Pinned Tweet
1/2 - Ok my thoughts on Delta's results, which turned into a bit of an essay:
There were a handful of early thinkers who we now call the Pre-Socratics, and Heraclitus was one of them. Almost nothing he wrote survives whole; pretty much only fragments quoted by later writers. One of them goes like this: the hidden harmony is stronger than the visible (Harmoniē aphanēs phanerēs kreittōn). The structure you cannot see holds better than the one you can.
Although it is fashionable in scholarship to wave the Pre-Socratics away as primitives who had not yet invented proper science or philosophy. I think that misses what they were good at, which was looking hard at the world and saying something true about its shape. In my view, they were better at that than we are today. This fragment was sitting in my head and I think it has a pretty good application to the Delta Property Fund context. The visible part of Delta is ugly, and as I should hope to demonstrate, the hidden value is stronger than the visible weakness.
As noted in recent letters, I've been waiting for Delta to release its AFS. The results are in. I want to remind everyone that this is, for obvious reasons, a neglected name. It is a company that sits beneath a mountain of debt. Of course, it is risky business trawling these territories. Where there is deep value there is meaningful risk. The company trades at 0.10x NAV; obviously, terms and conditions apply. It is easy to be a pessimist; to see the negatives and look no further. There isn't anything wrong with that approach either, but I often find the deepest value hiding in the ugliest corners of the market.
Let us begin where it is worst. This is a group in a difficult position; they are in a tough situation that is slowly getting less tough, and the share price that is still being set as though it is getting worse. The price is, as I have noted before, disconnected from the actual portfolio value, net of all debt, and therefore I anticipate a period of a price-discovery as the market starts, gradually – not all at once – to recognise the equity value that survives the debt wall. So here are the two main things that scare people.
The first is the auditor's note. KPMG signed an unmodified opinion on the 28 February 2026 numbers, which is the clean opinion we want, but they drew attention to a material uncertainty related to going concern. That phrase, "material uncertainty related to going concern", is the one that gets people to close the tab and move on. The reasons are obvious, and to be honest, 99% of the time it is probably correct to look away and move on. In this case, context, down to the minutae, is really important, because a lot of Delta's problems are uniquely structural, and if you aren't familiar with it, it just looks too terrible to even consider in more depth. I believe this has created an opportunity.
The second obvious red flag actually relates to the first - the balance sheet structure. At year end, Delta's current liabilities exceeded its current assets, including the properties it is holding for sale, by about R2.5 billion. On a literal reading, the company owes far more in the short term than it has available in the short term to pay. For most businesses that would be a screaming red flag. Again, this is a very obvious problem. For a property company, especially the one in this context, I think requires more thought.
I am not going to wave these concerns away; they are real, and anyone who tells you Delta is a simple, safe and sure thing is probably mistaken. I have tried to make the risks clear in previous letters, and I reiterate them here. I am, however, going to try and contextualise this note and explain what they mean, mechanically, then demonstrate why the weight the market is putting on this risk is, in my view, far heavier than the evidence and behavioural patterns suggest.
What the going concern note means
When auditors talk about going concern, they are asking a simple and narrow question: can this entity meet its obligations as they fall due over the next twelve months or so. They are not valuing the business, nor are they telling us what the equity is worth; they are stress-testing liquidity and the maturity of the debt.
Delta's big problem is they have a lot of debt, and worse, a large slice of that debt is short-dated. The facilities are written for one, two, and sometimes three years, and when a facility is within twelve months of maturity, accounting rules force the company to classify it as a current liability. It does not matter that the lender has rolled that facility every single time for consecutive years, nor does it matter that the largest lender is also one of the top shareholders. The board composition is obviously also, despite being a meaningful factor in the near-term debt obligation negotiations, not something that fits into the going concern note. On the balance sheet date, a facility maturing within the year sits in the current column, and because Delta carries roughly R3.6 billion of borrowings against a portfolio it is steadily shrinking, that classification mechanically produces the R2.5 billion gap between current liabilities and current assets.
This is why the going concern note is, in substance, a comment about the structure and timing of the funding, rather than a statement that the company is itself insolvent. The AFS itself provides a lot of counter-evidence to the insolvency argument. On a solvency basis, Delta's total assets of R6.5 billion exceed its total liabilities by R2.5 billion. The company is balance-sheet solvent by a wide margin. The audit committee spells out exactly where the doubt comes from, and it is the trio we would expect: the sale of the non-core assets, the extension of facilities by the lenders, and lease renewals.
