assab."
Different countries, different politics, one shared idea. Ethiopia should not be shut off from the sea.
76 years later, Ethiopia has more than 135 million people and no port of its own. The need the UN saw in 1950 did not disappear. It grew.
Ethiopians are not asking for anything new. We are asking the region to remember what the world already accepted, and to talk about it at the table, in peace.
A fair deal on the Red Sea is not a crime. The UN called it legitimate.
#Ethiopia #RedSea #Assab #Eritrea
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
Massive Air cargo and logistics capability serving international trade, supply chains, humanitarian response; Ethiopian Cargo and Logistics Services connecting over 70 global destinations and with over 750,000 tons of cargo; ICAO and IATA recognition as trusted career with strong credentials across businesses in Pharmaceuticals, E-commerce, Perishables, High-value goods and Time-sensitive cargo. #EthiopiaForICAOCouncil #TrustedVoiceOfAfricaInAviation
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
#Egypt has nothing of substance to offer Ethiopia, yet projects false and smug demands from it!
ุฃูุฏุช ู
ุตุฑ ุฑูุถูุง ุงูุฑุจุท ุจูู ู
ุณุงุนู ุฅุซููุจูุง ููุญุตูู ุนูู ู
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ุชุนููุฉ ุจุณุฏ ุงูููุถุฉ ุงูุฅุซููุจูุ ู
ุดุฏุฏุฉ ุนูู ุฃู ุงูู
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ุง ุฃุทุฑู ุงููุงููููุฉ ูุงูุณูุงุณูุฉ ุงูุฎุงุตุฉ.
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
Replying to @dw_amharic
@dw_amharic reported that another #TPLF high ranking official, Army 42 commander and others are encircled by #ENDF and #TPF in #Tigray, #Ethiopia
#แ
แแแต แฆแญ แ แญแ 42 แ แแฅ แจแแแต แฅแญแแดแญ แแแซแ แ แฅแญแ แฐแตแแญ แ แ
แ
แ แตแแธแ แตแแฉแ แฅแ แแแฝ แจแแฐแ แ แแฆแฝแ แ แจแ แฃ แแตแฅ แแแฃแณแธแแ แจแฐแแ แแญแ แฃแแตแแฃแ แแถแญแผแฌแ แฐแแแฏแแข
แจแ
แแแต แจแแฐแ แแณแฐแซแ แ แแฅ แแแซแ แฎแแแต แแฒแต แแแฐแซแ แแญแแฝ แฅแ
แฐแกแข p.dw.com/p/5NVHP?at_medium=Sโฆ
You say Assab's "stagnation" is a lie. Let's use neutral numbers, not slogans.
The IMF's 1996 country report (SM/96/66) says Assab "had been maintained relatively well, given its strategic importance for Ethiopia". It also says Eritrea's services account was positive "thanks mainly to port services, transport, and refinery services in Assab".
Port fees and charges were 31%, 27%, 15% and 17% of Eritrea's government revenue in 1992โ95 (my calculation from the report's Table XIII; all Eritrean ports). Eritrea bought 31โ37% of Assab refinery output. Ethiopia was the customer.
Then the 1998 war ended that trade. Today even your own supporters post Google Earth photos of an empty port.
Nobody is questioning Eritrea's independence or the 2002 border ruling. The ask is one thing: negotiated sea access, a port and a naval base agreed at a table, as UNCLOS Art. 125 says: by agreement.
Eritrea gets revenue, Ethiopia gets a route. Why is that "war"?
Source: IMF Staff Country Report 96/66.
The Potemkin Party continues to double down on its campaign of war and unremitting hostility against Eritrea by dwelling on revisionist historical narratives and the deplorable denigration of Eritrea's legitimate, decades-old, process of decolonization achieved through unparalleled and precious sacrifices.
In this vein, one of PP's official mouthpieces - Fana Broadcasting Corporation - disparages, on its X account today, Eritrea's overall development policy and what it dubs as "stagnation of Assab".
