Moneystack

감사합니다 감사합니다 의원님

I agree that founders should speak directly during a crisis, acknowledge the problem, and explain what is being done. But why is that same standard so hard to find whenever something goes wrong within the Stacks ecosystem? This isn’t just about Arkadiko. What has repeatedly frustrated me is the way you seem to take a step back whenever uncomfortable issues arise in our ecosystem. It’s hard to get a direct explanation from you about our own problems, yet you call another founder’s response a “master class in communication.” Honestly, I find that difficult to reconcile. Shouldn’t we be able to expect the same from you? There is clearly an atmosphere within Stacks where people feel uncomfortable voicing dissatisfaction or criticism publicly. Even when problems are obvious, they get brushed aside with “it’s fine” or “things will work out,” while the person raising them ends up being treated as someone bringing down the mood. I honestly don’t know how our ecosystem got here. When people see problems but keep reassuring each other that everything is fine, it looks like a sinking ship to me. I can’t say for certain who created this atmosphere. But I do think your own approach has played a significant role in shaping it. When one of the most influential people in an ecosystem speaks actively about some issues and stays silent on others, that sends a signal to the community. When uncomfortable questions repeatedly go unanswered and you keep your distance, people start to learn that some things are better left unsaid. I’m not saying you should personally solve every project’s problems. But we shouldn’t keep finding ourselves in a situation where successes are celebrated as achievements of the Stacks ecosystem, while comparable attention and explanations are hard to come by when things go wrong. I’d like to see the communication you praised in CZ within our own ecosystem, too. Before calling another founder’s response a “master class,” please take a look at whether people in your own community feel free to voice their concerns, and how you have responded to those concerns yourself. nitter.gq/MoneyStack9/status/211… nitter.gq/MoneyStack9/status/208… nitter.gq/MoneyStack9/status/208…

hacks..

say hello to everyone 👋

0G liquidity is getting a home. Bond is live in beta 👀 @BondSuperApp_ brings the familiar DeFi toolkit together on 0G: • LP pools for 0G, a0G, iAI and other ecosystem assets • Aave-based lending with assets like wBTC, wETH and 0G • Yield vaults • Perps coming later Basically, the DeFi stack you'd usually find spread across a chain, all in one place. The high APRs on the 0G and iAI pools caught my eye 👀 According to Bond's pinned post, a $10M incentive program is also in the works to support early ecosystem growth. Looks like Bond could be the starting point for a more active DeFi ecosystem on @0G_Foundation As an iAI holder, I'm happy to have more ways to put it to work. Once I can ease off the heavy coding a bit, I might unstake some iAI and try LP farming 👀

밸류에이션 뽑아오는 방식이 진짜 맛있네요..

대충 가격대를 얼마나 잡아야하나요?? 진짜 관심있어요

guuud job bro

오오케이 바로 털께요

really afraid

카이토의 왕이시여..

🏴‍☠️ 내 트랜잭션을 모두 숨기고 싶다면? American Fortress "아 내 트랜잭션 남들이 보는 거 싫은데.. 🤔" - 이름이나 컨셉 이상한 밈코 살 때 - 펍덱 파밍하다 손절하고 CEX 넘기는 패배 트랜잭션을 안보여주고 싶을 때 - 에어드랍용 다계정 파는 데 시빌 걸릴까봐 억지로 CEX 거칠 때 등의 경우 때마다 저는 이런 생각을 꽤 많이 했왔어요. 이 문제를 해결하기 위해 등장한 프로젝트가 있으니, 바로 American Fortress(이하 아포)입니다. 아포는 복잡한 0x 같은 지갑주소 대신 'moeny0stack9'같은 아이디만 입력하면 송금을 할 수 있게 하고, 이와 동시에 백그라운드에서는 매번 스텔스 주소를 생성해 내 메인 지갑을 노출하지 않고도 송금할 수 있는 기능을 제공합니다. ========= $RAIL이나 $STRK를 필두로 다시 한번 프라이버시와 양자 저항이 각광 받는 요즘, 아포는 요즘 시장에서 각광받는 재료를 한곳에 그러모은 프로젝트라 할 수 있어요. 인베스팅 닷컴에 따르면 SAVA 인베스트, Moon Pursuit, 0g Labs로부터 이미 8M 규모의 시드 라운드 투자를 유치했으며, 지금이 시장 적기라고 판단해 슬슬 고개를 드는게 아닐까 해요. 아무리 맛있는 요리라도, 잘 팔릴때까지 기다렸다가 팔아야 된다는 생각이 아니었을지? ========== American Fortess는 이 시기적절한 타이밍에 한국 커뮤니티를 오픈하고 앞으로 다양한 소식을 전할거라고 해요 🇰🇷 커뮤니티를 열었다는 건, 당연히 유저 몫도 어느 정도 있을거고 향후 에어드랍 작업 같은 것도 있지 않을까 생각합니다. 저도 좋은 기회로 아포와 함께 다양한 소식을 전달드릴 수 있게 되었습니다! 에어드랍 가이드는 각 나오는대로 탄탄하게 적어드릴 예정이지만, 일단 커뮤니티 이벤트에서 모바일 상품권 & 스벅 이벤트부터 한번 챙겨보셔요! 바로 불개미 트윗 가서 이벤트 참여까지 레에에쓰고 🏎️

100% agree

give me reset

+ What worried me most was that Stacks' DeFi TVL is currently so small that a sell-off in stSTX might shake on-chain liquidity dramatically, leading to cascading damage on lending protocols like Zest or Granite. However, from what I've looked into, Zest uses Pyth Network oracles, meaning it won't get exploited purely based on on-chain DEX reference prices. Also, looking at the attacker's address, they have already completed the swaps on-chain and transferred the funds to exchanges. Because of this, any additional sell pressure on the off-chain market seems likely to be limited.