So when we see "material uncertainty", the auditor is correct and doing its job by flagging that Delta's survival effectively depends on the banks continuing to roll the debt and on the disposal programme continuing to land. This is precisely what my 'thesis' is predicated on: I believe the banks will continue to roll and support the recovery, as they have done for years, allowing the equity another chance for price discovery. This note is also a red flag Delta has carried for years, through a far worse operating environment than today's (and with worse covenant breaches), and the banks have rolled. Every single time. I think the recovery is real, and I think it probably takes a lot of effort to understand it, more than most people will likely afford it.
Where the value sits, and why the debt is a timing problem
Before we get to the bull case, you have to understand the shape of the thing. A property company has layers. At the bottom are the assets, including the investment property portfolio, worth around R6.3bn here including what is held for sale. On top of those assets sits the debt, around R3.6bn. The equity is what is left when you take the assets and subtract the debt. That residual, roughly R2.7bn on the reported numbers, is what you own when you buy a share.
Delta itself reports a net asset value of R3.57 per share on the SA REIT measure, and R3.56 on the straight IFRS measure. Either way, call it R3.57.
The share closed the financial year at 38c. It closed Friday at 33c. Let's sit with that for a second. You are buying a claim on R3.57 of audited, independently valued net property for 33c. The market capitalisation is about R250m, against a net asset value of more than R2.5bn. The difference is literally an order of magnitude. It is one of the widest discounts you will find anywhere on the JSE, and this is a real company. It owns 72 real buildings, mostly let to the South African government, and it collected 99.8% of its rent last year. The contracts are short term which sucks, but the government isn't really going anywhere.
Now, the debt. The reason the debt looks menacing is the same reason the discount and therefore the opportunity exists. The buildings are financed, as most property is financed, and the financing is short-dated. But here is the part the headline readers don't really see. The debt is a near-term liability on paper because of the maturity classification, and yet in practice, in each of the last several years, that debt has been rolled. The maturities arrive, Delta and its lenders sit down, the facilities are extended, and the show goes on. The lenders keep doing this because the arithmetic tells them to. The assets comfortably cover the debt, so the lenders are well secured, and a bank recovers more by working with a borrower who is paying and improving than by forcing a fire sale of office blocks into a thin market. Liquidating is almost always a bank's worst option. It is the nuclear button, and you only actually press it when the borrower has stopped cooperating or stopped paying. Delta is doing neither. It is paying down debt, selling the weak assets, and the numbers are moving the right way. Again, the auditors' note on uncertainty is totally correct, but for mechanical reasons, not necessarily reflective, in my view at least, of the practical happenings. There has been material uncertainty for years (i.e. a doubt about the next twelve months), yet for years the banks have rolled the near term debt, which is the reason for the uncertainty. I shorted Copper360 a while ago (all-in about 30% gain) because they were in a serious net current liability situation; I wrote about it in a couple letters. Delta is by no means in a comfortable situation, and the banks do kinda have them 'by the balls', as it were, but the major lender is also a meaningful equity holder in this case, and I don't think they're necessarily in the position Copper360 was (in need of urgent capital raise to continue operations, and equity being the only viable route due to existing debt profile). This situation is complicated but it is worth understanding the differences.
Delta's value is structural and it lives almost entirely the net property value (although, even on an income statement level, the company is very cheap and earning well). The debt is senior to that equity, which is why it gets all the attention, and the debt is classified as near-term because of when the facilities mature. But the experience of the last several years is that the maturities get rolled because the banks are supported by the assets and encouraged by the progress. The whole trade is a bet that this pattern holds for long enough, and that the equity gets to behave like equity again once the debt overhang is managed down towards something the market stops fearing.
The sharpest pushback I get, and I get it a lot, is that the net asset value is 'not real'. The argument runs that the R3.57 is a number cooked up by valuers using optimistic assumptions, that office property in South Africa is structurally impaired, and that if you tried to actually sell these buildings you would get a fraction of book. It is a serious argument and it deserves a serious answer rather than a dismissal, hence the following.
My first answer is the one I have made before. Cut the net asset value in half and the share is still absurd. Halve R3.57 and you get R1.79. At 33c you are still getting the halved NAV at a 1/5 discount, give or take. Take an even more brutal view, knock seventy percent off the net asset value, and you are still at roughly a third of what is left. For the current price to be fair value, you have to believe the entire portfolio, net of debt, is worth around a tenth of what the book says. In round terms, that is an 89% haircut to net asset value, which says the third party valuers are wrong by nearly an order of magnitude. That is a very big thing to assert about buildings that are mostly full of government tenants paying their rent, with collections above 99%.