Furthermore, it laments the loss of "Ethiopia's Red Sea coastline", due, in its warped mind, "to conspiracy of external adversaries".
These pitiful diatribes are symptomatic of the incurable war psychosis that has gripped the Potemkin Party for years now.
Indeed, it is obvious that the PP will require massive reconfiguration in its mindset/soft-ware for reason and sanity to prevail.
As it is, the antidote for its multi-layered malaise does not lie in the propagation of revisionist history; and/or in the flagrant violation of foundational pillars and principles of international law.
The fact is:
1. A regime that is presiding over an ailing economy where 68.7% of the population are classified as "multidimensionally poor" (WB terminology) in spite of massive international assistance; and,
2. That is seething under interminable internal costly conflicts of its own making;
is not in a position to pontificate to its neighbours about astute development policy or the fostering of good-neighborly ties anchored on mutual respect of each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
xitter.cf/hawelti/status/1970139โฆ
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
"แแ
แถแฌ แฅแ
แ แแแแฅ แแคแ แฐแญแแ แแแก แญแแณแธแ แแ แแฐ แแตแ
แญแตแจแต ....." แฐแ แคแญแแซแต แฉแฅแณแช
I read paragraphs 6.30 to 6.32 of the 2002 Boundary Commission decision myself. @RenaissanceDam "The Asrat Blog quotes them correctly.
Here is the part I think matters most for the future. Paragraph 6.31
"It is not unknown for States to agree to locate a checkpoint or customs facility of one State within the territory of a neighbouring State. Such agreements, which reflect a common interest in efficiency and economy, do not necessarily involve a change of the boundary."
The Commission itself wrote that. So..
1. The 2002 decision is final. Ethiopia accepted it. Nobody here asks to redraw a line.
2. But a port, a customs post and a transit route can be agreed between neighbours without moving any border. It has been done before, on this same Assab road, in 1994.
3. That is exactly what negotiated sea access means: a fair deal on the Red Sea, a port and naval base agreed at a table, with real benefit for Eritreans, Afar communities and Ethiopians.
One more fact from the same document: in 1994 both countries signed a report to open transport along the AddisโAssab corridor. Cooperation worked once. It can again.
Source: EEBC decision, 13 April 2002, paras 6.30โ6.32, legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_โฆ
#Ethiopia #Assab #RedSea
๐๐ฆ๐ฆ๐๐: ๐ช๐๐ฌ ๐ ๐ญ๐ต๐ต๐ฐ ๐ง๐ฅ๐๐ก๐ฆ๐ฃ๐ข๐ฅ๐ง ๐ฅ๐๐ฃ๐ข๐ฅ๐ง ๐ ๐๐ง๐ง๐๐ฅ๐๐ ๐ง๐ข ๐ง๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ฅ๐ ๐๐ข๐จ๐ก๐๐๐ฅ๐ฌ
In 2002 the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission drew the eastern border under the 1908 treaty: ๐ฒ๐ฌ ๐ธ๐บ ๐ถ๐ป๐น๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ณ๐ฟ๐ผ๐บ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฐ๐ผ๐ฎ๐๐. At one place it adjusted that line. The place was ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ, the old checkpoint on the Assab road.
The Commission's own words: "๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ถ๐ ๐น๐ผ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐๐ต๐ถ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐ฑ๐ฒ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฒ๐ฌ ๐ธ๐ถ๐น๐ผ๐บ๐ฒ๐๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ." Yet it placed the border at Bure.
The reason: Eritrea presented a "๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐๐๐ฑ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฎ๐บ ๐ผ๐ป ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ป๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐ป๐ด๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฎ๐น๐ผ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ฑ๐ฑ๐ถ๐-๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ฏ ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฑ๐ผ๐ฟ," dated 7 November 1994 and signed by representatives of both countries. One agenda item, as quoted: "๐ข๐ฏ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ธ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฑ๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฎ๐ ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ธ ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐ ๐๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐." Its checkpoint list reads "๐ฐ. ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐๐ต๐ถ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ. ๐ฑ. ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ."
