Official online shop of #BitcoinVN ( @Bitcoin_Vietnam ) Authorized supplier of #Trezor, #Ledger, #Keystone, #Blockstream for #Vietnam
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Joined October 2020
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Pinned Tweet
"The moment a similar incident affects a more mainstream manufacturer while the ecosystem has still failed to migrate sufficiently towards multi-vendor multisig, we will have a far larger catastrophe on our hands.
And yes, those manufacturers may follow more secure practices – but a single point of failure remains a single point of failure, and a freak accident can happen to any one of them.
This is a call to action for anyone who cares about Bitcoin’s long-term success."
bitcoinvn.io/shop/new-era-fo…
As people remain interested in updates on the matter:
As of today - 20 October 2026 - we are still not aware of any device purchased from us having been affected by supply chain tampering.
We will update as soon as we receive any reports to the opposite. 🙂
#Ledger #cryptobilis
As the questions keep coming 🙂
- no, we do *not* have any #cryptobilis exposure/connection
- we are not aware of any single device procured from us to be bugged
With that said, supply chains *are* under attack - and even if we try to do handle matters the right way on our end, the level of sophistication of the attacks is increasing and an upstream compromise of the supply chain is always a non-zero possibility.
You can not - and should not - depend on a setup that contains single-point-of-failures.
Full article on the situation remains available below:
This is still valid as of today. 🙂
We're awaiting the outcome of the ongoing investigations into the wider South East Asian supply chain which are currently concluded by Team #Ledger - until these are concluded sales of Ledger devices remain suspended until further notice.
Updates by the Singapore 🇸🇬 Police Force - confirming the circulation of tampered devices in the City state.
Currently otherwise no further update on the situation in #Vietnam 🇻🇳.
To date, we have not received any reports of any devices procured through BitcoinVN Shop being affected by the supply chain tampering.
However, Ledger device sales will remain suspended as Team #Ledger investigates the wider supply chain security in South East Asia.
For your attention.
Passport Prime owners, @FoundationHQ has pushed a second precautionary Envoy update in two days. 2.3.7 moves the security check to a new onion address and adds more verification. No flaw described. Update Envoy to 2.3.7.
As serious as this incident was, @KeystoneWallet deserves credit for its disclosure & post-incident communication. Its response has set a positive example that we would welcome seeing more widely across the industry.
This year, essentially all hardware wallet manufacturers have been hit by cyber incidents of varying severity - from leaked customer/ home address / highly sensitive PII databases to severe cases of device compromise involving vulnerable firmware and possible/suspected/confirmed upstream supply chain tampering that put user funds at immediate risk.
Out of all these incidents, three cases resulted in existing stock being declared vulnerable and immediately withdrawn from sale due to the risk of users losing funds.
That also has direct consequences for reseller partners, who made the call to invest in a specific manufacturer’s stock and serve as its trusted on-the-ground partners - close to the communities and clients they serve in their respective geographic areas and jurisdictions. These clients might otherwise struggle to access genuine devices due to the various logistical and supply chain issues that individual buyers in more remote parts of the world can face.
Imagine the same in the car industry:
A manufacturer discovers a critical safety flaw, tells dealerships to stop selling the affected cars immediately - and the dealerships have to write down the value of the stock they previously purchased to zero, with no reimbursement or relief from the manufacturer whatsoever.
“Oops, sorry about the lemons we shipped you. Tough luck - we feel really sorry that you paid us for stock you can no longer sell. You’re welcome to buy new inventory from us at any time, though. At your own cost, of course.”
This is part of why being an “honest reseller” is NOT A BUSINESS MODEL we recommend getting into unless you have other reasons for doing so - in our case, supporting the clients of our parent entity, BitcoinVN ( @bitcoinvn_io ) exchange, by making it easy and smooth to take self-custody of their funds rather than storing them on the exchange.
The business model, capital outlay and margins all make it a pretty terrible standalone business.
Unless you have other reasons (as we do, see above) or some masochistic inclination to serve your community - with a fair chance of losing money doing so - to make self-custody more widespread, we strongly recommend against “getting into this business”.
As we stated elsewhere, there are thousands of easier ways to make money - with far less risk to your capital and reputation, and far less need for constant vigilance over the latest cyber threats.
We’ve been at it for close to a decade, and the only reason we’re still at it is the constant backing from BitcoinVN in its drive to make self-custody a thing for more people.
Bitcoin lives & dies on the ability and willingness of individuals to take self-custody - and without a broad, geographically diversified base of holders, the fundamentals of the network and thereby its value will erode.