My second answer is more specific to these results, and it is the part that I believe shifts the debate. This year the valuers marked the book up. Again, I'm sure people will now say this is further evidence you cannot trust the 'NAV'. I'm also sure they will have passed over the years of writing it down, after which NAV still sits above R2bn. Now, the fair value assessment reversed course. The portfolio carried a fair value adjustment gain of R20.4 million on investment property, against a loss of R178.3 million the prior year. The net asset value per share rose from R3.39 to R3.57. So the bear who wants to tell you the book is a stale fantasy that is deteriorating has to contend with the fact that, after independent valuation, the number rose. I don't place a lot of value on fair value adjustments, especially in operating companies, but in a property company the net asset value changes are often mechanical (i.e. driven by changes in underlying interest environment) and therefore more appropriate. One cannot simultaneously claim the fair values are detached from reality and ignore that the people doing the adjusting both i) moved them in the company's favour this year, and ii) have previously moved them to the company's detriment. I don't want to spend too much time on this because I think a lot of the arguments here become logically circular, and therefore not very helpful.
My third answer is about who checked the adjustments. The valuation of investment property was the single key audit matter in KPMG's report. That means it was the thing the auditor spent the most effort on. They brought in their own valuation specialist, compared Delta's valuations against their specialist's ranges, tested the inputs against market data, and concluded the fair values were acceptable. You can choose not to trust valuers. It is harder to wave away valuers plus a Big Four auditor's own independent valuation team plus a clean opinion. The argument against is not strong if it relies on KPMG's 'material uncertainty' note as a key point against Delta, but also then ignore KPMG's assessment of the valuations conducted, as well as their own valuations, and comparisons to market rentals, etc.
My fourth answer is about the adjustments themselves, because if you actually open the valuation note, and look in any level of detail, you find the assumptions are already conservative. The sovereign office portfolio is valued on capitalisation rates of 9.3% to 12.8% and discount rates of 13.5% to 16.5%. The other office is on cap rates of 9.0% to 13.0% and discount rates as high as 17.0%. Those are punitive rates that already bake in a great deal of South African office pain. Nobody adjusting a valuation hinging on optimism uses a 16% discount rate. If you want to argue the equity is worth R271 million, you are welcome to, but you need to tell me which capitalisation rate gets you there, because the ones the valuers are using do not. Meaningfully higher cap rates still do not. Also just to note, the fair value adjustments for the period were about R20m of the company's >R120m net profits. This is not the major factor in their net income, despite what has been suggested.
My fifth answer is the one the market can check for itself, without taking a valuer or an auditor on trust. It is what the buildings fetch when Delta actually sells them. The bear says these assets would go for a fraction of book in the real world. The transactions say otherwise. The non-core buildings that changed hands this year went out within single digits of their carrying value, and the tranche already sold and waiting to register is carried at exactly its sale price. Remember what is being sold here. This is the weakest, most vacant stock in the portfolio, the buildings the bear would expect to fetch the steepest haircut, and even these are clearing close to book. If the empty and unloved assets sell near book, the claim that the whole portfolio is worth a tenth of book in a sale becomes very hard to hold. This is not new behaviour either; the prior year's disposals also went out at or slightly above their carrying values. The buildings the market says are worth almost nothing keep being sold for roughly what they are marked at.
The detail that most people have missed
Now to the thing I really want you to understand, because it is buried in the notes and it is a really important piece of evidence that the deleveraging is already happening, with more locked in than the headline LTV shows.
Delta has been selling its weak buildings and it uses the cash to pay down debt. This is simple arithmetic largely, my favourite. During the year, 11 properties were transferred out, with a combined book value of R204.6m, for gross proceeds of R186.1m. Crucially, 71% of the floor space in those eleven buildings was vacant, which is why the portfolio vacancy rate fell from 31.9% to 27.3% even though the company now owns fewer buildings. What they are clearing out is the dead weight: the empty buildings with high vacancy that cost money in rates and security and give disproportionately little back. The good buildings are staying and held as core. R170m of proceeds from the sales went straight to the banks during the year, alongside scheduled amortisation. This is already in the year's figures.
Here is the part that is not yet in the numbers, and this is what people are missing. At year end, the company disclosed four further properties that are, in its own words, "disposals concluded but not yet transferred". These are In 2 Fruit, 88 Field Street, African Life and BestMed. Combined book value of R112.6m, sold for R112.6m, expected to transfer within about six months, over June and July of 2026. The sales are done. The transfers, the legal registration and the flow of cash to the banks, have not happened yet. So these four buildings are still sitting on the balance sheet inside the R611m of non-current assets held for sale. They count in the assets, however they have not yet counted in the debt reduction, and they have not yet counted, therefore, in the loan-to-value ratio.