Paragraph 6.31 concludes that the report "๐ฒ๐
๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐๐๐น๐ ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐๐ถ๐ด๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ฒ๐ ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐," and that both states treated their checkpoints there as the limits of their territorial sovereignty. The report, together with the parties' conduct, was treated as evidence of an agreed boundary.
Why should Ethiopians ask questions? The decision itself gives the reasons:
๐ญ. ๐๐๐ ๐ฝ๐๐ฟ๐ฝ๐ผ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐ ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐. That makes the signatories' instructions and the report's full wording worth examining.
๐ฎ. ๐ ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐๐ผ๐บ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐น๐น๐ ๐ฎ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ. Paragraph 6.31 says such arrangements "๐ฑ๐ผ ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐ป๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ถ๐น๐ ๐ถ๐ป๐๐ผ๐น๐๐ฒ ๐ฎ ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฎ๐ป๐ด๐ฒ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฏ๐ผ๐๐ป๐ฑ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐." The Commission found that Bure was different.
๐ฏ. ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฒ๐
๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป. In the eastern-sector assessment, paragraph 6.32 identifies Bure as the only conduct "๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐๐ฐ๐ต ๐๐ฒ๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐" to vary the treaty line. The adjustment fell on ground the treaty line had placed on Ethiopia's side.
None of this shows the Commission lacked evidence. It shows these documents had a real territorial consequence.
The honest limit: the Commission calls the adjustment "๐ฟ๐ฒ๐น๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐น๐ ๐๐บ๐ฎ๐น๐น." The 2002 decision is final and binding under the Algiers Agreement, and it did not transfer Assab.
๐๐ผ๐ฐ๐๐บ๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐น๐ถ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐๐ฝ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ผ ๐ฒ๐๐๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ถ๐๐ต ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ถ๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐ฎ๐น ๐ฏ๐ผ๐๐ป๐ฑ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ผ ๐ฏ๐ฒ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฑ ๐ถ๐ป ๐ณ๐๐น๐น. ๐๐๐ต๐ถ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ต๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ต๐ผ๐๐น๐ฑ ๐ฝ๐๐ฏ๐น๐ถ๐๐ต ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ผ๐ฟ๐๐, ๐ฒ๐
๐ฎ๐บ๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐๐๐ต๐ผ๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ต๐ถ๐ป๐ฑ ๐๐ต๐ฒ๐บ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฒ๐
๐ฝ๐น๐ฎ๐ถ๐ป ๐๐ต๐ฒ๐ถ๐ฟ ๐น๐ฒ๐ด๐ฎ๐น ๐ฒ๐ณ๐ณ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐.
Ethiopian legal experts, lawyers, historians and archivists should examine the complete 1994 reports, the signatoriesโ authority and Ethiopiaโs submissions to the Commission, and publish an evidence-based assessment of whether any unresolved legal issue remains.
Read it yourself ๐
EEBC decision, 13 April 2002, paras 6.30 to 6.32, RIAA vol. XXV, printed pp. 170 to 171
legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_โฆ
#Ethiopia #RedSea #RedSeaAccess #Assab #Redsea
Nobody asked Egypt to "give" #Ethiopia anything. Egypt is not our coastal neighbour.
A port or naval base for Ethiopia will be agreed with a neighbour that says yes, the same way Djibouti hosts the US, France, China and Japan today. Cairo's "we will not accept" has no seat at that table.
