The “Russian losses increased” narrative is a fabrication, since all evidence available point to the opposite. Vehicle losses have decreased significantly compared to 2025, with armor down by a factor of 5 in average. (source: Oryx) Mediazona’s in-year 2026 personnel-loss count remains 50% below 2025, without a valid explanation. The claim that bodies are harder to retrieve is insufficient: the battlefield and grey zone remain as dangerous as in 2025. Russian courts process MIA-to-KIA cases at high rates, and a body is not required to file for procedure. There has also been no specific additional documented enforcement of obituaries concealment which could explain such a sharp decrease. Regardless, there are absolutely no OSINT data available supporting claims of increased total Russian (or Ukrainian) casualties in 2026. For all we know, it could be inferior, equivalent, higher... The 2026 attrition ratio is more favorable for Russia than in 2025. Progress has slowed but stays within 2024 ranges once the AFU Kursk advances are factored in. 2025 was peculiar: the Kursk pocket collapse and rout destabilized Ukrainian forces and enabled rapid Russian advances front wide for 6 months. All signs indicate that 2026 reflects a more balanced attrition approach after the extremely costly 2024 and the front-wide pressure of 2025 that leveraged the post-Kursk situation, but at high cost. Another myth is: “if attrition worked Russian advances should accelerate”. In attrition warfare theories, the principle is to cause collapse of the adversary to enable decisive gains; not that advances will gradually increase in a linear way, which is subject to both side’s respective effort at a given time. For instance, the weaker side could expend massive resources in a surge attempt, stabilising in apparence the front but collapsing 6 months later. In 2025, Ukrainian forces suffered a sector collapse in the Sudja pocket, which rendered an entire part of the army combat ineffective. Hence, advances ensued. Nevertheless, Ukraine has accelerated mobilization (aggressively) and alternative means to recover, and is nowhere near a collapse of its ground military forces for the time being. Though, with a mobilization ratio currently standing at around 18-20% of the remaining military aged male population, it may be nearing sensitive levels. The point is to separate military objectives: conquest of the 4 oblasts against which Moscow can measure military success, and political objectives: demilitarisation and neutrality of Ukraine, central to the strategic settlement Moscow continues to seek. (Ideally enforced by a favorable regime change) This matters because to achieve its strategic political goal, Russia needs to continue investing in its expensive ballistic and drone programs to collapse the economy at the rear, and make rational choices for expenditures. Losing 4,000 armor a year is not an option anymore. The ground offensive’s primary goal is therefore not military conquest but applying pressure on the entire Ukrainian economic and social apparatus, to support the achievement of the political ambition. Seizing Donbas is a secondary and corollary territorial objective, because the political goal naturally secures the territorial one. Understanding this principle is the basis of analysing this war correctly. Moscow’s objectives in this conflict have not changed, but the strategy adopted has been evolving regularly based on various factors, including setbacks. Kyiv has also been adapting continuously to prevent its success. In 2026, the military situation has somehow improved for Ukraine, but the social and economic ones deteriorated at an accelerated pace. There is however no way to tell whether the Kremlin’s plan will ultimately succeed, even partially. See an earlier analysis in reply to understand attrition warfare performance measurement methods. #UkraineRussiaWar #Strategy #Attrition