Then there is Parkmore, a fifth building, book value about R19m, which actually transferred just after year end, on 7 May 2026. Put those together and we have about R131.6m of disposals that are either concluded and waiting to transfer, or already transferred since the year end, that have not yet been applied to the debt as of the reported figures. That is more than R130m of deleveraging that is effectively locked in and simply has not flowed through to the loan-to-value ratio yet. When it does, over the next few months, the LTV improves again, mechanically, on top of whatever the year already delivered. I believe we are watching a covenant cure arrive in slow motion and a chunk of the next instalment seems already to have been signed. One more detail on those four, because it kills a specific bear point. Every one of the four is carried at a book value equal to its selling price; there is no gap. In particular, 88 Field Street, which I flagged in my earlier note as the cautionary tale, valued at R93.83m and previously sold for R76m, now sits in the book at exactly R76m. The haircut already happened. So when these buildings transfer, there is no further write-down waiting to bite the net asset value. This tranche of disposals is neutral to NAV and purely positive for the debt. That is about as clean as deleveraging gets. A lot of the ugly stuff has already happened, and people seem to just assume it goes on forever. I disagree, strongly.
One Line Above All
I have gone through Delta's AFS a few times over the weekend. There is one line that really got me thinking. In the going concern note itself, which is the most heavily scrutinised, most carefully worded section of the whole document, here is what the board says, word for word:
"On the successful sale of properties earmarked for disposal, as a result of repayment of debt facilities from the proceeds of these disposals LTV is expected to reduce to below 50% and ICR to improve to within the covenant levels."
If you would bear with me, please read that again. The company is telling you, in the section the auditor has gone over with a magnifying glass, that completing the disposals it already has earmarked is expected to take the LTV ratio below the 50% covenant and bring interest cover back inside the covenant too. The Directors' Report says the same thing in slightly different words, that on successful disposal of the earmarked properties the LTV is expected to improve to 50% or below, i.e. a point it hasn't been at since the original collapse.
This is the whole game. The single risk in Delta has always been the debt, expressed through two covenant breaches: a loan-to-value above the 50% limit, and interest cover below the 2x floor. The company is now stating that the path it is already executing, selling the buildings it has already lined up, is expected to cure the LTV breach entirely. This is a stated expectation tied to a specific, in-progress programme, with R131.6m of it already signed or transferred and waiting to flow. It rests on transfers that are already concluded, so it doesn't really carry the hand-waving of the usual hope-for-a-better-economy story. One point of precision, because it matters. The cure the board is describing here is for the loan-to-value, the covenant the disposals attack directly. The interest cover is the second breach, and disposals do not fix it; only a lower cost of debt does. So of the two things holding this share down, one has a concrete path that is already partly executed, and the other still leans on where rates go from here. I am more sure of the first than the second, and I want that on the table. For the record, the loan-to-value closed the year at 56.7%, down from 59.5%, so the disposals have to carry it down a little under seven more points to clear the 50% covenant. It is moving the right way, and the buildings already lined up are what take it the rest of the way.
If the covenants get resolved, the going concern uncertainty starts to dissolve, because the going concern uncertainty is built on the covenants and the maturities. And when that uncertainty dissolves, the reason the equity trades at a tenth of book dissolves with it. It will be a long while before dividends resume, and I believe that, if/when that occurs, the share would already be at a higher price than current.
😂 if this pans out, there are going to be a lot of deleted tweets
DA leader Geordin Hill-Lewis has given an update on the party's coalition talks, and touched on the so-called 'plan' to keep out out of Gauteng's metros.
businesstech.co.za/news/gove…
11
4,824
So to the swarm of ‘racist’ comments… this is why I don’t like speaking on politics. No matter how logical the argument, this is always the default. The DA is literally the biggest non-ANC/MK party by black voters, but sure.
So I hate to be that guy, and I really tried not to speak much about these elections, but do you understand now why when you vote for a party other than the DA (eg ASA) you are effectively throwing your vote away/giving it to the ANC? Nobody else is serious, c’mon guys.
This guy is mentally handicapped
Seems like Arcelor Mittal SA kinda has to put out an updated cautionary based on all this news floating around on the R10bn EV offer?
4
22
3,062
Delta trading update out this morning: earnings per share up another 20-30% for the six months at 11-12c/share. Annualized we at a PE of 1.5x. Do with it what you will.
1/2 - Ok my thoughts on Delta's results, which turned into a bit of an essay:
There were a handful of early thinkers who we now call the Pre-Socratics, and Heraclitus was one of them. Almost nothing he wrote survives whole; pretty much only fragments quoted by later writers. One of them goes like this: the hidden harmony is stronger than the visible (Harmoniē aphanēs phanerēs kreittōn). The structure you cannot see holds better than the one you can.
Although it is fashionable in scholarship to wave the Pre-Socratics away as primitives who had not yet invented proper science or philosophy. I think that misses what they were good at, which was looking hard at the world and saying something true about its shape. In my view, they were better at that than we are today. This fragment was sitting in my head and I think it has a pretty good application to the Delta Property Fund context. The visible part of Delta is ugly, and as I should hope to demonstrate, the hidden value is stronger than the visible weakness.