And on the same day, Egypt's FM said Egypt is getting ready to send troops to Saudi Arabia. Bases and navies by agreement are normal everywhere. Just not for Ethiopia?
elbalad.news/7156739
ูุฒูุฑ ุงูุฎุงุฑุฌูุฉ ุจุฏุฑ ุนุจุฏ ุงูุนุงุทู ูููู ุฎูุงู ู
ุคุชู
ุฑ ุตุญูู ู
ุน ุงูุฃู
ูู ุงูุนุงู
ููุฃู
ู
ุงูู
ุชุญุฏุฉ ุฃูุทูููู ุบูุชูุฑูุด ุฅู ู
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ู ุฃุทุฑุงู ุซุงูุซุฉ ูููุจูู ุจู
ูุญ ุฅุซููุจูุง ู
ููุฐูุง ุฅูู ุงูุจุญุฑ ุงูุฃุญู
ุฑ ู
ูุงุจู ุชุณููู ุงูุชูุตู ุฅูู ุญู ุจุดุฃู ุณุฏ ุงูููุถุฉ ุจุญุณุจ ููุงูุฉ ุฃูุจุงุก ุงูุดุฑู ุงูุฃูุณุท
#Breaking or #Mocking ๐
A landlocked country can't have a navy? Check the record before the punchline.
โข #Ethiopia founded its navy in 1955, with its base and naval college at Massawa.
โข Bolivia, landlocked, has run the Armada Boliviana since 1963: about 5,000 personnel on Lake Titicaca and its rivers (WIRED).
โข Switzerland, landlocked, had 49 ocean-going ships under its flag in 2016 (swissinfo). Ethiopia's own shipping line runs 10 today (Capital).
โข UNCLOS Art. 90 "Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas." Art. 125 gives landlocked states the right of access to and from the sea.
The Addis workshop on the banner is run by the IMO's Djibouti Code of Conduct Secretariat under an EU-funded project. Ethiopia is a signatory to the Jeddah Amendment. It is about sharing maritime-security information, because most of Ethiopia's trade travels by sea through Djibouti (UN News).
Mocking a country of 130 million for needing a sea is not analysis. My view: the answer is a fair deal on the Red Sea, a port and a naval base agreed at a table. #Ethiopia
#BREAKING: โLandlocked Ethiopiaโs Navy Hosts Four-Day Maritime Summit
ETHIOPIA โ A landlocked country with no coastline, no access to the sea, and apparently no shortage of imagination is hosting a four-day "regional" naval commandersโ forum in Addis Ababa.
Naval commanders from #Yemen, #Oman, #Djibouti, Somalia's self-governing regions of #Somaliland, and #Puntland have traveled to Addis Ababa to discuss maritime security with a navy whose biggest maritime operation so far might be navigating a couple of speed boats on Lake Tana.
Imagine being a naval commander, traveling to a landlocked capital, sitting through four days of discussions about the ocean, and then returning home without seeing a single wave.
When you canโt bring the navy to the sea, you bring the sea to your imagination.๐ซฃ
(More story ... addisstandard.com/brief/n-60โฆ)
Talking about hitting a dam that holds 74 billion cubic metres of water, close to Sudan's own border, is not a warning. It is a threat against the people living downstream, and most of them are Sudanese.
So let's look at what we actually know about today.
1. Drones hit five power stations in Sudan this morning. AFP quotes a Sudanese government official blaming the RSF. Sudan's own electricity company listed the stations and the damage. Neither named Ethiopia.
2. The "launched from Ethiopia" line comes from one anonymous army source quoted by Al Arabiya. No evidence has been shown. In May, the same kind of claim was made about the Khartoum airport strike. Ethiopia called it baseless, and Reuters said it could not verify it.
3. Ethiopia sends power to Sudan. A 230 kV line from Shehedi, near Metema, has fed Gedaref since 2013, and Ethiopian Electric Power says it still supplies Sudan. Gedaref was one of the states that went dark today. Ethiopia gains nothing from Sudan in the dark.
4. Dams are protected under Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Sudan joined it in 2006. "Three kamikaze drones on GERD" is not strategy talk. It is talk about a war crime.
5. Ethiopia hosts Sudanese refugees and keeps saying the same thing: this war ends through a ceasefire and talks among Sudanese.
On 13 October Sudan's foreign minister said Khartoum is open to dialogue with Addis Ababa. Good. Then let's have it, with any evidence on the table from both sides, not drones and dam threats on X.