On its own, our business line is not financially sustainable.
Which brings us back to #Keystone:
Its handling of disclosure and post-incident communication deserves strong credit.
These situations are very difficult for everyone involved & should ideally not happen in the first place.
In practice however, large parts of the industry have been getting humbled in recent weeks and months, as we’re all - to varying degrees - insufficiently prepared for the new cyberthreat landscape we’ve entered recently.
With that said, Team Keystone took full responsibility - not just in compassionate words, but through swift, clear communication and a firm commitment to reimburse its partners and customers for any devices shipped that are deemed vulnerable in light of the latest security incident disclosure.
That is standard in many other, more mature industries: you ship a dangerously flawed lemon, you’re responsible for fixing the situation for your business partners and clients.
Keystone has handled its post-incident response exceptionally well in an industry that still has some growing up to do.
This is a standard of conduct we would like to see adopted more widely across the industry.
The outcome of trusting "professionals" when people decide that self-custody is too difficult and risky. 👇
A Bitcoin treasury company (@Datavault_ai $DVLT) just crashed because they informed investors that they haven't been able to withdraw BTC from the exchange (@BiconomyCom) that is holding all their treasury funds after 4 months of transfer requests.
…and of course, it won’t always be as obviously ridiculous as this story. But expect access to bitcoin left in the hands of “trusted third parties” to erode over time.
The temptation to find ways to “just keep it” is always there - and eventually, it will be acted upon. Just look at the monetary history of gold. 🙂
👇
I know with all the other shit going on everyone has forgotten about the implanted Ledgers in the wild.
But if you know of any (drained or not) please keep sharing information, photos, purchase date + location, etc.
Come to @SEAL_911. Tag me. Tag @MagicalTux. Tag @Ledger. 🙏
Just the last two days breaches of customer data at major providers.
While keeping supply chains as short, tight and controlled as possible can serve as partial risk mitigation - avoiding that your data enters any centralized database in the first place is crucial for operational security.
The people who pay to obtain these data do so for a very clear reason:
They expect to be able to extract a positive ROI.
And the repeated & ongoing data breaches show that it is a very profitable business for these threat actors.
If you have the opportunity, aim to procure any devices privately and ideally for cash or alternatively privacy-preserving crypto only.
Confirmed breach of email provider.
Your physical device is not at elevated risk
Please ignore these emails, warn your friends / share the tweet below - and never enter/share your seed phrase anywhere
ANNOUNCEMENT: SPAM EMAILS HAVE BEEN SENT THAT APPEAR TO HAVE COME FROM OFFICIAL FOUNDATION DOMAINS.
We have traced this back to one or more compromised API keys on Cloudflare, and have already revoked all API keys.
The malicious domain in the spam email has been taken down.
Funds stored on Passport are safe and Passport hardware is not compromised.
We are working nonstop to discover exactly what happened and will put out a report ASAP.
Monitoring the situation - remain alert.
At this moment we have no reason to believe that #PassportPrime devices bought through BitcoinVN Shop are at risk - it *currently* seems to be a possible database leak/phishing attack.
Do not enter / share your seed phrases anywhere (ever!).
TREAT EMAILS FROM @FoundationHQ WITH EXTREME CAUTION. ONGOING PHISHING ATTACK DISGUISED AS RECALL NOTICE.
DO NOT ENTER YOUR SEEDPHRASE INTO AN INTERNET CONNECTED MACHINE.
WEBSITE AND EMAIL COMPROMISED.
As we're already receiving some first concerned messages:
@KeystoneWallet bought from BitcoinVN Shop - authorized hardware wallet dealer in 🇻🇳 since 2017 (and Keystone in specific since 2025) - are not impacted by this customer database leak.
Independently, we will share soon more about our own data retention policies on our blog - and what we do on our end to minimize any retained customer data.
With that said:
Your safest way to acquire a hardware wallet is to *never* provide your real name or real home address upon purchase.
Buy in-store and with cash (ideally with an as short supply chain involved as possible) - so that any personal and sensitive data never enters any database in the first place.
And for whom it might be useful:
You can do exactly that if you're based in Vietnam 🇻🇳 - either at our Saigon HQ or via our Da Nang showroom partner @21BitCoffee
We owe you an apology.
On October 20, we detected unauthorized access to our official website. After verifying API activity with Shopify, we confirmed on October 23 that a third party obtained customer shipping information. You trusted us with those details, and we're sorry we didn't keep them safe.