As noted in recent letters, I've been waiting for Delta to release its AFS. The results are in. I want to remind everyone that this is, for obvious reasons, a neglected name. It is a company that sits beneath a mountain of debt. Of course, it is risky business trawling these territories. Where there is deep value there is meaningful risk. The company trades at 0.10x NAV; obviously, terms and conditions apply. It is easy to be a pessimist; to see the negatives and look no further. There isn't anything wrong with that approach either, but I often find the deepest value hiding in the ugliest corners of the market.
Let us begin where it is worst. This is a group in a difficult position; they are in a tough situation that is slowly getting less tough, and the share price that is still being set as though it is getting worse. The price is, as I have noted before, disconnected from the actual portfolio value, net of all debt, and therefore I anticipate a period of a price-discovery as the market starts, gradually – not all at once – to recognise the equity value that survives the debt wall. So here are the two main things that scare people.
The first is the auditor's note. KPMG signed an unmodified opinion on the 28 February 2026 numbers, which is the clean opinion we want, but they drew attention to a material uncertainty related to going concern. That phrase, "material uncertainty related to going concern", is the one that gets people to close the tab and move on. The reasons are obvious, and to be honest, 99% of the time it is probably correct to look away and move on. In this case, context, down to the minutae, is really important, because a lot of Delta's problems are uniquely structural, and if you aren't familiar with it, it just looks too terrible to even consider in more depth. I believe this has created an opportunity.
The second obvious red flag actually relates to the first - the balance sheet structure. At year end, Delta's current liabilities exceeded its current assets, including the properties it is holding for sale, by about R2.5 billion. On a literal reading, the company owes far more in the short term than it has available in the short term to pay. For most businesses that would be a screaming red flag. Again, this is a very obvious problem. For a property company, especially the one in this context, I think requires more thought.
I am not going to wave these concerns away; they are real, and anyone who tells you Delta is a simple, safe and sure thing is probably mistaken. I have tried to make the risks clear in previous letters, and I reiterate them here. I am, however, going to try and contextualise this note and explain what they mean, mechanically, then demonstrate why the weight the market is putting on this risk is, in my view, far heavier than the evidence and behavioural patterns suggest.
What the going concern note means
When auditors talk about going concern, they are asking a simple and narrow question: can this entity meet its obligations as they fall due over the next twelve months or so. They are not valuing the business, nor are they telling us what the equity is worth; they are stress-testing liquidity and the maturity of the debt.
Delta's big problem is they have a lot of debt, and worse, a large slice of that debt is short-dated. The facilities are written for one, two, and sometimes three years, and when a facility is within twelve months of maturity, accounting rules force the company to classify it as a current liability. It does not matter that the lender has rolled that facility every single time for consecutive years, nor does it matter that the largest lender is also one of the top shareholders. The board composition is obviously also, despite being a meaningful factor in the near-term debt obligation negotiations, not something that fits into the going concern note. On the balance sheet date, a facility maturing within the year sits in the current column, and because Delta carries roughly R3.6 billion of borrowings against a portfolio it is steadily shrinking, that classification mechanically produces the R2.5 billion gap between current liabilities and current assets.
This is why the going concern note is, in substance, a comment about the structure and timing of the funding, rather than a statement that the company is itself insolvent. The AFS itself provides a lot of counter-evidence to the insolvency argument. On a solvency basis, Delta's total assets of R6.5 billion exceed its total liabilities by R2.5 billion. The company is balance-sheet solvent by a wide margin. The audit committee spells out exactly where the doubt comes from, and it is the trio we would expect: the sale of the non-core assets, the extension of facilities by the lenders, and lease renewals.
So when we see "material uncertainty", the auditor is correct and doing its job by flagging that Delta's survival effectively depends on the banks continuing to roll the debt and on the disposal programme continuing to land. This is precisely what my 'thesis' is predicated on: I believe the banks will continue to roll and support the recovery, as they have done for years, allowing the equity another chance for price discovery. This note is also a red flag Delta has carried for years, through a far worse operating environment than today's (and with worse covenant breaches), and the banks have rolled. Every single time. I think the recovery is real, and I think it probably takes a lot of effort to understand it, more than most people will likely afford it.
Where the value sits, and why the debt is a timing problem
Before we get to the bull case, you have to understand the shape of the thing. A property company has layers. At the bottom are the assets, including the investment property portfolio, worth around R6.3bn here including what is held for sale. On top of those assets sits the debt, around R3.6bn. The equity is what is left when you take the assets and subtract the debt. That residual, roughly R2.7bn on the reported numbers, is what you own when you buy a share.
Delta itself reports a net asset value of R3.57 per share on the SA REIT measure, and R3.56 on the straight IFRS measure. Either way, call it R3.57.