Peace in Sudan is good for Ethiopia. And the power from GERD reaches Gedaref too.
#Ethiopia #Sudan #GERD
Kamikaze drones reportedly launched from Ethiopia targeted critical infrastructure facilities in Sudan today, including those most heavily relied upon by civilians.
Does Ethiopia really believe that Sudan lacks the capability to target its multibillion-dollar Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with just three kamikaze drones in the coming days? What is Ethiopia counting on?
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
Lebensraum? That word deserves more care. ๐ค
Lebensraum was Hitler's plan to seize other people's land and push them out. Millions died for it.
#Ethiopia is asking for the opposite: a seat at a table, not someone else's land.
Look at what was actually said this week:
๐ PM Abiy at Tana Forum (Oct 24) sea access is existential for 135M+ people, and it should come through dialogue and mutual benefit. ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9807843
๐ Field Marshal Birhanu Jula today (ENA, Oct 25): Ethiopia seeks peaceful relations, brotherhood and good-neighbourliness. ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9812616
- In 2023 Addis even offered stakes in GERD, Ethiopian Airlines or Ethio Telecom in return for a port. Conquerors don't offer shares.
Almost all our trade passes through one neighbour's port. Asking for a fair, negotiated deal on the Red Sea is what landlocked countries do everywhere. In my opinion, that is not expansion.
@_hudsonc , you know the Horn well. Putting a 130M nation's request to negotiate next to Hitler's wars doesn't help peace. It makes the table harder to reach.
#Ethiopia #RedSea
Cant help but think that Abiy calling port access on the Red Sea an existential issue has a definite ring of the German concept of Lebensraum... ftlsomalia.com/abiy-ahmed-caโฆ
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
A country of 130+ million people wants a negotiated port AND a navy on the Red Sea. Why is that treated as unusual, when this sea already runs on agreements with foreign navies?
Facts, with sources:
โข Djibouti, a country of under a million people, hosts bases of the US, France, Japan, China and Italy, all by agreement: aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/8/โฆ
โข Roughly 12% of world maritime trade passes Bab al-Mandeb (same Al Jazeera report). The EU extended its Aspides naval mission to Feb 2027: consilium.europa.eu/en/pressโฆ
โข Turkey opened its largest overseas military training base in Mogadishu in 2017: voanews.com/a/turkey-opens-lโฆ
โข AP reported that Assab in Eritrea served as a UAE base during the Yemen war (2015-2021): voanews.com/a/africa_uae-disโฆ
โข Al Jazeera lists Egypt among the first countries signing up to a new Saudi-led Red Sea coalition, alongside Pakistan, Tรผrkiye and Bangladesh: aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/14โฆ
So navies are already on this coast, by agreement. The real question is why Ethiopia should be the one left out of a sea that more than 130 million Ethiopians depend on for trade.
The 4 Oct El Alamein declaration (clause 4d) says Red Sea governance is "the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states": presidency.eg/en/%D9%82%D8%Bโฆ
In my opinion, that sits awkwardly with the facts above.
The law points to the table, not to exclusion. UNCLOS Art. 125: landlocked states have a right of access to the sea, with terms agreed through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements. Art. 90: every state, coastal or landlocked, may sail ships under its flag. un.org/depts/los/convention_โฆ
Ethiopia had a navy from 1955 until the 1990s and has been rebuilding it since 2018, with naval cooperation steps with France (2019) and Russia (2025). In my opinion, a navy is a normal part of sea access for a country this size. It protects ships, crews and trade. It belongs inside the deal, not added on afterwards.
What I support negotiated sea access. A fair deal on the Red Sea. A port and a naval base agreed at a table, with clear terms, transparency and respect for every neighbour's sovereignty. Peaceful means only.
That is also the stated Ethiopian position. PM Abiy, 24 Oct, Tana Forum: "We will continue to persuade through dialogue and mutual benefit."
ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9807843
Fair points, and I agree with most of them.