🚨 Arkadiko Post-mortem(Using claude and surfAI) the attacker address provided by @ArkadikoFinance used Claude to trace the funds and cross-checked the results against public on-chain transactions. On October 22 (UTC), 2,065,481.479441 stSTX and 1.65221692 sBTC were drained from Arkadiko vaults. Attacker / fund recipient address: SP1JB85VZ7TX7SWSNW0PHV115YPQE5QXJDG6P60AQ Governance proposal / execution address: SP1V1BN459229EJG94YYBJDN50ADVB6MXVVEZ0G34 Proposal #12 passed with about 4.57 million DIKO in favor and 0 against, granting an attacker-deployed contract permission to withdraw collateral and mint USDA. The attacker also minted 1,500,354,999 unbacked USDA. That is the number of tokens minted, not $1.5 billion in losses. The funds moved as follows. Swaps The attacker swapped stSTX in 5 transactions for about 2.28 million STX. Selling USDA separately netted about 540,000 STX. Distribution From the recipient wallet, about 2.29 million STX and 1.65 sBTC moved to SPR3...SCY1, and about 514,000 STX moved to SP26...KJ18W. Bitcoin Through 4 successful withdrawals, 4.85824088 BTC was paid out to bc1q8h...j08s. That total includes sBTC acquired through additional purchases. The funds then moved to bc1q09...4qle, whose owner has not been identified. Ethereum Across 14 matched bridge transfers, 305,348.87 USDCx was burned on Stacks and 305,320.87 USDC was minted on Ethereum. At the receiving addresses 0x9a86...3875 and 0x4256...4073, the USDC was swapped for ETH. Tornado Cash A downstream wallet, 0xe8cb...5006, deposited 213.3 ETH across 9 transactions. However, other funds were commingled upstream, so the full amount cannot be attributed to the Arkadiko exploit. These figures include swaps and transfers of the same funds, so adding them all together would overstate the losses. The Binance and Bybit deposit routes in the image are marked as "speculative." I confirmed ETH transfers from Binance hot wallets to wallets linked to the incident. What hasn't been confirmed is whether the stolen STX was deposited into those exchanges beforehand. That's the flow. Honestly, I didn't even know governance was still active. I don't know yet how much can be recovered. But based on the public fund flows, I think it's highly likely that most of the direct selling pressure from this incident has already passed. A significant amount has already gone through the market, and my guess is that some of it went to exchanges. The next thing to watch is how much can be frozen and recovered through exchange cooperation and investigations. That said, with STX already carrying Binance's Monitoring Tag, the timing is a real headache. Of course, as an industry leader, Binance will know very well that a dApp exploit and a security flaw in the mainnet itself are different things. I don't expect this incident itself to directly affect Binance's judgment. But I don't think outsiders' trust in the ecosystem can be completely separated from it either. And of all times, this had to happen near the end of the month. I suspect relatively few users had active vaults at the time. But USDA holders and liquidity providers were also affected, so it's hard to call that a relief when people have lost money. Separately, this is something I've felt for a long time: the ecosystem's response in situations like this is disappointing. If the attacker addresses and suspected fund flows had been shared with the first official announcement, users could have worked together to trace the exploit and check for further risks. It would also have helped them assess their own exposure and decide what to do with their assets. But the initial announcement left out the addresses and routes needed to make those assessments and respond. I think the confirmed findings could have been shared, with the speculative parts clearly labeled as such. I understand that the Stacks ecosystem has a lot to navigate right now. Even so, these are exactly the moments when I'd like to see information shared early so the community can respond together. During the Cetus incident on Sui, multiple dApps stepped up alongside the foundation to coordinate a response. I think it matters to keep showing who is doing what, how they are working together, what progress has been made, and what still needs to be resolved. As a user, seeing that process gives you a sense that "even when something goes wrong here, the ecosystem comes together and works through it." I don't like the attitude that seems to treat publicly showing this kind of response as a blemish on the ecosystem. If you want to boast about a strong DeFi ecosystem over the long term, I think you also have to show up when an incident happens. If the position is that this is a decentralized ecosystem and individual projects are responsible for their own affairs, then claiming their DeFi successes as wins for the entire ecosystem whenever things go well is inconsistent. The SEC investigation concerning Stacks and Hiro was also closed in 2024. At the very least, I don't see why sharing attacker addresses, disclosing fund flows, and helping coordinate a response should still require so much tiptoeing. You can't have it both ways. From where I stand, it looks like "we're strong eco" when things go well, and "nothing to do with us" when funds get stolen. If this attitude persists, I believe the long-term cost will be far greater than the money stolen here: the loss of trust in the ecosystem. And it is the users and projects that stay who will end up paying that price.

using claude now

What is the current status of the hacked funds? Have they all already been moved to exchanges? Or are they still sitting on-chain and dumped into pools like Bitflow or ALEX, meaning we need to watch out for vault positions? We need additional information for pool users, such as details on freezes or suspensions.

Do you think this is at a level that could actually accelerate Bitcoin-related research?

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