The share closed the financial year at 38c. It closed Friday at 33c. Let's sit with that for a second. You are buying a claim on R3.57 of audited, independently valued net property for 33c. The market capitalisation is about R250m, against a net asset value of more than R2.5bn. The difference is literally an order of magnitude. It is one of the widest discounts you will find anywhere on the JSE, and this is a real company. It owns 72 real buildings, mostly let to the South African government, and it collected 99.8% of its rent last year. The contracts are short term which sucks, but the government isn't really going anywhere.
Now, the debt. The reason the debt looks menacing is the same reason the discount and therefore the opportunity exists. The buildings are financed, as most property is financed, and the financing is short-dated. But here is the part the headline readers don't really see. The debt is a near-term liability on paper because of the maturity classification, and yet in practice, in each of the last several years, that debt has been rolled. The maturities arrive, Delta and its lenders sit down, the facilities are extended, and the show goes on. The lenders keep doing this because the arithmetic tells them to. The assets comfortably cover the debt, so the lenders are well secured, and a bank recovers more by working with a borrower who is paying and improving than by forcing a fire sale of office blocks into a thin market. Liquidating is almost always a bank's worst option. It is the nuclear button, and you only actually press it when the borrower has stopped cooperating or stopped paying. Delta is doing neither. It is paying down debt, selling the weak assets, and the numbers are moving the right way. Again, the auditors' note on uncertainty is totally correct, but for mechanical reasons, not necessarily reflective, in my view at least, of the practical happenings. There has been material uncertainty for years (i.e. a doubt about the next twelve months), yet for years the banks have rolled the near term debt, which is the reason for the uncertainty. I shorted Copper360 a while ago (all-in about 30% gain) because they were in a serious net current liability situation; I wrote about it in a couple letters. Delta is by no means in a comfortable situation, and the banks do kinda have them 'by the balls', as it were, but the major lender is also a meaningful equity holder in this case, and I don't think they're necessarily in the position Copper360 was (in need of urgent capital raise to continue operations, and equity being the only viable route due to existing debt profile). This situation is complicated but it is worth understanding the differences.
Delta's value is structural and it lives almost entirely the net property value (although, even on an income statement level, the company is very cheap and earning well). The debt is senior to that equity, which is why it gets all the attention, and the debt is classified as near-term because of when the facilities mature. But the experience of the last several years is that the maturities get rolled because the banks are supported by the assets and encouraged by the progress. The whole trade is a bet that this pattern holds for long enough, and that the equity gets to behave like equity again once the debt overhang is managed down towards something the market stops fearing.
The sharpest pushback I get, and I get it a lot, is that the net asset value is 'not real'. The argument runs that the R3.57 is a number cooked up by valuers using optimistic assumptions, that office property in South Africa is structurally impaired, and that if you tried to actually sell these buildings you would get a fraction of book. It is a serious argument and it deserves a serious answer rather than a dismissal, hence the following.
My first answer is the one I have made before. Cut the net asset value in half and the share is still absurd. Halve R3.57 and you get R1.79. At 33c you are still getting the halved NAV at a 1/5 discount, give or take. Take an even more brutal view, knock seventy percent off the net asset value, and you are still at roughly a third of what is left. For the current price to be fair value, you have to believe the entire portfolio, net of debt, is worth around a tenth of what the book says. In round terms, that is an 89% haircut to net asset value, which says the third party valuers are wrong by nearly an order of magnitude. That is a very big thing to assert about buildings that are mostly full of government tenants paying their rent, with collections above 99%.
My second answer is more specific to these results, and it is the part that I believe shifts the debate. This year the valuers marked the book up. Again, I'm sure people will now say this is further evidence you cannot trust the 'NAV'. I'm also sure they will have passed over the years of writing it down, after which NAV still sits above R2bn. Now, the fair value assessment reversed course. The portfolio carried a fair value adjustment gain of R20.4 million on investment property, against a loss of R178.3 million the prior year. The net asset value per share rose from R3.39 to R3.57. So the bear who wants to tell you the book is a stale fantasy that is deteriorating has to contend with the fact that, after independent valuation, the number rose. I don't place a lot of value on fair value adjustments, especially in operating companies, but in a property company the net asset value changes are often mechanical (i.e. driven by changes in underlying interest environment) and therefore more appropriate. One cannot simultaneously claim the fair values are detached from reality and ignore that the people doing the adjusting both i) moved them in the company's favour this year, and ii) have previously moved them to the company's detriment. I don't want to spend too much time on this because I think a lot of the arguments here become logically circular, and therefore not very helpful.