390 A (V) does not name Assab, and I never said it did. It also doesn't say what it didn't say: it federated Eritrea "under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown" and listed "Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate access to the sea." docs.un.org/en/A/RES/390(V)
Eritrea has been an independent UN member since 1993. I accept that, and so does Ethiopia. docs.un.org/en/A/RES/47/230
And yes: access means agreed access, not owning anyone's port. That's exactly my point. In my opinion, a fair deal on the Red Sea is negotiated by two sovereign states, with terms both can live with.
Russia has offered a table in Moscow on 28โ29 Oct. Would you support both sides sitting down?
en.sputniknews.africa/202610โฆ
Replying to @yonast98
390 A (V) never gave you Assab, it federated Eritrea as autonomous, it didn't cede sovereignty. That federation died in 1962, and in 1993 Eritrea voted 99.8% for independence, a vote Ethiopia and the UN accepted. "Access to the sea" means trade, not owning another nation's port.
A country of 130+ million people wants a negotiated port AND a navy on the Red Sea. Why is that treated as unusual, when this sea already runs on agreements with foreign navies?
Facts, with sources:
โข Djibouti, a country of under a million people, hosts bases of the US, France, Japan, China and Italy, all by agreement: aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/8/โฆ
โข Roughly 12% of world maritime trade passes Bab al-Mandeb (same Al Jazeera report). The EU extended its Aspides naval mission to Feb 2027: consilium.europa.eu/en/pressโฆ
โข Turkey opened its largest overseas military training base in Mogadishu in 2017: voanews.com/a/turkey-opens-lโฆ
โข AP reported that Assab in Eritrea served as a UAE base during the Yemen war (2015-2021): voanews.com/a/africa_uae-disโฆ
โข Al Jazeera lists Egypt among the first countries signing up to a new Saudi-led Red Sea coalition, alongside Pakistan, Tรผrkiye and Bangladesh: aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/14โฆ
So navies are already on this coast, by agreement. The real question is why Ethiopia should be the one left out of a sea that more than 130 million Ethiopians depend on for trade.
The 4 Oct El Alamein declaration (clause 4d) says Red Sea governance is "the exclusive responsibility of the littoral states": presidency.eg/en/%D9%82%D8%Bโฆ
In my opinion, that sits awkwardly with the facts above.
The law points to the table, not to exclusion. UNCLOS Art. 125: landlocked states have a right of access to the sea, with terms agreed through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements. Art. 90: every state, coastal or landlocked, may sail ships under its flag. un.org/depts/los/convention_โฆ
Ethiopia had a navy from 1955 until the 1990s and has been rebuilding it since 2018, with naval cooperation steps with France (2019) and Russia (2025). In my opinion, a navy is a normal part of sea access for a country this size. It protects ships, crews and trade. It belongs inside the deal, not added on afterwards.
What I support negotiated sea access. A fair deal on the Red Sea. A port and a naval base agreed at a table, with clear terms, transparency and respect for every neighbour's sovereignty. Peaceful means only.
That is also the stated Ethiopian position. PM Abiy, 24 Oct, Tana Forum: "We will continue to persuade through dialogue and mutual benefit."
ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9807843
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
แจแแตแญ แแฅ แขแตแฎแตแซ
แจแแแจ แฅแญแแ แฅแ
แ แตแแ
แแแฐ แญแฅแญ
แจแขแตแฎแตแซ แฆแญแถแถแญแต แฐแแแถ แค/แญ แจ3000 แแแต แณแชแญ แจแแแกแ แต แแแแต แ แตแแซแ แแแข
@Hamereberhan
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
Mr. Hany Ibrahim, humanitarian concern demands honesty. Exploiting the suffering of Ethiopians for political advantage while posing as a concerned benefactor warrants a firm and unequivocal response. The victims need protection, not crocodile tears.
#VirtueSignalers GTHOOH!
Moyale: The Suffering of Ethiopians Must Not Become a Geopolitical Weapon.