Exposed: names, contact details, shipping addresses, and order details (items and prices).
Not exposed: payment card or bank details, recovery phrases, private keys, or wallet passwords.
We've blocked access, fixed the vulnerability, opened an investigation, and are emailing affected customers.
Scammers may pose as Keystone by phone, text, email, or mail, offering refunds, replacement devices, or "fixes" for your order or address. None of it is from us.
NEVER share your recovery phrase or private keys, and NEVER enter your recovery phrase into a device you didn't order. We will never ask for them. Don't click links in unexpected messages. Type keyst.one yourself.
A detailed report is coming soon.
Until then, trust only our official channels. If anything feels off, email [email protected]. We'd rather hear from you than have you take a chance.
Again, we're truly sorry to everyone affected.
Glad that some experienced voices of sanity enter the conversation. 🫶
Good job @laurashin & @tanuki42_
Buying direct from the manufacturer means fewer hands on your device, @tanuki42_ told me. 🤝
But he says there are real reasons people use resellers, from paying cash in a store to Vietnam's import license rules. 🌏
Effective immediately, BitcoinVN Shop is suspending all #Ledger device sales until further notice.
While we have received no reports of devices sold by us being affected so far, recent developments warrant a thorough assessment of risks across the supply chain.
This step is taken out of an abundance of caution while investigations continue.
For our general position, please also refer to our pinned tweet from August 2026.
BitcoinVN Shop retweeted
"multisig, and multi-vendor multisig, needs to become the standard for self-custody in the futur'
A few words given the recent exploits on hardware signing devices:
• The Ledger supply chain attack represents one of the most sophisticated attacks thus far on the wallet ecosystem. In many ways it’s a lot more sophisticated than the Coldcard RNG exploit, because that one was software only. This one took a cross-border company buyout, tampering with the devices (implanting an eSIM, an LTE module and a CPU) and manufacturing the implants at scale.
• These sorts of attacks have been predicted by early Bitcoiners, but in Bitcoin they remained theoretical or crude until this year. It shows that the level of sophistication of attacks has risen quickly, and what was previously “good enough” advice on wallets and self-custody is no longer sufficient.
• When we started Nunchuk a few years ago, our premise was that multisig, and multi-vendor multisig, needs to become the standard for self-custody in the future. But even we didn’t expect how fast it would materialize. This is likely due to 2 factors: Bitcoin getting more mainstream, and the rise of AI-assisted attacks. This is a Sputnik moment for Bitcoin self-custody. The defenses need to level up.
• Passphrases wouldn’t have helped in the Ledger case, since you are required to enter the passphrase into the device for it to sign any transactions. A compromised device that phones home the seed phrase can also easily phone home the passphrase the moment you enter it.
• Similarly, generating the private key somewhere else (even by rolling dice) and subsequently importing it onto a tampered device wouldn’t save you here. The device can phone home the seed phrase the moment it’s imported.
• Anti-tampering techniques might help, such as transparent casing or bricking the device if it’s tampered with. Or forever displaying a message once the seal is broken. Or using on-device encryption between the internal hardware components. But a dedicated and resourceful enough attacker can still find ways to get around these layers. Tampering and anti-tampering have long been a cat-and-mouse game. In 2008, card readers doctored right off a Chinese production line sent card data and PINs over mobile networks to Pakistan. The Ledger attack is the same playbook, 18 years later. The bigger the target, the more attackers spend on overcoming the defenses.
• You should order directly from the vendors as much as possible, using a PO box for privacy.
• Any setup that relies on a single hardware/software stack or a single vendor should be considered at risk.
• Building your own hardware signers from generic parts is a good option for technical users.
• Multi-vendor multisig should become the standard. Each signer should have a completely independent hardware/software stack from the other signers. The point is that there shouldn’t be any single-point-of-failure anywhere in your setup.
• Many advanced protocols rely on timelocks and the recovery path being a simple singlesig. The recent attacks and exploits should highlight how dangerous this could be. Timelocks simply delay a risk. If a seed is compromised and there’s a timelock involved, the attacker just needs to wait out the timelock. (For Miniscript wallets, there’s the wallet descriptor too, but presumably it also gets sent to the device at some point.) Vault-like protocols face a similar problem: any withdrawal or recovery path that relies on a single key is a potential single point of failure.
• For our on-chain timelock-assisted wallets, in a few weeks we are adding the option to customize the recovery path to be an M-of-N, so that, if you want, spending would require multiple keys at all points during the wallet’s lifetime.