My third answer is about who checked the adjustments. The valuation of investment property was the single key audit matter in KPMG's report. That means it was the thing the auditor spent the most effort on. They brought in their own valuation specialist, compared Delta's valuations against their specialist's ranges, tested the inputs against market data, and concluded the fair values were acceptable. You can choose not to trust valuers. It is harder to wave away valuers plus a Big Four auditor's own independent valuation team plus a clean opinion. The argument against is not strong if it relies on KPMG's 'material uncertainty' note as a key point against Delta, but also then ignore KPMG's assessment of the valuations conducted, as well as their own valuations, and comparisons to market rentals, etc.
My fourth answer is about the adjustments themselves, because if you actually open the valuation note, and look in any level of detail, you find the assumptions are already conservative. The sovereign office portfolio is valued on capitalisation rates of 9.3% to 12.8% and discount rates of 13.5% to 16.5%. The other office is on cap rates of 9.0% to 13.0% and discount rates as high as 17.0%. Those are punitive rates that already bake in a great deal of South African office pain. Nobody adjusting a valuation hinging on optimism uses a 16% discount rate. If you want to argue the equity is worth R271 million, you are welcome to, but you need to tell me which capitalisation rate gets you there, because the ones the valuers are using do not. Meaningfully higher cap rates still do not. Also just to note, the fair value adjustments for the period were about R20m of the company's >R120m net profits. This is not the major factor in their net income, despite what has been suggested.
My fifth answer is the one the market can check for itself, without taking a valuer or an auditor on trust. It is what the buildings fetch when Delta actually sells them. The bear says these assets would go for a fraction of book in the real world. The transactions say otherwise. The non-core buildings that changed hands this year went out within single digits of their carrying value, and the tranche already sold and waiting to register is carried at exactly its sale price. Remember what is being sold here. This is the weakest, most vacant stock in the portfolio, the buildings the bear would expect to fetch the steepest haircut, and even these are clearing close to book. If the empty and unloved assets sell near book, the claim that the whole portfolio is worth a tenth of book in a sale becomes very hard to hold. This is not new behaviour either; the prior year's disposals also went out at or slightly above their carrying values. The buildings the market says are worth almost nothing keep being sold for roughly what they are marked at.
The detail that most people have missed
Now to the thing I really want you to understand, because it is buried in the notes and it is a really important piece of evidence that the deleveraging is already happening, with more locked in than the headline LTV shows.
Delta has been selling its weak buildings and it uses the cash to pay down debt. This is simple arithmetic largely, my favourite. During the year, 11 properties were transferred out, with a combined book value of R204.6m, for gross proceeds of R186.1m. Crucially, 71% of the floor space in those eleven buildings was vacant, which is why the portfolio vacancy rate fell from 31.9% to 27.3% even though the company now owns fewer buildings. What they are clearing out is the dead weight: the empty buildings with high vacancy that cost money in rates and security and give disproportionately little back. The good buildings are staying and held as core. R170m of proceeds from the sales went straight to the banks during the year, alongside scheduled amortisation. This is already in the year's figures.
Here is the part that is not yet in the numbers, and this is what people are missing. At year end, the company disclosed four further properties that are, in its own words, "disposals concluded but not yet transferred". These are In 2 Fruit, 88 Field Street, African Life and BestMed. Combined book value of R112.6m, sold for R112.6m, expected to transfer within about six months, over June and July of 2026. The sales are done. The transfers, the legal registration and the flow of cash to the banks, have not happened yet. So these four buildings are still sitting on the balance sheet inside the R611m of non-current assets held for sale. They count in the assets, however they have not yet counted in the debt reduction, and they have not yet counted, therefore, in the loan-to-value ratio.
Then there is Parkmore, a fifth building, book value about R19m, which actually transferred just after year end, on 7 May 2026. Put those together and we have about R131.6m of disposals that are either concluded and waiting to transfer, or already transferred since the year end, that have not yet been applied to the debt as of the reported figures. That is more than R130m of deleveraging that is effectively locked in and simply has not flowed through to the loan-to-value ratio yet. When it does, over the next few months, the LTV improves again, mechanically, on top of whatever the year already delivered. I believe we are watching a covenant cure arrive in slow motion and a chunk of the next instalment seems already to have been signed. One more detail on those four, because it kills a specific bear point. Every one of the four is carried at a book value equal to its selling price; there is no gap. In particular, 88 Field Street, which I flagged in my earlier note as the cautionary tale, valued at R93.83m and previously sold for R76m, now sits in the book at exactly R76m. The haircut already happened. So when these buildings transfer, there is no further write-down waiting to bite the net asset value. This tranche of disposals is neutral to NAV and purely positive for the debt. That is about as clean as deleveraging gets. A lot of the ugly stuff has already happened, and people seem to just assume it goes on forever. I disagree, strongly.