Mr. Hany Ibrahim, humanitarian concern demands honesty. Exploiting the suffering of Ethiopians for political advantage while posing as a concerned benefactor warrants a firm and unequivocal response. The victims need protection, not crocodile tears. Ethiopia has the capacity to manage the situation and address its underlying causes.
I have received information from a trusted intelligence source that individuals identified as TPLF agents arrived in Moyale a few weeks before the violence began. The pattern is unmistakable: wherever conflict erupts, there is always TPLF involvement; wherever the TPLF is involved, Egyptian security operatives are close behind.
Conflict between Oromo and Somali communities is a destructive legacy of political manipulation along the OromiaโSomali regional boundary, particularly during Abdi Illeyโs administration under TPLF leadership. Local grievances must never become weapons through which political actors turn neighbouring communities against one another. At that time, TPLF used Abdi Illey and invaded its neighboring Region of Oromia and shed blood between two brotherly people. That is where Borena-Garri conflict started by the will of the then government.
I know the Borana as a people with a deeply rooted culture of peace, dignity, and community responsibility. I also know of instances in which Borana communities protected their Garri neighbours against threats from other communities. That tradition of protection and coexistence was first shattered by TPLF security agents. Mercenaries deployed by Egypt are now seeking to perpetuate that instability and divert the governmentโs attention from the north to the south. That is the reality.
Mr. Ibrahim, millions are suffering before your eyes in Gaza, Libya, and Sudan. Yet we have not seen a single expression of sympathy from Egyptian leaders for these people. It is an extraordinary display of hypocrisy for those who instigate conflict and violence to shed crocodile tears over the consequences and then appeal for humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian assistance must never become political camouflage. Borana and Garri families deserve peace, protection, and dignity. Those who organize or exploit their suffering must be held accountable.
Lebensraum? That word deserves more care. ๐ค
Lebensraum was Hitler's plan to seize other people's land and push them out. Millions died for it.
#Ethiopia is asking for the opposite: a seat at a table, not someone else's land.
Look at what was actually said this week:
๐ PM Abiy at Tana Forum (Oct 24) sea access is existential for 135M+ people, and it should come through dialogue and mutual benefit. ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9807843
๐ Field Marshal Birhanu Jula today (ENA, Oct 25): Ethiopia seeks peaceful relations, brotherhood and good-neighbourliness. ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_9812616
- In 2023 Addis even offered stakes in GERD, Ethiopian Airlines or Ethio Telecom in return for a port. Conquerors don't offer shares.
Almost all our trade passes through one neighbour's port. Asking for a fair, negotiated deal on the Red Sea is what landlocked countries do everywhere. In my opinion, that is not expansion.
@_hudsonc , you know the Horn well. Putting a 130M nation's request to negotiate next to Hitler's wars doesn't help peace. It makes the table harder to reach.
#Ethiopia #RedSea
Cant help but think that Abiy calling port access on the Red Sea an existential issue has a definite ring of the German concept of Lebensraum... ftlsomalia.com/abiy-ahmed-caโฆ
Yonas Ethio ๐ช๐น retweeted
#ASSAB_PORT: The Untold History & Its Historical Ties to #Ethiopia
๐ฌ PART ONE | Coming Soon on YouTube
๐ A journey through history, facts and historical perspectives.
แแต #Ethiopians แ แฃแ แฅแ แจแแญ แแแฝ แชแตแฎ แฅแแตแฐแซ แตแแ แจแแ แตแซ แแญ แแ แแต แแแแผ แจแขแตแฎแตแซ แแณแแฝ แขแตแฎแตแซ แจ130 แแแฎแ แ
แแฅ แแแช แแฐแฅ แซแตแแแแณแ แแแ แฅแญแฅแญ แจแแแ แแแฐแซแ แชแตแฎ แญแ แ
แแปแ แฅแแฝแ แจแแณแตแกแตแ แชแตแฎแแฝ แซแ แแแฉแ แ DM แแฉแแ Thank you ๐๐คฉ

