One Line Above All
I have gone through Delta's AFS a few times over the weekend. There is one line that really got me thinking. In the going concern note itself, which is the most heavily scrutinised, most carefully worded section of the whole document, here is what the board says, word for word:
"On the successful sale of properties earmarked for disposal, as a result of repayment of debt facilities from the proceeds of these disposals LTV is expected to reduce to below 50% and ICR to improve to within the covenant levels."
If you would bear with me, please read that again. The company is telling you, in the section the auditor has gone over with a magnifying glass, that completing the disposals it already has earmarked is expected to take the LTV ratio below the 50% covenant and bring interest cover back inside the covenant too. The Directors' Report says the same thing in slightly different words, that on successful disposal of the earmarked properties the LTV is expected to improve to 50% or below, i.e. a point it hasn't been at since the original collapse.
This is the whole game. The single risk in Delta has always been the debt, expressed through two covenant breaches: a loan-to-value above the 50% limit, and interest cover below the 2x floor. The company is now stating that the path it is already executing, selling the buildings it has already lined up, is expected to cure the LTV breach entirely. This is a stated expectation tied to a specific, in-progress programme, with R131.6m of it already signed or transferred and waiting to flow. It rests on transfers that are already concluded, so it doesn't really carry the hand-waving of the usual hope-for-a-better-economy story. One point of precision, because it matters. The cure the board is describing here is for the loan-to-value, the covenant the disposals attack directly. The interest cover is the second breach, and disposals do not fix it; only a lower cost of debt does. So of the two things holding this share down, one has a concrete path that is already partly executed, and the other still leans on where rates go from here. I am more sure of the first than the second, and I want that on the table. For the record, the loan-to-value closed the year at 56.7%, down from 59.5%, so the disposals have to carry it down a little under seven more points to clear the 50% covenant. It is moving the right way, and the buildings already lined up are what take it the rest of the way.
If the covenants get resolved, the going concern uncertainty starts to dissolve, because the going concern uncertainty is built on the covenants and the maturities. And when that uncertainty dissolves, the reason the equity trades at a tenth of book dissolves with it. It will be a long while before dividends resume, and I believe that, if/when that occurs, the share would already be at a higher price than current.
And that’s all she wrote… we have received immense support from wronged shareholders - so many of you - to push for a reckoning on our terms, or at least get face to face with the board… but it isn’t going to matter due to this. I will keep you posted but it looks like it’s over.
This is insane. Read this whole thing
[ICYMI] The world of “high finance” can be brutal and duplicitous. Court proceedings involving the JSE’s largest brokerage Peresec has provided a rare window into this cut-throat world – and raise questions about market oversight. Read amaBhungane’s analysis.
amabhungane.org/analysis-per…
Marlie Chunger retweeted
$JPM CEO Jamie Dimon: "You want to try something humbling? People think they’re very smart. Take home an annual report, rip out the pages that show the stock price, and then say what you think it’s worth.
He did this with me a couple of times. Pick a company you might understand...Say what you think it’s worth, and you’ll be shocked how wrong you are.
It’s humbling how you value something, and it’s intellectually challenging."
Labat shareholders (who haven’t already been in touch with me), please message me - we need all the support we can get here, and we’re close!
Labat's $JSELAB board declares a maiden dividend with 2.2bn shares in issue.
They issue another 900m shares that also get the dividend.
Then they realise they can’t afford it and get suspended.
Now they correcting their earlier statements that said they were still paying it?!
Diabolical
Labat's $JSELAB board declares a maiden dividend with 2.2bn shares in issue.
They issue another 900m shares that also get the dividend.
Then they realise they can’t afford it and get suspended.
Now they correcting their earlier statements that said they were still paying it?!
Guys, two things about me: I don’t make spelling mistakes, and I’m not Nigerian. Pls report this impersonator 😅
19
1,294
$PAF.L extremely cheap
Marlie Chunger retweeted
Buy lots of WHL and Spar and Pick n Pay and Cls and Tru and TFG and Dischem at these prices
😂😂😂
Replying to @citrini
Marlie Chunger retweeted
The total return on Pan African Resources over 5 years is 1,011%.
Bitcoin has done 95% over the same period.
Where did all the laser-eyed dudes go? They haven't been irritating me on my feed for a while now.
Maybe they found out about gold instead.
😂😂😂😂 I need to start a fund these are returns for ants?
Piet Viljoen still leads Magnus Heystek in the BizNews R1m local-vs-offshore challenge by a wide margin.
Started Nov 2021 with R500k each. Latest public numbers (May 2026): Viljoen’s SA value fund around R809k vs Heystek’s offshore around R685k. Ends Nov 2026.
Cheap starting valuations beat the long-run “offshore always wins” story so far. Two months left.
@MagnusHeystek @BizNewsCOM @alechogg
4
32
6,315




















